From Andrew.Cormack at ja.net Mon Nov 2 20:04:57 2009 From: Andrew.Cormack at ja.net (Andrew Cormack) Date: Mon, 2 Nov 2009 20:04:57 -0000 Subject: Wifi hot spots - 'not secure' In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <6ED388AA006C454BA35B0098396B9BFB062C40C9@uxsrvr20.atlas.ukerna.ac.uk> Hi Chris I've just raised the same question on another list, having not seen the programme. But I note from the write-up (http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/watchdog/2009/10/wifi_hot_spots_not_secure.h tml) that they seem to regard "VPNs" as a user solution to whatever the problem is. That seems to support your feeling that it might be lack of SSL that's a problem, but then it seems a bit mean to beat up the wifi provider when it's actually the webmail provider that's at fault... Andrew -- Andrew Cormack, Chief Regulatory Adviser JANET(UK), Lumen House, Library Avenue, Harwell Science and Innovation Campus, Didcot, OX11 0SG, UK Phone: +44 (0) 1235 822302 Fax: +44 (0) 1235 822399 JANET, the UK's education and research network JANET(UK) is a trading name of The JNT Association, a company limited by guarantee which is registered in England under No. 2881024 and whose Registered Office is at Lumen House, Library Avenue, Harwell Science and Innovation Campus, Didcot, Oxfordshire. OX11 0SG > -----Original Message----- > From: ukcrypto-bounces at chiark.greenend.org.uk [mailto:ukcrypto- > bounces at chiark.greenend.org.uk] On Behalf Of Chris Edwards > Sent: 30 October 2009 09:19 > To: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk > Subject: Wifi hot spots - 'not secure' > > What attack do we recon is performed here ? > > http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/sci/tech/8332689.stm > > Initially expected to see an SSL middle-person attack used to sniff > passwd, > with user clicking past a "bad-certificate warning". But on watching, > I > think they took advantage of webmail services that by default use https > for the login, then plain http thereafter (e.g hotmail). Sniffing an > authentication cookie, as transmitted with every request after the > initial > login, is sufficient to hijack the webmail session. > > In which case, the open letter referred to in Richard Clayton's blog > discussed the issues well: > > http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/2009/06/16/open-letter-to-google/ > > Then again, the inability of the victim to log out suggests the > scammers > are in the path, somehow. From pgut001.reflector at gmail.com Thu Nov 5 10:12:32 2009 From: pgut001.reflector at gmail.com (pgut001 reflector) Date: Thu, 5 Nov 2009 23:12:32 +1300 Subject: Wifi hot spots - 'not secure' Message-ID: <44da907e0911050212v6fb79c31w5c9393c57a4ca7fe@mail.gmail.com> >What attack do we recon is performed here ? It could have been a transparent SSL downgrade attack, which involves using a rogue AP to MITM an SSL'd web site to turn it into a non-SSL'd web site. Here's an extract of a writeup on how easy (and effective) this is to do: This attack is particularly easy to carry out on wireless networks, in which you can force a disconnect via a deauthenticate/dissociate message so that the targeted device will look for alternative access points to connect to on the assumption that the original is no longer available [182]. Alternatively, any number of denial-of-service attacks can be used to force a client to disconnect, even ones that take advantage of security measures designed to protect against security breaches such as disconnecting clients that send packets with invalid authentication codes [183]. Support for these sorts of attacks are a standard feature of many 802.11 hacking tools. Fig.X: SSL downgrade attack on a bank site A screenshot of an SSL downgrade attack of this kind carried out using a US $29 open-source wireless networking appliance roughly the size of a packet of cigarettes is shown in Fig.X. Note how practically all of the visible security indicators show that the page is "secure". As Fig.Y shows, even the Verisign site seal, if clicked on, promises that this attacker- controlled page is safe to use. Fig.Y: Verisign site seal for the attacker-controlled site shown above When this attack was demonstrated live on several occasions to a roomful of hardcore geeks it took multiple iterations of considerable amounts of explanation to convey to them how it worked, and that using HTTPS on the server wasn?t going to help. Even then, several of them were still convinced afterwards that, because their server used SSL, this attack wouldn?t work against them. If it?s this hard to explain to geeks, imagine getting it across to average users. Peter. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From colinthomson1 at o2.co.uk Thu Nov 5 16:14:02 2009 From: colinthomson1 at o2.co.uk (Tom Thomson) Date: Thu, 5 Nov 2009 16:14:02 -0000 Subject: Wifi hot spots - 'not secure' In-Reply-To: <44da907e0911050212v6fb79c31w5c9393c57a4ca7fe@mail.gmail.com> References: <44da907e0911050212v6fb79c31w5c9393c57a4ca7fe@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: pgut001 reflector wrote: > If it?s this hard to explain to geeks, imagine > getting it across to average users. It might be a lot easier ? average users have a lot less to unlearn than geeks. I will always remember one geek who had learnt, when attending an information theory course, the Nyquist-Shannon sampling theorem. He and was utterly convinced as a result that it was impossible to get more than 2B bits per second out of a channel with bandwidth B. I tried to explain that the Nyquist rate was a signalling rate, not a data transmission rate, that the signalling limit was 2B baud, not 2B bits per second, and that 1 baud is not 1 bit per second; but this had not the slightest effect, no amount of explanation could convince him he was wrong ? Claude Shannon was an eminent authority and therefore his interpretation must be right (it always amuses me how often a geek will have completely misunderstood the eminent authority to whom he appeals to support his nonsense; they are almost as bad as politicians in this respect). Even pointing out that this same eminent authority, Claude Shannon, was responsible for the Shannon-Hartley theorem which clearly contradicted his conclusion had no effect (presumably his information theory course hadn?t got that far). Nor, some time (?years?) later, did pointing out that the post office had just announced a shiny new 9.6kb/s modem to operate over its 4kHz bandwidth phone lines, and 9.6/4 is a little larger than 2 - he claimed that that must all be being done by clever compression. I imagine he still believes that the Nyquist-Shannon sampling theorem provides a limit on data transmission rates. I can?t imagine ever having that sort of problem with a non-geek. M. From richard at highwayman.com Fri Nov 6 14:50:41 2009 From: richard at highwayman.com (Richard Clayton) Date: Fri, 6 Nov 2009 14:50:41 +0000 Subject: RIP authorisations consultation response Message-ID: -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 The consultation response on changing authorisations in RIP is now out. http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/documents/cons-2009-ripa/ - -=-=-=-=- - From the press release: The level of authorisation required by local authorities to sign off investigatory techniques will be raised to prevent them being used for trivial matters under new plans announced by the Policing Minister David Hanson MP today. Following a public consultation of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA), a senior executive now has to approve how and when the techniques are used to protect the public and fight crime. Under the new measures, elected councillors in each local authority are also required to oversee the use of RIPA. In addition, training for local authority authorising officers and bespoke written guidance on how local authorities should use RIPA will be issued. New codes of practice make it clear to all public authorities who can make authorisations under RIPA that they cannot be used for minor matters. The Home Office received 222 responses to the consultation (new window) launched in April and will now bring forward legislation to implement the changes. The orders and the related codes of practice will include measures to: * clarify the test of necessity and proportionality so techniques will not be used to investigate dog fouling or people putting bins out a day early * raise the rank of authorising officer for RIPA techniques in local authorities to senior executive at a minimum of 'director' level * give elected councillors a role in overseeing the way local authorities use covert investigatory techniques * require constituents' communications with MPs on constituency business to be treated as confidential information, and therefore subject to authorisation by a higher rank of officer * treat covert surveillance of legal consultations as 'intrusive' rather than 'directed' surveillance, meaning it can only be carried out by a very limited number of public authorities. Many of the investigations that rely on the techniques regulated by RIPA are vital to protecting public safety - not just for serious crime and terrorism - and they can also make a real difference to people's everyday lives. For example, by stopping rogue traders or trapping fly tippers who dump tonnes of rubbish on an industrial scale. - -=-=-=-=- Presumably only industrial scales measure tonnes; and presumably because it is industrial, that means that it has to be metrically measured. - -- richard Richard Clayton Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety. Benjamin Franklin 11 Nov 1755 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGPsdk version 1.7.1 iQA/AwUBSvQ3wZoAxkTY1oPiEQLAwwCeIS835wNlkBo52VLpekOiNDALeCoAoJHL 9HZ+VEnLdg8DmQXjF/DXIn42 =n/yh -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From pwt at iosis.co.uk Fri Nov 6 15:28:33 2009 From: pwt at iosis.co.uk (Peter Tomlinson) Date: Fri, 06 Nov 2009 15:28:33 +0000 Subject: RIP authorisations consultation response In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <4AF440A1.8010000@iosis.co.uk> A farmer who has half a ton[ne] of asbestos contaminated waste dumped is not going to be pleased when told the activity is not on an industrial scale. And this Policing Minister is only one alpha character away from our very own David H. Peter Richard Clayton wrote: > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > Hash: SHA1 > > > The consultation response on changing authorisations in RIP is now out. > > http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/documents/cons-2009-ripa/ > > - -=-=-=-=- > > - From the press release: > > The level of authorisation required by local authorities to sign off > investigatory techniques will be raised to prevent them being used > for trivial matters under new plans announced by the Policing > Minister David Hanson MP today. > > > > Many of the investigations that rely on the techniques regulated by > RIPA are vital to protecting public safety - not just for serious > crime and terrorism - and they can also make a real difference to > people's everyday lives. For example, by stopping rogue traders or > trapping fly tippers who dump tonnes of rubbish on an industrial > scale. > > - -=-=-=-=- > > Presumably only industrial scales measure tonnes; and presumably because > it is industrial, that means that it has to be metrically measured. > > > From rl.hird at orpheusmail.co.uk Fri Nov 6 15:41:13 2009 From: rl.hird at orpheusmail.co.uk (Roger Hird) Date: Fri, 06 Nov 2009 15:41:13 +0000 (GMT) Subject: Metric - was RIP authorisations consultation response In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <50b603d1c7rl.hird@orpheusmail.co.uk> In article , Richard Clayton wrote: > Presumably only industrial scales measure tonnes; and > presumably because it is industrial, that means that it has to > be metrically measured. An aside from my past: to all intents and purposes all legal metrology in the UK has been "metric" (SI to its afficionadps) for decades (together with most teaching). The exceptions represent a relatively small set of "familiar" things - and those exceptions appear to be be being phased out. -- Roger Hird rl.hird at orpheusmail.co.uk Website: http://roger.hird.orpheusweb.co.uk From igb at batten.eu.org Fri Nov 6 16:13:50 2009 From: igb at batten.eu.org (Ian Batten) Date: Fri, 6 Nov 2009 16:13:50 +0000 Subject: Metric - was RIP authorisations consultation response In-Reply-To: <50b603d1c7rl.hird@orpheusmail.co.uk> References: <50b603d1c7rl.hird@orpheusmail.co.uk> Message-ID: <2CB255A8-9183-4A42-AD79-D2B1D2B4CCBB@batten.eu.org> On 06 Nov 09, at 1541, Roger Hird wrote: > In article , > Richard Clayton wrote: >> Presumably only industrial scales measure tonnes; and >> presumably because it is industrial, that means that it has to >> be metrically measured. > > An aside from my past: to all intents and purposes all legal > metrology in the UK has been "metric" (SI to its afficionadps) > for decades (together with most teaching). The exceptions > represent a relatively small set of "familiar" things - and those > exceptions appear to be be being phased out. On a vaguely related topic, one of the pieces of legislation that fell at the end of the Major government was a proposal to make UK legal time UTC, rather than `GMT' (UT0). I had a correspondence with Lord Sainsbury which boiled down to `those that care know the difference and it doesn't matter to anyone else'. ian From rl.hird at orpheusmail.co.uk Fri Nov 6 16:45:17 2009 From: rl.hird at orpheusmail.co.uk (Roger Hird) Date: Fri, 06 Nov 2009 16:45:17 +0000 (GMT) Subject: Metric - was RIP authorisations consultation response In-Reply-To: <2CB255A8-9183-4A42-AD79-D2B1D2B4CCBB@batten.eu.org> References: <50b603d1c7rl.hird@orpheusmail.co.uk> <2CB255A8-9183-4A42-AD79-D2B1D2B4CCBB@batten.eu.org> Message-ID: <50b609af9crl.hird@orpheusmail.co.uk> In article <2CB255A8-9183-4A42-AD79-D2B1D2B4CCBB at batten.eu.org>, Ian Batten wrote: > On a vaguely related topic, one of the pieces of legislation > that fell at the end of the Major government was a proposal > to make UK legal time UTC, rather than `GMT' (UT0). I had a > correspondence with Lord Sainsbury which boiled down to > `those that care know the difference and it doesn't matter to > anyone else'. Indeed - I was manging NPL's budget at the time in DTI - and of course NPL maintains our time standards. There was a Tory back bench peer - Lord Tanlaw? - who much exercised about it. It was a fair point - GMT, as such, is/was no longer maintained and it really is a nonsense to have as the legal basis of time measurement something that is only a secondary - and artificial - standard. Actually, my memory may be failing me but I thought the actual name for what we use as a GMT equivalent was not UTC but UTC (NPL)? -- Roger Hird rl.hird at orpheusmail.co.uk Website: http://roger.hird.orpheusweb.co.uk From watching_them_watching_us at hushmail.com Sat Nov 7 15:53:27 2009 From: watching_them_watching_us at hushmail.com (Watching Them, Watching Us) Date: Sat, 07 Nov 2009 16:53:27 +0100 Subject: RIP authorisations consultation response - no use of encryption ? Message-ID: <20091107155327.39BAE20045@smtp.hushmail.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 >Richard Clayton richard at highwayman.com >Fri Nov 6 14:50:41 GMT 2009 >The consultation response on changing authorisations in RIP is now >out. >http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/documents/cons-2009-ripa/ http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/documents/cons-2009-ripa/ripa-cons- response?view=Binary (292Kb .pdf) - --------------- page 13 6. Are the Government?s other proposed changes in the Consolidating Orders appropriate? [...] there should be a mandatory requirement for all RIPA applications, authorisations and material obtained to be encrypted; [...] GOVERNMENT?S POSITION [...] It would be impractical to require all material obtained through the use of RIPA to be encrypted. However, it is perfectly reasonable for members of the public to want reassurance that all appropriate steps are taken to protect material obtained through the use of techniques under RIPA. All relevant public authorities have in place a variety of security measures, including physical security measures, security procedures, staff vetting and training, to ensure that material is protected from improper disclosure. - ---------------- Given the Government data security and privacy disasters of recent years, is anyone reassured by this "Government Position" ? The list of security measures "in place" by "all relevant public authorities" does *not* include "encryption". This rather implies that they *never* use encryption to protect the RIPA documentation or end products, in transit or in storage, even where this is obviously cheap and practical to do. Why are the Home Office so dead set against normal, professional IT security procedures ? regards Mark - ---- http://SpyBlog.org.uk - Spy Blog blog at spy.org.uk PGP Public Encryption Key for blog at spy.org.uk: http://SpyBlog.org.uk/Spy_Blog_PGP_Public_Encryption_Key.pl PGP Public Encryption Key ID: 0xEB3CF9A8 Fingerprint: 8DBB D4C8 AB0B 3F2A 3548 D252 A736 3503 EB3C F9A8 If you are researching, or writing, or protesting about anything to do with National Security, or Government spin and secrecy, you should take some basic precautions: Hints and Tips for Whistleblowers http://ht4w.co.uk -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Note: This signature can be verified at https://www.hushtools.com/verify Charset: UTF8 Version: Hush 3.0 wkYEARECAAYFAkr1l/kACgkQUjiF2PgjBMKd1ACfZfTSXmga70Ev+Ugbci00Pwhq3wUA n2/etMSo/GycYd0MG4epaepo7dmz =LnPu -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From DaveHowe at gmx.co.uk Sat Nov 7 22:50:40 2009 From: DaveHowe at gmx.co.uk (Dave Howe) Date: Sat, 07 Nov 2009 22:50:40 +0000 Subject: Wifi hot spots - 'not secure' In-Reply-To: <6ED388AA006C454BA35B0098396B9BFB062C40C9@uxsrvr20.atlas.ukerna.ac.uk> References: <6ED388AA006C454BA35B0098396B9BFB062C40C9@uxsrvr20.atlas.ukerna.ac.uk> Message-ID: <4AF5F9C0.3090107@gmx.co.uk> Andrew Cormack wrote: > Hi Chris > I've just raised the same question on another list, having not seen the > programme. But I note from the write-up > (http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/watchdog/2009/10/wifi_hot_spots_not_secure.h > tml) that they seem to regard "VPNs" as a user solution to whatever the > problem is. That seems to support your feeling that it might be lack of > SSL that's a problem, but then it seems a bit mean to beat up the wifi > provider when it's actually the webmail provider that's at fault... I have noticed that quite a few wifi hotspots are NATted to the internet and do not support ipsec; an SSL vpn may well work, but classic ipsec clients (like the cisco one) fail, even in nat-t (udp encapsulation) mode. most free ones seem ok, and the "cloud" ones that are common in pubs seem ok, but a lot of hotel ones seem to fail (which is odd, you would think that customers wanting to vpn back to their home base would be a large segment of their user base) From signup at bealoid.co.uk Sun Nov 8 00:10:07 2009 From: signup at bealoid.co.uk (signup at bealoid.co.uk) Date: Sun, 08 Nov 2009 00:10:07 +0000 Subject: Health privacy again In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20091108001007.15604sfxsra979gk@webmail01.purplecloud.com> Quoting Ross Anderson : > The second is a paper by > up-and-coming US legal scholar Paul Ohm on the ineffectiveness of > "de-identification" as a means of protecting patient privacy: > > http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1450006 > > Now we technies have known for thirty years that de-identification is > much harder than it looks, thanks to Dorothy Denning. You can even > read all about it in my book. However, up till now the policy folks > have been in deep denial about this. A major paper by a respected > scholar in the UCLA Law Review, though, will be harder for them to > ignore than the science is. People may be re-assured by the fact that NHS research units, and national statistics units, are well aware about the problems of keeping data anonymous, and just taking a few bits of data off doesn't make much difference. See, for example, suicide statistics where towns with less than a certain number of suicides (5?) are not included in the lists available to the public. From lists at internetpolicyagency.com Sun Nov 8 09:24:52 2009 From: lists at internetpolicyagency.com (Roland Perry) Date: Sun, 8 Nov 2009 09:24:52 +0000 Subject: RIP authorisations consultation response - no use of encryption ? In-Reply-To: <20091107155327.39BAE20045@smtp.hushmail.com> References: <20091107155327.39BAE20045@smtp.hushmail.com> Message-ID: In article <20091107155327.39BAE20045 at smtp.hushmail.com>, "Watching Them, Watching Us" writes >This rather implies that they *never* use encryption to protect the >RIPA documentation or end products, in transit or in storage, even >where this is obviously cheap and practical to do. > >Why are the Home Office so dead set against normal, professional IT >security procedures ? When the local council sends a man to inspect a fly-tipping site, and he sees a white van driving away, and he takes the phone number off the side, then does a reverse-DQ to get the address, and later on writes that in his book to pay an enforcement visit the following day, little of that process lends itself to easy encryption. (Although part of the phone call to the office to request the reverse-DQ will be encrypted if they are using Skype or GSM). A slightly more serious issue is that with thousands of different agencies and private sector organisations exchanging this data (and holding results) it would probably be a good idea to have some sort of standardisation on the encryption used. And that has been one of the stumbling blocks in the past. Especially as most people seem to think that "large public sector PKI is more difficult than it looks". -- Roland Perry From lists at internetpolicyagency.com Sun Nov 8 09:25:00 2009 From: lists at internetpolicyagency.com (Roland Perry) Date: Sun, 8 Nov 2009 09:25:00 +0000 Subject: Metric - was RIP authorisations consultation response In-Reply-To: <2CB255A8-9183-4A42-AD79-D2B1D2B4CCBB@batten.eu.org> References: <50b603d1c7rl.hird@orpheusmail.co.uk> <2CB255A8-9183-4A42-AD79-D2B1D2B4CCBB@batten.eu.org> Message-ID: In article <2CB255A8-9183-4A42-AD79-D2B1D2B4CCBB at batten.eu.org>, Ian Batten writes >On a vaguely related topic, one of the pieces of legislation that fell >at the end of the Major government was a proposal to make UK legal time >UTC, rather than `GMT' (UT0). I had a correspondence with Lord >Sainsbury which boiled down to `those that care know the difference and >it doesn't matter to anyone else'. And if the difference had a name, it would presumably be DUT0. -- Roland Perry From iptv at gn.apc.org Sun Nov 8 17:48:14 2009 From: iptv at gn.apc.org (IPTV) Date: Sun, 08 Nov 2009 17:48:14 +0000 Subject: RIPA authorisations consultation response - no use of encryption ? Message-ID: <6.2.5.6.2.20091108174805.02b58c28@gn.apc.org> The law enforcement community/CSP are pretty much in the Dark Ages. Professionally (as an expert witness) I have seen and examined voluminous amounts RIPA s22 data disclosures of communication data, call data and cellsite information. The almost invariable practice is to sent data, unencrypted, as CSV or XLS files. From CSP to SPOC, and then on to everyone else. Only one CSP routinely provides some encryption when downloading data, but this is not preserved at the next stage. As you might expect, the idea of generating and sending hashes or another form of digital signature to certify the integrity of the data has not found any hold. When I made the obvious points to the Home Office, the response was that it wasn't Chief Constables top priority. Duncan At 07/11/2009 15:53, you wrote: >-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- >Hash: SHA1 > > > >Richard Clayton richard at highwayman.com > >Fri Nov 6 14:50:41 GMT 2009 > > >The consultation response on changing authorisations in RIP is now > >out. > > >http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/documents/cons-2009-ripa/ > > >http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/documents/cons-2009-ripa/ripa-cons- >response?view=Binary (292Kb .pdf) > > >- --------------- > >page 13 > >6. Are the Government???s other proposed changes in the >Consolidating Orders appropriate? > >[...] > > there should be a mandatory requirement for all RIPA >applications, authorisations and material obtained to be encrypted; > > >[...] > >GOVERNMENT???S POSITION > >[...] > >It would be impractical to require all material obtained through >the use of RIPA to be encrypted. However, it is perfectly >reasonable for members of the public to want reassurance that all >appropriate steps are taken to protect material obtained through >the use of techniques under RIPA. All relevant public authorities >have in place a variety of security measures, including physical >security measures, security procedures, staff vetting and training, >to ensure that material is protected from improper disclosure. > >- ---------------- > >Given the Government data security and privacy disasters of recent >years, is anyone reassured by this "Government Position" ? > >The list of security measures "in place" by "all relevant public >authorities" does *not* include "encryption". > >This rather implies that they *never* use encryption to protect the >RIPA documentation or end products, in transit or in storage, even >where this is obviously cheap and practical to do. > >Why are the Home Office so dead set against normal, professional IT >security procedures ? > > > >regards > >Mark > >- ---- >http://SpyBlog.org.uk - Spy Blog >blog at spy.org.uk > >PGP Public Encryption Key for blog at spy.org.uk: >http://SpyBlog.org.uk/Spy_Blog_PGP_Public_Encryption_Key.pl >PGP Public Encryption Key ID: 0xEB3CF9A8 >Fingerprint: 8DBB D4C8 AB0B 3F2A 3548 D252 A736 3503 EB3C F9A8 > >If you are researching, or writing, or protesting about anything to >do with National Security, or Government spin and secrecy, you >should take some basic precautions: > >Hints and Tips for Whistleblowers >http://ht4w.co.uk >-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- >Note: This signature can be verified at https://www.hushtools.com/verify >Charset: UTF8 >Version: Hush 3.0 > >wkYEARECAAYFAkr1l/kACgkQUjiF2PgjBMKd1ACfZfTSXmga70Ev+Ugbci00Pwhq3wUA >n2/etMSo/GycYd0MG4epaepo7dmz >=LnPu >-----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From lists at internetpolicyagency.com Sun Nov 8 19:35:39 2009 From: lists at internetpolicyagency.com (Roland Perry) Date: Sun, 8 Nov 2009 19:35:39 +0000 Subject: RIPA authorisations consultation response - no use of encryption ? In-Reply-To: <6.2.5.6.2.20091108174805.02b58c28@gn.apc.org> References: <6.2.5.6.2.20091108174805.02b58c28@gn.apc.org> Message-ID: In article <6.2.5.6.2.20091108174805.02b58c28 at gn.apc.org>, IPTV writes >The law enforcement community/CSP are pretty much in the Dark Ages. > >Professionally (as an expert witness) I have seen and examined >voluminous amounts RIPA s22 data disclosures of communication data, >call data and cellsite information. > >The almost invariable practice is to sent data, unencrypted, as CSV or >XLS files. From CSP to SPOC, and then on to everyone else. Only one >CSP routinely provides some encryption when downloading data, but this >is not preserved at the next stage. > >As you might expect, the idea of generating and sending hashes or >another form of digital signature to certify the integrity of the data >has not found any hold. > >When I made the obvious points to the Home Office, the response was >that it wasn't Chief Constables top priority. At the risk of repeating myself, this is not a new problem: "...it would probably be a good idea to have some sort of standardisation on the encryption used. And that has been one of the stumbling blocks in the past. " Any suggestions, given that the distributed nature of law enforcement means there's no central procurement process? -- Roland Perry From casparb at microsoft.com Sun Nov 8 21:36:35 2009 From: casparb at microsoft.com (Caspar Bowden) Date: Sun, 8 Nov 2009 21:36:35 +0000 Subject: RIPA authorisations consultation response - no use of encryption ? In-Reply-To: References: <6.2.5.6.2.20091108174805.02b58c28@gn.apc.org> Message-ID: <87A6D89C0D9E3E4E94253D25B8F9B2E711621F@DB3EX14MBXC316.europe.corp.microsoft.com> >bounces at chiark.greenend.org.uk] On Behalf Of Roland Perry ... >Any suggestions, given that the distributed nature of law enforcement means there's >no central procurement process? GPG key signing parties at ACPO meetings, topped up by Sir Paul Kennedy when he makes a visit ? Caspar From iptv at gn.apc.org Sun Nov 8 21:50:00 2009 From: iptv at gn.apc.org (IPTV) Date: Sun, 08 Nov 2009 21:50:00 +0000 Subject: RIPA authorisations consultation response - no use of encryption ? In-Reply-To: <87A6D89C0D9E3E4E94253D25B8F9B2E711621F@DB3EX14MBXC316.euro pe.corp.microsoft.com> References: <6.2.5.6.2.20091108174805.02b58c28@gn.apc.org> <87A6D89C0D9E3E4E94253D25B8F9B2E711621F@DB3EX14MBXC316.europe.corp.microsoft.com> Message-ID: <6.2.5.6.2.20091108214915.02aafa70@gn.apc.org> I'm sorry! Banqueting schedules at these gigs are onerous and intensive. Duncan At 08/11/2009 21:36, you wrote: > >bounces at chiark.greenend.org.uk] On Behalf Of Roland Perry >... > >Any suggestions, given that the distributed nature of law > enforcement means there's >no central procurement process? > >GPG key signing parties at ACPO meetings, topped up by Sir Paul >Kennedy when he makes a visit ? > >Caspar From casparb at microsoft.com Sun Nov 8 23:17:24 2009 From: casparb at microsoft.com (Caspar Bowden) Date: Sun, 8 Nov 2009 23:17:24 +0000 Subject: RIPA authorisations consultation response - no use of encryption ? In-Reply-To: <6.2.5.6.2.20091108214915.02aafa70@gn.apc.org> References: <6.2.5.6.2.20091108174805.02b58c28@gn.apc.org> <87A6D89C0D9E3E4E94253D25B8F9B2E711621F@DB3EX14MBXC316.europe.corp.microsoft.com> <6.2.5.6.2.20091108214915.02aafa70@gn.apc.org> Message-ID: <87A6D89C0D9E3E4E94253D25B8F9B2E71162E1@DB3EX14MBXC316.europe.corp.microsoft.com> >bounces at chiark.greenend.org.uk] On Behalf Of IPTV >I'm sorry! Banqueting schedules at these gigs are onerous and intensive. Indeed. But presumably paid out of the public purse. Perhaps we need to put Sir David Omand (http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2004/may/10/davidkelly.uk) ...on the case of whether the taxpayer is getting full value (http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/politics/article6899528.ece) ...out of ACPO, if they are too busy for such matters... Caspar From peter at pmsommer.com Mon Nov 9 06:57:54 2009 From: peter at pmsommer.com (Peter Sommer) Date: Mon, 09 Nov 2009 06:57:54 +0000 Subject: RIPA authorisations consultation response - no use of encryption ? In-Reply-To: <6.2.5.6.2.20091108174805.02b58c28@gn.apc.org> References: <6.2.5.6.2.20091108174805.02b58c28@gn.apc.org> Message-ID: <4AF7BD72.30501@pmsommer.com> However, in relation to intercept material (inadmissible in the UK under s 17 RIPA), if the international standard is followed - ETSI TS 101 671 (Lawful Interception: handover interface for the lawful interception of telecommunications traffic) - then all the material handed over - the content plus the associated Intecept Related Information (authority for intercept, start and stop times, serial number of communications etc etc) is supposed to be cryptographically hashed. So it is not as though some parts of the LE and spook communities don't know how they should be doing these things. Peter Sommer IPTV wrote: > > The law enforcement community/CSP are pretty much in the Dark Ages. > > Professionally (as an expert witness) I have seen and examined voluminous amounts RIPA s22 data disclosures of communication data, call data and cellsite information. > > The almost invariable practice is to sent data, unencrypted, as CSV or XLS files. From CSP to SPOC, and then on to everyone else. Only one CSP routinely provides some encryption when downloading data, but this is not preserved at the next stage. > > As you might expect, the idea of generating and sending hashes or another form of digital signature to certify the integrity of the data has not found any hold. > > When I made the obvious points to the Home Office, the response was that it wasn't Chief Constables top priority. > > Duncan > From Ray.Bellis at nominet.org.uk Mon Nov 9 05:09:38 2009 From: Ray.Bellis at nominet.org.uk (Ray.Bellis at nominet.org.uk) Date: Mon, 9 Nov 2009 14:09:38 +0900 Subject: RIPA authorisations consultation response - no use of encryption ? In-Reply-To: <6.2.5.6.2.20091108174805.02b58c28@gn.apc.org> References: <6.2.5.6.2.20091108174805.02b58c28@gn.apc.org> Message-ID: > Professionally (as an expert witness) I have seen > and examined voluminous amounts RIPA s22 data > disclosures of communication data, call data and cellsite information. > > The almost invariable practice is to sent data, > unencrypted, as CSV or XLS files. From CSP to > SPOC, and then on to everyone else. Only one > CSP routinely provides some encryption when > downloading data, but this is not preserved at the next stage. > > As you might expect, the idea of generating and > sending hashes or another form of digital > signature to certify the integrity of the data has not found any hold. > > When I made the obvious points to the Home > Office, the response was that it wasn't Chief Constables top priority. One hopes that it would become so the first time someone wins a case because the prosecution cannot prove that the disclosed data has not been modified. Ray -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From lists at internetpolicyagency.com Mon Nov 9 12:17:41 2009 From: lists at internetpolicyagency.com (Roland Perry) Date: Mon, 9 Nov 2009 12:17:41 +0000 Subject: RIPA authorisations consultation response - no use of encryption ? In-Reply-To: <87A6D89C0D9E3E4E94253D25B8F9B2E711621F@DB3EX14MBXC316.europe.corp.microsoft.com> References: <6.2.5.6.2.20091108174805.02b58c28@gn.apc.org> <87A6D89C0D9E3E4E94253D25B8F9B2E711621F@DB3EX14MBXC316.europe.corp.microsoft.com> Message-ID: In article <87A6D89C0D9E3E4E94253D25B8F9B2E711621F at DB3EX14MBXC316.europe.corp.micros oft.com>, Caspar Bowden writes >>Any suggestions, given that the distributed nature of law enforcement means there's >no central procurement process? > >GPG key signing parties at ACPO meetings, topped up by Sir Paul Kennedy when he makes a visit ? Unfortunately, no-one has produced a sufficiently user-friendly interface to PGP, so that it's safe to let out on the masses. Obviously it would have to be approved by CESG as well, but maybe they've already studied it sufficiently to be able to decide whether it's suitable if asked. -- Roland Perry From lists at internetpolicyagency.com Mon Nov 9 12:17:24 2009 From: lists at internetpolicyagency.com (Roland Perry) Date: Mon, 9 Nov 2009 12:17:24 +0000 Subject: RIPA authorisations consultation response - no use of encryption ? In-Reply-To: References: <6.2.5.6.2.20091108174805.02b58c28@gn.apc.org> Message-ID: In article , Ray.Bellis at nominet.org.uk writes >> As you might expect, the idea of generating and >> sending hashes or another form of digital >> signature to certify the integrity of the data has not found any >hold. >> >> When I made the obvious points to the Home >> Office, the response was that it wasn't Chief Constables top >priority. > >One hopes that it would become so the first time someone wins a case >because the prosecution cannot prove that the disclosed data has not >been modified. Perhaps you are confusing the collection of evidence with the collection of intelligence. The collection of evidence does appear to pass the normal "quality" tests most of the time (given the apparent absence of such cases being won/lost). -- Roland Perry From casparb at microsoft.com Mon Nov 9 12:38:56 2009 From: casparb at microsoft.com (Caspar Bowden) Date: Mon, 9 Nov 2009 12:38:56 +0000 Subject: RIPA authorisations consultation response - no use of encryption ? In-Reply-To: References: <6.2.5.6.2.20091108174805.02b58c28@gn.apc.org> <87A6D89C0D9E3E4E94253D25B8F9B2E711621F@DB3EX14MBXC316.europe.corp.microsoft.com> Message-ID: <87A6D89C0D9E3E4E94253D25B8F9B2E711675F@DB3EX14MBXC316.europe.corp.microsoft.com> >bounces at chiark.greenend.org.uk] On Behalf Of Roland Perry ... >>GPG key signing parties at ACPO meetings, topped up by Sir Paul Kennedy when he makes a visit ? >Unfortunately, no-one has produced a sufficiently user-friendly interface to PGP, so >that it's safe to let out on the masses. Unusual to refer to Chief Constables as "the masses". They have to be competent enough to apply protective security doctrine to paperwork just as much as electronic data. If they (or their bag carriers) can't handle PGP after yet another of the interminable training courses they get sent on that would mean they are a bit thick. >Obviously it would have to be approved by CESG as well, but maybe they've already >studied it sufficiently to be able to decide whether it's suitable if asked. If the authenticity of the evidence is not in practice challengeable in court (any cases so far?) unprotected, PGP would anyway be an improvement all round.... -- CB From lists at internetpolicyagency.com Mon Nov 9 13:47:27 2009 From: lists at internetpolicyagency.com (Roland Perry) Date: Mon, 9 Nov 2009 13:47:27 +0000 Subject: RIPA authorisations consultation response - no use of encryption ? In-Reply-To: <87A6D89C0D9E3E4E94253D25B8F9B2E711675F@DB3EX14MBXC316.europe.corp.microsoft.com> References: <6.2.5.6.2.20091108174805.02b58c28@gn.apc.org> <87A6D89C0D9E3E4E94253D25B8F9B2E711621F@DB3EX14MBXC316.europe.corp.microsoft.com> <87A6D89C0D9E3E4E94253D25B8F9B2E711675F@DB3EX14MBXC316.europe.corp.microsoft.com> Message-ID: In article <87A6D89C0D9E3E4E94253D25B8F9B2E711675F at DB3EX14MBXC316.europe.corp.micros oft.com>, Caspar Bowden writes >>bounces at chiark.greenend.org.uk] On Behalf Of Roland Perry >... >>>GPG key signing parties at ACPO meetings, topped up by Sir Paul >>>Kennedy when he makes a visit ? > >>Unfortunately, no-one has produced a sufficiently user-friendly >>interface to PGP, so >that it's safe to let out on the masses. > >Unusual to refer to Chief Constables as "the masses". They have to be >competent enough to apply protective security doctrine to paperwork >just as much as electronic data. If they (or their bag carriers) can't >handle PGP after yet another of the interminable training courses they >get sent on that would mean they are a bit thick. Everyone working with the evidence would need to be able to handle the extremely clumsy way that PGP is implemented. It's almost as if the writers *didn't* want it to be usable by the general public. But first, you have to convince the bosses that PGP is good enough, and complies with their purchasing policy. Sadly, there's a shortage of official PGP salesmen to ask - so you'll probably end up with something from a blue-chip vendor instead. >>Obviously it would have to be approved by CESG as well, but maybe >>they've already >studied it sufficiently to be able to decide whether >>it's suitable if asked. > >If the authenticity of the evidence is not in practice challengeable in >court (any cases so far?) unprotected, There are enough clever defence lawyers out there, that if the *evidential* copy of the information was challengeable (and challenging it would help) they would. But almost all of it is just used as intelligence. >PGP would anyway be an improvement all round.... And you'd want my fly-tipping inspector to use PGP on some handheld device (rather than a pen and paper) to make his notes? -- Roland Perry From tugwilson at gmail.com Mon Nov 9 12:49:53 2009 From: tugwilson at gmail.com (John Wilson) Date: Mon, 9 Nov 2009 12:49:53 +0000 Subject: RIPA authorisations consultation response - no use of encryption ? In-Reply-To: <87A6D89C0D9E3E4E94253D25B8F9B2E711675F@DB3EX14MBXC316.europe.corp.microsoft.com> References: <6.2.5.6.2.20091108174805.02b58c28@gn.apc.org> <87A6D89C0D9E3E4E94253D25B8F9B2E711621F@DB3EX14MBXC316.europe.corp.microsoft.com> <87A6D89C0D9E3E4E94253D25B8F9B2E711675F@DB3EX14MBXC316.europe.corp.microsoft.com> Message-ID: 2009/11/9 Caspar Bowden : >>bounces at chiark.greenend.org.uk] On Behalf Of Roland Perry [snip] > Unusual to refer to Chief Constables as "the masses". They have to be competent enough to apply protective security doctrine to paperwork just as much as electronic data. If they (or their bag carriers) can't handle PGP after yet another of the interminable training courses they get sent on that would mean they are a bit thick. Metropolitan Police Assistant Commissioner Bob Quick didn't seem to understand how to handle secret paperwork. If finding a manila folder is beyond them what hope is there for using PGP? John Wilson From brg at gladman.plus.com Mon Nov 9 12:54:05 2009 From: brg at gladman.plus.com (Brian Gladman) Date: Mon, 09 Nov 2009 12:54:05 +0000 Subject: RIPA authorisations consultation response - no use of encryption ? In-Reply-To: References: <6.2.5.6.2.20091108174805.02b58c28@gn.apc.org> Message-ID: <4AF810ED.3050505@gladman.plus.com> Roland Perry wrote: > In article > >, Ray.Bellis at nominet.org.uk writes >>> As you might expect, the idea of generating and >>> sending hashes or another form of digital >>> signature to certify the integrity of the data has not found any >> hold. >>> >>> When I made the obvious points to the Home >>> Office, the response was that it wasn't Chief Constables top >> priority. >> >> One hopes that it would become so the first time someone wins a case >> because the prosecution cannot prove that the disclosed data has not >> been modified. > > Perhaps you are confusing the collection of evidence with the collection > of intelligence. The collection of evidence does appear to pass the > normal "quality" tests most of the time (given the apparent absence of > such cases being won/lost). What technical authenticity tests are applied to electronic data as a matter of course before it can be put before a UK Court as evidence? Brian Gladman __________ Information from ESET NOD32 Antivirus, version of virus signature database 4587 (20091109) __________ The message was checked by ESET NOD32 Antivirus. http://www.eset.com From richard at highwayman.com Mon Nov 9 14:37:40 2009 From: richard at highwayman.com (Richard Clayton) Date: Mon, 9 Nov 2009 14:37:40 +0000 Subject: IMP shelved (for the moment at least) Message-ID: -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Home Office publishes consultation responses on Interception Modernisation Programme. The 221 respondents comprised 167 members of the public and 54 organisations including communications services providers, industry bodies, public authorities and campaign groups. 90 respondents did not address the questions asked but objected generally to the paper, almost invariably on the grounds of opposition in principle to any sort of surveillance. [...] The Government will continue to develop the approach it proposed in the consultation document with a view to bringing forward the necessary legislation. In particular, it agrees with the significant view amongst respondents on the importance of safeguards and will ensure that the same strict safeguards that apply today will continue to minimise the potential for abuse and to ensure the safety and security of communications data under any new proposals. This view is strongly supported by public authorities that use communications data on behalf of the public. The Government will also continue to work closely with communications service providers to ensure that any additional requirements will be feasible and reasonable, and to minimise, as far as possible, any impact on industry. But you need to read between the lines (or be briefed by the Home Office): Guardian story: http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2009/nov/09/home-office-plan-data-storage Legislation to access public's texts and emails put on hold Widespread concern about the safety and security of communications data prompts Home Office rethink Legislation to introduce a ?2bn Home Office plan to store the details of everyone's text, email and internet communications has been postponed until after the general election, it was confirmed today. The Home Office said a communications data bill will not feature in the pre-election legislative programme outlined in the Queen's speech next Wednesday. The decision follows the critical results of consultation over the summer on the plan, which showed widespread concern about the safety and security of communications data and the potential for abuse. Half said the proposed safeguards were inadequate. The responses published today also show that the service providers such as BT, Orange, T-Mobile and Vodafone raised concerns about the technical feasibility of the project and who would pay the costs of the project. [etc] - -- richard @ highwayman . com "Nothing seems the same Still you never see the change from day to day And no-one notices the customs slip away" -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGPsdk version 1.7.1 iQA/AwUBSvgpNJoAxkTY1oPiEQLnTwCbBsM3q/hsOvtTE7LGLELv6SF4MLQAoPCn vrw9+eqyxB/RJQIyi8euL/yz =Grrb -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From richard at highwayman.com Mon Nov 9 14:43:48 2009 From: richard at highwayman.com (Richard Clayton) Date: Mon, 9 Nov 2009 14:43:48 +0000 Subject: RIPA authorisations consultation response - no use of encryption ? In-Reply-To: <4AF810ED.3050505@gladman.plus.com> References: <6.2.5.6.2.20091108174805.02b58c28@gn.apc.org> <4AF810ED.3050505@gladman.plus.com> Message-ID: -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 In article <4AF810ED.3050505 at gladman.plus.com>, Brian Gladman writes >What technical authenticity tests are applied to electronic data as a >matter of course before it can be put before a UK Court as evidence? People make sure there's a witness statement that introduces it :) - -- richard Richard Clayton Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety. Benjamin Franklin 11 Nov 1755 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGPsdk version 1.7.1 iQA/AwUBSvgqpJoAxkTY1oPiEQKbjQCg26mjA/hjgy+VZ8gb1SN3JKt02ZwAnAzP Dyy0DyawlBsrat23LW8xlUA7 =2ziY -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From richard at highwayman.com Mon Nov 9 14:45:29 2009 From: richard at highwayman.com (Richard Clayton) Date: Mon, 9 Nov 2009 14:45:29 +0000 Subject: RIPA authorisations consultation response - no use of encryption ? In-Reply-To: References: <6.2.5.6.2.20091108174805.02b58c28@gn.apc.org> <87A6D89C0D9E3E4E94253D25B8F9B2E711621F@DB3EX14MBXC316.europe.corp.microsoft.com> <87A6D89C0D9E3E4E94253D25B8F9B2E711675F@DB3EX14MBXC316.europe.corp.microsoft.com> Message-ID: -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 In article , Roland Perry writes >But first, you have to convince the bosses that PGP is good enough, and >complies with their purchasing policy. I have corresponded with both SOCA and the Met using PGP. It may not be universally used, but some serving officers seem to manage quite well. The aim is to ensure confidentiality, should correspondence go astray; no other cryptographic property is sought. >There are enough clever defence lawyers out there, that if the >*evidential* copy of the information was challengeable (and challenging >it would help) they would. But almost all of it is just used as >intelligence. PGP signing provides assistance in demonstrating authenticity, but it is not a prerequisite for authenticity,... ... and of course if there was a dispute, then you'd end up with multiple experts trying to persuade the jury of the correctness of their version of events to explain the wrong document being signed by the right key... >>PGP would anyway be an improvement all round.... > >And you'd want my fly-tipping inspector to use PGP on some handheld >device (rather than a pen and paper) to make his notes? I'd merely like to see them using full disk encryption to ensure that it didn't matter when their handheld got lost. - -- richard Richard Clayton Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety. Benjamin Franklin 11 Nov 1755 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGPsdk version 1.7.1 iQA/AwUBSvgrCZoAxkTY1oPiEQKMtQCghynJCo3YK/AoMJOHmEOa0TClhkoAoLT7 LQNvedBYla82ZNDpH0MqxxLB =lJji -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From nbohm at ernest.net Mon Nov 9 14:50:26 2009 From: nbohm at ernest.net (Nicholas Bohm) Date: Mon, 09 Nov 2009 14:50:26 +0000 Subject: RIPA authorisations consultation response - no use of encryption ? In-Reply-To: <4AF810ED.3050505@gladman.plus.com> References: <6.2.5.6.2.20091108174805.02b58c28@gn.apc.org> <4AF810ED.3050505@gladman.plus.com> Message-ID: <4AF82C32.4060305@ernest.net> An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From brg at gladman.plus.com Mon Nov 9 15:12:41 2009 From: brg at gladman.plus.com (Brian Gladman) Date: Mon, 9 Nov 2009 15:12:41 -0000 Subject: RIPA authorisations consultation response - no use of encryption ? In-Reply-To: <4AF82C32.4060305@ernest.net> References: <6.2.5.6.2.20091108174805.02b58c28@gn.apc.org> <4AF810ED.3050505@gladman.plus.com> <4AF82C32.4060305@ernest.net> Message-ID: ----- Original Message ----- From: "Nicholas Bohm" To: "UK Cryptography Policy Discussion Group" Sent: Monday, November 09, 2009 2:50 PM Subject: Re: RIPA authorisations consultation response - no use of encryption ? > Brian Gladman wrote: > Roland Perry wrote: > In article > , Ray.Bellis at nominet.org.uk writes > As you might expect, the idea of generating and > sending hashes or another form of digital > signature to certify the integrity of the data has not found any > hold. > When I made the obvious points to the Home > Office, the response was that it wasn't Chief Constables top > priority. > > One hopes that it would become so the first time someone wins a case > because the prosecution cannot prove that the disclosed data has not > been modified. > Perhaps you are confusing the collection of evidence with the > collection > of intelligence. The collection of evidence does appear to pass the > normal "quality" tests most of the time (given the apparent absence of > such cases being won/lost). > > What technical authenticity tests are applied to electronic data as a > matter of course before it can be put before a UK Court as evidence? > I believe none; it's up to any party to whom the evidence is adverse to > challenge it. > > (An old example: telex messages were routinely used in evidence without > anyone needing to put anything in evidence about the reliability of the > system, such as that the text at both ends was identical.) Thank you both Richard and Nicholas. Sadly it's the answer I expected even if not the one I hoped for. Brian Gladman __________ Information from ESET NOD32 Antivirus, version of virus signature database 4588 (20091109) __________ The message was checked by ESET NOD32 Antivirus. http://www.eset.com From peter at pmsommer.com Mon Nov 9 14:44:06 2009 From: peter at pmsommer.com (Peter Sommer) Date: Mon, 09 Nov 2009 14:44:06 +0000 Subject: RIPA authorisations consultation response - no use of encryption ? In-Reply-To: <4AF810ED.3050505@gladman.plus.com> References: <6.2.5.6.2.20091108174805.02b58c28@gn.apc.org> <4AF810ED.3050505@gladman.plus.com> Message-ID: <4AF82AB6.2070800@pmsommer.com> Brian Gladman wrote: > What technical authenticity tests are applied to electronic data as a > matter of course before it can be put before a UK Court as evidence? > > Brian Gladman > > Brian: My IAAC Guide might give you some idea of the practical issues: http://www.iaac.org.uk/Portals/0/DigitalInvestigationsGuide.pdf Forensic disk images are always cryptographically hashed. On another matter: there have been attempts at challenging the reliability of telecoms data - indeed Duncan and I have been in two cases together where this was an issue - one was an alleged gang-land slaying and the other narcotics trafficking. In both instances we were able to show levels of inreliability but not to the point at which the judges were prepared to exclude the material (they have a discretion to do so under s 78 PACE) - they were prepared to let the evidence go to the respective juries. Because of the protection juries get from the Contempt of Court Act, we don't know how they finally evaluated the evidence. Peter Sommer From matthew at pemble.net Mon Nov 9 14:43:18 2009 From: matthew at pemble.net (Matthew Pemble) Date: Mon, 9 Nov 2009 14:43:18 +0000 Subject: RIPA authorisations consultation response - no use of encryption ? In-Reply-To: <4AF810ED.3050505@gladman.plus.com> References: <6.2.5.6.2.20091108174805.02b58c28@gn.apc.org> <4AF810ED.3050505@gladman.plus.com> Message-ID: 2009/11/9 Brian Gladman : > > What technical authenticity tests are applied to electronic data as a > matter of course before it can be put before a UK Court as evidence? > Absolutely none. Many can be and are applied by the court-appointed or opposing experts but none of these are a matter of course. -- Matthew Pemble Technical Director, Idrach Ltd Mobile: +44 (0) 7595 652175 Office: + 44 (0) 1324 820690 From iptv at gn.apc.org Mon Nov 9 16:15:15 2009 From: iptv at gn.apc.org (IPTV) Date: Mon, 09 Nov 2009 16:15:15 +0000 Subject: RIPA authorisations consultation response - no use of encryption ? In-Reply-To: <4AF810ED.3050505@gladman.plus.com> References: <6.2.5.6.2.20091108174805.02b58c28@gn.apc.org> <4AF810ED.3050505@gladman.plus.com> Message-ID: <6.2.5.6.2.20091109143837.02bb2440@gn.apc.org> >Brian Gladman asks: >Q: What technical authenticity tests are applied to electronic data >as a matter of course before it can be put before a UK Court as evidence? A: (from wide experience) The answer falls in two distinct parts: 1. For computer-based electronic evidence derived from seized hard drives and other media. Generally, a high standard. The ACPO Guidelines from the current guide are perceived to the norm. See http://7safe.com/electronic_evidence/ACPO_guidelines_computer_evidence_v4_web.pdf It is the norm to generate, and subsequently compare, overall original hashes from seized media. 2. For (ordinary, i.e. not intercept related) communications data provided by ISPs or CSPs pursuant to RIPA. Nothing at all. Until a case in which I and Peter intervened 7 years ago (R v Sayers, unreported, since you ask) there was no standard at all. Now there is a concept of a "golden copy" which is, if you please, now means the copy of the e-mail that was received through orthodox e-mail without encryption or digital certification Some may think the "gold" here rather base. But note: a. Readers might think that an e-mail passing between networked computers and whose contents are to be explicitly used as evidence in a criminal case is surely "computer-based electronic evidence" and thus falls within the ACPO guidelines, but if so would be wrong in the view of numerous judges. I've lost count of the number of times I've heard the "ACPO guidelines" don't apply argument many many times. If you want to read the "ACPO guidelines don't apply" to e-mails of communications data, read Neil Barrett's book "Traces of Guilt". He describes the Sayers case in which he also appeared (without naming names) and sets out that stall. http://www.amazon.co.uk/Traces-Guilt-Neil-Barrett/dp/0552150886/ref=sr_1_4?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1257782817&sr=1-4 b. Even if the ACPO guidelines are breached, for example by "live" or careless searches or tests on a seized computer, that does not cause the evidence to be rejected. I've seen several searches done in haste on computers taken from airline or ferry passengers arriving in the UK. What judges will look for is evidence of mala fides, that is that the changes to the digital evidence which should not have happened were done maliciously and/or with intent. c. Matthew is also right. There is no statute law on this, only forms of practice. For where the forensic standards are headed, Peter is probably a found of some knowledge. Duncan From igb at batten.eu.org Mon Nov 9 16:51:22 2009 From: igb at batten.eu.org (Ian Batten) Date: Mon, 9 Nov 2009 16:51:22 +0000 Subject: RIPA authorisations consultation response - no use of encryption ? In-Reply-To: References: <6.2.5.6.2.20091108174805.02b58c28@gn.apc.org> <87A6D89C0D9E3E4E94253D25B8F9B2E711621F@DB3EX14MBXC316.europe.corp.microsoft.com> <87A6D89C0D9E3E4E94253D25B8F9B2E711675F@DB3EX14MBXC316.europe.corp.microsoft.com> Message-ID: <28270D46-AF3E-4988-B19F-0811DFCFBC5A@batten.eu.org> It's routinely used within my employer's security practice, including for non-technical-ish (ie project managers and technical authors). I use a plug-in for Apple Mail which seems eminently usable, and behaves reasonably sensible under most circumstances. ian On 9 Nov 2009, at 14:45, Richard Clayton wrote: > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > Hash: SHA1 > > In article , Roland Perry > olicyagency.com> writes > >> But first, you have to convince the bosses that PGP is good enough, >> and >> complies with their purchasing policy. > > I have corresponded with both SOCA and the Met using PGP. It may not > be > universally used, but some serving officers seem to manage quite well. > > The aim is to ensure confidentiality, should correspondence go astray; > no other cryptographic property is sought. > >> There are enough clever defence lawyers out there, that if the >> *evidential* copy of the information was challengeable (and >> challenging >> it would help) they would. But almost all of it is just used as >> intelligence. > > PGP signing provides assistance in demonstrating authenticity, but > it is > not a prerequisite for authenticity,... > > ... and of course if there was a dispute, then you'd end up with > multiple experts trying to persuade the jury of the correctness of > their > version of events to explain the wrong document being signed by the > right key... > >>> PGP would anyway be an improvement all round.... >> >> And you'd want my fly-tipping inspector to use PGP on some handheld >> device (rather than a pen and paper) to make his notes? > > I'd merely like to see them using full disk encryption to ensure > that it > didn't matter when their handheld got lost. > > - -- > richard Richard > Clayton > > Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little > temporary > Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety. Benjamin Franklin 11 Nov > 1755 > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- > Version: PGPsdk version 1.7.1 > > iQA/AwUBSvgrCZoAxkTY1oPiEQKMtQCghynJCo3YK/AoMJOHmEOa0TClhkoAoLT7 > LQNvedBYla82ZNDpH0MqxxLB > =lJji > -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- > From brg at gladman.plus.com Mon Nov 9 17:14:33 2009 From: brg at gladman.plus.com (Brian Gladman) Date: Mon, 9 Nov 2009 17:14:33 -0000 Subject: RIPA authorisations consultation response - no use of encryption ? In-Reply-To: <6.2.5.6.2.20091109143837.02bb2440@gn.apc.org> References: <6.2.5.6.2.20091108174805.02b58c28@gn.apc.org> <4AF810ED.3050505@gladman.plus.com> <6.2.5.6.2.20091109143837.02bb2440@gn.apc.org> Message-ID: ----- Original Message ----- From: "IPTV" To: "UK Cryptography Policy Discussion Group" Sent: Monday, November 09, 2009 4:15 PM Subject: Re: RIPA authorisations consultation response - no use of encryption ? My thanks to Matthew, Peter and Duncan for their responses and to Peter and Duncan for references to very useful further reading. I have worked for authorities (in other countries) on the cryptographic protection of hard drive images but I have not been aware of any requirements (outside of defence) for establishing and subsequently protecting the authenticity of transient evidential data derived from real time systems. I must say that I find the dichotomy somewhat surprising given the enormous differences in the 'quality' of the systems from which such data is extracted (let alone the integrity of its subsequent handling). Brian Gladman __________ Information from ESET NOD32 Antivirus, version of virus signature database 4588 (20091109) __________ The message was checked by ESET NOD32 Antivirus. http://www.eset.com From mjdb at dorevale.demon.co.uk Mon Nov 9 18:04:45 2009 From: mjdb at dorevale.demon.co.uk (M J D Brown) Date: Mon, 9 Nov 2009 18:04:45 -0000 Subject: RIPA authorisations consultation response - no use of encryption ? References: <6.2.5.6.2.20091108174805.02b58c28@gn.apc.org> <4AF810ED.3050505@gladman.plus.com> <6.2.5.6.2.20091109143837.02bb2440@gn.apc.org> Message-ID: Many thanks to Duncan for clear explanations. Two questions: In the instance of the 'as seized' contents of a hard disk produced as evidence in court, how does the prosecution demonstate that the searching/arresting officers did not inject suitably incriminating files from a pre-prepared memory stick? If done before the disks are removed for forensic examination, including secure digital fingerprinting, of what value are the technical precautions described in the docemend URLed below? No point in objecting to ACPO practice guidelines, of course, just wondering about the evidential chain connecting a crime scene to the subsequent court hearing. Mike. ----- Original Message ----- From: "IPTV" To: "UK Cryptography Policy Discussion Group" Sent: Monday, November 09, 2009 4:15 PM Subject: Re: RIPA authorisations consultation response - no use of encryption ? > >>Brian Gladman asks: > >>Q: What technical authenticity tests are applied to electronic data >>as a matter of course before it can be put before a UK Court as >>evidence? > > > A: (from wide experience) The answer falls in two distinct parts: > > > 1. For computer-based electronic evidence derived from seized hard > drives and other media. > > Generally, a high standard. The ACPO Guidelines from the current > guide are perceived to the norm. > > See > http://7safe.com/electronic_evidence/ACPO_guidelines_computer_evidence_v4_web.pdf > > > It is the norm to generate, and subsequently compare, overall > original hashes from seized media. > > > 2. For (ordinary, i.e. not intercept related) communications data > provided by ISPs or CSPs pursuant to RIPA. > > Nothing at all. Until a case in which I and Peter intervened 7 > years ago (R v Sayers, unreported, since you ask) there was no > standard at all. Now there is a concept of a "golden copy" which > is, if you please, now means the copy of the e-mail that was received > through orthodox e-mail without encryption or digital > certification Some may think the "gold" here rather base. > > > But note: > > a. Readers might think that an e-mail passing between networked > computers and whose contents are to be explicitly used as evidence in > a criminal case is surely "computer-based electronic evidence" and > thus falls within the ACPO guidelines, but if so would be wrong in > the view of numerous judges. I've lost count of the number of times > I've heard the "ACPO guidelines" don't apply argument many many times. > > If you want to read the "ACPO guidelines don't apply" to e-mails of > communications data, read Neil Barrett's book "Traces of Guilt". He > describes the Sayers case in which he also appeared (without naming > names) and sets out that > stall. > http://www.amazon.co.uk/Traces-Guilt-Neil-Barrett/dp/0552150886/ref=sr_1_4?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1257782817&sr=1-4 > > > b. Even if the ACPO guidelines are breached, for example by "live" or > careless searches or tests on a seized computer, that does not cause > the evidence to be rejected. I've seen several searches done in > haste on computers taken from airline or ferry passengers arriving in > the UK. What judges will look for is evidence of mala fides, that > is that the changes to the digital evidence which should not have > happened were done maliciously and/or with intent. > > > c. Matthew is also right. There is no statute law on this, only > forms of practice. For where the forensic standards are headed, > Peter is probably a found of some knowledge. > > Duncan From matthew at pemble.net Mon Nov 9 19:19:46 2009 From: matthew at pemble.net (Matthew Pemble) Date: Mon, 9 Nov 2009 19:19:46 +0000 Subject: RIPA authorisations consultation response - no use of encryption ? In-Reply-To: References: <6.2.5.6.2.20091108174805.02b58c28@gn.apc.org> <4AF810ED.3050505@gladman.plus.com> <6.2.5.6.2.20091109143837.02bb2440@gn.apc.org> Message-ID: I2009/11/9 M J D Brown : > Many thanks to Duncan for clear explanations. > > Two questions: > In the instance of the 'as seized' contents of a hard disk produced as > evidence in court, how does the prosecution demonstate that the > searching/arresting officers did not inject suitably incriminating files > from a pre-prepared memory stick? If done before the disks are removed > for forensic examination, including secure digital fingerprinting, of > what value are the technical precautions described in the docemend URLed > below? > > No point in objecting to ACPO practice guidelines, of course, just > wondering about the evidential chain connecting a crime scene to the > subsequent court hearing. It is not done technically. It is done procedurally by having the officer(s) who seized the disks make a witness statement in to court and be available for both presenting their evidence in chief and subsequent cross-examination by the defence. As will all those in the chain of evidence, through to the forensic analyst and any expert called to draw opinion evidence from the "facts" produced by the analyst. Some times, technology makes this a bit easier - whether it is individually numbered evidence seals or digital hash / certificates. Other times it is just done by following sound procedures (or not, as the case may be.) Matthew -- Matthew Pemble Technical Director, Idrach Ltd Mobile: +44 (0) 7595 652175 Office: + 44 (0) 1324 820690 From jya at pipeline.com Mon Nov 9 19:33:00 2009 From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young) Date: Mon, 09 Nov 2009 14:33:00 -0500 Subject: RIPA authorisations consultation response - no use of encryption ? In-Reply-To: References: <6.2.5.6.2.20091108174805.02b58c28@gn.apc.org> <4AF810ED.3050505@gladman.plus.com> <6.2.5.6.2.20091109143837.02bb2440@gn.apc.org> Message-ID: There is some humor in establishing the evidentiary chain in computer evidence. In court testimony in a US case an FBI expert testified about how evidence was validated. When questioned by the defense to more precisely support questionable parts of the evidence, in particular the technology used to collect and analyze, the FBI expert admitted that such precision was beyond his capabilities. The defense asked the court to call the contractor who operated the FBI collection system, stored data and performed analyses. The prosecution had attempted to prevent the contractor's testimony but the defense was headed by a former prosecutor. The contractor, a giant US defense firm, was called to testify and its technician straightforwardly admitted that there were technical glitzes in the data due to insufficient continuity between surveillance and analysis systems (which spanned several years of varying contracts). So, he said, he helpfully fabricated continuity to close gaps, interpret static, add tweak language to be easier to understand than inaudible garble, and, lo, declared that this rendering of the data is what the FBI expected. He said he had not been called to testify before, and said that providing testimony was the role of FBI experts who knew how to make technology credible to jurors. Most of the credibilty consisted of citing the FBI expert's credentials. From mjdb at dorevale.demon.co.uk Mon Nov 9 18:38:19 2009 From: mjdb at dorevale.demon.co.uk (M J D Brown) Date: Mon, 9 Nov 2009 18:38:19 -0000 Subject: RIPA authorisations consultation response - no use of encryption ? References: <6.2.5.6.2.20091108174805.02b58c28@gn.apc.org> Message-ID: <8DC3D07FAD4D493E8BAC1B9D055CFB6B@Powerstation> Another question: Though the obtaining of material for law enforcement purposes is exempt from the usual Data Protection Act rules about otaining, processing, and storing, is it the case that there is no duty of care about safeguarding the personal data against unauthorised or inadvertent/improper disclosure? Mike. ----- Original Message ----- From: "IPTV" To: "UK Cryptography Policy Discussion Group" Sent: Sunday, November 08, 2009 5:48 PM Subject: RIPA authorisations consultation response - no use of encryption ? The law enforcement community/CSP are pretty much in the Dark Ages. Professionally (as an expert witness) I have seen and examined voluminous amounts RIPA s22 data disclosures of communication data, call data and cellsite information. The almost invariable practice is to sent data, unencrypted, as CSV or XLS files. From CSP to SPOC, and then on to everyone else. Only one CSP routinely provides some encryption when downloading data, but this is not preserved at the next stage. As you might expect, the idea of generating and sending hashes or another form of digital signature to certify the integrity of the data has not found any hold. When I made the obvious points to the Home Office, the response was that it wasn't Chief Constables top priority. -- From matthew at pemble.net Mon Nov 9 20:40:05 2009 From: matthew at pemble.net (Matthew Pemble) Date: Mon, 9 Nov 2009 20:40:05 +0000 Subject: RIPA authorisations consultation response - no use of encryption ? In-Reply-To: <8DC3D07FAD4D493E8BAC1B9D055CFB6B@Powerstation> References: <6.2.5.6.2.20091108174805.02b58c28@gn.apc.org> <8DC3D07FAD4D493E8BAC1B9D055CFB6B@Powerstation> Message-ID: 2009/11/9 M J D Brown : > Another question: > > Though the obtaining of material for law enforcement purposes is exempt > from the usual Data Protection Act rules about otaining, processing, and > storing, is it the case that there is no duty of care about safeguarding > the personal data against unauthorised or inadvertent/improper > disclosure? Mike, et al, As far as I am aware, both principle 6 and 7 continue to apply regardless of the authority under which you obtain Schedule 2 or 3 compliance. s63(1) should also be noted. SI2000/417 limits Principle 1 & Schedule 3 s4 & s5. However, the problem has never been the breach of the DPA - it has been the lack of meaningful sanctions (except against ICO employees - I wonder what they were thinking of). This seems to be on the way to being fixed. There are no mandated technical or procedural safeguards - although non-binding ICO guidance is rapidly getting to the point that some form of encryption will become accepted as a minimal measure. Matthew -- Matthew Pemble Technical Director, Idrach Ltd Mobile: +44 (0) 7595 652175 Office: + 44 (0) 1324 820690 From peter at pmsommer.com Mon Nov 9 19:34:14 2009 From: peter at pmsommer.com (Peter Sommer) Date: Mon, 09 Nov 2009 19:34:14 +0000 Subject: RIPA authorisations consultation response - no use of encryption ? In-Reply-To: References: <6.2.5.6.2.20091108174805.02b58c28@gn.apc.org> <4AF810ED.3050505@gladman.plus.com> <6.2.5.6.2.20091109143837.02bb2440@gn.apc.org> Message-ID: <4AF86EB6.1030605@pmsommer.com> M J D Brown wrote: > In the instance of the 'as seized' contents of a hard disk produced as > evidence in court, how does the prosecution demonstate that the > searching/arresting officers did not inject suitably incriminating files > from a pre-prepared memory stick? If done before the disks are removed > for forensic examination, including secure digital fingerprinting, of > what value are the technical precautions described in the docemend URLed > below? > Almost the first thing you do when you check out on a received forensically imaged computer is look at the very last date/time stamp recorded. It should, of course, be earlier than the point at which the seizure took place. There should be a witness statement and contemporaneous notes from the seizing officer. The names of the last files written to will also tell you whether the computer was shut down normally (in the Windows environment this will be NTUSER.DAT or similar) or forcibly closed down by yanking the power. Again, this finding should match with what the seizing police officer said. My own experience is that where there are date/times after the seizure this is due to incompetence rather than a deliberate plan to plant. But most search officers, even if they don't know much about computers, do know about the importance of maintaining what is called "continuity of evidence" (called "chain of custody" in the US). Incidentally, if a pre-prepared USB stick is used in the way you suggest, an entry will show up in several of the Registry hives. (Yes, I know you could avoid this by booting direct from the USB stick, but all that assumes a fairly high level of technical capability - and one has to ask in what sort of circumstances any police officer would think the exercise worthwhile). Peter Sommer From igb at batten.eu.org Tue Nov 10 03:44:44 2009 From: igb at batten.eu.org (Ian Batten) Date: Tue, 10 Nov 2009 03:44:44 +0000 Subject: IMP shelved (for the moment at least) In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <2582C05C-01D7-44BE-88C1-DA944A256467@batten.eu.org> On 9 Nov 2009, at 14:37, Richard Clayton wrote (quoting the Graun): > Legislation to introduce a ?2bn Home Office plan to store the > details > of everyone's text, email and internet communications has been > postponed until after the general election, it was confirmed today. > The Home Office said a communications data bill will not feature in > the pre-election legislative programme outlined in the Queen's > speech > next Wednesday Torygraph claims that the legislation will require CPs to record the complete clickstream. How much data is that, again? http://www.telegraph.co.uk:80/news/newstopics/politics/lawandorder/6533107/Every-phone-call-email-and-internet-click-stored-by-state-spying-databases.html From David_Biggins at usermgmt.com Tue Nov 10 14:20:53 2009 From: David_Biggins at usermgmt.com (David Biggins) Date: Tue, 10 Nov 2009 14:20:53 -0000 Subject: RIPA authorisations consultation response - no use of encryption ? In-Reply-To: <87A6D89C0D9E3E4E94253D25B8F9B2E711621F@DB3EX14MBXC316.europe.corp.microsoft.com> References: <6.2.5.6.2.20091108174805.02b58c28@gn.apc.org> <87A6D89C0D9E3E4E94253D25B8F9B2E711621F@DB3EX14MBXC316.europe.corp.microsoft.com> Message-ID: > -----Original Message----- > From: ukcrypto-bounces at chiark.greenend.org.uk [mailto:ukcrypto- > bounces at chiark.greenend.org.uk] On Behalf Of Caspar Bowden > Sent: 08 November 2009 21:37 > To: UK Cryptography Policy Discussion Group > Subject: RE: RIPA authorisations consultation response - no use of > encryption ? > > >bounces at chiark.greenend.org.uk] On Behalf Of Roland Perry > ... > >Any suggestions, given that the distributed nature of law enforcement > means there's >no central procurement process? > > GPG key signing parties at ACPO meetings, topped up by Sir Paul Kennedy > when he makes a visit ? http://xkcd.com/364/ D. From richard at highwayman.com Tue Nov 10 15:51:49 2009 From: richard at highwayman.com (Richard Clayton) Date: Tue, 10 Nov 2009 15:51:49 +0000 Subject: IMP shelved (for the moment at least) In-Reply-To: <2582C05C-01D7-44BE-88C1-DA944A256467@batten.eu.org> References: <2582C05C-01D7-44BE-88C1-DA944A256467@batten.eu.org> Message-ID: -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 In article <2582C05C-01D7-44BE-88C1-DA944A256467 at batten.eu.org>, Ian Batten writes >On 9 Nov 2009, at 14:37, Richard Clayton wrote (quoting the Graun): > >> Legislation to introduce a ?2bn Home Office plan to store the >> details >> of everyone's text, email and internet communications has been >> postponed until after the general election, it was confirmed today. >> The Home Office said a communications data bill will not feature in >> the pre-election legislative programme outlined in the Queen's >> speech >> next Wednesday > >Torygraph claims that the legislation will require CPs to record the >complete clickstream. How much data is that, again? > >http://www.telegraph.co.uk:80/news/newstopics/politics/lawandorder/6533107/Every >-phone-call-email-and-internet-click-stored-by-state-spying-databases.html There seems a wide split in the reporting, between those who spoke to Ministers (everything going ahead, just not in this Queen's Speech) and those who spoke to officials -- who seem to think that the proposal is off in the long grass and will not be back for quite a while (I expect that the Treasury's reaction to the "billions" price tag will have something to do with that!): Plans to store information about every phone call, email and internet visit in the United Kingdom have in effect been abandoned by the Government. [...] A Whitehall source told The Independent last night that the project, estimated to cost up to ?2bn over 10 years, was "in the very long grass". [...] - -=-=-=- I'd suggest that he real fight in the next few years will probably be in the US, where there are signs of interest in a data retention regime to parallel the EU one. As usual, the four horsemen are being cited, with as usual, paedophiles being top of the list.... The 2009 version of this (previous efforts being in 2006 and 2008) was The Internet Safety Act http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_Safety_Act and doubtless something similar will reappear in the new session. If that regime, should it come to pass, be extended beyond logging of IP address usage at ISPs into systems like Gmail, Hotmail, MySpace, FaceBook etc -- then that will make a significant difference to everyone in the UK. Kind of turns around the "no data retention with representation" that Boston was once concerned about (or did I misremember that?) Of course Data Retention is way short of what IMP proposed; but you don't have to capture the information off the wire if Facebook has it in an Oracle database already! - -- richard Richard Clayton Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety. Benjamin Franklin 11 Nov 1755 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGPsdk version 1.7.1 iQA/AwUBSvmMFZoAxkTY1oPiEQLsNQCgyB9mjSaPy/zEhqUEjgQ+6vtE9agAmwa1 KneCEphXDkCKekxBGJD7zUp+ =IVsd -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From casparb at microsoft.com Tue Nov 10 18:23:28 2009 From: casparb at microsoft.com (Caspar Bowden) Date: Tue, 10 Nov 2009 18:23:28 +0000 Subject: IMP shelved (for the moment at least) In-Reply-To: References: <2582C05C-01D7-44BE-88C1-DA944A256467@batten.eu.org> Message-ID: <87A6D89C0D9E3E4E94253D25B8F9B2E71172F0@DB3EX14MBXC316.europe.corp.microsoft.com> >bounces at chiark.greenend.org.uk] On Behalf Of Richard Clayton ... >There seems a wide split in the reporting, between those who spoke to Ministers >(everything going ahead, just not in this Queen's Speech) and those who spoke to >officials -- who seem to think that the proposal is off in the long grass and will not be >back for quite a while [CB] Yes, but they have different Rice-Davies motivations. Ministers don't want journos to get the idea they are impotent fag-ends of a doomed administration, and still have political credibility in policymaking. Officials don't want journos to delve into the implications of this policy while they get on with crafting the legislation. Rememember 1997 and key-escrow? It took about 3 weeks after the election for New Labour to be "briefed" and jettison the manifesto rejection of escrow policy. The reason: nobody who mattered ever understood the implications of that paragraph of the manifesto. -- Caspar From fw at deneb.enyo.de Tue Nov 10 18:27:06 2009 From: fw at deneb.enyo.de (Florian Weimer) Date: Tue, 10 Nov 2009 19:27:06 +0100 Subject: IMP shelved (for the moment at least) In-Reply-To: <2582C05C-01D7-44BE-88C1-DA944A256467@batten.eu.org> (Ian Batten's message of "Tue, 10 Nov 2009 03:44:44 +0000") References: <2582C05C-01D7-44BE-88C1-DA944A256467@batten.eu.org> Message-ID: <871vk6b5hh.fsf@mid.deneb.enyo.de> * Ian Batten: > Torygraph claims that the legislation will require CPs to record the > complete clickstream. How much data is that, again? Not that much that major content providers can't store in a rather unlimited fashion. From lists at internetpolicyagency.com Tue Nov 10 19:26:33 2009 From: lists at internetpolicyagency.com (Roland Perry) Date: Tue, 10 Nov 2009 19:26:33 +0000 Subject: RIPA authorisations consultation response - no use of encryption ? In-Reply-To: References: <6.2.5.6.2.20091108174805.02b58c28@gn.apc.org> <87A6D89C0D9E3E4E94253D25B8F9B2E711621F@DB3EX14MBXC316.europe.corp.microsoft.com> <87A6D89C0D9E3E4E94253D25B8F9B2E711675F@DB3EX14MBXC316.europe.corp.microsoft.com> Message-ID: In article , Richard Clayton writes >>>PGP would anyway be an improvement all round.... >> >>And you'd want my fly-tipping inspector to use PGP on some handheld >>device (rather than a pen and paper) to make his notes? > >I'd merely like to see them using full disk encryption to ensure that it >didn't matter when their handheld got lost. So losing the pen-and-paper is OK? -- Roland Perry From mjdb at dorevale.demon.co.uk Tue Nov 10 19:27:31 2009 From: mjdb at dorevale.demon.co.uk (M J D Brown) Date: Tue, 10 Nov 2009 19:27:31 -0000 Subject: RIPA authorisations consultation response - no use of encryption ? References: <6.2.5.6.2.20091108174805.02b58c28@gn.apc.org> <4AF810ED.3050505@gladman.plus.com> <6.2.5.6.2.20091109143837.02bb2440@gn.apc.org> <4AF86EB6.1030605@pmsommer.com> Message-ID: <69510063BA3044B496874A64E3B5C4A2@Powerstation> In a recent message I wrote: > In the instance of the 'as seized' contents of a hard disk produced as > evidence in court, how does the prosecution demonstate that the > searching/arresting officers did not inject suitably incriminating > files > from a pre-prepared memory stick? If done before the disks are > removed > for forensic examination, including secure digital fingerprinting, of > what value are the technical precautions described in the docemend > URLed > below? Peter Sommer kindly replied, describing the forensic procedure on receipt of a seized computer (snipped here to focus on the planted files scenario), then continuing: > Incidentally, if a pre-prepared USB stick is used in the way you > suggest, an entry will show up in several of the Registry hives. > (Yes, > I know you could avoid this by booting direct from the USB stick, > but > all that assumes a fairly high level of technical capability - and one > has to ask in what sort of circumstances any police officer would > think > the exercise worthwhile). It has often been alleged, and sometimes demonstrated, in past times that incriminating material has been planted on suspects. I was trying to imagine the equivalent for computer-based evidence under the seizure regime described in the ACPO Good Practice Guide. I could imagine that there might be both motive and opportunity in the case of a raid following a period of RIPA directed surveillance, especially in high profile cases. The possibility, however remote, suggests that anybody innocently enmeshed in such a situation should insist on remaining present until the computer equipment has been sealed in evidence bags. Likewise, the villains would likely attempt not to be present. The situation I envisaged seems to be playing out in the present Fort Hood case where the US FBI have apparently discovered that the suspect had previously made attempt to contact radical groups. I wonder what evidence will be discovered on his computer. Regards, Mike. From lists at internetpolicyagency.com Tue Nov 10 19:43:26 2009 From: lists at internetpolicyagency.com (Roland Perry) Date: Tue, 10 Nov 2009 19:43:26 +0000 Subject: RIPA authorisations consultation response - no use of encryption ? In-Reply-To: <69510063BA3044B496874A64E3B5C4A2@Powerstation> References: <6.2.5.6.2.20091108174805.02b58c28@gn.apc.org> <4AF810ED.3050505@gladman.plus.com> <6.2.5.6.2.20091109143837.02bb2440@gn.apc.org> <4AF86EB6.1030605@pmsommer.com> <69510063BA3044B496874A64E3B5C4A2@Powerstation> Message-ID: <7PTuq1keJc+KFA1W@perry.co.uk> In article <69510063BA3044B496874A64E3B5C4A2 at Powerstation>, M J D Brown writes >in the present Fort Hood case where the US FBI have apparently >discovered that the suspect had previously made attempt to contact >radical groups. I've not been following news reports of this at all, but presumably this is exactly the kind of circumstance where law enforcement can make use of "data retention" evidence, once they know that they need to look? (People often complain of a lack of case studies). -- Roland Perry From casparb at microsoft.com Tue Nov 10 21:27:13 2009 From: casparb at microsoft.com (Caspar Bowden) Date: Tue, 10 Nov 2009 21:27:13 +0000 Subject: RIPA authorisations consultation response - no use of encryption ? In-Reply-To: <7PTuq1keJc+KFA1W@perry.co.uk> References: <6.2.5.6.2.20091108174805.02b58c28@gn.apc.org> <4AF810ED.3050505@gladman.plus.com> <6.2.5.6.2.20091109143837.02bb2440@gn.apc.org> <4AF86EB6.1030605@pmsommer.com> <69510063BA3044B496874A64E3B5C4A2@Powerstation> <7PTuq1keJc+KFA1W@perry.co.uk> Message-ID: <87A6D89C0D9E3E4E94253D25B8F9B2E711748E@DB3EX14MBXC316.europe.corp.microsoft.com> >bounces at chiark.greenend.org.uk] On Behalf Of Roland Perry ... >>in the present Fort Hood case where the US FBI have apparently >>discovered that the suspect had previously made attempt to contact >>radical groups. >I've not been following news reports of this at all, but presumably this is exactly the >kind of circumstance where law enforcement can make use of "data retention" >evidence, once they know that they need to look? ...what, you mean that without data retention, they might not be able to catch the guy who did it and prosecute him? C From lists at internetpolicyagency.com Tue Nov 10 21:54:43 2009 From: lists at internetpolicyagency.com (Roland Perry) Date: Tue, 10 Nov 2009 21:54:43 +0000 Subject: RIPA authorisations consultation response - no use of encryption ? In-Reply-To: References: <6.2.5.6.2.20091108174805.02b58c28@gn.apc.org> <4AF810ED.3050505@gladman.plus.com> <6.2.5.6.2.20091109143837.02bb2440@gn.apc.org> Message-ID: In article , M J D Brown writes >In the instance of the 'as seized' contents of a hard disk produced as >evidence in court, how does the prosecution demonstate that the >searching/arresting officers did not inject suitably incriminating files >from a pre-prepared memory stick? Talking of tools on memory sticks: -- Roland Perry From lists at internetpolicyagency.com Tue Nov 10 21:56:14 2009 From: lists at internetpolicyagency.com (Roland Perry) Date: Tue, 10 Nov 2009 21:56:14 +0000 Subject: RIPA authorisations consultation response - no use of encryption ? In-Reply-To: <87A6D89C0D9E3E4E94253D25B8F9B2E711748E@DB3EX14MBXC316.europe.corp.microsoft.com> References: <6.2.5.6.2.20091108174805.02b58c28@gn.apc.org> <4AF810ED.3050505@gladman.plus.com> <6.2.5.6.2.20091109143837.02bb2440@gn.apc.org> <4AF86EB6.1030605@pmsommer.com> <69510063BA3044B496874A64E3B5C4A2@Powerstation> <7PTuq1keJc+KFA1W@perry.co.uk> <87A6D89C0D9E3E4E94253D25B8F9B2E711748E@DB3EX14MBXC316.europe.corp.microsoft.com> Message-ID: In article <87A6D89C0D9E3E4E94253D25B8F9B2E711748E at DB3EX14MBXC316.europe.corp.micros oft.com>, Caspar Bowden writes >>>in the present Fort Hood case where the US FBI have apparently >>>discovered that the suspect had previously made attempt to contact >>>radical groups. > >>I've not been following news reports of this at all, but presumably this is exactly the >>kind of circumstance where law enforcement can make use of "data retention" > >evidence, once they know that they need to look? > >...what, you mean that without data retention, they might not be able to catch the guy who did it and prosecute him? No, they can find out things like: does he have accomplices, and what else has he been up to recently. -- Roland Perry From casparb at microsoft.com Fri Nov 13 17:00:41 2009 From: casparb at microsoft.com (Caspar Bowden) Date: Fri, 13 Nov 2009 17:00:41 +0000 Subject: RIPA authorisations consultation response - no use of encryption ? In-Reply-To: References: <6.2.5.6.2.20091108174805.02b58c28@gn.apc.org> <4AF810ED.3050505@gladman.plus.com> <6.2.5.6.2.20091109143837.02bb2440@gn.apc.org> <4AF86EB6.1030605@pmsommer.com> <69510063BA3044B496874A64E3B5C4A2@Powerstation> <7PTuq1keJc+KFA1W@perry.co.uk> <87A6D89C0D9E3E4E94253D25B8F9B2E711748E@DB3EX14MBXC316.europe.corp.microsoft.com> Message-ID: <87A6D89C0D9E3E4E94253D25B8F9B2E7117F07@DB3EX14MBXC316.europe.corp.microsoft.com> > bounces at chiark.greenend.org.uk] On Behalf Of Roland Perry ... >>>I've not been following news reports of this at all, but presumably >>>this is exactly the kind of circumstance where law enforcement can make >>> use of "data retention" evidence, once they know that they need to look? >> >>...what, you mean that without data retention, they might not be able to >>catch the guy who did it and prosecute him? > > No, they can find out things like: does he have accomplices, and what else has > he been up to recently. So you think mandatory systematic data retention on the entire population is justified by its marginal extra utility in investigating an army psychiatrist going postal? (colour, mast, nail!) Reports I have been reading suggest contrary: they did catch the guy's international comms, which were evaluated under compartmentalised intel sharing procedures, but after evaluation they didn't trip the alarm. Some things can't be predicted.... C From glynwintle at yahoo.com Fri Nov 13 16:47:57 2009 From: glynwintle at yahoo.com (Glyn Wintle) Date: Fri, 13 Nov 2009 08:47:57 -0800 (PST) Subject: Bruce Schneier talk in London on 4 December Message-ID: <612845.40955.qm@web52707.mail.re2.yahoo.com> http://futureofprivacy.eventbrite.com/ We live in a unique time in our technological history. The cameras are ubiquitous, but we can still see them. ID checks are everywhere, but we still know they're going on. Computers inherently generate personal data, and everyone leaves an audit trail everywhere they go. Bruce Schneier, internationally-renowned cryptographer, technologist and author, will share his vision of current and future technologies' effects on privacy. Schneier rejects the traditional "security vs. privacy" dichotomy in favor of a more subtle and realistic one. Data is the pollution problem of the information age and we need to start thinking about how to deal with it. Tickets and more info http://futureofprivacy.eventbrite.com/ Hosted by Open Rights Group From lists at internetpolicyagency.com Fri Nov 13 21:01:30 2009 From: lists at internetpolicyagency.com (Roland Perry) Date: Fri, 13 Nov 2009 21:01:30 +0000 Subject: RIPA authorisations consultation response - no use of encryption ? In-Reply-To: <87A6D89C0D9E3E4E94253D25B8F9B2E7117F07@DB3EX14MBXC316.europe.corp.microsoft.com> References: <6.2.5.6.2.20091108174805.02b58c28@gn.apc.org> <4AF810ED.3050505@gladman.plus.com> <6.2.5.6.2.20091109143837.02bb2440@gn.apc.org> <4AF86EB6.1030605@pmsommer.com> <69510063BA3044B496874A64E3B5C4A2@Powerstation> <7PTuq1keJc+KFA1W@perry.co.uk> <87A6D89C0D9E3E4E94253D25B8F9B2E711748E@DB3EX14MBXC316.europe.corp.microsoft.com> <87A6D89C0D9E3E4E94253D25B8F9B2E7117F07@DB3EX14MBXC316.europe.corp.microsoft.com> Message-ID: In article <87A6D89C0D9E3E4E94253D25B8F9B2E7117F07 at DB3EX14MBXC316.europe.corp.micros oft.com>, Caspar Bowden writes >> bounces at chiark.greenend.org.uk] On Behalf Of Roland Perry >... >>>>I've not been following news reports of this at all, but presumably >>>>this is exactly the kind of circumstance where law enforcement can make >>>> use of "data retention" evidence, once they know that they need to look? >>> >>>...what, you mean that without data retention, they might not be able to >>>catch the guy who did it and prosecute him? >> >> No, they can find out things like: does he have accomplices, and what >>else has >> he been up to recently. > >So you think mandatory systematic data retention on the entire >population is justified by its marginal extra utility in investigating >an army psychiatrist going postal? (colour, mast, nail!) If he was the only criminal in the world, you might have a point. >Reports I have been reading suggest contrary: they did catch the guy's >international comms, which were evaluated under compartmentalised intel >sharing procedures, but after evaluation they didn't trip the alarm. >Some things can't be predicted.... I wasn't talking about trawling the data speculatively, trying to make predictions. -- Roland Perry From davidh at spidacom.co.uk Sun Nov 15 18:30:25 2009 From: davidh at spidacom.co.uk (David Hansen) Date: Sun, 15 Nov 2009 18:30:25 -0000 Subject: RIPA authorisations consultation response - no use of encryption ? In-Reply-To: <87A6D89C0D9E3E4E94253D25B8F9B2E7117F07@DB3EX14MBXC316.europe.corp.microsoft.com> References: <6.2.5.6.2.20091108174805.02b58c28@gn.apc.org>, , <87A6D89C0D9E3E4E94253D25B8F9B2E7117F07@DB3EX14MBXC316.europe.corp.microsoft.com> Message-ID: <4B0048C1.27826.D9BA38@davidh.spidacom.co.uk> On 13 Nov 2009 at 17:00, Caspar Bowden wrote: > Some things can't be predicted.... And, other than those who allow red top newspapers todo their thinking for them, the public don't expect the government to protect them against everything. The spin after the explosions on the underground and the bus in London was correct, we are not afraid we will continue going about our business. However, while the public were not afraid officials and party politicians were, or found the explosions a useful excuse. -- David Hansen, Edinburgh I will *always* explain revoked encryption keys, unless RIP prevents me http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2000/ukpga_20000023_en_8#pt3-pb3-l1g54 From pwt at iosis.co.uk Sun Nov 15 19:54:54 2009 From: pwt at iosis.co.uk (Peter Tomlinson) Date: Sun, 15 Nov 2009 19:54:54 +0000 Subject: RIPA authorisations consultation response - no use of encryption ? In-Reply-To: <4B0048C1.27826.D9BA38@davidh.spidacom.co.uk> References: <6.2.5.6.2.20091108174805.02b58c28@gn.apc.org>, , <87A6D89C0D9E3E4E94253D25B8F9B2E7117F07@DB3EX14MBXC316.europe.corp.microsoft.com> <4B0048C1.27826.D9BA38@davidh.spidacom.co.uk> Message-ID: <4B005C8E.2040306@iosis.co.uk> David Hansen wrote: > On 13 Nov 2009 at 17:00, Caspar Bowden wrote: > >> Some things can't be predicted.... >> > And, other than those who allow red top newspapers todo their thinking > for them, the public don't expect the government to protect them > against everything. > > The spin after the explosions on the underground and the bus in London > was correct, we are not afraid we will continue going about our > business. However, while the public were not afraid officials and party > politicians were, or found the explosions a useful excuse. > Bruce Schneier's November Crypto-Gram is very relevant to David's view: http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0911.html Peter From lists at internetpolicyagency.com Mon Nov 16 13:10:46 2009 From: lists at internetpolicyagency.com (Roland Perry) Date: Mon, 16 Nov 2009 13:10:46 +0000 Subject: RIPA authorisations consultation response - no use of encryption ? In-Reply-To: <4B005C8E.2040306@iosis.co.uk> References: <6.2.5.6.2.20091108174805.02b58c28@gn.apc.org> <87A6D89C0D9E3E4E94253D25B8F9B2E7117F07@DB3EX14MBXC316.europe.corp.microsoft.com> <4B0048C1.27826.D9BA38@davidh.spidacom.co.uk> <4B005C8E.2040306@iosis.co.uk> Message-ID: In article <4B005C8E.2040306 at iosis.co.uk>, Peter Tomlinson writes >> The spin after the explosions on the underground and the bus in >>London was correct, we are not afraid we will continue going about >>our business. However, while the public were not afraid officials and >>party politicians were, or found the explosions a useful excuse. >> >Bruce Schneier's November Crypto-Gram is very relevant to David's view: >http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0911.html Unless, of course, data retention qualifies as part of the traditional "following the evidence" approach that Bruce seems to approve of (previously with data kept for billing purposes, you can't follow things that don't exist). -- Roland Perry From colinthomson1 at o2.co.uk Mon Nov 16 19:18:07 2009 From: colinthomson1 at o2.co.uk (Tom Thomson) Date: Mon, 16 Nov 2009 19:18:07 -0000 Subject: RIPA authorisations consultation response - no use of encryption ? In-Reply-To: References: <6.2.5.6.2.20091108174805.02b58c28@gn.apc.org><87A6D89C0D9E3E4E94253D25B8F9B2E7117F07@DB3EX14MBXC316.europe.corp.microsoft.com><4B0048C1.27826.D9BA38@davidh.spidacom.co.uk><4B005C8E.2040306@iosis.co.uk> Message-ID: Sgriobh Roland Perry > In article <4B005C8E.2040306 at iosis.co.uk>, Peter Tomlinson > writes > >> The spin after the explosions on the underground and the bus in > >>London was correct, we are not afraid we will continue going about > >>our business. However, while the public were not afraid officials and > >>party politicians were, or found the explosions a useful excuse. > >> > >Bruce Schneier's November Crypto-Gram is very relevant to David's view: > >http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0911.html > > Unless, of course, data retention qualifies as part of the traditional > "following the evidence" approach that Bruce seems to approve of > (previously with data kept for billing purposes, you can't follow things > that don't exist). The trouble with data retention is that it is a disaster waiting to happen - just think what crooks can do with all that information; and do understand very clearly that no-one in law-enforcement gives a damn about protecting the data, they've made that pretty clear; and even if they did, many of the people who are going to have/control access to it have demonstrated their incompetence about keeping the data secure. Anyway I think no, data retention doesn't count as part of traditional evidence following. If the data is needed for business purposes, it will exist and it would be straightforward to legislate for law enforcement access to it to be obtainable through the courts on presentation of evidence demonstrating the need for that access - now that would be completely in line with the traditional follow the evidence approach. Yes there are arguments for keeping everything - let's finger-print the whole population, get dna samples of the whole population (of course we would need toeducate our "expert" witnesses on statistics and on the chances of false positives, but you can be pretty sure that that would not happen), place surveillance cameras with face-recognition computers on every street corner and in every shop/office/bank in the country, cameras with number plate recognition on every road bridge and at road junction, and make sure that their output is retained for at least 16 years. That is part of the traditional evidence following approach to exactly the same extent as all the data retention stuff our current masters in Whitehall desire. The traditional evidence following approach involved gathering evidence when it was needed and applying directed surveillance when it was justified. That is very different from recording everything and keeping it for all time regardless of whether that gathering and retention justified or proportionate or totally unjustified and disproportionate. M. From igb at batten.eu.org Mon Nov 16 21:06:57 2009 From: igb at batten.eu.org (Ian Batten) Date: Mon, 16 Nov 2009 21:06:57 +0000 Subject: RIPA authorisations consultation response - no use of encryption ? In-Reply-To: References: <6.2.5.6.2.20091108174805.02b58c28@gn.apc.org><87A6D89C0D9E3E4E94253D25B8F9B2E7117F07@DB3EX14MBXC316.europe.corp.microsoft.com><4B0048C1.27826.D9BA38@davidh.spidacom.co.uk><4B005C8E.2040306@iosis.co.uk> Message-ID: <2B4C2F68-70FA-459D-8534-35125A916F74@batten.eu.org> On 16 Nov 2009, at 19:18, Tom Thomson wrote: > The trouble with data retention is that it is a disaster waiting to > happen - just think what crooks can do with all that information Humour me. Let's assume that the data retention is of the things that would currently fall under the definition of `traffic data' or the stuff that ISPs are typically logging without the universe endeding, which is all that has been suggested. So that would be from/to pairs for some email, IP number or `hostname' (first component) of some URLs and perhaps a bit of Netflow data. I can see the civil liberties issues, and I can see the potential for miscarriages of justice. But I'm really, really struggling to understand what `crooks can do with all that information'. Could you outline the crimes that would be opened up? I guess that there are some exotic blackmail attacks by data-mining large volumes, but they seem a bit like hard work and because blackmail usually relies on the immediate impact of the threat (``what happens when I show your wife _these_?'') something that requires a BSc in statistics and two hours to explain doesn't seem as bad, really. I don't see the information being remotely sufficient for what we used to call fraud but has now morphed into `identity theft'. What crimes are you worried about? Don't get me wrong. I'm violently opposed to data retention on civil liberties grounds. But I really don't see that anyone's purposes are helped by creating threats that aren't actually credible. ian From lists at internetpolicyagency.com Mon Nov 16 21:05:46 2009 From: lists at internetpolicyagency.com (Roland Perry) Date: Mon, 16 Nov 2009 21:05:46 +0000 Subject: RIPA authorisations consultation response - no use of encryption ? In-Reply-To: References: <6.2.5.6.2.20091108174805.02b58c28@gn.apc.org> <87A6D89C0D9E3E4E94253D25B8F9B2E7117F07@DB3EX14MBXC316.europe.corp.microsoft.com> <4B0048C1.27826.D9BA38@davidh.spidacom.co.uk> <4B005C8E.2040306@iosis.co.uk> Message-ID: <7DQuZ5Lq6bALFARr@perry.co.uk> In article , Tom Thomson writes > > >Sgriobh Roland Perry > >> In article <4B005C8E.2040306 at iosis.co.uk>, Peter Tomlinson >> writes >> >> The spin after the explosions on the underground and the bus in >> >>London was correct, we are not afraid we will continue going about >> >>our business. However, while the public were not afraid officials and >> >>party politicians were, or found the explosions a useful excuse. >> >> >> >Bruce Schneier's November Crypto-Gram is very relevant to David's view: >> >http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0911.html >> >> Unless, of course, data retention qualifies as part of the traditional >> "following the evidence" approach that Bruce seems to approve of >> (previously with data kept for billing purposes, you can't follow things >> that don't exist). > >The trouble with data retention is that it is a disaster waiting to >happen But is it a "disaster" that Bruce is advocating? >- just think what crooks can do with all that information; And what they can do in the absence of the information (all bad deeds leaving no trail of evidence). >and do understand very clearly that no-one in law-enforcement gives a >damn about protecting the data, they've made that pretty clear; and >even if they did, many of the people who are going to have/control >access to it have demonstrated their incompetence about keeping the >data secure. > >Anyway I think no, data retention doesn't count as part of traditional >evidence following. If the data is needed for business purposes, it >will exist and it would be straightforward to legislate for law >enforcement access to it to be obtainable through the courts on >presentation of evidence demonstrating the need for that access - now >that would be completely in line with the traditional follow the >evidence approach. Apart from the "asking a court to get involved", yes. Courts don't get involved when they collect other kinds of evidence (for example typical CCTV collection after an incident). I know you are going to say: "but the traffic data evidence is so much more sensitive". Well, Parliament disagrees with you. You can't blame law enforcement for acting within the available law. >Yes there are arguments for keeping everything - let's finger-print the >whole population, get dna samples of the whole population (of course we >would need toeducate our "expert" witnesses on statistics and on the >chances of false positives, What's that got to do with keeping traffic data for long enough for it to be useful? > but you can be pretty sure that that would not happen), place >surveillance cameras with face-recognition computers on every street >corner and in every shop/office/bank in the country, cameras with >number plate recognition on every road bridge and at road junction, and >make sure that their output is retained for at least 16 years. That is >part of the traditional evidence following approach to exactly the same >extent as all the data retention stuff our current masters in Whitehall >desire. Again, that's a completely different kind of regime. >The traditional evidence following approach involved gathering evidence >when it was needed Exactly, traffic data is collected from the CSPs, when it's needed. >and applying directed surveillance when it was justified. That is very >different from recording everything and keeping it for all time >regardless of whether that gathering and retention justified or >proportionate or totally unjustified and disproportionate. Who suggested any of that? -- Roland Perry From davidh at spidacom.co.uk Mon Nov 16 22:16:39 2009 From: davidh at spidacom.co.uk (David Hansen) Date: Mon, 16 Nov 2009 22:16:39 -0000 Subject: RIPA authorisations consultation response - no use of encryption ? In-Reply-To: <7DQuZ5Lq6bALFARr@perry.co.uk> References: <6.2.5.6.2.20091108174805.02b58c28@gn.apc.org>, , <7DQuZ5Lq6bALFARr@perry.co.uk> Message-ID: <4B01CF47.20044.219819F@davidh.spidacom.co.uk> On 16 Nov 2009 at 21:05, Roland Perry wrote: > You can't blame law > enforcement for acting within the available law. That would be a valid argument if all laws were enforced. However, the police did nothing to prevent illegal acts taking place on British soil during the most recent Iraq war, despite those acts being clearly illegal under the Terrorism Act of 2000. Neither have they yet arrested the war criminal Mr Bliar (or his co-conspirator Mr Brown) despite illegal acts under the Terrorism Act and international law. -- David Hansen, Edinburgh I will *always* explain revoked encryption keys, unless RIP prevents me http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2000/ukpga_20000023_en_8#pt3-pb3-l1g54 From colinthomson1 at o2.co.uk Tue Nov 17 01:43:41 2009 From: colinthomson1 at o2.co.uk (Tom Thomson) Date: Tue, 17 Nov 2009 01:43:41 -0000 Subject: RIPA authorisations consultation response - no use of encryption ? In-Reply-To: <7DQuZ5Lq6bALFARr@perry.co.uk> References: <6.2.5.6.2.20091108174805.02b58c28@gn.apc.org><87A6D89C0D9E3E4E94253D25B8F9B2E7117F07@DB3EX14MBXC316.europe.corp.microsoft.com><4B0048C1.27826.D9BA38@davidh.spidacom.co.uk><4B005C8E.2040306@iosis.co.uk> <7DQuZ5Lq6bALFARr@perry.co.uk> Message-ID: Sgriobh Roland Perry (snip much) > You can't blame > law enforcement for acting within the available law. Since law enforcement believes it to be within the current law to act against those outside then tent, using the full force of laws which parliament very clearly did not intend to be applicable in the circumstances where they are applied, at the same time as believing (or acting as if they believe) that those inside the tent are above the law, I can certainly blame law enforcement for acting within what they believe to be the available law. And I can blame the CPS for encouraging them in that belief. And I can certainly be unhappy about law enforcement paying no attention to the security of data which is required by current law to be secured: I believe regulations concerning the securing of certain classes of data in public services have the force of law and apply to law enforcement agencies (as does also the DPA, of course) and I know that these regulations are not obeyed because ACPO apparently has more important fish to fry than to ensure that our police forces conform to law. > >different from recording everything and keeping it for all time > >regardless of whether that gathering and retention justified or > >proportionate or totally unjustified and disproportionate. > > Who suggested any of that? Can you name a recent (since 1997; maybe since 1979) home secretary who hasn't suggested some (perhaps most) of that? With spin to suggest that it is justified and disproportionate, of course, even though it clearly isn't. M. From igb at batten.eu.org Tue Nov 17 08:05:43 2009 From: igb at batten.eu.org (Ian Batten) Date: Tue, 17 Nov 2009 08:05:43 +0000 Subject: RIPA authorisations consultation response - no use of encryption ? In-Reply-To: References: <6.2.5.6.2.20091108174805.02b58c28@gn.apc.org><87A6D89C0D9E3E4E94253D25B8F9B2E7117F07@DB3EX14MBXC316.europe.corp.microsoft.com><4B0048C1.27826.D9BA38@davidh.spidacom.co.uk><4B005C8E.2040306@iosis.co.uk> <7DQuZ5Lq6bALFARr@perry.co.uk> Message-ID: <66CE5199-8366-4EE4-A2E0-007BE18368BF@batten.eu.org> On 17 Nov 2009, at 01:43, Tom Thomson wrote: > Sgriobh Roland Perry > (snip much) >> You can't blame >> law enforcement for acting within the available law. > > Since law enforcement believes it to be within the current law to > act against those outside then tent, using the full force of laws > which parliament very clearly did not intend to be applicable in the > circumstances where they are applied Firstly, it's not at all clear to me --- and I followed the process of the legislation very closely --- that this repeated claim that RIPA is or was intended to be somehow limited to anti-terrorism holds the slightest water. The list of authorised bodies was developed in parallel with the bill itself, and Trading Standards, DHSS or whatever it was called that week and other bodies far removed from terrorism were always present. Secondly, the idea that RIPA opened up a range of new powers to a waiting horde of state actors is preposterous. What RIPA did was move a wide range of activities which had happened with no legislative or procedural oversight into a better form of governance. Not perfect, not ideal, not what we would necessarily have designed ourselves. When you read about some local authority engaging in surveillance in some trivial case, the right response is not ``my, this would never have happened before RIPA'', the right response is ``had this happened before RIPA, which it probably did, I'd never have known about it.'' Rows about fronting of addresses to get children into desirable schools have been occurring since (to my certain knowledge) the 1970s (*), and it's hard to imagine that when those needed to be sorted out the state never bothered to nip round and see if the child actually lived there. For example, prior to RIPA, ISPs were still being asked for information. But instead of being asked through a code of practice- backed single point of contact with oversight through the commissioner, they were being asked through vague DPA S.27(3) notices which weren't, so far as I understand it, even centrally collated. Individual officers were able to issue such notices (I recall getting one from a detective sergeant). The forms of surveillance that the recent cases have highlighted --- photography, following, making enquiries of neighbours --- would have had absolutely no oversight whatsoever, and if their purpose was not a trial but rather say a re- allocation of school places they would never had even ended up in front of a magistrate. Telcos were routinely asked to do reverse-DQ, and more, on the basis of a handshake and a personal contact, too. I think that what RIPA has actually done is expose in living colour the amount of informal, unoverseen surveillance that had been going on for decades. It's noticeable that, as with a lot of local authority shenanigans, it's the smaller authorities that seem to be the least capable of decent governance. I don't think that the system of having a retired judge as the commissioner is necessarily the best that could be produced, but it's a damned sight better than nothing, and prior to RIPA nothing was what you got. Yes, probably there are people in government who have had their eyes opened to possibilities they didn't realise existed, but we simply can't know if RIPA has increased or decreased the levels of state surveillance because there are no records worth much from prior to its inception. > And I can certainly be unhappy about law enforcement paying no > attention to the security of data which is required by current law > to be secured: Why, have there been cases of it leaking? Because pretty much all of government which holds unclassified-but-sensitive data (2-2-4, say) has had a leak or two, but I can't recall a single case of intercept or traffic data leaking. Good luck, or a counter-proof to your accusation? Intercept product, as in content, is I believe either CONFIDENTIAL or SECRET and cases of that leaking other than by the explicit act of a cleared and authorised officer are extremely rare. Not unknown --- there was that document left on a train a few years ago which was substantially above-SECRET--- but rare, and not in any way evidence of ``paying no attention to the security of data''. > > Can you name a recent (since 1997; maybe since 1979) home secretary > who hasn't suggested some (perhaps most) of that? With spin to > suggest that it is justified and disproportionate, of course, even > though it clearly isn't. Home Secretaries ask for the moon. It's their job to represent the positions of their department. Prime Ministers, Parliament, judges and the ECHR give them a low-orbit satellite. It's their job to rein in the positions of the Home Secretaries' departments. ian From casparb at microsoft.com Tue Nov 17 09:46:16 2009 From: casparb at microsoft.com (Caspar Bowden) Date: Tue, 17 Nov 2009 09:46:16 +0000 Subject: RIPA authorisations consultation response - no use of encryption ? In-Reply-To: <66CE5199-8366-4EE4-A2E0-007BE18368BF@batten.eu.org> References: <6.2.5.6.2.20091108174805.02b58c28@gn.apc.org><87A6D89C0D9E3E4E94253D25B8F9B2E7117F07@DB3EX14MBXC316.europe.corp.microsoft.com><4B0048C1.27826.D9BA38@davidh.spidacom.co.uk><4B005C8E.2040306@iosis.co.uk> <7DQuZ5Lq6bALFARr@perry.co.uk> <66CE5199-8366-4EE4-A2E0-007BE18368BF@batten.eu.org> Message-ID: <87A6D89C0D9E3E4E94253D25B8F9B2E7118FF6@DB3EX14MBXC316.europe.corp.microsoft.com> > bounces at chiark.greenend.org.uk] On Behalf Of Ian Batten ... > legislation very closely --- that this repeated claim that RIPA is or was > intended to be somehow limited to anti-terrorism holds the slightest water. > The list of authorised bodies was developed in parallel with the bill itself, and > Trading Standards, DHSS or whatever it was called that week and other > bodies far removed from terrorism were always present. It's bit more complex than that. When FIPR was on RIPA's case in Parliament, of course we suspected that the clauses allowing other bodies to be added to the list of traffic data recipients looked too heavy duty not to be planned for use. So we duly pressed the govt. via oppostition questions in debate, and got a Minister to intone "we have no plans yada-yada". Was this a lie? Were officials lying to Ministers? I suspect it was very like in The Thick of It. Anyway a year or so after RIPA went through (and after an election now with ramblebrained Blunkett as HomeSec), the govt. said "Stone me, looks like we'll have to add hundreds of other councils/public bodies" Of course all this is somewhat orthogonal to the question of statutory purposes for which comms data can be obtained, which were always way (way, way) broader than counter-terrorism. When this was raised during RIPA debate, typically the government would imply the legislation was all "about" terrorism, but then offer up some tragic hypothetical in a lesser domain as a case which no sane person would want to exclude. Also, what the Home Office press office would put out to the media never had any particular connection to the truth or what was being told to Parliament. The press office just made up whatever sounded plausible, and what a broadsheet crime reporter would expect the legislation to say. But most of government is like that the past 10 years at least. ... > d to possibilities they didn't > realise existed, but we simply can't know if RIPA has increased or decreased > the levels of state surveillance because there are no records worth much from > prior to its inception. Anyone in any doubt that RIPA has led to a "motorization" of surveillance across all sectors has not been paying attention. The basic criticism of New Labour home secretaries is they have simply gone to ACPO (especially) and asked "what do you want", and after prioritizing their surveillance wish list through the prism of populism, just gone and enacted it. Labour thought that being more socially authoritarian than the centre-right ever used to be (Blair's strategy never to be outflanked on law and order) was a vote-winner with their core and middle-england, thus a no-brainer. They have had not the slightest serious interest in human rights or unintended consequence critique. caspar From richard at highwayman.com Tue Nov 17 23:19:41 2009 From: richard at highwayman.com (Richard Clayton) Date: Tue, 17 Nov 2009 23:19:41 +0000 Subject: RIPA authorisations consultation response - no use of encryption ? In-Reply-To: <66CE5199-8366-4EE4-A2E0-007BE18368BF@batten.eu.org> References: <6.2.5.6.2.20091108174805.02b58c28@gn.apc.org> <87A6D89C0D9E3E4E94253D25B8F9B2E7117F07@DB3EX14MBXC316.europe.corp.microsoft.com> <4B0048C1.27826.D9BA38@davidh.spidacom.co.uk> <4B005C8E.2040306@iosis.co.uk> <7DQuZ5Lq6bALFARr@perry.co.uk> <66CE5199-8366-4EE4-A2E0-007BE18368BF@batten.eu.org> Message-ID: -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 In article <66CE5199-8366-4EE4-A2E0-007BE18368BF at batten.eu.org>, Ian Batten writes >Firstly, it's not at all clear to me --- and I followed the process of >the legislation very closely --- that this repeated claim that RIPA is >or was intended to be somehow limited to anti-terrorism holds the >slightest water. I agree -- notwithstanding Caspar's memory -- it was entirely clear to the ISP/telco world that there would be a continuation of the use of data for the investigation of all sorts of other crimes; just as was the case with the DPA forms that were used for the system up to that time. I don't think it was clear, mainly because we hadn't thought it through very carefully, what a wide range of offences are investigated by organisations other than the police ... all the "Egg Marketing Boards" that we discuss so inaccurately from time to time. I'd never heard of the NHS counter fraud people (which first sounded like fake chemist shops, with inappropriate formica table tops) until they turned up in some draft regs. The reason for my ignorance was of course that they very seldom ever turned up asking for comms data from the ISP world, and perhaps they still don't ? Anyway -- it seems to me that the "it's all about terrorism" meme came from the Home Office website. When they redesigned the RIP material to the subsite "security.homeoffice.gov.uk" almost exactly 4 years ago, the blurb on the page said The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA) legislates for using various methods of surveillance and information gathering for the prevention of crime including terrorism. so what's a journalist, in a hurry to write a story, going to say that RIP 2000 is all about before they get on with the rest of their article? The equivalent page (albeit with a revamped URL) now says The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA) provides for, and regulates the use of, a range of investigative powers, by a variety of public authorities. or on the main RIP page The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA) puts a regulatory framework around a range of investigatory powers. >Why, have there been cases of it leaking? Because pretty much all of >government which holds unclassified-but-sensitive data (2-2-4, say) >has had a leak or two, but I can't recall a single case of intercept >or traffic data leaking. Good luck, or a counter-proof to your >accusation? Intercept product, as in content, is I believe either >CONFIDENTIAL or SECRET and cases of that leaking other than by the >explicit act of a cleared and authorised officer are extremely rare. >Not unknown --- there was that document left on a train a few years >ago which was substantially above-SECRET--- but rare, and not in any >way evidence of ``paying no attention to the security of data''. A similar idea of "not really leaking", but I think they sailed pretty close to the wind in the comments made after the trials of the liquid bomb plotters. In the second trial they were able to introduce some key emails because they had managed to obtain copies via MLA processes from (IIRC) Yahoo! The strong implication was that this material had been available to the investigators at the time... ... mind you, that may have just been legal niceties in that the Feds had provided copies of the email on an "intelligence basis" the first time and the MLAT wheels ground so slowly that during the first trial they just couldn't obtain copies fast enough that could be put before the court. - -- richard Richard Clayton Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety. Benjamin Franklin 11 Nov 1755 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGPsdk version 1.7.1 iQA/AwUBSwMvjZoAxkTY1oPiEQKvXgCeMPjPa4l/glPPwwWbP77ESdtCyZQAoO0i pUMBznOSVwe367JWWW/8/d4H =VlKl -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From clive at davros.org Tue Nov 17 23:28:31 2009 From: clive at davros.org (Clive D.W. Feather) Date: Tue, 17 Nov 2009 23:28:31 +0000 Subject: RIPA authorisations consultation response - no use of encryption ? In-Reply-To: References: <87A6D89C0D9E3E4E94253D25B8F9B2E7117F07@DB3EX14MBXC316.europe.corp.microsoft.com> <4B0048C1.27826.D9BA38@davidh.spidacom.co.uk> <4B005C8E.2040306@iosis.co.uk> <7DQuZ5Lq6bALFARr@perry.co.uk> <66CE5199-8366-4EE4-A2E0-007BE18368BF@batten.eu.org> Message-ID: <20091117232831.GU67345@davros.org> Richard Clayton said: >> Firstly, it's not at all clear to me --- and I followed the process of >> the legislation very closely --- that this repeated claim that RIPA is >> or was intended to be somehow limited to anti-terrorism holds the >> slightest water. > > I agree -- notwithstanding Caspar's memory -- it was entirely clear to > the ISP/telco world that there would be a continuation of the use of > data for the investigation of all sorts of other crimes; just as was the > case with the DPA forms that were used for the system up to that time. Indeed. The whole point was to replace the rather dubious use of s.29(3) DPA forms. Terrorism wasn't even on the horizon (this was about the time that everyone was laughing the idea of data retention out of the House). -- Clive D.W. Feather | If you lie to the compiler, Email: clive at davros.org | it will get its revenge. Web: http://www.davros.org | - Henry Spencer Mobile: +44 7973 377646 From lists at internetpolicyagency.com Wed Nov 18 05:17:43 2009 From: lists at internetpolicyagency.com (Roland Perry) Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2009 05:17:43 +0000 Subject: RIPA authorisations consultation response - no use of encryption ? In-Reply-To: <4B01CF47.20044.219819F@davidh.spidacom.co.uk> References: <6.2.5.6.2.20091108174805.02b58c28@gn.apc.org> <7DQuZ5Lq6bALFARr@perry.co.uk> <4B01CF47.20044.219819F@davidh.spidacom.co.uk> Message-ID: In article <4B01CF47.20044.219819F at davidh.spidacom.co.uk>, David Hansen writes >> enforcement for acting within the available law. > >That would be a valid argument if all laws were enforced. However, the >police did nothing to prevent illegal acts taking place on British soil >during the most recent Iraq war, despite those acts being clearly >illegal under the Terrorism Act of 2000. Neither have they yet arrested >the war criminal Mr Bliar (or his co-conspirator Mr Brown) despite >illegal acts under the Terrorism Act and international law. I'll try to remember that if a policeman tries to give me a speeding ticket: "I refuse to accept your authority for doing this, on the grounds that there are several alleged war criminals you have failed to arrest earlier in your shift". -- Roland Perry From igb at batten.eu.org Wed Nov 18 07:29:30 2009 From: igb at batten.eu.org (Ian Batten) Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2009 07:29:30 +0000 Subject: RIPA authorisations consultation response - no use of encryption ? In-Reply-To: References: <6.2.5.6.2.20091108174805.02b58c28@gn.apc.org> <87A6D89C0D9E3E4E94253D25B8F9B2E7117F07@DB3EX14MBXC316.europe.corp.microsoft.com> <4B0048C1.27826.D9BA38@davidh.spidacom.co.uk> <4B005C8E.2040306@iosis.co.uk> <7DQuZ5Lq6bALFARr@perry.co.uk> <66CE5199-8366-4EE4-A2E0-007BE18368BF@batten.eu.org> Message-ID: <0045051D-0B49-4B0C-A894-54FD2F4B9DFC@batten.eu.org> > > A similar idea of "not really leaking", Just to clarify, I used `leaking' to mean `carelessly allowing information to leak' rather than in the sense of `deliberately leaking something to a journalist'. I'm sure that the latter happens with classified data, but my contention is that there is no evidence of widespread and gross carelessness on a systematic level. ian From lists at internetpolicyagency.com Wed Nov 18 09:04:01 2009 From: lists at internetpolicyagency.com (Roland Perry) Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2009 09:04:01 +0000 Subject: RIPA authorisations consultation response - no use of encryption ? In-Reply-To: <87A6D89C0D9E3E4E94253D25B8F9B2E7118FF6@DB3EX14MBXC316.europe.corp.microsoft.com> References: <6.2.5.6.2.20091108174805.02b58c28@gn.apc.org> <87A6D89C0D9E3E4E94253D25B8F9B2E7117F07@DB3EX14MBXC316.europe.corp.microsoft.com> <4B0048C1.27826.D9BA38@davidh.spidacom.co.uk> <4B005C8E.2040306@iosis.co.uk> <7DQuZ5Lq6bALFARr@perry.co.uk> <66CE5199-8366-4EE4-A2E0-007BE18368BF@batten.eu.org> <87A6D89C0D9E3E4E94253D25B8F9B2E7118FF6@DB3EX14MBXC316.europe.corp.microsoft.com> Message-ID: In article <87A6D89C0D9E3E4E94253D25B8F9B2E7118FF6 at DB3EX14MBXC316.europe.corp.micros oft.com>, Caspar Bowden writes >> bounces at chiark.greenend.org.uk] On Behalf Of Ian Batten >... >> legislation very closely --- that this repeated claim that RIPA is or was >> intended to be somehow limited to anti-terrorism holds the slightest water. >> The list of authorised bodies was developed in parallel with the bill >>itself, and >> Trading Standards, DHSS or whatever it was called that week and other >> bodies far removed from terrorism were always present. There were lists in circulation amongst industry, listing numerous bits of vertical legislation [giving powers to specific organisations] that RIPA was going to obsolete, and hence stem the flow of 29(3) requests from those organisations. That gave a huge clue to the probable diversity of organisations (named in those bits of legislation). The concept of the Egg Marketing Board as a potential RIPA authority managed to get some traction. And it was true, but for surveillance ('snooping' on people falsely printing Lions on imported eggs) only, not acquiring comms data. >It's bit more complex than that. When FIPR was on RIPA's case in >Parliament, of course we suspected that the clauses allowing other >bodies to be added to the list of traffic data recipients looked too >heavy duty not to be planned for use. So we duly pressed the govt. via >oppostition questions in debate, and got a Minister to intone "we have >no plans yada-yada". It was clear to me that the main reason for that clause was to allow RIPA to be "extended" to an organisation such as SOCA [whose formation probably wasn't being planned yet] without passing new primary legislation, meanwhile deleting obsoleted organisations like NCIS and NCS. >Was this a lie? Were officials lying to Ministers? I suspect it was >very like in The Thick of It. Anyway a year or so after RIPA went >through (and after an election now with ramblebrained Blunkett as >HomeSec), the govt. said "Stone me, looks like we'll have to add >hundreds of other councils/public bodies" They were always going to be included, for their Trading Standards departments to investigate rogue traders, if nothing else. Whether that's by using the mechanism above, or a very similar one in its absence, is not especially relevant. >Of course all this is somewhat orthogonal to the question of statutory >purposes for which comms data can be obtained, which were always way >(way, way) broader than counter-terrorism. That's because the legislation wasn't described as "counter-terrorism". That's a much more recent meme, that also makes good newspaper articles. It might have been better to pass three (or even four) separate Acts, for the different parts/sections. Then there wouldn't have arisen the possibility for surveillance by local council bin inspectors to get mixed up with intercepting phone calls by the Security Services (etc). >When this was raised during RIPA debate, typically the government would >imply the legislation was all "about" terrorism, but then offer up some >tragic hypothetical in a lesser domain as a case which no sane person >would want to exclude. I don't recall that. Perhaps you are conflating it with the post 9/11 Data Retention discussions that arose soon afterwards? >>we simply can't know if RIPA has increased or decreased >> the levels of state surveillance because there are no records worth much from >> prior to its inception. > >Anyone in any doubt that RIPA has led to a "motorization" of >surveillance across all sectors has not been paying attention. It's possible that some public authorities have been alerted to the fact that surveillance is a tool they could use, as a result of the publicity surrounding RIPA. I'm more inclined to think that they were doing it all along, in an unregulated fashion, and never really gave it a name. -- Roland Perry From casparb at microsoft.com Wed Nov 18 22:01:26 2009 From: casparb at microsoft.com (Caspar Bowden) Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2009 22:01:26 +0000 Subject: Why our honourable friends can't encrypt... Message-ID: <87A6D89C0D9E3E4E94253D25B8F9B2E71198C0@DB3EX14MBXC316.europe.corp.microsoft.com> http://www.theregister.co.uk/2009/11/16/pgp_parliament_no_go/ -- Caspar Bowden -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From pwt at iosis.co.uk Thu Nov 19 06:10:54 2009 From: pwt at iosis.co.uk (Peter Tomlinson) Date: Thu, 19 Nov 2009 06:10:54 +0000 Subject: Why our honourable friends can't encrypt... In-Reply-To: <87A6D89C0D9E3E4E94253D25B8F9B2E71198C0@DB3EX14MBXC316.europe.corp.microsoft.com> References: <87A6D89C0D9E3E4E94253D25B8F9B2E71198C0@DB3EX14MBXC316.europe.corp.microsoft.com> Message-ID: <4B04E16E.60401@iosis.co.uk> I have already forwarded the link to Lord Erroll, whose background is IT. If I don't hear anything soon, I may ask a friend who sometimes works with him to give him a call. Peter Caspar Bowden wrote: > > http://www.theregister.co.uk/2009/11/16/pgp_parliament_no_go/ > > > > -- > > Caspar Bowden > > > From lists at internetpolicyagency.com Fri Nov 20 16:26:25 2009 From: lists at internetpolicyagency.com (Roland Perry) Date: Fri, 20 Nov 2009 16:26:25 +0000 Subject: Why our honourable friends can't encrypt... In-Reply-To: <87A6D89C0D9E3E4E94253D25B8F9B2E71198C0@DB3EX14MBXC316.europe.corp.microsoft.com> References: <87A6D89C0D9E3E4E94253D25B8F9B2E71198C0@DB3EX14MBXC316.europe.corp.microsoft.com> Message-ID: In article <87A6D89C0D9E3E4E94253D25B8F9B2E71198C0 at DB3EX14MBXC316.europe.corp.micros oft.com>, Caspar Bowden writes >http://www.theregister.co.uk/2009/11/16/pgp_parliament_no_go/ If it's just a technical issue, surely some clever techies can sort it out? Doing tech support by PQ is just... so... clumsy. This sort of story re-inforces my view that current implementations of things like PGP are simply so far away from plug-and-play that they simply can't let out on the general public. -- Roland Perry From casparb at microsoft.com Fri Nov 20 17:21:06 2009 From: casparb at microsoft.com (Caspar Bowden) Date: Fri, 20 Nov 2009 17:21:06 +0000 Subject: Why our honourable friends can't encrypt... In-Reply-To: References: <87A6D89C0D9E3E4E94253D25B8F9B2E71198C0@DB3EX14MBXC316.europe.corp.microsoft.com> Message-ID: <87A6D89C0D9E3E4E94253D25B8F9B2E711A2C8@DB3EX14MBXC316.europe.corp.microsoft.com> > bounces at chiark.greenend.org.uk] On Behalf Of Roland Perry ... > If it's just a technical issue, surely some clever techies can sort it out? Doing > tech support by PQ is just... so... clumsy. > > This sort of story re-inforces my view that current implementations of things > like PGP are simply so far away from plug-and-play that they simply can't let > out on the general public. Er...but the reason had nothing to do with it being an encryption program - might as well say the public can't be trusted to install software that depends on DLLs... I sort of imagine... HoC PFY: "...that MP with the nerdy assistant is hassling us about PGP again. Looks like he doesn't trust the Wilson doctrine applies to e-mails..." HoC BOFH: "...tell them about that spurious DLL incompatibility with the previous version. We want to spin this out as long as possible else Cheltenham will be wanting us to install a few non-optional extras on the Members' machines, and that will not please the Speaker. The next govt will probably abolish Wilson doctrine anyway after the IoCC's recommendations, and then we can say it would be contrary to public policy..." Caspar From lists at internetpolicyagency.com Sat Nov 21 14:09:13 2009 From: lists at internetpolicyagency.com (Roland Perry) Date: Sat, 21 Nov 2009 14:09:13 +0000 Subject: Why our honourable friends can't encrypt... In-Reply-To: <87A6D89C0D9E3E4E94253D25B8F9B2E711A2C8@DB3EX14MBXC316.europe.corp.microsoft.com> References: <87A6D89C0D9E3E4E94253D25B8F9B2E71198C0@DB3EX14MBXC316.europe.corp.microsoft.com> <87A6D89C0D9E3E4E94253D25B8F9B2E711A2C8@DB3EX14MBXC316.europe.corp.microsoft.com> Message-ID: In article <87A6D89C0D9E3E4E94253D25B8F9B2E711A2C8 at DB3EX14MBXC316.europe.corp.micros oft.com>, Caspar Bowden writes >> bounces at chiark.greenend.org.uk] On Behalf Of Roland Perry >... >> If it's just a technical issue, surely some clever techies can sort >>it out? Doing >> tech support by PQ is just... so... clumsy. >> >> This sort of story re-inforces my view that current implementations of things >> like PGP are simply so far away from plug-and-play that they simply can't let >> out on the general public. > >Er...but the reason had nothing to do with it being an encryption >program - might as well say the public can't be trusted to install >software that depends on DLLs... It doesn't matter what the software is intended to do, if it's so hard to install, with so many pitfalls, then it's unfit for purpose. >I sort of imagine... > >HoC PFY: "...that MP with the nerdy assistant is hassling us about PGP >again. Looks like he doesn't trust the Wilson doctrine applies to >e-mails..." > >HoC BOFH: "...tell them about that spurious DLL incompatibility with >the previous version. But if it was easy to show that a subsequent version installed without any issues, why wouldn't that sweep aside all these 'political' wrigglings? -- Roland Perry