Mastering the Internet

[Roland Perry]

In article <49FE8503.2060301@zen.co.uk>, Peter Fairbrother 
<zenadsl6186@zen.co.uk> writes
>** If you send any content along the wire to the "black box" you are 
>making it available to the box and whoever controls or has access to 
>the box, and you are therefore intercepting. If there isn't a relevant 
>warrant or Order in place, it's illegal, no matter who asks you 
>(politely) to do it. **

I think we may have had this debate before.

What you describe is not "making available" until the data flows. 
Otherwise our intercept-ready telephone exchanges would be illegal.

>>  If you wanted to use the probes to extract "all" comms data, then 
>>you  are back to the central warehouse idea. There either will or 
>>won't be  one, and if there is the probes are merely the way it's 
>>implemented.
>
>We are told there won't be a central warehouse?

The fat lady is some way off singing, I reckon.

[Snip - issues answered by Ken]
[snip - more stuff about "making available"]

>>  You misunderstand what s12 is all about.
>
>I don't think so. It says the SOS can require something for 
>interception capability.
>
>I may have misunderstood a part of it though, on re-reading it. S. 
>12(3) says "the only steps that may be specified or described in a 
>notice given to a person under subsection (2) are steps appearing to 
>the Secretary of State to be necessary for securing that that person 
>has the practical capability of providing any assistance which he may 
>be required to provide in relation to relevant interception warrants."
>
>I had taken that to include the fitting of black boxes with access to 
>content, to be switched on by GCHQ or whoever was implementing the 
>warrant, with GCHQ then being responsible for only looking at what is 
>legal. But perhaps I was wrong about that?

The permanent intercept capability can be operated by the CSP. All that 
s12 does is alter the cashflow situation so that the Home Office 
benefits from the economy of scale of a permanently installed system 
that can be used quickly and cheaply whenever required (using individual 
warrants to legalise each individual live tapping session), rather than 
having to pay for ad-hoc arrangements every time the need arises.

>>  Nevertheless, you might want to have a look at: "Regulation of 
>>Investigatory Powers (Maintenance of Interception Capability) Order .
>> 2002" 2002/1931 which does seem to have gone through Parliament 
>>despite  your earlier assertion that no such orders had been laid.
>
>That doesn't cover black boxes, not even nearly.

It does if a "black box" is the way that the permanent intercept 
capability has to implemented to be effective at a specific CSP. If the 
CSP disagrees, that's what the TAB is for as an appeals mechanism.

-- 
Roland Perry