Mastering the Internet
Peter Fairbrother
ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk
Tue, 05 May 2009 21:19:47 +0100
Roland Perry wrote:
> In article <49FE8503.2060301@zen.co.uk>, Peter Fairbrother
> <zenadsl6186@zen.co.uk> writes
>> ** If you send any content along the wire to the "black box" you are
>> making it available to the box and whoever controls or has access to
>> the box, and you are therefore intercepting. If there isn't a relevant
>> warrant or Order in place, it's illegal, no matter who asks you
>> (politely) to do it. **
>
> I think we may have had this debate before.
>
> What you describe is not "making available" until the data flows.
Sigh. Flows where? To GCHQ. or along the wire to the box?
(hint - the answer is the second one. In the first case, even if the box
isn't switched on, it's still interception, as long as GCHQ control the
switch.)
> Otherwise our intercept-ready telephone exchanges would be illegal.
In the old days, before computers, BT would shoo everyone out of an
exchange, and a special BT repairman executive type would come in and
install the hardware.
I don't know how today's intercept-ready telephone exchanges work
though. Who controls when data is sent?
If it's BT then it's legal; but if GCHQ control when data is sent then
it wouldn't be legal, even if no data is flowing [1].
[1] except perhaps because of the existence of a relevant Order - ref.
3(3)(b) last part. I'm assuming an Order is an "enactment", but I'm not
sure whether it's an "enactment relating to the use of postal services
or telecommunications services".
[...]
> The permanent intercept capability can be operated by the CSP.
But it can't be operated or controlled by GCHQ/whoever without illegally
intercepting, unless perhaps there is an order in place. That's the
point I'm trying to make.
>>> Nevertheless, you might want to have a look at: "Regulation of
>>> Investigatory Powers (Maintenance of Interception Capability) Order .
>>> 2002" 2002/1931 which does seem to have gone through Parliament
>>> despite your earlier assertion that no such orders had been laid.
>>
>> That doesn't cover black boxes, not even nearly.
>
> It does if a "black box" is the way that the permanent intercept
> capability has to implemented to be effective at a specific CSP. If the
> CSP disagrees, that's what the TAB is for as an appeals mechanism.
I'm pretty sure the installation of a black box can't be imposed under
that Order, and it wouldn't get as far as the TAB. I'll re-read it
though, after I finish designing a "black box".
(BTW, any idea what hardware would be needed to strip from: IP addresses
from a OC-192, compare them with a list of IP addresses, and output the
packets which don't match?)
-- Peter Fairbrother