Data Retention Regulations in the Lords

Pete Mitchell ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk
Fri, 27 Mar 2009 11:35:23 +0000


James Firth wrote  on 27-03-09 09:54:
> The simplest argument I can find against spending any significant money in
> this area at this moment it that the spending will be wasted entering an
> arms race that the government can't, by insisting on broad-brush measures,
> win due to the pace and agility that the foe can move forward compared to
> the inertia of government legislation and technology roll-outs on a massive
> scale in co-operation with independent telcos.
> 
> It's already acknowledged that IMP will do little for offshore web-based
> communications systems that use SSL, except to identify the precise date and
> time that TCP-sessions were established with the offshore server from within
> the UK.
> 
> I can think of numerous countermeasures against this (proxy-routing, decoy
> traffic etc), and I don't for a minute believe that terrorist organisations
> or seriously organised criminals will not employ rather quickly.
> 
> The intercept capability will quickly become useless against all but petty
> criminals and yet be open to abuse by the government if it so chose to abuse
> the data.

Quite, but that's not an argument against them doing it.



-- 
Pete Mitchell