Mastering the Internet
Peter Fairbrother
ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk
Fri, 15 May 2009 16:01:46 +0100
Ian Batten wrote:
>>
>> But unlike alcohol, it is also illegal simply to make content
>> available, as stated in ss.2(2)(a).
>
> But from a practical point of view, this is difficult, and the law
> (contrary to the belief of engineers on t'Internet) tends to favour
> practicality over hair-splitting.
Roland's the one who is trying to split hairs here, the law is plain.
And practical.
(BTW, I'm told that if you leave a pile of cocaine out for people to use
at a party then you are supplying them, even if no-one takes any. So I
guess the hotel IS supplying the minor, even if he doesn't drink any.
Even more obviously so for "making available".)
> Consider the case of the targeted, warranted interception of a single
> named individual. This would most likely be done by taking a feed out
> of a roughly adjacent switch, and supplying it unmediated to a Black Box
> which extracts the content for which the warrant has been issued.
Eh? If we are talking about some DPI regime in the future, maybe, but I
believe nowadays warranted content is selected and filtered by the ISP.
There ain't no black boxes, and they would be illegal.
> I
> doubt many of us would have a problem with that process, unless we want
> to argue that no one should have their communications intercepted ever.
Yes, I most certainly would have a problem with feeding everything from
a "roughly adjacent switch" (ouch!) to a blackbox! Apart from being
completely and obviously illegal, it would give the owner of the black
box access to far too much traffic.
And who is going to identify the "roughly adjacent switch"? The Police?
HM Customs or whatever they call themselves these days? MI5, MI6? GCHQ?
The ISPs are the only ones with sufficient technical knowledge of their
own networks to be able to do it.
>
> But by your reading that's illegal: everyone whose traffic wasn't on the
> warrant is being intercepted (and not just by `making available': it's
> being fed into the box that does the targeting).
>
> What's your alternative? That every ISP should have DPI-capable
> inspection gear throughout its network, and be given the raw targeting
> information?
Yes, exactly that. If DPI is to be done, then someone must do it - and
the ISP is the obvious person.
There are three main cases - first, DPI to identify and provide
warranted content. That's fairly easy if the target's IP can be
determined (if it can't be, it's almost impossible). A big ISP will have
a few of these in operation at any time.
Next, DPI to identify traffic data for targeted people, including
"hidden" comms in webmail etc. Maybe a few thousand of these?
Lastly, DPI to detect and store traffic data for all "hidden" comms for
everyone, to add to the email etc traffic logs which the ISPs already
have to keep. I don't know whether that is going to happen, though I
know "they" want it - however the cost would be mind-boggling.
Whoever does whatever is eventually deemed necessary, it's going to cost
much the same - and as it's just a question of who controls the filter
box, give me the ISPs every time.
Besides, who says there is only one filter output? The ISPs may have to
supply warranted content to different police forces, intelligence
services, different Customs offices, Egg Marketing Boards, and so on.
Or do you want a single organisation like the Police or GCHQ or whoever
to do it, and thereby have access to all the internet's traffic to do
with as they please?
And which organisation might that be?
Hmm, how about the ISPs?
> Fine: hands up all the ISPs which want to maintain a full
> intercept capability
They are already *required* to do that, at least the bigger ones are.
> plus the staff and processes to handle the
> targeting list, which will be HMG SECRET at least.
ISPs already know, and unless they are to feed everything on their nets
into blackboxes they have to know, the targeting list, - and I for one
would have huge problems with the latter idea!
-- Peter Fairbrother
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