Out-Law newsletter says IWF "was wrong to lift its ban on a Wikipedia page"

[Florian Weimer]

* Clive D. W. Feather:

> In article <87ljuiiqgb.fsf@mid.deneb.enyo.de>, Florian Weimer 
> <fw@deneb.enyo.de> writes
>>Depends on what you mean by "hosting".  The hosting/access distinction
>>for content enforcement breaks down once the party who is directly
>>reponsible for the content is itself an ISP (at least technically).
>
> No, it doesn't. The legal tests are based on the activity, not the 
> connectivity.

So you tell me that in order to opt out of jurisdiction, all I have to
do is to rent a few RUs in some London data centers, become a RIPE
member, fake a few traceroutes (as an optimization), and can serve
illegal content, from within the UK?

I thought we had learned from that incident...

>>According to the RIPE database and the Routeviews project, DataHop
>>provides connectivity for Wikimedia's European network, to ISPs such
>>as NTT/Verio, KPN, and Sprint.
>>
>>The problem is that once you disclaim domestic responsibility for such
>>IP transit service, you create an easy way for anyone to opt out of
>>jurisdiction.
>
> It doesn't matter.
>
> Under EU law, there are two separate tests.

It's not "EU law", it's just your (or maybe the Crown's)
interpretation of it.

> (1) If an ISP transmits material provided by another, they are not 
> liable for the contents of that transmission - e.g. if they could be 
> sued for "publication" or prosecuted for "possession", they have an 
> absolute defence. This is not subject to a test of knowledge.

Hopefully, they still can become an accessory to the crime.
Otherwise, you've got a major loophole.

> (2) If an ISP hosts material on behalf of another, they are not liable 
> for the contents of that material *until* they are put on notice and 
> fail to expeditiously remove it or block access to it. If they continue 
> to provide access after notice, then they lose this defence but may 
> continue to have other defences (e.g. "it's not indecent").
>
> If DataHop don't control the machines (not the access, the machines) 
> that Wikimedia use, then (2) doesn't apply.

So how do we get illegal content off the Internet if the criminals are
service providers themselves?