From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk  Thu Sep  4 16:15:21 2008
From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (jul kornbluth)
Date: Thu, 4 Sep 2008 16:15:21 +0100
Subject: Talk next Friday
In-Reply-To: <E1KYkxh-0001Ov-00@mta2.cl.cam.ac.uk>
References: <E1KYkxh-0001Ov-00@mta2.cl.cam.ac.uk>
Message-ID: <9b67f38f0809040815q72770bd5l69255ce06f7ade15@mail.gmail.com>

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I would be very interested in this talk.  Where is it?

Jul Kornbluth
www.healtheCard.co.uk <http://www.healthecard.co.uk/>



2008/8/28 Ross Anderson <Ross.Anderson@cl.cam.ac.uk>

> I'm pleased to announce that Deborah Peel will be visiting the UK next
> week and giving a talk on Friday September 5th:
>
>  http://www.talks.cam.ac.uk/talk/index/13305
>
> Deborah leads he US Coalition for Patient Privacy and of the NGO
> Patient Privacy Rights, whose achievements in the last few years
> have been extremely impressive.
>
> I hope to see many of you there
>
> Ross
>
>
> ______________________________________________
> This email has been scanned by Netintelligence
> http://www.netintelligence.com/email
>
>

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<div dir="ltr"><div>I would be very interested in this talk.&nbsp; Where is it?</div>
<div>&nbsp;</div>
<div>Jul Kornbluth</div>
<div><a href="http://www.healthecard.co.uk/">www.healtheCard.co.uk</a></div>
<div><br><br>&nbsp;</div>
<div class="gmail_quote">2008/8/28 Ross Anderson <span dir="ltr">&lt;<a href="mailto:Ross.Anderson@cl.cam.ac.uk">Ross.Anderson@cl.cam.ac.uk</a>&gt;</span><br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="PADDING-LEFT: 1ex; MARGIN: 0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; BORDER-LEFT: #ccc 1px solid">I&#39;m pleased to announce that Deborah Peel will be visiting the UK next<br>week and giving a talk on Friday September 5th:<br>
<br>&nbsp;<a href="http://www.talks.cam.ac.uk/talk/index/13305" target="_blank">http://www.talks.cam.ac.uk/talk/index/13305</a><br><br>Deborah leads he US Coalition for Patient Privacy and of the NGO<br>Patient Privacy Rights, whose achievements in the last few years<br>
have been extremely impressive.<br><br>I hope to see many of you there<br><br>Ross<br><br><br>______________________________________________<br>This email has been scanned by Netintelligence<br><a href="http://www.netintelligence.com/email" target="_blank">http://www.netintelligence.com/email</a><br>
<br></blockquote></div><br></div>

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From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk  Thu Sep  4 19:29:18 2008
From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Chris Salter)
Date: Thu, 4 Sep 2008 19:29:18 +0100
Subject: Re[2]: Talk next Friday
In-Reply-To: <9b67f38f0809040815q72770bd5l69255ce06f7ade15@mail.gmail.com>
References: <E1KYkxh-0001Ov-00@mta2.cl.cam.ac.uk><9b67f38f0809040815q72770bd5l69255ce06f7ade15@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <591691910.20080904192918@originalthinktank.org.uk>

Hello Jul & UKCrypto,

Thursday, September 4, 2008, 4:15:21 PM, you wrote:

> I would be very interested in this talk.  Where is it?

A little drilling unearthed the following

http://www.cam.ac.uk/map/v4/drawmap.cgi?mp=main;xx=671;yy=491;mt=c;tl=William%20Gates%20Building
or
http://preview.tinyurl.com/5n9qvx

> Jul Kornbluth
> www.healtheCard.co.uk <http://www.healthecard.co.uk/>



> 2008/8/28 Ross Anderson <Ross.Anderson@cl.cam.ac.uk>

>> I'm pleased to announce that Deborah Peel will be visiting the UK next
>> week and giving a talk on Friday September 5th:
>>
>>  http://www.talks.cam.ac.uk/talk/index/13305
>>
>> Deborah leads he US Coalition for Patient Privacy and of the NGO
>> Patient Privacy Rights, whose achievements in the last few years
>> have been extremely impressive.
>>
>> I hope to see many of you there
>>
>> Ross
>>
>>
>> ______________________________________________
>> This email has been scanned by Netintelligence
>> http://www.netintelligence.com/email
>>
>>



-- 
 Chris Salter                      mailto:ukcrypto@originalthinktank.org.uk
 Cornwall United Kingdom        http://www.originalthinktank.org.uk/



From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk  Thu Sep  4 18:41:10 2008
From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Roger Hird)
Date: Thu, 04 Sep 2008 18:41:10 +0100
Subject: Talk next Friday
In-Reply-To: <9b67f38f0809040815q72770bd5l69255ce06f7ade15@mail.gmail.com>
References: <E1KYkxh-0001Ov-00@mta2.cl.cam.ac.uk> <9b67f38f0809040815q72770bd5l69255ce06f7ade15@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <4fd9a50540roger.hird@argonet.co.uk>

In article <9b67f38f0809040815q72770bd5l69255ce06f7ade15@mail.gmail.com>,
   jul kornbluth <jul@healthecard.co.uk> wrote:
> I would be very interested in this talk.  Where is it?
SNIP
> 2008/8/28 Ross Anderson <Ross.Anderson@cl.cam.ac.uk>

> > I'm pleased to announce that Deborah Peel will be visiting the UK next
> > week and giving a talk on Friday September 5th:
> >
> >  http://www.talks.cam.ac.uk/talk/index/13305

Try clicking on the link, above.

-- 
Roger Hird
roger.hird@argonet.co.uk

Running RISCOS 4.39 on an Acorn StrongARM RiscPC 


From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk  Sat Sep  6 21:32:26 2008
From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Ian Batten)
Date: Sat, 6 Sep 2008 21:32:26 +0100
Subject: The Great Zero Challenge
Message-ID: <6690F1C8-168F-4812-8870-346257BD9710@batten.eu.org>

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I don't know about anyone else, but I have auditors making strong  
noises about data destruction on disks containing sensitive  
information.  I gather the fun increases when it's protectively marked  
--- cynics who say that the correct way to dispose of government data  
is to mark it `sensitive' and leave it outside your office door with  
the empty milk bottles are just being difficult --- especially if the  
disk itself has failed in some way so it can't have data erasure  
software run.

These dudes are challenging people to recover data from a disk that's  
been overwritten with zeros once.    The silence is deafening: you  
would naively expect that companies that sell data erasure software  
would be able to test their own software to show that it wipes blanker  
than mere dd-ing of zeroes over the top, but clearly not...

http://16systems.com/zero/index.html

http://hardware.slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=08/09/06/189248
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	charset=US-ASCII
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<html><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: space; =
-webkit-line-break: after-white-space; "><base href=3D"data:"><div =
style=3D"font-family: 'Segoe UI'; font-size: 13px; color: black; =
text-align: left; ">I don't know about anyone else, but I have auditors =
making strong noises about data destruction on disks containing =
sensitive information. &nbsp;I gather the fun increases when it's =
protectively marked --- cynics who say that the correct way to dispose =
of government data is to mark it `sensitive' and leave it outside your =
office door with the empty milk bottles are just being difficult --- =
especially if the disk itself has failed in some way so it can't have =
data erasure software run.</div><div style=3D"font-family: 'Segoe UI'; =
font-size: 13px; color: black; text-align: left; "><br></div><div =
style=3D"font-family: 'Segoe UI'; font-size: 13px; color: black; =
text-align: left; ">These dudes are challenging people to recover data =
from a disk that's been overwritten with zeros once. &nbsp; &nbsp;The =
silence is deafening: you would naively expect that companies that sell =
data erasure software would be able to test their own software to show =
that it wipes blanker than mere dd-ing of zeroes over the top, but =
clearly not...</div><div style=3D"font-family: 'Segoe UI'; font-size: =
13px; color: black; text-align: left; "><br></div><a =
href=3D"http://16systems.com/zero/index.html">http://16systems.com/zero/in=
dex.html</a><div style=3D"font-family: 'Segoe UI'; font-size: 13px; =
color: black; text-align: left; "><br =
class=3D"webkit-block-placeholder"></div><div><a =
href=3D"http://hardware.slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=3D08/09/06/189248">htt=
p://hardware.slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=3D08/09/06/189248</a></div></body=
></html>=

--Apple-Mail-24--239705435--


From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk  Sat Sep  6 21:51:38 2008
From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Stephen Early)
Date: Sat, 06 Sep 2008 21:51:38 +0100
Subject: The Great Zero Challenge
In-Reply-To: <6690F1C8-168F-4812-8870-346257BD9710@batten.eu.org>
Message-ID: <E1Kc4ks-0006Ym-00@chiark.greenend.org.uk>

In article <6690F1C8-168F-4812-8870-346257BD9710@batten.eu.org> you write:
>These dudes are challenging people to recover data from a disk that's  
>been overwritten with zeros once.    The silence is deafening: you  
>would naively expect that companies that sell data erasure software  
>would be able to test their own software to show that it wipes blanker  
>than mere dd-ing of zeroes over the top, but clearly not...

The rules of the challenge forbid disassembly of the drive.  It's not
a serious challenge.

Steve


From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk  Sat Sep  6 22:08:54 2008
From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Brian Morrison)
Date: Sat, 6 Sep 2008 22:08:54 +0100
Subject: The Great Zero Challenge
In-Reply-To: <E1Kc4ks-0006Ym-00@chiark.greenend.org.uk>
References: <6690F1C8-168F-4812-8870-346257BD9710@batten.eu.org>
 <E1Kc4ks-0006Ym-00@chiark.greenend.org.uk>
Message-ID: <20080906220854.43706c22@peterson.fenrir.org.uk>

--Sig_/8rhpW12JB.yapHOvmPD.7XV
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

On Sat, 06 Sep 2008 21:51:38 +0100
Stephen Early <steve@greenend.org.uk> wrote:

> In article <6690F1C8-168F-4812-8870-346257BD9710@batten.eu.org> you write:
> >These dudes are challenging people to recover data from a disk that's =20
> >been overwritten with zeros once.    The silence is deafening: you =20
> >would naively expect that companies that sell data erasure software =20
> >would be able to test their own software to show that it wipes blanker =
=20
> >than mere dd-ing of zeroes over the top, but clearly not...
>=20
> The rules of the challenge forbid disassembly of the drive.  It's not
> a serious challenge.

So it's just theatre then? Why are they bothering? Naivety perhaps?

--=20

Brian Morrison

bdm at fenrir dot org dot uk

   "Arguing with an engineer is like wrestling with a pig in the mud;
    after a while you realize you are muddy and the pig is enjoying it."
   =20
GnuPG key ID DE32E5C5 - http://wwwkeys.uk.pgp.net/pgpnet/wwwkeys.html

--Sig_/8rhpW12JB.yapHOvmPD.7XV
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Version: GnuPG v2.0.9 (GNU/Linux)

iD8DBQFIwvF49BNjUd4y5cURArLgAKD3wJPwEi3/xhqI2Em2jft4XNyzGwCfXEST
reLzK1fMRNCiYZOa63gKv00=
=UHN7
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--Sig_/8rhpW12JB.yapHOvmPD.7XV--


From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk  Sat Sep  6 23:43:15 2008
From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Ian Batten)
Date: Sat, 6 Sep 2008 23:43:15 +0100
Subject: The Great Zero Challenge
In-Reply-To: <E1Kc4ks-0006Ym-00@chiark.greenend.org.uk>
References: <E1Kc4ks-0006Ym-00@chiark.greenend.org.uk>
Message-ID: <86A86B11-C1F0-4BDE-9AED-61C2D426D7EB@batten.eu.org>

On 6 Sep 2008, at 21:51, Stephen Early wrote:

> In article <6690F1C8-168F-4812-8870-346257BD9710@batten.eu.org> you  
> write:
>> These dudes are challenging people to recover data from a disk that's
>> been overwritten with zeros once.    The silence is deafening: you
>> would naively expect that companies that sell data erasure software
>> would be able to test their own software to show that it wipes  
>> blanker
>> than mere dd-ing of zeroes over the top, but clearly not...
>
> The rules of the challenge forbid disassembly of the drive.  It's not
> a serious challenge.

Unless you're a data recovery firm.

ian



From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk  Sun Sep  7 09:26:11 2008
From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Mary Hawking)
Date: Sun, 7 Sep 2008 09:26:11 +0100
Subject: The Great Zero Challenge
In-Reply-To: <20080907064730.24759.87793.Mailman@chiark.greenend.org.uk>
References: <20080907064730.24759.87793.Mailman@chiark.greenend.org.uk>
Message-ID: <WyQfFhAjA5wIFwL3@tigers.demon.co.uk>

>>> These dudes are challenging people to recover data from a disk that's
>>> been overwritten with zeros once.    The silence is deafening: you
>>> would naively expect that companies that sell data erasure software
>>> would be able to test their own software to show that it wipes 
>>>blanker
>>> than mere dd-ing of zeroes over the top, but clearly not...
>>
>> The rules of the challenge forbid disassembly of the drive.  It's not
>> a serious challenge.
>
>Unless you're a data recovery firm.


I have some computers I am reluctant to get rid of because of data on 
them (personal - but *I* consider it confidential!)
The terms of the challenge say
"We used the 32 year-old Unix dd command using /dev/zero as input to 
overwrite the drive. "
Is this command as efficient as Slashdot implies, and if so could I run 
it on Windows 98, 2000 and XP?
If not, could I use it by linking an ASUS eee (the basic one with Linux) 
and a cable?
Data erasure programs seem to be both inefficient and expensive!
Mary Hawking

-- 
Mary Hawking



From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk  Sun Sep  7 10:34:47 2008
From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Peter Sommer)
Date: Sun, 07 Sep 2008 10:34:47 +0100
Subject: The Great Zero Challenge
In-Reply-To: <WyQfFhAjA5wIFwL3@tigers.demon.co.uk>
References: <20080907064730.24759.87793.Mailman@chiark.greenend.org.uk> <WyQfFhAjA5wIFwL3@tigers.demon.co.uk>
Message-ID: <48C3A037.5020605@pmsommer.com>

Mary Hawking wrote:
>
> Data erasure programs seem to be both inefficient and expensive!

You don't need to use dd, which is a command-line unix facility.   You 
can't use a Unix/Linux machine with dd on it to wipe a Windows machine 
because there would need to be some sort of network or serial connection 
between the two - and which would get deleted and therefore be 
inoperable before the disk wiping was completed.

 There are plenty of free disk wiping programs around:

eg Eraser:  http://www.heidi.ie/node/6;,  Darin's Boot and Nuke:  
http://www.dban.org/ ;  Secure Delete: 
http://www.objmedia.demon.co.uk/freeSoftware/secureDelete.html    plus 
many more if you a google among the lines of: "data wiping free download"

You'll see that there are two classes of file wiping software,  those 
that undertake to wipe a disk in its entirety and those that over-write 
unused portions of the disk plus wiping things like the Internet cache,  
the Recycle Bin, swap files etc.

The general view is that you only need to one wiping run run rather than 
the several specified by US DoD because disk tracks are now so narrow 
and disk heads so accurate that there is no realistic scope for reovery 
by means of data remanance.

The wiki article on tihis subject is not too bad a 
start...http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Data_remanence


Peter Sommer





-- 
THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS E-MAIL IS CONFIDENTIAL AND LEGALLY PRIVILEGED.  IT IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE ADDRESSEE NAMED ABOVE. IF YOU ARE NOT THE ADDRESSEE ANY DISTRIBUTION, COPYING OR DISCLOSURE OF THIS E-MAIL IS STRICTLY PROHIBITED. IF YOU HAVE RECEIVED IT IN ERROR PLEASE NOTIFY THE SENDER BY E-MAIL IMMEDIATELY AND DESTROY THE ORIGINAL
The contents of this e-mail are subject to contract in all cases and no contractual commitments are made whatsoever express or implied. This e-mail and any attachments have been scanned for viruses prior to leaving this office but it is your responsibility to scan any e-mails and their attachments. No liability is accepted for any losses as a result of any viruses being passed on.
Peter Sommer
peter@pmsommer.com



From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk  Sun Sep  7 10:50:52 2008
From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Ian Batten)
Date: Sun, 7 Sep 2008 10:50:52 +0100
Subject: The Great Zero Challenge
In-Reply-To: <48C3A037.5020605@pmsommer.com>
References: <20080907064730.24759.87793.Mailman@chiark.greenend.org.uk> <WyQfFhAjA5wIFwL3@tigers.demon.co.uk> <48C3A037.5020605@pmsommer.com>
Message-ID: <0D17FE74-C5FB-462F-866F-E9C201C7870D@batten.eu.org>

On 7 Sep 2008, at 10:34, Peter Sommer wrote:

> Mary Hawking wrote:
>>
>> Data erasure programs seem to be both inefficient and expensive!
>
> You don't need to use dd, which is a command-line unix facility.   =20
> You can't use a Unix/Linux machine with dd on it to wipe a Windows =20
> machine because there would need to be some sort of network or =20
> serial connection between the two - and which would get deleted and =20=

> therefore be inoperable before the disk wiping was completed.

If you're handy with a screwdriver and don't mind spending ten quid, =20
USB enclosures for IDE disk drives are widely available.  Remove the =20
drive from the old computer, install it in the enclosure, plug it into =20=

your LInux machine with a USB cable, check three hundred times that =20
you know the difference between the internal drive (wiping this is =20
bad) and the newly inserted external drive (wiping this is the intent) =20=

and dd if=3D/dev/zero of=3D/dev/sda1 bs=3D1024k.  Use /dev/urandom =
rather =20
than /dev/zero if that's your thing.

=
http://pctradestore.com/code/ui/main/product.aspx?catid=3D8&subcatid=3D0&g=
clid=3DCMXPpOayyZUCFQiNHgodJAN-jQ

Appears to have the sort of thing for =A37.34, but Google shows any =20
number of similar suppliers.  Or you may have an enclosure like that =20
already you can re-purpose.

>
> THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS E-MAIL IS CONFIDENTIAL AND LEGALLY =20=

> PRIVILEGED.  IT IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE ADDRESSEE NAMED ABOVE. IF =20
> YOU ARE NOT THE ADDRESSEE ANY DISTRIBUTION, COPYING OR DISCLOSURE OF =20=

> THIS E-MAIL IS STRICTLY PROHIBITED.

Quite how this applies to mailing lists I don't know.

ian=


From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk  Sun Sep  7 11:23:01 2008
From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Peter Sommer)
Date: Sun, 07 Sep 2008 11:23:01 +0100
Subject: The Great Zero Challenge
In-Reply-To: <0D17FE74-C5FB-462F-866F-E9C201C7870D@batten.eu.org>
References: <20080907064730.24759.87793.Mailman@chiark.greenend.org.uk> <WyQfFhAjA5wIFwL3@tigers.demon.co.uk> <48C3A037.5020605@pmsommer.com> <0D17FE74-C5FB-462F-866F-E9C201C7870D@batten.eu.org>
Message-ID: <48C3AB85.4060301@pmsommer.com>

Ian Batten wrote:
>
>>
>> THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS E-MAIL IS CONFIDENTIAL AND LEGALLY 
>> PRIVILEGED.  IT IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE ADDRESSEE NAMED ABOVE. IF 
>> YOU ARE NOT THE ADDRESSEE ANY DISTRIBUTION, COPYING OR DISCLOSURE OF 
>> THIS E-MAIL IS STRICTLY PROHIBITED.
>
> Quite how this applies to mailing lists I don't know.
>
> ian
You are right it doesn't,  and I apologise.  But much of my 
correspondence is confidential and legall privileged which is why by 
default I have this sig file.  I have to remember to delete it.  Better 
to cause amusement on ukcrypto, it seems to me,  than professional 
embarassment.

Peter Sommer

-- 
THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS E-MAIL IS CONFIDENTIAL AND LEGALLY PRIVILEGED.  IT IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE ADDRESSEE NAMED ABOVE. IF YOU ARE NOT THE ADDRESSEE ANY DISTRIBUTION, COPYING OR DISCLOSURE OF THIS E-MAIL IS STRICTLY PROHIBITED. IF YOU HAVE RECEIVED IT IN ERROR PLEASE NOTIFY THE SENDER BY E-MAIL IMMEDIATELY AND DESTROY THE ORIGINAL
The contents of this e-mail are subject to contract in all cases and no contractual commitments are made whatsoever express or implied. This e-mail and any attachments have been scanned for viruses prior to leaving this office but it is your responsibility to scan any e-mails and their attachments. No liability is accepted for any losses as a result of any viruses being passed on.
Peter Sommer
peter@pmsommer.com



From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk  Sun Sep  7 11:42:24 2008
From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Mark Sowerby)
Date: Sun, 7 Sep 2008 11:42:24 +0100
Subject: The Great Zero Challenge
In-Reply-To: <0D17FE74-C5FB-462F-866F-E9C201C7870D@batten.eu.org>
References: <20080907064730.24759.87793.Mailman@chiark.greenend.org.uk> <WyQfFhAjA5wIFwL3@tigers.demon.co.uk> <48C3A037.5020605@pmsommer.com> <0D17FE74-C5FB-462F-866F-E9C201C7870D@batten.eu.org>
Message-ID: <DEDACCE290F94C9BA5E06FBDE17E51F3@wideboy>

Hi,

 It goes withouth saying, but I will state it for completeness as I don't 
think it has been stated in the thread (apologies, suck eggs etc) - 
overwriting is different from deleting, which generally does not delete.

Drives use pre-emptive error correction where they remap data from weak 
sectors to spare sectors. So, whilst dd may actually oblitorate the data 
(beyond economical physical recovery), it is unlikely that dd will have 
erased all of the data as drive electronics (keeping the weak sectors from 
being addressed by the computer) and mybe the operating system device driver 
may have got in the way....It may be the case that it is undesirable for 
even these mere remnants of data trapped on the "weak" remapped sectors of 
the drive to be recovered.

For HMG use only wiping systems listed at the link below should be used, 
which have been tested to be suitable:

http://www.cesg.gov.uk/site/iacs/itsec/


With software based data erasure - if the method is not assured - then you 
cannnot rely upon it to give assurance. However - it may be a case that a 
complete overwrite (for example dd) is a suitable risk mitigation method 
when taking into account what was actually on the disk. There are plenty of 
Linux distributions that can be run from CD that could be used to "dd" a 
drive. If there is no need to reuse a drive, I find a large hammer works for 
me.

BR
Mark







From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk  Sun Sep  7 11:44:57 2008
From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (David Hansen)
Date: Sun, 07 Sep 2008 11:44:57 +0100
Subject: The Great Zero Challenge
In-Reply-To: <48C3AB85.4060301@pmsommer.com>
References: <20080907064730.24759.87793.Mailman@chiark.greenend.org.uk>, <0D17FE74-C5FB-462F-866F-E9C201C7870D@batten.eu.org>, <48C3AB85.4060301@pmsommer.com>
Message-ID: <48C3BEB9.23122.123C36@davidh.spidacom.co.uk>

On 7 Sep 2008 at 11:23, Peter Sommer wrote:

> >> THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS E-MAIL IS CONFIDENTIAL AND LEGALLY 
> >> PRIVILEGED.  IT IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE ADDRESSEE NAMED ABOVE. IF 
> >> YOU ARE NOT THE ADDRESSEE ANY DISTRIBUTION, COPYING OR DISCLOSURE OF 
> >> THIS E-MAIL IS STRICTLY PROHIBITED.
> >
> > Quite how this applies to mailing lists I don't know.
> >
> But much of my 
> correspondence is confidential and legall privileged which is why by 
> default I have this sig file.

ISTM that sooner or later these bits of text will be shown up for what 
they are, when someone tries to enforce one in the courts. I hope the 
courts will laugh as loudly as I do at attempts to transfer 
responsibility for a mistake from the person making the mistake to 
their innocent victim. Empty threats attempting to spread FUD should be 
no part of any form of communication.



-- 
  David Hansen, Edinburgh 
 I will *always* explain revoked encryption keys, unless RIP prevents 
me   
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2000/00023--e.htm#54




From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk  Sun Sep  7 12:34:02 2008
From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Ian Batten)
Date: Sun, 7 Sep 2008 12:34:02 +0100
Subject: The Great Zero Challenge
In-Reply-To: <48C3AB85.4060301@pmsommer.com>
References: <20080907064730.24759.87793.Mailman@chiark.greenend.org.uk> <WyQfFhAjA5wIFwL3@tigers.demon.co.uk> <48C3A037.5020605@pmsommer.com> <0D17FE74-C5FB-462F-866F-E9C201C7870D@batten.eu.org> <48C3AB85.4060301@pmsommer.com>
Message-ID: <71FC4700-06FD-421E-86FC-328E637F91B1@batten.eu.org>

On 7 Sep 2008, at 11:23, Peter Sommer wrote:
>> n
> You are right it doesn't,  and I apologise.  But much of my  
> correspondence is confidential and legall privileged which is why by  
> default I have this sig file.  I have to remember to delete it.   
> Better to cause amusement on ukcrypto, it seems to me,  than  
> professional embarassment.

My logic for stopping people using disclaimers is as follows:

There are often occasions when it's hard to tell if the disclaimer is  
`real' or not.  Were someone to attempt to enforce a disclaimer  
against my employer, I would look through our archives and Google for  
mail from that organisation where we had:

* An official order, change request or similar contractual item with a  
footer which said ``this is not an official statement''

* Something which was manifestly intended by the sender to be  
distributed widely that said ``do not distribute without permission''

* Something which said it wasn't legal advice when it was legal advice  
(this is a favourite of solicitors).

* You get the idea.

I'd then say ``since the organisation can't decide if the disclaimer  
applies, how can we as recipients be expected to?''

If this logic holds water (and lawyers I've spoken to say it's not  
entirely laughable), sending mail to mailing lists isn't just a source  
of amusement for ukcrypto-ites: it's something which might later count  
against you were you to try to enforce it.

ian




From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk  Sun Sep  7 12:35:14 2008
From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Ian Batten)
Date: Sun, 7 Sep 2008 12:35:14 +0100
Subject: The Great Zero Challenge
In-Reply-To: <DEDACCE290F94C9BA5E06FBDE17E51F3@wideboy>
References: <20080907064730.24759.87793.Mailman@chiark.greenend.org.uk> <WyQfFhAjA5wIFwL3@tigers.demon.co.uk> <48C3A037.5020605@pmsommer.com> <0D17FE74-C5FB-462F-866F-E9C201C7870D@batten.eu.org> <DEDACCE290F94C9BA5E06FBDE17E51F3@wideboy>
Message-ID: <EC35CAD5-6F06-47F9-920C-AF4383C3ED0A@batten.eu.org>

>
> For HMG use only wiping systems listed at the link below should be  
> used, which have been tested to be suitable:


I think that at the moment HMG might prefer to give its own staff  
advice on beams, prior to giving the rest of us advice on motes.   
We're soon going to reach a point where you're unusual _not_ to have  
had your data lost by the government.

ian


From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk  Sun Sep  7 15:07:39 2008
From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Chris Salter)
Date: Sun, 7 Sep 2008 15:07:39 +0100
Subject: The Great Zero Challenge
In-Reply-To: <WyQfFhAjA5wIFwL3@tigers.demon.co.uk>
References: <20080907064730.24759.87793.Mailman@chiark.greenend.org.uk><WyQfFhAjA5wIFwL3@tigers.demon.co.uk>
Message-ID: <4610647271.20080907150739@originalthinktank.org.uk>

Hello Mary and UKCrypto,

Sunday, September 7, 2008, 9:26:11 AM, you wrote:

> I have some computers I am reluctant to get rid of because of data on 
> them (personal - but *I* consider it confidential!)

1. If practical deploy one or more suitable disk wiping procedure as
suggested elsewhere in this thread.

2. Remove hard disk(s) (wiped or not). [Store disk(s) in safe if you
are really concerned.] Retain until such time you can attack disk(s)
with a hammer. [Retain disk fragments indefinitely in safe if you are
really really concerned.]

3. Dispose of rest of computer in an environmentally responsible way.

Chris

-- 
 Chris Salter                      mailto:ukcrypto@originalthinktank.org.uk
 Cornwall United Kingdom        http://www.originalthinktank.org.uk/



From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk  Sun Sep  7 15:32:30 2008
From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Zoe O'Connell)
Date: Sun, 07 Sep 2008 15:32:30 +0100
Subject: The Great Zero Challenge
In-Reply-To: <4610647271.20080907150739@originalthinktank.org.uk>
References: <20080907064730.24759.87793.Mailman@chiark.greenend.org.uk><WyQfFhAjA5wIFwL3@tigers.demon.co.uk> <4610647271.20080907150739@originalthinktank.org.uk>
Message-ID: <48C3E5FE.6070502@complicity.co.uk>

Chris Salter wrote:
> Hello Mary and UKCrypto,
>
> Sunday, September 7, 2008, 9:26:11 AM, you wrote:
>   
>> I have some computers I am reluctant to get rid of because of data on 
>> them (personal - but *I* consider it confidential!)
>>     
>
> 1. If practical deploy one or more suitable disk wiping procedure as
> suggested elsewhere in this thread.
>
> 2. Remove hard disk(s) (wiped or not). [Store disk(s) in safe if you
> are really concerned.] Retain until such time you can attack disk(s)
> with a hammer. [Retain disk fragments indefinitely in safe if you are
> really really concerned.]
>
> 3. Dispose of rest of computer in an environmentally responsible way.

Heating the hard drive sufficiently will demagnetise the platters 
permanantly, even before they begin to melt. I can't remember the 
scientific term for this so I can't find it on google offhand, but I 
seem to recall this is the method many governments and military forces 
use. I'm not sure if a home oven will be hot enough for this but even if 
it is I suspect it's dangerous doing it inside. In the past, lacking a 
proper incinerator, I've simply removed the top of the drive and applied 
a blowtorch to the platters until they melt. Particularly if you're 
doing several drives and have the tools to hand, this is quicker than 
other methods and perhaps not as silly as it might first sound. (Doing 
it on a commercial setting would have health and safety impliciations I 
suspect.)


From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk  Sun Sep  7 18:55:21 2008
From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (PeteM)
Date: Sun, 07 Sep 2008 18:55:21 +0100
Subject: The Great Zero Challenge
In-Reply-To: <4610647271.20080907150739@originalthinktank.org.uk>
References: <20080907064730.24759.87793.Mailman@chiark.greenend.org.uk><WyQfFhAjA5wIFwL3@tigers.demon.co.uk> <4610647271.20080907150739@originalthinktank.org.uk>
Message-ID: <48C41589.6030604@callnetuk.com>

Chris Salter wrote  on 7-09-08 15:07:
> 
> 2. Remove hard disk(s) (wiped or not). [Store disk(s) in safe if you
> are really concerned.] Retain until such time you can attack disk(s)
> with a hammer. [Retain disk fragments indefinitely in safe if you are
> really really concerned.]


Do you have to do in the disk platter itself? With some of these drives 
it isn't that easy to get into the enclosure.


-- 
PeteM


From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk  Sun Sep  7 19:20:07 2008
From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Ian Mason)
Date: Sun, 7 Sep 2008 19:20:07 +0100
Subject: The Great Zero Challenge
In-Reply-To: <48C3BEB9.23122.123C36@davidh.spidacom.co.uk>
References: <20080907064730.24759.87793.Mailman@chiark.greenend.org.uk>, <0D17FE74-C5FB-462F-866F-E9C201C7870D@batten.eu.org>, <48C3AB85.4060301@pmsommer.com> <48C3BEB9.23122.123C36@davidh.spidacom.co.uk>
Message-ID: <3452E045-84B4-4ABA-A319-4D379CA1E44A@sourcetagged.ian.co.uk>

On 7 Sep 2008, at 11:44, David Hansen wrote:

> On 7 Sep 2008 at 11:23, Peter Sommer wrote:
>
>>>> THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS E-MAIL IS CONFIDENTIAL AND  
>>>> LEGALLY
>>>> PRIVILEGED.  IT IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE ADDRESSEE NAMED ABOVE. IF
>>>> YOU ARE NOT THE ADDRESSEE ANY DISTRIBUTION, COPYING OR  
>>>> DISCLOSURE OF
>>>> THIS E-MAIL IS STRICTLY PROHIBITED.
>>>
>>> Quite how this applies to mailing lists I don't know.
>>>
>> But much of my
>> correspondence is confidential and legall privileged which is why by
>> default I have this sig file.
>
> ISTM that sooner or later these bits of text will be shown up for what
> they are, when someone tries to enforce one in the courts. I hope the
> courts will laugh as loudly as I do at attempts to transfer
> responsibility for a mistake from the person making the mistake to
> their innocent victim. Empty threats attempting to spread FUD  
> should be
> no part of any form of communication.
>

Indeed, which is why I have the appended signature in my armoury for  
replies to those who send such ludicrous legalese.

Ian




=====
By reading this you agree to pay me, Ian Mason, one million pounds  
sterling
within thirty days. Should you fail to make such payment, for  
whatever reason,
you further agree to become my indentured servant for life, to use or  
dispose of
in any fashion I think fit. And that my friend, is why 'legal'  
claimers at the
foot of email, web-pages and the like are not, and never will be,  
worth the
paper they are written on; and why any lawyer who advises their  
clients to use
them is a waste of good oxygen.





From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk  Sun Sep  7 19:25:09 2008
From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Ian Mason)
Date: Sun, 7 Sep 2008 19:25:09 +0100
Subject: The Great Zero Challenge
In-Reply-To: <48C3E5FE.6070502@complicity.co.uk>
References: <20080907064730.24759.87793.Mailman@chiark.greenend.org.uk><WyQfFhAjA5wIFwL3@tigers.demon.co.uk> <4610647271.20080907150739@originalthinktank.org.uk> <48C3E5FE.6070502@complicity.co.uk>
Message-ID: <AFEB0398-ED60-4700-A3FB-31668EC7A744@sourcetagged.ian.co.uk>

On 7 Sep 2008, at 15:32, Zoe O'Connell wrote:

> Chris Salter wrote:
>> Hello Mary and UKCrypto,
>>
>> Sunday, September 7, 2008, 9:26:11 AM, you wrote:
>>
>>> I have some computers I am reluctant to get rid of because of  
>>> data on them (personal - but *I* consider it confidential!)
>>>
>>
>> 1. If practical deploy one or more suitable disk wiping procedure as
>> suggested elsewhere in this thread.
>>
>> 2. Remove hard disk(s) (wiped or not). [Store disk(s) in safe if you
>> are really concerned.] Retain until such time you can attack disk(s)
>> with a hammer. [Retain disk fragments indefinitely in safe if you are
>> really really concerned.]
>>
>> 3. Dispose of rest of computer in an environmentally responsible way.
>
> Heating the hard drive sufficiently will demagnetise the platters  
> permanantly, even before they begin to melt. I can't remember the  
> scientific term for this so I can't find it on google offhand

Curie point.




From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk  Sun Sep  7 21:27:58 2008
From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (David Biggins)
Date: Sun, 7 Sep 2008 21:27:58 +0100
Subject: The Great Zero Challenge
In-Reply-To: <4610647271.20080907150739@originalthinktank.org.uk>
References: <20080907064730.24759.87793.Mailman@chiark.greenend.org.uk><WyQfFhAjA5wIFwL3@tigers.demon.co.uk> <4610647271.20080907150739@originalthinktank.org.uk>
Message-ID: <C6F343320DAC194BA010FD66AD4936233916DA@home.usermgmt.local>

I am given to understand that Inverness recycling centre have an
interesting device.

A LARGE coin-operated shredder, with a clear front

For a small fee, you can insert an entire hard disk into the device, and
see that the entire drive - platters, heads, casing and all, have been
reduced to very, very small pieces.=20

It would be nice, I feel, if other recycling centres were to start
offering this service.


Dave.=20



From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk  Sun Sep  7 21:29:07 2008
From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Roland Perry)
Date: Sun, 7 Sep 2008 21:29:07 +0100
Subject: The Great Zero Challenge
In-Reply-To: <3452E045-84B4-4ABA-A319-4D379CA1E44A@sourcetagged.ian.co.uk>
References: <20080907064730.24759.87793.Mailman@chiark.greenend.org.uk>
 <0D17FE74-C5FB-462F-866F-E9C201C7870D@batten.eu.org>
 <48C3AB85.4060301@pmsommer.com> <48C3BEB9.23122.123C36@davidh.spidacom.co.uk>
 <3452E045-84B4-4ABA-A319-4D379CA1E44A@sourcetagged.ian.co.uk>
Message-ID: <Cy3Rp2BTmDxIFAQk@perry.co.uk>

In article 
<3452E045-84B4-4ABA-A319-4D379CA1E44A@sourcetagged.ian.co.uk>, Ian Mason 
<ukcrypto@sourcetagged.ian.co.uk> writes
>I have the appended signature in my armoury for  replies to those who 
>send such ludicrous legalese.

I have one too - which seeks to illustrate that if you don't understand 
it, how can you comply?

[unbelievably, the entire thing is a Googlewhack].
-- 
Mae'r e-bost hwn ac unrhyw ffeiliau a drosglwyddir gydag ef yn gyfrinachol ac
wedi'u bwriadu ar gyfer pwy bynnag y cyfeirir ef ato neu atynt.


From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk  Sun Sep  7 22:12:34 2008
From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Wendy M. Grossman)
Date: Sun, 07 Sep 2008 22:12:34 +0100
Subject: The Great Zero Challenge
In-Reply-To: <Cy3Rp2BTmDxIFAQk@perry.co.uk>
References: <20080907064730.24759.87793.Mailman@chiark.greenend.org.uk> <0D17FE74-C5FB-462F-866F-E9C201C7870D@batten.eu.org> <48C3AB85.4060301@pmsommer.com> <48C3BEB9.23122.123C36@davidh.spidacom.co.uk> <3452E045-84B4-4ABA-A319-4D379CA1E44A@sourcetagged.ian.co.uk> <Cy3Rp2BTmDxIFAQk@perry.co.uk>
Message-ID: <48C443C2.8040808@pelicancrossing.net>

Roland Perry wrote:
> 
> I have one too - which seeks to illustrate that if you don't understand 
> it, how can you comply?
> 
> [unbelievably, the entire thing is a Googlewhack].

I guess we all have them. The email sig that really bugs me these days 
is the one exhorting me not to print the message out unless I really 
need to. So officious and rude, I think.

wg
IMPORTANT - ANTI-DISCLAIMER - This email is not and cannot, by its 
nature, be confidential.  En route from me to you, it will pass across 
the public Internet, easily readable by any number of system 
administrators along the way.  If you have received this message by 
mistake, it would be ridiculous for me to tell you not to read it or 
copy to anyone else, because, let's face it, if it's a message revealing 
confidential information or that could embarrass me intensely, that's 
precisely what you'll do.  Who wouldn't?  Likewise, it is superfluous 
for me to claim copyright in the contents, because I own that anyway, 
even if you print out a hard copy or disseminate this message all over 
the known universe.  I don't know why so many corporate mail servers 
feel impelled to attach a disclaimer to the bottom of every email 
message saying otherwise.  If you don't know either, why not email your 
corporate lawyers and system administrators and ask them why they insist 
on contributing so much to the waste of bandwidth?


From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk  Sun Sep  7 22:18:39 2008
From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Ian Batten)
Date: Sun, 7 Sep 2008 22:18:39 +0100
Subject: The Great Zero Challenge
In-Reply-To: <Cy3Rp2BTmDxIFAQk@perry.co.uk>
References: <20080907064730.24759.87793.Mailman@chiark.greenend.org.uk> <0D17FE74-C5FB-462F-866F-E9C201C7870D@batten.eu.org> <48C3AB85.4060301@pmsommer.com> <48C3BEB9.23122.123C36@davidh.spidacom.co.uk> <3452E045-84B4-4ABA-A319-4D379CA1E44A@sourcetagged.ian.co.uk> <Cy3Rp2BTmDxIFAQk@perry.co.uk>
Message-ID: <971C6611-7486-465F-B97D-425BE365D10E@batten.eu.org>

On 7 Sep 2008, at 21:29, Roland Perry wrote:

> In article <3452E045-84B4-4ABA-A319-4D379CA1E44A@sourcetagged.ian.co.uk 
> >, Ian Mason <ukcrypto@sourcetagged.ian.co.uk> writes
>> I have the appended signature in my armoury for  replies to those  
>> who send such ludicrous legalese.
>
> I have one too - which seeks to illustrate that if you don't  
> understand it, how can you comply?

There's a certain sort of person who thinks they apply a veneer of  
`professionalism' to the proceedings.   They see them on financial and  
legal companies' communications, where they do have some force, and  
assume that anyone can play that game.  But that's because dealings  
with solicitors and FSA-regulated financial companies have, under  
certain well-defined circumstances, an extra wrap of primary  
legislation over and above simple contracts: you can't simply deem  
material `privileged', for example, but a solicitor will know what is  
and isn't, and will know that failing to mark it as such can have  
serious repercussions.

But what a solicitor will also know is that marking as privileged  
material that isn't may also repercussions.  Simply blasting ``this  
may be privileged'' all over your quick note asking who's getting the  
drinks in is a bad idea, because if it all came to court it's  
perfectly reasonable to argue ``well, the solicitor marked as  
privileged things that clearly weren't, such as 'get me a Campari and  
soda if you get there first', so I had no way to know that this other  
thing that was marked privileged actually was''.

The give away is ``what does their letterhead say?''  FSA-regulated  
companies may need to use such statements on email, but they'll be on  
their letterhead, marketing collateral and much else.  If it's not on  
the paper, why is it on the email?

In a previous job, one of our commercial people got an order once  
which was worth, on the face of it, a million pounds or so, but had an  
automatically appended statement that it wasn't to be taken as the  
official position of the company.  He queried it, and was told that it  
should be obvious that an order is an order, and ``everyone'' knows  
that you ignore the things that say they aren't orders.  You do have  
to question the sanity of companies that behave like that.

I have once had a thread of email that was fitted with legal warnings  
correctly.  I _pre_pended to every item in a discussion with  
solicitors and our directors ``prepared in contemplation of legal  
action, legally privileged'' or somesuch.  That's not nonsense: it was  
prepared in contemplation of legal action, and it was legally  
privileged by virtue of being communication with a solicitor in the  
course of the preparation of a legal action.  Had things turned nasty  
and discovery been an issue, the notation would have simplified our  
response.   But that's a special case, and I had legal advice about it  
on a weekly basis.

ian

ian


From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk  Sun Sep  7 22:26:48 2008
From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Richard Lamont)
Date: Sun, 07 Sep 2008 22:26:48 +0100
Subject: The Great Zero Challenge
In-Reply-To: <DEDACCE290F94C9BA5E06FBDE17E51F3@wideboy>
References: <20080907064730.24759.87793.Mailman@chiark.greenend.org.uk> <WyQfFhAjA5wIFwL3@tigers.demon.co.uk> <48C3A037.5020605@pmsommer.com> <0D17FE74-C5FB-462F-866F-E9C201C7870D@batten.eu.org> <DEDACCE290F94C9BA5E06FBDE17E51F3@wideboy>
Message-ID: <48C44718.3030406@lamont.me.uk>

Mark Sowerby wrote:

> to "dd" a drive. If there is no need to reuse a drive, I find a large
> hammer works for me.

Maybe I'm some kind of closet pyromaniac, but I prefer a blowlamp.
There's something particularly reassuring about platters heated to
incandescence and buckling in a cloud of smoke.


-- 
Richard Lamont                        http://www.lamont.me.uk/
<richard@lamont.me.uk>
OpenPGP Key ID: 0xBD89BE41
Fingerprint: CE78 C285 1F97 0BDA 886D BA78 26D8 6C34 BD89 BE41


From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk  Sun Sep  7 22:04:17 2008
From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Matthew Pemble)
Date: Sun, 07 Sep 2008 22:04:17 +0100
Subject: The Great Zero Challenge
In-Reply-To: <C6F343320DAC194BA010FD66AD4936233916DA@home.usermgmt.local>
References: <20080907064730.24759.87793.Mailman@chiark.greenend.org.uk><WyQfFhAjA5wIFwL3@tigers.demon.co.uk> <4610647271.20080907150739@originalthinktank.org.uk> <C6F343320DAC194BA010FD66AD4936233916DA@home.usermgmt.local>
Message-ID: <48C441D1.40205@pemble.net>

David Biggins wrote:
> I am given to understand that Inverness recycling centre have an
> interesting device.
>
> A LARGE coin-operated shredder, with a clear front
>
> For a small fee, you can insert an entire hard disk into the device, and
> see that the entire drive - platters, heads, casing and all, have been
> reduced to very, very small pieces. 
>   
The military use these - and call them macerators.  Used for disposal of 
all sorts of interesting kit.  Not coin operated last time I used one, 
but I would not put that past the current bunch of charlatans.  I'm not 
sure what the unit cost is but they are satisfying to use.

There are other "macerators" in military use, but they are used in the 
plumbing (effluent not nuclear) systems of submarines.

Matthew



From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk  Mon Sep  8 00:18:32 2008
From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (James Cox)
Date: Mon, 8 Sep 2008 00:18:32 +0100
Subject: The Great Zero Challenge
In-Reply-To: <971C6611-7486-465F-B97D-425BE365D10E@batten.eu.org>
References: <20080907064730.24759.87793.Mailman@chiark.greenend.org.uk> <0D17FE74-C5FB-462F-866F-E9C201C7870D@batten.eu.org> <48C3AB85.4060301@pmsommer.com> <48C3BEB9.23122.123C36@davidh.spidacom.co.uk> <3452E045-84B4-4ABA-A319-4D379CA1E44A@sourcetagged.ian.co.uk> <Cy3Rp2BTmDxIFAQk@perry.co.uk> <971C6611-7486-465F-B97D-425BE365D10E@batten.eu.org>
Message-ID: <E88B518E-A209-4F4B-B06F-DC75D9C6D6D5@imaj.es>

On 7 Sep 2008, at 22:18, Ian Batten wrote:

>
> On 7 Sep 2008, at 21:29, Roland Perry wrote:
>
>> In article <3452E045-84B4-4ABA-A319-4D379CA1E44A@sourcetagged.ian.co.uk 
>> >, Ian Mason <ukcrypto@sourcetagged.ian.co.uk> writes
>>> I have the appended signature in my armoury for  replies to those  
>>> who send such ludicrous legalese.
>>
>> I have one too - which seeks to illustrate that if you don't  
>> understand it, how can you comply?
>
> There's a certain sort of person who thinks they apply a veneer of  
> `professionalism' to the proceedings.   They see them on financial  
> and legal companies' communications, where they do have some force,  
> and assume that anyone can play that game.  But that's because  
> dealings with solicitors and FSA-regulated financial companies have,  
> under certain well-defined circumstances, an extra wrap of primary  
> legislation over and above simple contracts: you can't simply deem  
> material `privileged', for example, but a solicitor will know what  
> is and isn't, and will know that failing to mark it as such can have  
> serious repercussions.

i'm fairly sure it's not a certain sort of person, per se, but due to  
fsa/sox regulation that prohibits you from being even 10 feet of  
information which may influence decisions you make. it's CYA in the  
broadest most maligned sense of the word, and yes, it's liberal use  
only further weakens the position (yay us who might have to defend  
against it). That said, since we cannot trust civil servants 'trained'  
in data safety to be aware of how properly to handle data, nor can we  
often trust a waiter to get our order right... what hope have  
conglomerates to believe their employees will remember to attach a  
warning to each email that might be legally privileged?

Ian - you yourself mentioned that you were having to wrap statements  
to prevent prejudicial action - whilst this is useful on a case by  
case basis, could you imagine if, say, Goldman Sachs or JP Morgan had  
all its employees have a lawyer signoff on their email for potential  
confidentiality/compliance issues? Could you imagine any lawyer worth  
her salt who'd willingly be party to that many potential suits??

we spend lots of our time with the lowest common denominator. this is  
one such example. Yes, you and i (and many other people here) know  
that it's a fairly trivial legal position, and one that's not hard to  
overcome - but, in a court of law, the statement "body of evidence" is  
meaningful in this way; it's often the more you have, the stronger  
your case*.

the solution, as ever, is to fire this generation of luddites and hope  
the next one is more carefully aware of such problems. I will,  
however, leave the country just prior - i've no intention to pay their  
pensions. :)

--james

* caveat: if your evidence is weak yet plentiful, then clearly an iron  
clad alibi will prevail - but we're talking about being able to  
supplant real evidence with backup, 'enter the door' type evidence  
such as these signatures.



From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk  Mon Sep  8 01:13:15 2008
From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Peter Fairbrother)
Date: Mon, 08 Sep 2008 01:13:15 +0100
Subject: The Great Zero Challenge
In-Reply-To: <Cy3Rp2BTmDxIFAQk@perry.co.uk>
References: <20080907064730.24759.87793.Mailman@chiark.greenend.org.uk> <0D17FE74-C5FB-462F-866F-E9C201C7870D@batten.eu.org> <48C3AB85.4060301@pmsommer.com> <48C3BEB9.23122.123C36@davidh.spidacom.co.uk> <3452E045-84B4-4ABA-A319-4D379CA1E44A@sourcetagged.ian.co.uk> <Cy3Rp2BTmDxIFAQk@perry.co.uk>
Message-ID: <48C46E1B.6090709@zen.co.uk>

Roland Perry wrote:
> In article 
> <3452E045-84B4-4ABA-A319-4D379CA1E44A@sourcetagged.ian.co.uk>, Ian Mason 
> <ukcrypto@sourcetagged.ian.co.uk> writes
>> I have the appended signature in my armoury for  replies to those who 
>> send such ludicrous legalese.
> 
> I have one too - which seeks to illustrate that if you don't understand 
> it, how can you comply?

As I understand it, a disclaimer that a communication is legally 
privileged may have some legal effect in preventing third parties from 
divulging it. Once received, the recipient can reveal the contents 
(unless he's a solicitor under a duty to keep schtumm).

However if you send me a disclaimer attached to a communication, I can 
just ignore it - I haven't agreed to keep it secret, and am perfectly at 
liberty to repeat the sense of the contents, though if eg it's a poem I 
may not have copyright to the expression, and then I can't reproduce it 
exactly.


The last situation is when the contents of an unpriviliged communication 
comes into the hands of a third party. If it has come by interception I 
think (haven't checked) it's illegal under RIPA to reproduce it.

However if it has come into the hands of third party by chance, or by 
some other means not involving interception, then I'm not so sure. 
Obviously posting to usenet implies that a communication can be freely 
reproduced, but in other cases where eg a third party reads a 
communication marked PRIVATE at the end, does the reader have any duty 
to keep it private?

In common courtesy, yes, but under law I don't know. I doubt it, but - 
Nicholas?

-- Peter Fairbrother


From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk  Mon Sep  8 01:15:29 2008
From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Peter Fairbrother)
Date: Mon, 08 Sep 2008 01:15:29 +0100
Subject: The Great Zero Challenge
In-Reply-To: <48C443C2.8040808@pelicancrossing.net>
References: <20080907064730.24759.87793.Mailman@chiark.greenend.org.uk> <0D17FE74-C5FB-462F-866F-E9C201C7870D@batten.eu.org> <48C3AB85.4060301@pmsommer.com> <48C3BEB9.23122.123C36@davidh.spidacom.co.uk> <3452E045-84B4-4ABA-A319-4D379CA1E44A@sourcetagged.ian.co.uk> <Cy3Rp2BTmDxIFAQk@perry.co.uk> <48C443C2.8040808@pelicancrossing.net>
Message-ID: <48C46EA1.5030202@zen.co.uk>

Wendy M. Grossman wrote:
> Roland Perry wrote:
>>
>> I have one too - which seeks to illustrate that if you don't 
>> understand it, how can you comply?
>>
>> [unbelievably, the entire thing is a Googlewhack].
> 
> I guess we all have them. The email sig that really bugs me these days 
> is the one exhorting me not to print the message out unless I really 
> need to. So officious and rude, I think.
> 
> wg
> IMPORTANT - ANTI-DISCLAIMER - This email is not and cannot, by its 
> nature, be confidential.  En route from me to you, it will pass across 
> the public Internet, easily readable by any number of system 
> administrators along the way.  

While sometimes sysadmins can read mail along the way, it's highly 
illegal ..

-- Peter Fairbrother


From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk  Sun Sep  7 22:22:53 2008
From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Dave Howe)
Date: Sun, 07 Sep 2008 22:22:53 +0100
Subject: The Great Zero Challenge
In-Reply-To: <48C3A037.5020605@pmsommer.com>
References: <20080907064730.24759.87793.Mailman@chiark.greenend.org.uk> <WyQfFhAjA5wIFwL3@tigers.demon.co.uk> <48C3A037.5020605@pmsommer.com>
Message-ID: <48C4462D.9070101@gmx.co.uk>

Peter Sommer wrote:
> Mary Hawking wrote:
>>
>> Data erasure programs seem to be both inefficient and expensive!
> 
> You don't need to use dd, which is a command-line unix facility.   You
> can't use a Unix/Linux machine with dd on it to wipe a Windows machine
> because there would need to be some sort of network or serial connection
> between the two - and which would get deleted and therefore be
> inoperable before the disk wiping was completed.

but you CAN use a bootable live cd or floppy of linux to do so - in
fact, dban referenced below is such a bootable linux kernel.


From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk  Mon Sep  8 03:26:04 2008
From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Chris Salter)
Date: Mon, 8 Sep 2008 03:26:04 +0100
Subject: Re[2]: The Great Zero Challenge
In-Reply-To: <48C41589.6030604@callnetuk.com>
References: <20080907064730.24759.87793.Mailman@chiark.greenend.org.uk><WyQfFhAjA5wIFwL3@tigers.demon.co.uk><4610647271.20080907150739@originalthinktank.org.uk><48C41589.6030604@callnetuk.com>
Message-ID: <1179231938.20080908032604@originalthinktank.org.uk>

Hello Peter and UKCrypto,

Sunday, September 7, 2008, 6:55:21 PM, you wrote:

> Chris Salter wrote  on 7-09-08 15:07:
>> 
>> 2. Remove hard disk(s) (wiped or not). [Store disk(s) in safe if you
>> are really concerned.] Retain until such time you can attack disk(s)
>> with a hammer. [Retain disk fragments indefinitely in safe if you are
>> really really concerned.]


> Do you have to do in the disk platter itself? With some of these drives
> it isn't that easy to get into the enclosure.

Well, I have to admit that I am only at the stage of having a small
column of 'drive enclosures' awaiting 'total destruction'. However,
total destruction the disk platter is without doubt what we should be
aiming for. Elsewhere in this thread a 'blow torch' was suggested as a
proven improvement on the hammer approach. I guess it all depends on
how sensitive is the nature of the data you wish to destroy? I'm just
playing safe as I'm sure there are security oversights hidden on those
disks (e.g. passwords in clipboard backups).

Regards to All,

Chris

-- 
 Chris Salter                      mailto:ukcrypto@originalthinktank.org.uk
 Cornwall United Kingdom        http://www.originalthinktank.org.uk/



From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk  Mon Sep  8 03:26:17 2008
From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Chris Salter)
Date: Mon, 8 Sep 2008 03:26:17 +0100
Subject: Re[2]: The Great Zero Challenge
In-Reply-To: <48C46EA1.5030202@zen.co.uk>
References: <20080907064730.24759.87793.Mailman@chiark.greenend.org.uk><0D17FE74-C5FB-462F-866F-E9C201C7870D@batten.eu.org><48C3AB85.4060301@pmsommer.com><48C3BEB9.23122.123C36@davidh.spidacom.co.uk><3452E045-84B4-4ABA-A319-4D379CA1E44A@sourcetagged.ian.co.uk><Cy3Rp2BTmDxIFAQk@perry.co.uk> <48C443C2.8040808@pelicancrossing.net><48C46EA1.5030202@zen.co.uk>
Message-ID: <794159971.20080908032617@originalthinktank.org.uk>

Hello Peter and UKCrypto,

Monday, September 8, 2008, 1:15:29 AM, you wrote:

> Wendy M. Grossman wrote:
>> Roland Perry wrote:
>>>
>>> I have one too - which seeks to illustrate that if you don't 
>>> understand it, how can you comply?
>>>
>>> [unbelievably, the entire thing is a Googlewhack].
>> 
>> I guess we all have them. The email sig that really bugs me these days 
>> is the one exhorting me not to print the message out unless I really 
>> need to. So officious and rude, I think.
>> 
>> wg
>> IMPORTANT - ANTI-DISCLAIMER - This email is not and cannot, by its 
>> nature, be confidential.  En route from me to you, it will pass across 
>> the public Internet, easily readable by any number of system 
>> administrators along the way.  

> While sometimes sysadmins can read mail along the way, it's highly 
> illegal ..

I have in the back of my mind that it is not illegal for a member of
the general public to monitor police radio communications but it *is*
illegal to act upon any information gleaned from 'listening in'.

In my retired status I provide voluntary 'sysadmin' services to a
number of charities and in past 'career lives' I have worked in
applications/system programming and datacomms/telecommunications. In
the normal course of problem determination in all those 'lives' there
is a risk of seeing sensitive information. If there is a problem with
a live system it is more than likely you will have to monitor the live
system in order to identify where the fault lies.

My current 'sysadmin' responsibilities for the charities include
reviewing for false positives mail designated as spam by our anti-spam
measures. I'm human so in that reviewing process I 'read mail along
the way'. What I don't do is act upon it apart from forwarding the
false positives to the intended recipients. It's an important point.

Regards to All,

Chris

-- 
 Chris Salter                      mailto:ukcrypto@originalthinktank.org.uk
 Cornwall United Kingdom        http://www.originalthinktank.org.uk/



From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk  Mon Sep  8 06:37:49 2008
From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Ian Batten)
Date: Mon, 8 Sep 2008 06:37:49 +0100
Subject: The Great Zero Challenge
In-Reply-To: <E88B518E-A209-4F4B-B06F-DC75D9C6D6D5@imaj.es>
References: <20080907064730.24759.87793.Mailman@chiark.greenend.org.uk> <0D17FE74-C5FB-462F-866F-E9C201C7870D@batten.eu.org> <48C3AB85.4060301@pmsommer.com> <48C3BEB9.23122.123C36@davidh.spidacom.co.uk> <3452E045-84B4-4ABA-A319-4D379CA1E44A@sourcetagged.ian.co.uk> <Cy3Rp2BTmDxIFAQk@perry.co.uk> <971C6611-7486-465F-B97D-425BE365D10E@batten.eu.org> <E88B518E-A209-4F4B-B06F-DC75D9C6D6D5@imaj.es>
Message-ID: <2B518307-2A1E-41A7-BB6E-00D7DDCC20BD@batten.eu.org>

>
> i'm fairly sure it's not a certain sort of person, per se, but due  
> to fsa/sox regulation that prohibits you from being even 10 feet of  
> information which may influence decisions you make.

Fair enough.  But I work in telecoms.  I can guarantee you that 98% of  
the companies I do business with are not affected by the FSA and are  
only affected by SOX/JSOX/etc in so far as they are traded companies.

ian



From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk  Mon Sep  8 06:46:27 2008
From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Ian Batten)
Date: Mon, 8 Sep 2008 06:46:27 +0100
Subject: The Great Zero Challenge
In-Reply-To: <48C46E1B.6090709@zen.co.uk>
References: <20080907064730.24759.87793.Mailman@chiark.greenend.org.uk> <0D17FE74-C5FB-462F-866F-E9C201C7870D@batten.eu.org> <48C3AB85.4060301@pmsommer.com> <48C3BEB9.23122.123C36@davidh.spidacom.co.uk> <3452E045-84B4-4ABA-A319-4D379CA1E44A@sourcetagged.ian.co.uk> <Cy3Rp2BTmDxIFAQk@perry.co.uk> <48C46E1B.6090709@zen.co.uk>
Message-ID: <2F06D521-8CEA-4740-BAD7-6B7221F021F9@batten.eu.org>

On 8 Sep 2008, at 01:13, Peter Fairbrother wrote:

> Roland Perry wrote:
>> In article <3452E045-84B4-4ABA-A319-4D379CA1E44A@sourcetagged.ian.co.uk 
>> >, Ian Mason <ukcrypto@sourcetagged.ian.co.uk> writes
>>> I have the appended signature in my armoury for  replies to those  
>>> who send such ludicrous legalese.
>> I have one too - which seeks to illustrate that if you don't  
>> understand it, how can you comply?
>
> As I understand it, a disclaimer that a communication is legally  
> privileged may have some legal effect in preventing third parties  
> from divulging it.

I was told that the only reason to tag documents was so that if thing  
went nuclear and substantial discovery motions were served, it would  
make it easier to put to one side stuff that needn't be handed over.   
I'm told it's unlikely for a document to be legally privileged unless  
either the sender or one of the recipients is a lawyer engaged upon  
the matter at hand.

>
> However if you send me a disclaimer attached to a communication, I  
> can just ignore it - I haven't agreed to keep it secret, and am  
> perfectly at liberty to repeat the sense of the contents, though if  
> eg it's a poem I may not have copyright to the expression, and then  
> I can't reproduce it exactly.

The key piece of nonsense from those footers is the `act on' bit that  
seems popular.  It's hard to imagine outside narrowly drawn exceptions  
in finance and legal proceedings how you can send me information which  
it's in any way illegal for me to act on.  It may be immoral and  
ungentlemanly, but that's a separate argument.

>
> However if it has come into the hands of third party by chance, or  
> by some other means not involving interception, then I'm not so  
> sure. Obviously posting to usenet implies that a communication can  
> be freely reproduced, but in other cases where eg a third party  
> reads a communication marked PRIVATE at the end, does the reader  
> have any duty to keep it private?

Another piece of nonsense is the ``if you are not the intended  
recipient''.  If the sender doesn't know, how on earth can the  
recipient?  In the case of ``mis addressed'' email (which I suspect  
the clause is intended to address) of course I'm the intended  
recipient: there's my email address, right in the To: line.

ian


From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk  Mon Sep  8 06:48:44 2008
From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Ian Batten)
Date: Mon, 8 Sep 2008 06:48:44 +0100
Subject: The Great Zero Challenge
In-Reply-To: <48C46EA1.5030202@zen.co.uk>
References: <20080907064730.24759.87793.Mailman@chiark.greenend.org.uk> <0D17FE74-C5FB-462F-866F-E9C201C7870D@batten.eu.org> <48C3AB85.4060301@pmsommer.com> <48C3BEB9.23122.123C36@davidh.spidacom.co.uk> <3452E045-84B4-4ABA-A319-4D379CA1E44A@sourcetagged.ian.co.uk> <Cy3Rp2BTmDxIFAQk@perry.co.uk> <48C443C2.8040808@pelicancrossing.net> <48C46EA1.5030202@zen.co.uk>
Message-ID: <92426299-0D37-47E9-8ACE-C354BE86415F@batten.eu.org>

On 8 Sep 2008, at 01:15, Peter Fairbrother wrote:
>> g
>> IMPORTANT - ANTI-DISCLAIMER - This email is not and cannot, by its  
>> nature, be confidential.  En route from me to you, it will pass  
>> across the public Internet, easily readable by any number of system  
>> administrators along the way.
>
> While sometimes sysadmins can read mail along the way, it's highly  
> illegal ..

It _might_ be illegal.

If an employee of company X sends mail to an employee of company Y, in  
their official capacities, it's perfectly likely that sysadmins at X  
and Y are entitled to read it.  If in the course of its transmission  
the mail passes through a country whose attitude to privacy is a  
little less developed that yours and mine, it's perfectly likely that  
they can read it legally, too.

ian


From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk  Mon Sep  8 06:51:48 2008
From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Ian Batten)
Date: Mon, 8 Sep 2008 06:51:48 +0100
Subject: Re[2]: The Great Zero Challenge
In-Reply-To: <794159971.20080908032617@originalthinktank.org.uk>
References: <20080907064730.24759.87793.Mailman@chiark.greenend.org.uk><0D17FE74-C5FB-462F-866F-E9C201C7870D@batten.eu.org><48C3AB85.4060301@pmsommer.com><48C3BEB9.23122.123C36@davidh.spidacom.co.uk><3452E045-84B4-4ABA-A319-4D379CA1E44A@sourcetagged.ian.co.uk><Cy3Rp2BTmDxIFAQk@perry.co.uk> <48C443C2.8040808@pelicancrossing.net><48C46EA1.5030202@zen.co.uk> <794159971.20080908032617@originalthinktank.org.uk>
Message-ID: <14C17ECB-F9CE-4D0C-B4B8-40CC15A4997D@batten.eu.org>

On 8 Sep 2008, at 03:26, Chris Salter wrote:

> Hello Peter and UKCrypto,
>
> I have in the back of my mind that it is not illegal for a member of
> the general public to monitor police radio communications but it *is*
> illegal to act upon any information gleaned from 'listening in'.

_Any_ information?

Policeman X: It's raining here in Selly Oak.

Policeman Y: Yeah, Northfield too.  Tell Dave to wrap up warm for his  
shift.

Member of public decides to take an umbrella to work that day.   
Illegal?  Should they document that they had intended to take an  
umbrella based upon the weather forecast before they heard the  
aforementioned conversation?

ian





From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk  Mon Sep  8 08:15:43 2008
From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Peter Sommer)
Date: Mon, 08 Sep 2008 08:15:43 +0100
Subject: The Great Zero Challenge
In-Reply-To: <2F06D521-8CEA-4740-BAD7-6B7221F021F9@batten.eu.org>
References: <20080907064730.24759.87793.Mailman@chiark.greenend.org.uk> <0D17FE74-C5FB-462F-866F-E9C201C7870D@batten.eu.org> <48C3AB85.4060301@pmsommer.com> <48C3BEB9.23122.123C36@davidh.spidacom.co.uk> <3452E045-84B4-4ABA-A319-4D379CA1E44A@sourcetagged.ian.co.uk> <Cy3Rp2BTmDxIFAQk@perry.co.uk> <48C46E1B.6090709@zen.co.uk> <2F06D521-8CEA-4740-BAD7-6B7221F021F9@batten.eu.org>
Message-ID: <48C4D11F.9040900@pmsommer.com>

The main purpose of these blanket "legal" sig files is to put any 
recipient on notice that the email may be subject to legal professional 
privilege and, as some of you have spotted,  to restrict their use in 
any subsequent legal proceedings.    Much of my professional 
correspondence falls into this category as by far my biggest source of 
income comes from lawyers. 

It is quite true to say that the impact of such a sig file may become 
modified by particular circumstances,  but the general claim of legal 
privilege has nevertheless been made.  Lawyers are always concerned that 
privilege may be inadvertently "waived" or contracts and obligations 
implied.

If I want proper confidentiality I use encryption.

Peter Sommer



From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk  Mon Sep  8 08:30:00 2008
From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Roland Perry)
Date: Mon, 8 Sep 2008 08:30:00 +0100
Subject: The Great Zero Challenge
In-Reply-To: <2F06D521-8CEA-4740-BAD7-6B7221F021F9@batten.eu.org>
References: <20080907064730.24759.87793.Mailman@chiark.greenend.org.uk>
 <0D17FE74-C5FB-462F-866F-E9C201C7870D@batten.eu.org>
 <48C3AB85.4060301@pmsommer.com> <48C3BEB9.23122.123C36@davidh.spidacom.co.uk>
 <3452E045-84B4-4ABA-A319-4D379CA1E44A@sourcetagged.ian.co.uk>
 <Cy3Rp2BTmDxIFAQk@perry.co.uk> <48C46E1B.6090709@zen.co.uk>
 <2F06D521-8CEA-4740-BAD7-6B7221F021F9@batten.eu.org>
Message-ID: <NJNiHUW4RNxIFATx@perry.co.uk>

In article <2F06D521-8CEA-4740-BAD7-6B7221F021F9@batten.eu.org>, Ian 
Batten <igb@batten.eu.org> writes
>Another piece of nonsense is the ``if you are not the intended 
>recipient''.  If the sender doesn't know, how on earth can the 
>recipient?  In the case of ``mis addressed'' email (which I suspect the 
>clause is intended to address) of course I'm the intended recipient: 
>there's my email address, right in the To: line.

Reminds me of the (still unresolved as far as I'm aware) "RIPA 
one-to-many wars". Is the intended recipient of *this* email:

(1) Ian Batten
(2) The ukcrypto mailing list robot
(3) Everyone on the UKCrypto list
(4) Something else - eg it changes from #2 to #3 during transmission.
-- 
Roland Perry


From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk  Mon Sep  8 08:25:58 2008
From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Roland Perry)
Date: Mon, 8 Sep 2008 08:25:58 +0100
Subject: The Great Zero Challenge
In-Reply-To: <48C46E1B.6090709@zen.co.uk>
References: <20080907064730.24759.87793.Mailman@chiark.greenend.org.uk>
 <0D17FE74-C5FB-462F-866F-E9C201C7870D@batten.eu.org>
 <48C3AB85.4060301@pmsommer.com> <48C3BEB9.23122.123C36@davidh.spidacom.co.uk>
 <3452E045-84B4-4ABA-A319-4D379CA1E44A@sourcetagged.ian.co.uk>
 <Cy3Rp2BTmDxIFAQk@perry.co.uk> <48C46E1B.6090709@zen.co.uk>
Message-ID: <kpSo$PVGONxIFA0q@perry.co.uk>

In article <48C46E1B.6090709@zen.co.uk>, Peter Fairbrother 
<zenadsl6186@zen.co.uk> writes
>The last situation is when the contents of an unpriviliged 
>communication comes into the hands of a third party. If it has come by 
>interception I think (haven't checked) it's illegal under RIPA to 
>reproduce it.
>
>However if it has come into the hands of third party by chance, or by 
>some other means not involving interception, then I'm not so sure.

You are adding frills that don't exist (on the face of the Act, anyway).

It's quite simple: an illegal [1] interception on a public network is a 
criminal offence - whatever [2] you do with the material. If it's on a 
private network it's not illegal but you can be sued for damages [3].

[1] There are some exceptions, like warrants and ISP staff.
[2] It has to be "made available" to a person, but yourself will do.
[3] There's an interesting thread today on uk.legal.moderated about
     whether in general "distress" can result in damages, but the view
     seems to be that a "loss" is required.
-- 
Roland Perry


From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk  Mon Sep  8 10:44:29 2008
From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Wendy M. Grossman)
Date: Mon, 08 Sep 2008 10:44:29 +0100
Subject: The Great Zero Challenge
In-Reply-To: <NJNiHUW4RNxIFATx@perry.co.uk>
References: <20080907064730.24759.87793.Mailman@chiark.greenend.org.uk> <0D17FE74-C5FB-462F-866F-E9C201C7870D@batten.eu.org> <48C3AB85.4060301@pmsommer.com> <48C3BEB9.23122.123C36@davidh.spidacom.co.uk> <3452E045-84B4-4ABA-A319-4D379CA1E44A@sourcetagged.ian.co.uk> <Cy3Rp2BTmDxIFAQk@perry.co.uk> <48C46E1B.6090709@zen.co.uk> <2F06D521-8CEA-4740-BAD7-6B7221F021F9@batten.eu.org> <NJNiHUW4RNxIFATx@perry.co.uk>
Message-ID: <48C4F3FD.8000304@pelicancrossing.net>

Roland Perry wrote:
> 
> Reminds me of the (still unresolved as far as I'm aware) "RIPA 
> one-to-many wars". Is the intended recipient of *this* email:
> 
> (1) Ian Batten
> (2) The ukcrypto mailing list robot
> (3) Everyone on the UKCrypto list
> (4) Something else - eg it changes from #2 to #3 during transmission.

Plus: whose intention. If I take a confidential email that arrives in my 
in-box and forward it to, say, the editor of the New York Times, that 
editor is not the original sender's intended recipient, but he's 
certainly *my* intended recipient.

wg


From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk  Mon Sep  8 11:04:11 2008
From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Roland Perry)
Date: Mon, 8 Sep 2008 11:04:11 +0100
Subject: The Great Zero Challenge
In-Reply-To: <48C4F3FD.8000304@pelicancrossing.net>
References: <20080907064730.24759.87793.Mailman@chiark.greenend.org.uk>
 <0D17FE74-C5FB-462F-866F-E9C201C7870D@batten.eu.org>
 <48C3AB85.4060301@pmsommer.com> <48C3BEB9.23122.123C36@davidh.spidacom.co.uk>
 <3452E045-84B4-4ABA-A319-4D379CA1E44A@sourcetagged.ian.co.uk>
 <Cy3Rp2BTmDxIFAQk@perry.co.uk> <48C46E1B.6090709@zen.co.uk>
 <2F06D521-8CEA-4740-BAD7-6B7221F021F9@batten.eu.org>
 <NJNiHUW4RNxIFATx@perry.co.uk> <48C4F3FD.8000304@pelicancrossing.net>
Message-ID: <g2VZIujbiPxIFAVB@perry.co.uk>

In article <48C4F3FD.8000304@pelicancrossing.net>, Wendy M. Grossman 
<wendyg@pelicancrossing.net> writes
>>  Reminds me of the (still unresolved as far as I'm aware) "RIPA 
>>one-to-many wars". Is the intended recipient of *this* email:
>>  (1) Ian Batten
>> (2) The ukcrypto mailing list robot
>> (3) Everyone on the UKCrypto list
>> (4) Something else - eg it changes from #2 to #3 during transmission.
>
>Plus: whose intention. If I take a confidential email that arrives in 
>my in-box and forward it to, say, the editor of the New York Times, 
>that editor is not the original sender's intended recipient, but he's 
>certainly *my* intended recipient.

Did you get that email by mistake, by some malfeasance of your own 
design, or was it just sent to you in confidence which you have broken?
-- 
Roland Perry


From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk  Mon Sep  8 11:42:08 2008
From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Nicholas Bohm)
Date: Mon, 08 Sep 2008 11:42:08 +0100
Subject: The Great Zero Challenge
In-Reply-To: <48C46E1B.6090709@zen.co.uk>
References: <20080907064730.24759.87793.Mailman@chiark.greenend.org.uk> <0D17FE74-C5FB-462F-866F-E9C201C7870D@batten.eu.org> <48C3AB85.4060301@pmsommer.com> <48C3BEB9.23122.123C36@davidh.spidacom.co.uk> <3452E045-84B4-4ABA-A319-4D379CA1E44A@sourcetagged.ian.co.uk> <Cy3Rp2BTmDxIFAQk@perry.co.uk> <48C46E1B.6090709@zen.co.uk>
Message-ID: <48C50180.1000409@ernest.net>

Peter Fairbrother wrote:
> Roland Perry wrote:
>> In article 
>> <3452E045-84B4-4ABA-A319-4D379CA1E44A@sourcetagged.ian.co.uk>, Ian 
>> Mason <ukcrypto@sourcetagged.ian.co.uk> writes
>>> I have the appended signature in my armoury for  replies to those who 
>>> send such ludicrous legalese.
>>
>> I have one too - which seeks to illustrate that if you don't 
>> understand it, how can you comply?
> 
> As I understand it, a disclaimer that a communication is legally 
> privileged may have some legal effect in preventing third parties from 
> divulging it. Once received, the recipient can reveal the contents 
> (unless he's a solicitor under a duty to keep schtumm).
> 
> However if you send me a disclaimer attached to a communication, I can 
> just ignore it - I haven't agreed to keep it secret, and am perfectly at 
> liberty to repeat the sense of the contents, though if eg it's a poem I 
> may not have copyright to the expression, and then I can't reproduce it 
> exactly.
> 
> 
> The last situation is when the contents of an unpriviliged communication 
> comes into the hands of a third party. If it has come by interception I 
> think (haven't checked) it's illegal under RIPA to reproduce it.
> 
> However if it has come into the hands of third party by chance, or by 
> some other means not involving interception, then I'm not so sure. 
> Obviously posting to usenet implies that a communication can be freely 
> reproduced, but in other cases where eg a third party reads a 
> communication marked PRIVATE at the end, does the reader have any duty 
> to keep it private?
> 
> In common courtesy, yes, but under law I don't know. I doubt it, but - 
> Nicholas?

Last time I thought I understood "breach of confidence" (which was 
before it began its recent strenuous morphing into a basis for a remedy 
for breach of privacy), the answer was that marking things "Private" or 
"Confidential" did not by itself impose a duty on the recipient.  It 
might, if consistently used in the course of a continuing relationship, 
especially if used by both parties, provide evidence that a 
"relationship of confidence" had come into existence.  If so, disclosure 
of information exchanged within that relationship, as long as it was 
information of an intrinsically confidential kind, would be a breach of 
confidence.  Marking may also act to designate something as part of a 
class protected under a prior agreement.

In the absence of circumstances of this kind, such markings have a 
fairly limited effect.  At best, I think, an envelope marked "Private" 
or "Confidential" operates as a request to the recipient (perhaps a post 
room in a business) to apply its usual procedures for mail so marked 
(e.g. pass unopened to the addressee).

The firm where I served my articles applied such a policy.  When my 
principal went on holiday, he instructed me to open all unopened mail 
addressed to him.  "Even if marked 'Strictly Private and Confidential'?" 
I asked him.  "Even if written in violet ink and strongly perfumed," he 
replied.  "There are no skeletons in my cupboard."  Sadly, there weren't.

As to the Great Zero Challenge, with which this thread dawned, 
unfortunately absence of evidence isn't evidence of absence.  The 
challenge does at least suggest that data recovery from disks 
overwritten with zeros isn't trivial, but the challenge is hardly 
tempting if such a thing can be done but only with significant effort. 
And I doubt if any three or even four letter agencies would see any 
virtue in demonstrating in public their prowess at recovery.  So I 
prefer to keep going with Eraser (particularly handy for its capacity 
for scheduled wipes of Temp folders etc).  Another comfort is 
TrueCrypt's ability to do full disk encryption (including system disks).

Nicholas
-- 
Salkyns, Great Canfield, Takeley,
Bishop's Stortford CM22 6SX, UK

Phone  01279 870285    (+44 1279 870285)
Mobile  07715 419728    (+44 7715 419728)

PGP public key ID: 0x899DD7FF.  Fingerprint:
5248 1320 B42E 84FC 1E8B  A9E6 0912 AE66 899D D7FF


From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk  Mon Sep  8 12:14:27 2008
From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (ken)
Date: Mon, 08 Sep 2008 12:14:27 +0100
Subject: The Great Zero Challenge
In-Reply-To: <48C44718.3030406@lamont.me.uk>
References: <20080907064730.24759.87793.Mailman@chiark.greenend.org.uk> <WyQfFhAjA5wIFwL3@tigers.demon.co.uk> <48C3A037.5020605@pmsommer.com> <0D17FE74-C5FB-462F-866F-E9C201C7870D@batten.eu.org> <DEDACCE290F94C9BA5E06FBDE17E51F3@wideboy> <48C44718.3030406@lamont.me.uk>
Message-ID: <48C50913.5080607@bbk.ac.uk>

Richard Lamont wrote:
> Mark Sowerby wrote:
> 
>> to "dd" a drive. If there is no need to reuse a drive, I find a large
>> hammer works for me.
> 
> Maybe I'm some kind of closet pyromaniac, but I prefer a blowlamp.
> There's something particularly reassuring about platters heated to
> incandescence and buckling in a cloud of smoke.

Last time I wanted to destroy a disk I just opened it up with a 
chisel.  It was hardly neccessary to deliberately damage the 
platter. When I were a lad they were big chunks of what looked 
like rusty iron. These days they are fragile little things 
smooth enough to work as mirrors. The force used to open the box 
  smashed the disk into what looked like little pieces of shiny 
glass.  It would be difficult to put them together again. More 
or less impossible if you mixed up the bits from more  than one 
disk I would have thought. Or maybe GCHQ recruiters hang around 
at jigsaw conventions :-)


From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk  Mon Sep  8 12:18:49 2008
From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (ken)
Date: Mon, 08 Sep 2008 12:18:49 +0100
Subject: The Great Zero Challenge
In-Reply-To: <EC35CAD5-6F06-47F9-920C-AF4383C3ED0A@batten.eu.org>
References: <20080907064730.24759.87793.Mailman@chiark.greenend.org.uk> <WyQfFhAjA5wIFwL3@tigers.demon.co.uk> <48C3A037.5020605@pmsommer.com> <0D17FE74-C5FB-462F-866F-E9C201C7870D@batten.eu.org> <DEDACCE290F94C9BA5E06FBDE17E51F3@wideboy> <EC35CAD5-6F06-47F9-920C-AF4383C3ED0A@batten.eu.org>
Message-ID: <48C50A19.6000507@bbk.ac.uk>

Ian Batten wrote:
>>
>> For HMG use only wiping systems listed at the link below should be 
>> used, which have been tested to be suitable:
> 
> 
> I think that at the moment HMG might prefer to give its own staff advice 
> on beams, prior to giving the rest of us advice on motes.  We're soon 
> going to reach a point where you're unusual _not_ to have had your data 
> lost by the government.

AFAICT HMG staff almost never lose data. Its nearly always the 
contractors or consultants or whoever that they are forced to 
outsource to (and have been forced to outsource to for about 
thirty years) because the government doesn't believe that its 
own employees are as competent as 23-year-old recent economics 
graduates who did a six week course in Business Analysis and 
want to grow up to be Management Consultants


From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk  Mon Sep  8 12:32:25 2008
From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (PeteM)
Date: Mon, 08 Sep 2008 12:32:25 +0100
Subject: The Great Zero Challenge
In-Reply-To: <48C50A19.6000507@bbk.ac.uk>
References: <20080907064730.24759.87793.Mailman@chiark.greenend.org.uk> <WyQfFhAjA5wIFwL3@tigers.demon.co.uk> <48C3A037.5020605@pmsommer.com> <0D17FE74-C5FB-462F-866F-E9C201C7870D@batten.eu.org> <DEDACCE290F94C9BA5E06FBDE17E51F3@wideboy> <EC35CAD5-6F06-47F9-920C-AF4383C3ED0A@batten.eu.org> <48C50A19.6000507@bbk.ac.uk>
Message-ID: <48C50D49.1040106@callnetuk.com>

ken wrote  on 8-09-08 12:18:
> Ian Batten wrote:
>>>
>>> For HMG use only wiping systems listed at the link below should be 
>>> used, which have been tested to be suitable:
>>
>>
>> I think that at the moment HMG might prefer to give its own staff 
>> advice on beams, prior to giving the rest of us advice on motes.  
>> We're soon going to reach a point where you're unusual _not_ to have 
>> had your data lost by the government.
> 
> AFAICT HMG staff almost never lose data. Its nearly always the 
> contractors or consultants or whoever that they are forced to outsource 
> to (and have been forced to outsource to for about thirty years) because 
> the government doesn't believe that its own employees are as competent 
> as 23-year-old recent economics graduates who did a six week course in 
> Business Analysis and want to grow up to be Management Consultants
> 

The biggest loss, of the child benefit records, was perpetrated by an 
employee of HMRC who IIRC posted it to the auditors and then forgot all 
about it. Of course you can try and blame the courier service, but if 
you do that then you can always find an "outsourced service" somewhere 
in the chain that can conveniently take the blame for everything and 
thus exonerate civil servants.

In my experience government agencies like HMRC and DWP are utterly 
arrogant about the powers they have and their lack of any accountability 
for misusing them. I would expect their attitude to data security to be 
exactly the same; more so, in fact, since they are pretty unlikely to be 
found out.

--
Peter Mitchell


From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk  Mon Sep  8 12:31:19 2008
From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Matthew Pemble)
Date: Mon, 08 Sep 2008 12:31:19 +0100
Subject: The Great Zero Challenge
In-Reply-To: <48C50A19.6000507@bbk.ac.uk>
References: <20080907064730.24759.87793.Mailman@chiark.greenend.org.uk> <WyQfFhAjA5wIFwL3@tigers.demon.co.uk> <48C3A037.5020605@pmsommer.com> <0D17FE74-C5FB-462F-866F-E9C201C7870D@batten.eu.org> <DEDACCE290F94C9BA5E06FBDE17E51F3@wideboy> <EC35CAD5-6F06-47F9-920C-AF4383C3ED0A@batten.eu.org> <48C50A19.6000507@bbk.ac.uk>
Message-ID: <48C50D07.3090506@pemble.net>

ken wrote:
> Ian Batten wrote:
>>>
>>> For HMG use only wiping systems listed at the link below should be 
>>> used, which have been tested to be suitable:
>>
>>
>> I think that at the moment HMG might prefer to give its own staff 
>> advice on beams, prior to giving the rest of us advice on motes.  
>> We're soon going to reach a point where you're unusual _not_ to have 
>> had your data lost by the government.
>
> AFAICT HMG staff almost never lose data. Its nearly always the 
> contractors or consultants or whoever that they are forced to 
> outsource to (and have been forced to outsource to for about thirty 
> years) because the government doesn't believe that its own employees 
> are as competent as 23-year-old recent economics graduates who did a 
> six week course in Business Analysis and want to grow up to be 
> Management Consultants
>
I'm not sure the HMRC CDs example quite fits that, nor does the MOD 
recruiter's laptop.  I would suggest that it also often occurs at the 
(contractually rarely properly specified and never, in my experience, so 
with regard to data security) interfaces between different government 
departments (eg HMRC and NAO) or between the government department and 
the outsourcer.  Add in a lack of budget to spend on security measures 
(MOD laptop again), a callous disregard for security rules, especially 
amongst politicians (Blears & her constitiuency computer) and senior 
civil servants (intel documents on train) and you have the hideous mess 
that currently is facing us.

Matthew

Matthew



From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk  Mon Sep  8 11:30:38 2008
From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Caspar Bowden)
Date: Mon, 8 Sep 2008 11:30:38 +0100
Subject: The Great Zero Challenge
In-Reply-To: <WyQfFhAjA5wIFwL3@tigers.demon.co.uk>
References: <20080907064730.24759.87793.Mailman@chiark.greenend.org.uk>
 <WyQfFhAjA5wIFwL3@tigers.demon.co.uk>
Message-ID: <2298D4476FA2F44591690E423F07C37B2195995BD8@EA-EXMSG-C333.europe.corp.microsoft.com>

> admin@chiark.greenend.org.uk] On Behalf Of Mary Hawking
...
> "We used the 32 year-old Unix dd command using /dev/zero as input to
> overwrite the drive. "
> Is this command as efficient as Slashdot implies, and if so could I run
> it on Windows 98, 2000 and XP?

FYI - there's a Microsoft command-line utility which can be used to overwri=
te deleted data
http://support.microsoft.com/kb/315672/en-us

Caspar


From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk  Mon Sep  8 11:45:30 2008
From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Caspar Bowden)
Date: Mon, 8 Sep 2008 11:45:30 +0100
Subject: Data breach solecism
Message-ID: <2298D4476FA2F44591690E423F07C37B2195995BF4@EA-EXMSG-C333.europe.corp.microsoft.com>

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2700330/Lost-prison-data-disc-has-not-falle=
n-into-wrong-hands-claims-Government.html

Headline: Lost prison data disc has not fallen into wrong hands, claims Gov=
ernment

Article: <<...But Michael Wills, the data protection minister, said: "We be=
lieve the data is not in the public domain and therefore there are not sign=
ificant risks to security.">>

--
Caspar Bowden



From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk  Mon Sep  8 17:03:59 2008
From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (James Cox)
Date: Mon, 8 Sep 2008 17:03:59 +0100
Subject: The Great Zero Challenge
In-Reply-To: <2B518307-2A1E-41A7-BB6E-00D7DDCC20BD@batten.eu.org>
References: <20080907064730.24759.87793.Mailman@chiark.greenend.org.uk> <0D17FE74-C5FB-462F-866F-E9C201C7870D@batten.eu.org> <48C3AB85.4060301@pmsommer.com> <48C3BEB9.23122.123C36@davidh.spidacom.co.uk> <3452E045-84B4-4ABA-A319-4D379CA1E44A@sourcetagged.ian.co.uk> <Cy3Rp2BTmDxIFAQk@perry.co.uk> <971C6611-7486-465F-B97D-425BE365D10E@batten.eu.org> <E88B518E-A209-4F4B-B06F-DC75D9C6D6D5@imaj.es> <2B518307-2A1E-41A7-BB6E-00D7DDCC20BD@batten.eu.org>
Message-ID: <0F1F7C78-5B23-4EC7-911A-2C504F2A5504@imaj.es>

On 8 Sep 2008, at 06:37, Ian Batten wrote:

>>
>> i'm fairly sure it's not a certain sort of person, per se, but due  
>> to fsa/sox regulation that prohibits you from being even 10 feet of  
>> information which may influence decisions you make.
>
> Fair enough.  But I work in telecoms.  I can guarantee you that 98%  
> of the companies I do business with are not affected by the FSA and  
> are only affected by SOX/JSOX/etc in so far as they are traded  
> companies.

there's absolutely no question as to the pointlessness of it - however  
where it might have started by solicitors trying to do basic CYA at  
FSA regulated firms, this has spread to other parts of the industry  
because people think it's a 'good idea' - considering it free legal  
advice, perhaps. hence the viral nature of its spread.

-james


From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk  Mon Sep  8 17:06:14 2008
From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (James Cox)
Date: Mon, 8 Sep 2008 17:06:14 +0100
Subject: The Great Zero Challenge
In-Reply-To: <48C4D11F.9040900@pmsommer.com>
References: <20080907064730.24759.87793.Mailman@chiark.greenend.org.uk> <0D17FE74-C5FB-462F-866F-E9C201C7870D@batten.eu.org> <48C3AB85.4060301@pmsommer.com> <48C3BEB9.23122.123C36@davidh.spidacom.co.uk> <3452E045-84B4-4ABA-A319-4D379CA1E44A@sourcetagged.ian.co.uk> <Cy3Rp2BTmDxIFAQk@perry.co.uk> <48C46E1B.6090709@zen.co.uk> <2F06D521-8CEA-4740-BAD7-6B7221F021F9@batten.eu.org> <48C4D11F.9040900@pmsommer.com>
Message-ID: <E481256A-4BDC-49F2-8DE5-F61FC47B0F67@imaj.es>

On 8 Sep 2008, at 08:15, Peter Sommer wrote:

> The main purpose of these blanket "legal" sig files is to put any  
> recipient on notice that the email may be subject to legal  
> professional privilege and, as some of you have spotted,  to  
> restrict their use in any subsequent legal proceedings.    Much of  
> my professional correspondence falls into this category as by far my  
> biggest source of income comes from lawyers.
> It is quite true to say that the impact of such a sig file may  
> become modified by particular circumstances,  but the general claim  
> of legal privilege has nevertheless been made.  Lawyers are always  
> concerned that privilege may be inadvertently "waived" or contracts  
> and obligations implied.
>
> If I want proper confidentiality I use encryption.

i seriously wonder how many lawyers send email which is _at least_  
signed and preferably encrypted, with keyserver verifiable keys.....

that does sort out the problem some?


From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk  Mon Sep  8 18:54:31 2008
From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Dave Howe)
Date: Mon, 08 Sep 2008 18:54:31 +0100
Subject: The Great Zero Challenge
In-Reply-To: <2298D4476FA2F44591690E423F07C37B2195995BD8@EA-EXMSG-C333.europe.corp.microsoft.com>
References: <20080907064730.24759.87793.Mailman@chiark.greenend.org.uk> <WyQfFhAjA5wIFwL3@tigers.demon.co.uk> <2298D4476FA2F44591690E423F07C37B2195995BD8@EA-EXMSG-C333.europe.corp.microsoft.com>
Message-ID: <48C566D7.5040400@gmx.co.uk>

Caspar Bowden wrote:
>> admin@chiark.greenend.org.uk] On Behalf Of Mary Hawking
> ...
>> "We used the 32 year-old Unix dd command using /dev/zero as input to
>> overwrite the drive. "
>> Is this command as efficient as Slashdot implies, and if so could I run
>> it on Windows 98, 2000 and XP?
> 
> FYI - there's a Microsoft command-line utility which can be used to overwrite deleted data
> http://support.microsoft.com/kb/315672/en-us
> 
> Caspar
> 
Personally I would suggest heidi's /eraser/ freeware:

http://www.heidi.ie/eraser/

note however that if the disc is faulty, then "hot redirect" could mean
the overwritten drive sectors are not those which contain the data, but
standins for said data sectors which are then not readable under normal
circumstances (but reachable with the right forensic software)

eraser can just use /dev/zero or can do more complex stuff - your choice.

DBAN is bundled with it, as a floppy image. note that dban does the
entire disk however, so you aren't going to be left with a viable
operating system if you run it (for that matter, you aren't going to be
left with a detectable partition structure after you run it, unless you
are *very* selective what you wipe :)


From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk  Mon Sep  8 15:28:44 2008
From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (James Firth)
Date: Mon, 8 Sep 2008 15:28:44 +0100
Subject: The Great Zero Challenge
In-Reply-To: <2298D4476FA2F44591690E423F07C37B2195995BD8@EA-EXMSG-C333.europe.corp.microsoft.com>
References: <20080907064730.24759.87793.Mailman@chiark.greenend.org.uk> <WyQfFhAjA5wIFwL3@tigers.demon.co.uk> <2298D4476FA2F44591690E423F07C37B2195995BD8@EA-EXMSG-C333.europe.corp.microsoft.com>
Message-ID: <029d01c911bf$33b3d8e0$c77fa8c0@Jinja>

> FYI - there's a Microsoft command-line utility which can be used to
> overwrite deleted data
> http://support.microsoft.com/kb/315672/en-us

Given this section from the Microsoft help text: "If you create files in
plain text and then encrypt them, Encrypting File System (EFS) makes a
backup copy of the file so that, if an error occurs during the encryption
process, the data is not lost. After the encryption is complete, the backup
copy is deleted. As with other deleted files, the data is not completely
removed until it has been overwritten."

If this is the default behaviour for their encryption software I personally
would not trust the tool to secure anything beyond a copy of my public
website.

Does anyone have any opinions on degaussing? I use a combination of
degausser and 4lb hammer.

James Firth




From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk  Mon Sep  8 19:56:16 2008
From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (M J D Brown)
Date: Mon, 8 Sep 2008 19:56:16 +0100
Subject: The Great Zero Challenge
References: <20080907064730.24759.87793.Mailman@chiark.greenend.org.uk> <WyQfFhAjA5wIFwL3@tigers.demon.co.uk> <2298D4476FA2F44591690E423F07C37B2195995BD8@EA-EXMSG-C333.europe.corp.microsoft.com> <029d01c911bf$33b3d8e0$c77fa8c0@Jinja>
Message-ID: <00a801c911e4$95a5b350$891a313e@Powerstation>

A colleague wrote:

> Given this section from the Microsoft help text: "If you create files 
> in
> plain text and then encrypt them, Encrypting File System (EFS) makes a
> backup copy of the file so that, if an error occurs during the 
> encryption
> process, the data is not lost. After the encryption is complete, the 
> backup
> copy is deleted. As with other deleted files, the data is not 
> completely
> removed until it has been overwritten."
>
> If this is the default behaviour for their encryption software I 
> personally
> would not trust the tool to secure anything beyond a copy of my public
> website.

The Microsoft help text is at least candid and allows the security risk 
to be assessed and appropriate precautions taken.

<tongue-in-cheek mode on>
Holding 'classified' files on the same computer as non-sensitive ones 
opens up all the problems of multi-level security.  If one is that 
worried about leakage, then the prudent option would be to hold all 
sensitive files and perform all cryptographic processing on a separate, 
physically secured computer that has no network or internet connection. 
Encrypted files must then be carried across the 'air gap' to the 
networked computer.  Naturally, one would then have to assess the EMC 
vulnerability of the secure computer and consider the need for a Faraday 
cage and mains filtering.  And then ....
<tongue-in-cheek mode off>

Unless formally classified material is involved, in which case it is a 
matter of complying with the data controller's regulations, I would 
think that a reasonable approach would be to store sensitive files on a 
separate portable drive kept in the office safe which is given a routine 
wiping when de-commissioned and then physically destroyed when 
opportunity permits.  I take this approach with identifiable personal 
data relating to my voluntary welfare casework, though I have not yet 
needed to de-commission the portable hard drive.

Regards,
Mike.
 




From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk  Mon Sep  8 18:02:50 2008
From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Tom Thomson)
Date: Mon, 8 Sep 2008 18:02:50 +0100
Subject: The Great Zero Challenge
In-Reply-To: <71FC4700-06FD-421E-86FC-328E637F91B1@batten.eu.org>
References: <20080907064730.24759.87793.Mailman@chiark.greenend.org.uk> <WyQfFhAjA5wIFwL3@tigers.demon.co.uk> <48C3A037.5020605@pmsommer.com> <0D17FE74-C5FB-462F-866F-E9C201C7870D@batten.eu.org> <48C3AB85.4060301@pmsommer.com> <71FC4700-06FD-421E-86FC-328E637F91B1@batten.eu.org>
Message-ID: <4BD78029550E4B9C832248E5D5FA9F64@neos.tv>

Isn't there a more fundamental problem?  If the disclaimer is at the end 
of the document, you can just say "I didn't read the disclaimer, I didn't 
get that far".  If the document contains information on which the 
recipient needs to act quickly, you may have reacted when you read that 
information and when you went back to read the rest and found the 
disclaimer it was already too late.

M.

-----Original Message-----
From: ukcrypto-admin@chiark.greenend.org.uk 
[mailto:ukcrypto-admin@chiark.greenend.org.uk] On Behalf Of Ian Batten
Sent: 07 September 2008 12:34
To: ukcrypto@chiark.greenend.org.uk
Subject: Re: The Great Zero Challenge


On 7 Sep 2008, at 11:23, Peter Sommer wrote:
>> n
> You are right it doesn't,  and I apologise.  But much of my
> correspondence is confidential and legall privileged which is why by
> default I have this sig file.  I have to remember to delete it.
> Better to cause amusement on ukcrypto, it seems to me,  than
> professional embarassment.

My logic for stopping people using disclaimers is as follows:

There are often occasions when it's hard to tell if the disclaimer is
`real' or not.  Were someone to attempt to enforce a disclaimer
against my employer, I would look through our archives and Google for
mail from that organisation where we had:

* An official order, change request or similar contractual item with a
footer which said ``this is not an official statement''

* Something which was manifestly intended by the sender to be
distributed widely that said ``do not distribute without permission''

* Something which said it wasn't legal advice when it was legal advice
(this is a favourite of solicitors).

* You get the idea.

I'd then say ``since the organisation can't decide if the disclaimer
applies, how can we as recipients be expected to?''

If this logic holds water (and lawyers I've spoken to say it's not
entirely laughable), sending mail to mailing lists isn't just a source
of amusement for ukcrypto-ites: it's something which might later count
against you were you to try to enforce it.

ian






From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk  Mon Sep  8 23:20:22 2008
From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Chris Edwards)
Date: Mon, 8 Sep 2008 23:20:22 +0100 (BST)
Subject: The Great Zero Challenge
Message-ID: <Pine.SOC.4.64.0809082319500.509@bowling.cent.gla.ac.uk>

On Mon, 8 Sep 2008, Tom Thomson wrote:

| Isn't there a more fundamental problem?  If the disclaimer is at the end 
| of the document

Yes.  I fear the right solution for anyone serious about their disclaimer 
is probably to send only the disclaimer text, with the orig message itself 
included as an attachment.  How horrid...


From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk  Tue Sep  9 01:08:17 2008
From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Peter Fairbrother)
Date: Tue, 09 Sep 2008 01:08:17 +0100
Subject: The Great Zero Challenge
In-Reply-To: <48C50180.1000409@ernest.net>
References: <20080907064730.24759.87793.Mailman@chiark.greenend.org.uk> <0D17FE74-C5FB-462F-866F-E9C201C7870D@batten.eu.org> <48C3AB85.4060301@pmsommer.com> <48C3BEB9.23122.123C36@davidh.spidacom.co.uk> <3452E045-84B4-4ABA-A319-4D379CA1E44A@sourcetagged.ian.co.uk> <Cy3Rp2BTmDxIFAQk@perry.co.uk> <48C46E1B.6090709@zen.co.uk> <48C50180.1000409@ernest.net>
Message-ID: <48C5BE71.8070700@zen.co.uk>

Nicholas Bohm wrote:
> Peter Fairbrother wrote:
>> Roland Perry wrote:
>>> In article 
>>> <3452E045-84B4-4ABA-A319-4D379CA1E44A@sourcetagged.ian.co.uk>, Ian 
>>> Mason <ukcrypto@sourcetagged.ian.co.uk> writes
>>>> I have the appended signature in my armoury for  replies to those 
>>>> who send such ludicrous legalese.
>>>
>>> I have one too - which seeks to illustrate that if you don't 
>>> understand it, how can you comply?
>>
>> As I understand it, a disclaimer that a communication is legally 
>> privileged may have some legal effect in preventing third parties from 
>> divulging it. Once received, the recipient can reveal the contents 
>> (unless he's a solicitor under a duty to keep schtumm).
>>
>> However if you send me a disclaimer attached to a communication, I can 
>> just ignore it - I haven't agreed to keep it secret, and am perfectly 
>> at liberty to repeat the sense of the contents, though if eg it's a 
>> poem I may not have copyright to the expression, and then I can't 
>> reproduce it exactly.
>>
>>
>> The last situation is when the contents of an unpriviliged 
>> communication comes into the hands of a third party. If it has come by 
>> interception I think (haven't checked) it's illegal under RIPA to 
>> reproduce it.
>>
>> However if it has come into the hands of third party by chance, or by 
>> some other means not involving interception, then I'm not so sure. 
>> Obviously posting to usenet implies that a communication can be freely 
>> reproduced, but in other cases where eg a third party reads a 
>> communication marked PRIVATE at the end, does the reader have any duty 
>> to keep it private?
>>
>> In common courtesy, yes, but under law I don't know. I doubt it, but - 
>> Nicholas?
> 
> Last time I thought I understood "breach of confidence" (which was 
> before it began its recent strenuous morphing into a basis for a remedy 
> for breach of privacy), the answer was that marking things "Private" or 
> "Confidential" did not by itself impose a duty on the recipient.  It 
> might, if consistently used in the course of a continuing relationship, 
> especially if used by both parties, provide evidence that a 
> "relationship of confidence" had come into existence.  If so, disclosure 
> of information exchanged within that relationship, as long as it was 
> information of an intrinsically confidential kind, would be a breach of 
> confidence.  Marking may also act to designate something as part of a 
> class protected under a prior agreement.

Is it correct that, for a breach of confidence, there has to be an 
agreement beforehand that that matters will be kept confidential, and 
absent such an agreement there is no duty to keep matters confidential?

Would that then mean that a continued marking as "private" may (or may 
not) simply be evidence of such an agreement?



This leads on, or back, to RIPA and Phorm and the need for bilateral 
consent to an interception.

Under RIPA consent is needed from *both* the sender and the recipient of 
a communication while it is in transit (which I take generally to mean 
before the intended recipient has received it) for it to be legally 
intercepted by consent. This is actually quite good, though I don't know 
how far it is being applied, eg in the Police investigation of BT's 
Phorm trials.

So post-RIPA an (un?)articled clerk might be committing a RIPA offense 
in opening an envelope marked "for addressee only" if it was clear that 
it was meant only for the senior partner (assuming it was still 
technically in transit in a public communications system - but see Lord 
Bassam's doormat, maybe the internal mail system of a solicitor's office 
is a private comms system).


But if there is a private comms system in the path, how can I send 
someone a communication which won't be, and would be illegal (not just 
actionable) to be, read by third parties?

I might well want to do that. Can't think why offhand, but it's possible.



-- Peter

(who just got 40 cases of beer delivered, but then had to carry them up 
the stairs - hard work!)

(they do beer deliveries 24/7, or rather 24/5.5, around here - a big :) 
to Blair (otherwise, spit!!) for that)


From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk  Mon Sep  8 23:37:45 2008
From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Ian Miller)
Date: Mon, 8 Sep 2008 23:37:45 +0100
Subject: The Great Zero Challenge
In-Reply-To: <029d01c911bf$33b3d8e0$c77fa8c0@Jinja>
References: <2298D4476FA2F44591690E423F07C37B2195995BD8@EA-EXMSG-C333.europe.corp.micr
 osoft.com> <20080907064730.24759.87793.Mailman@chiark.greenend.org.uk>
 <WyQfFhAjA5wIFwL3@tigers.demon.co.uk>
 <2298D4476FA2F44591690E423F07C37B2195995BD8@EA-EXMSG-C333.europe.corp.micr
 osoft.com>
Message-ID: <l03102801c4eb2efe35a0@[192.168.1.2]>

At 15:28 +0100 8/9/08, James Firth wrote:
>Does anyone have any opinions on degaussing? I use a combination of
>degausser and 4lb hammer.
>
I have always thought the most reliable approach would be to dissolve the
magnetic coating off the surface of the platter.  The ideal solvent will
depend on precisely what they are using for modern storage media.   However
I sure there will be something that will made short work of it.
[ A quick web search suggests that phosphoric acid might be the solvent of
choice for iron oxide. ]
This also allows for extremely fast destruction.  If you have an
appropriate hole drilled in the case and a syringe containing the
appropriate solvent in the hole, then all you need do is push the plunger
and job is done.

Another possibility is to run the disc in a moderate vaccum.  If the
internal air pressure drops sufficiently, then the heads don't "fly"
anymore and they will grind the coating off the surface of the disc.  If
you run an access-the-whole-surface program with head in contact, you
should have a fairly clean platter at the end.  My main worry would be that
the dust might jam the bearings before you had completed it and leave part
of the surface intact.

Ian

--
32 Stockwell St, Cambridge, CB1 3ND
Tel:  +44 1223 511943	            Mobile: +44 777 5536663
Fax:  +44 870 0514333	 (e-mail preferred to Fax)






From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk  Tue Sep  9 00:31:49 2008
From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Dan Beale-Cocks)
Date: Tue, 09 Sep 2008 00:31:49 +0100
Subject: The Great Zero Challenge
In-Reply-To: <029d01c911bf$33b3d8e0$c77fa8c0@Jinja>
References: <20080907064730.24759.87793.Mailman@chiark.greenend.org.uk> <WyQfFhAjA5wIFwL3@tigers.demon.co.uk> <2298D4476FA2F44591690E423F07C37B2195995BD8@EA-EXMSG-C333.europe.corp.microsoft.com> <029d01c911bf$33b3d8e0$c77fa8c0@Jinja>
Message-ID: <48C5B5E5.7060201@bealoid.co.uk>

Degaussers have to be pretty hefty to work.  Handheld degaussers (used 
for tape) won't work.  The hammer isn't doing much, except risking your 
health.

James Firth wrote:
> Does anyone have any opinions on degaussing? I use a combination of
> degausser and 4lb hammer.
>
> James Firth
>
>
>
>   



From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk  Tue Sep  9 00:24:02 2008
From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Dan Beale-Cocks)
Date: Tue, 09 Sep 2008 00:24:02 +0100
Subject: The Great Zero Challenge
In-Reply-To: <48C3E5FE.6070502@complicity.co.uk>
References: <20080907064730.24759.87793.Mailman@chiark.greenend.org.uk><WyQfFhAjA5wIFwL3@tigers.demon.co.uk> <4610647271.20080907150739@originalthinktank.org.uk> <48C3E5FE.6070502@complicity.co.uk>
Message-ID: <48C5B412.1080800@bealoid.co.uk>

Why, whenever hard drive deletion is mentioned, do sensible people 
forget anything they know about attack models and cost-benefit?

You cannot prove that data on a disc that has been over written is 
unrecoverable, but that won't matter for most users.  Anyone who thinks 
CESG is going to attack their hard drive will have enough money to 
over-write, degaus and then grind all hard drives.  Anyone else will be 
satisfied with a single overwrite of all zeros,  especially if that's 
done using ATA commands.




From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk  Tue Sep  9 00:13:36 2008
From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Dan Beale-Cocks)
Date: Tue, 09 Sep 2008 00:13:36 +0100
Subject: The Great Zero Challenge
In-Reply-To: <DEDACCE290F94C9BA5E06FBDE17E51F3@wideboy>
References: <20080907064730.24759.87793.Mailman@chiark.greenend.org.uk> <WyQfFhAjA5wIFwL3@tigers.demon.co.uk> <48C3A037.5020605@pmsommer.com> <0D17FE74-C5FB-462F-866F-E9C201C7870D@batten.eu.org> <DEDACCE290F94C9BA5E06FBDE17E51F3@wideboy>
Message-ID: <48C5B1A0.7070408@bealoid.co.uk>

The ATA command set includes a SECURE ERASE function, which IIRC does 
overwrite sectors marked as bad.  It's a bit quicker than DBAN.

I'm not aware of any commercial company, anywhere in the world, who 
claims to be able to recover any data from a disk that's been 
overwritten, even just once with all zeros.



Mark Sowerby wrote:
> Hi,
>
> It goes withouth saying, but I will state it for completeness as I 
> don't think it has been stated in the thread (apologies, suck eggs 
> etc) - overwriting is different from deleting, which generally does 
> not delete.
>
> Drives use pre-emptive error correction where they remap data from 
> weak sectors to spare sectors. So, whilst dd may actually oblitorate 
> the data (beyond economical physical recovery), it is unlikely that dd 
> will have erased all of the data as drive electronics (keeping the 
> weak sectors from being addressed by the computer) and mybe the 
> operating system device driver may have got in the way....It may be 
> the case that it is undesirable for even these mere remnants of data 
> trapped on the "weak" remapped sectors of the drive to be recovered.
>
> For HMG use only wiping systems listed at the link below should be 
> used, which have been tested to be suitable:
>
> http://www.cesg.gov.uk/site/iacs/itsec/
>
>
> With software based data erasure - if the method is not assured - then 
> you cannnot rely upon it to give assurance. However - it may be a case 
> that a complete overwrite (for example dd) is a suitable risk 
> mitigation method when taking into account what was actually on the 
> disk. There are plenty of Linux distributions that can be run from CD 
> that could be used to "dd" a drive. If there is no need to reuse a 
> drive, I find a large hammer works for me.
>
> BR
> Mark
>
>
>
>
>
>



From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk  Tue Sep  9 07:50:28 2008
From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Mary Hawking)
Date: Tue, 9 Sep 2008 07:50:28 +0100
Subject: The Great Zero Challenge
In-Reply-To: <20080909021901.18551.33748.Mailman@chiark.greenend.org.uk>
References: <20080909021901.18551.33748.Mailman@chiark.greenend.org.uk>
Message-ID: <NbkJPEG0yhxIFwDX@tigers.demon.co.uk>

In message <20080909021901.18551.33748.Mailman@chiark.greenend.org.uk>, 
ukcrypto-request@chiark.greenend.org.uk writes

>Why, whenever hard drive deletion is mentioned, do sensible people 
>forget anything they know about attack models and cost-benefit?
>
>You cannot prove that data on a disc that has been over written is 
>unrecoverable, but that won't matter for most users.  Anyone who thinks 
>CESG is going to attack their hard drive will have enough money to 
>over-write, degaus and then grind all hard drives.  Anyone else will be 
>satisfied with a single overwrite of all zeros,  especially if that's 
>done using ATA commands.

I wasn't really thinking about CESG.
Does anyone know how good Nigerian (and other) scammers are at reading 
discs supposedly erased?
Mary Hawking
PS as I said, this is personal data - and as the problem is to safely 
erase data before dumping the computers, I don't really care whether the 
disc could be re-used.


-- 
Mary Hawking



From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk  Tue Sep  9 06:29:09 2008
From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Roland Perry)
Date: Tue, 9 Sep 2008 06:29:09 +0100
Subject: The Great Zero Challenge
In-Reply-To: <48C5BE71.8070700@zen.co.uk>
References: <20080907064730.24759.87793.Mailman@chiark.greenend.org.uk>
 <0D17FE74-C5FB-462F-866F-E9C201C7870D@batten.eu.org>
 <48C3AB85.4060301@pmsommer.com> <48C3BEB9.23122.123C36@davidh.spidacom.co.uk>
 <3452E045-84B4-4ABA-A319-4D379CA1E44A@sourcetagged.ian.co.uk>
 <Cy3Rp2BTmDxIFAQk@perry.co.uk> <48C46E1B.6090709@zen.co.uk>
 <48C50180.1000409@ernest.net> <48C5BE71.8070700@zen.co.uk>
Message-ID: <v+qa6B$lmgxIFAly@perry.co.uk>

In article <48C5BE71.8070700@zen.co.uk>, Peter Fairbrother 
<zenadsl6186@zen.co.uk> writes
>So post-RIPA an (un?)articled clerk might be committing a RIPA offense 
>in opening an envelope marked "for addressee only" if it was clear that 
>it was meant only for the senior partner (assuming it was still 
>technically in transit in a public communications system - but see Lord 
>Bassam's doormat, maybe the internal mail system of a solicitor's 
>office is a private comms system).

That's the whole point of the 'doormat' concept. It is to decriminalise 
things that happen after the Royal Mail has let go of them.

(And also to avoid an offence of interception when a PBX has a "group 
pickup" function, and so on...)
-- 
Roland Perry


From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk  Tue Sep  9 10:18:52 2008
From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Ian Batten)
Date: Tue, 9 Sep 2008 10:18:52 +0100
Subject: The Great Zero Challenge
In-Reply-To: <48C5B5E5.7060201@bealoid.co.uk>
References: <20080907064730.24759.87793.Mailman@chiark.greenend.org.uk> <WyQfFhAjA5wIFwL3@tigers.demon.co.uk> <2298D4476FA2F44591690E423F07C37B2195995BD8@EA-EXMSG-C333.europe.corp.microsoft.com> <029d01c911bf$33b3d8e0$c77fa8c0@Jinja> <48C5B5E5.7060201@bealoid.co.uk>
Message-ID: <79CEFA9B-0515-44F6-9DEA-B2BDE08DE06D@batten.eu.org>

On 09 Sep 08, at 0031, Dan Beale-Cocks wrote:

> Degaussers have to be pretty hefty to work.  Handheld degaussers  
> (used for tape) won't work.

And don't work for a lot of tape, either.  DAT is very high coercivity  
and can't be erased with typical audio tape bulk erasers, and I  
believe the same's true for LTO.

ian



From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk  Tue Sep  9 10:59:51 2008
From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Nicholas Bohm)
Date: Tue, 09 Sep 2008 10:59:51 +0100
Subject: The Great Zero Challenge
In-Reply-To: <48C5BE71.8070700@zen.co.uk>
References: <20080907064730.24759.87793.Mailman@chiark.greenend.org.uk> <0D17FE74-C5FB-462F-866F-E9C201C7870D@batten.eu.org> <48C3AB85.4060301@pmsommer.com> <48C3BEB9.23122.123C36@davidh.spidacom.co.uk> <3452E045-84B4-4ABA-A319-4D379CA1E44A@sourcetagged.ian.co.uk> <Cy3Rp2BTmDxIFAQk@perry.co.uk> <48C46E1B.6090709@zen.co.uk> <48C50180.1000409@ernest.net> <48C5BE71.8070700@zen.co.uk>
Message-ID: <48C64917.7040706@ernest.net>

Peter Fairbrother wrote:
> Nicholas Bohm wrote:
>> Peter Fairbrother wrote:
>>> Roland Perry wrote:
>>>> In article 
>>>> <3452E045-84B4-4ABA-A319-4D379CA1E44A@sourcetagged.ian.co.uk>, Ian 
>>>> Mason <ukcrypto@sourcetagged.ian.co.uk> writes
>>>>> I have the appended signature in my armoury for  replies to those 
>>>>> who send such ludicrous legalese.
>>>>
>>>> I have one too - which seeks to illustrate that if you don't 
>>>> understand it, how can you comply?
>>>
>>> As I understand it, a disclaimer that a communication is legally 
>>> privileged may have some legal effect in preventing third parties 
>>> from divulging it. Once received, the recipient can reveal the 
>>> contents (unless he's a solicitor under a duty to keep schtumm).
>>>
>>> However if you send me a disclaimer attached to a communication, I 
>>> can just ignore it - I haven't agreed to keep it secret, and am 
>>> perfectly at liberty to repeat the sense of the contents, though if 
>>> eg it's a poem I may not have copyright to the expression, and then I 
>>> can't reproduce it exactly.
>>>
>>>
>>> The last situation is when the contents of an unpriviliged 
>>> communication comes into the hands of a third party. If it has come 
>>> by interception I think (haven't checked) it's illegal under RIPA to 
>>> reproduce it.
>>>
>>> However if it has come into the hands of third party by chance, or by 
>>> some other means not involving interception, then I'm not so sure. 
>>> Obviously posting to usenet implies that a communication can be 
>>> freely reproduced, but in other cases where eg a third party reads a 
>>> communication marked PRIVATE at the end, does the reader have any 
>>> duty to keep it private?
>>>
>>> In common courtesy, yes, but under law I don't know. I doubt it, but 
>>> - Nicholas?
>>
>> Last time I thought I understood "breach of confidence" (which was 
>> before it began its recent strenuous morphing into a basis for a 
>> remedy for breach of privacy), the answer was that marking things 
>> "Private" or "Confidential" did not by itself impose a duty on the 
>> recipient.  It might, if consistently used in the course of a 
>> continuing relationship, especially if used by both parties, provide 
>> evidence that a "relationship of confidence" had come into existence.  
>> If so, disclosure of information exchanged within that relationship, 
>> as long as it was information of an intrinsically confidential kind, 
>> would be a breach of confidence.  Marking may also act to designate 
>> something as part of a class protected under a prior agreement.
> 
> Is it correct that, for a breach of confidence, there has to be an 
> agreement beforehand that that matters will be kept confidential, and 
> absent such an agreement there is no duty to keep matters confidential?

No; the traditional requirement was that there must be a confidential 
relationship - contract could establish that, but so could other things. 
  Communications between spouses, for example, are confidential.

> Would that then mean that a continued marking as "private" may (or may 
> not) simply be evidence of such an agreement?

It might indeed help to show that things so marked were sent in the 
course of a confidential relationship - although, as others have pointed 
out, persistent inappropriate use of such markings would undermine the 
possibility of sustaining such an inference.

> This leads on, or back, to RIPA and Phorm and the need for bilateral 
> consent to an interception.
> 
> Under RIPA consent is needed from *both* the sender and the recipient of 
> a communication while it is in transit (which I take generally to mean 
> before the intended recipient has received it) for it to be legally 
> intercepted by consent. This is actually quite good, though I don't know 
> how far it is being applied, eg in the Police investigation of BT's 
> Phorm trials.
> 
> So post-RIPA an (un?)articled clerk might be committing a RIPA offense 
> in opening an envelope marked "for addressee only" if it was clear that 
> it was meant only for the senior partner (assuming it was still 
> technically in transit in a public communications system - but see Lord 
> Bassam's doormat, maybe the internal mail system of a solicitor's office 
> is a private comms system).
> 
> 
> But if there is a private comms system in the path, how can I send 
> someone a communication which won't be, and would be illegal (not just 
> actionable) to be, read by third parties?
> 
> I might well want to do that. Can't think why offhand, but it's possible.

As Roland says, RIPA wasn't designed to help you.

Nick
-- 
Salkyns, Great Canfield, Takeley,
Bishop's Stortford CM22 6SX, UK

Phone  01279 870285    (+44 1279 870285)
Mobile  07715 419728    (+44 7715 419728)

PGP public key ID: 0x899DD7FF.  Fingerprint:
5248 1320 B42E 84FC 1E8B  A9E6 0912 AE66 899D D7FF


From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk  Tue Sep  9 08:19:36 2008
From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (James Davis)
Date: Tue, 09 Sep 2008 08:19:36 +0100
Subject: The Great Zero Challenge
In-Reply-To: <2298D4476FA2F44591690E423F07C37B2195995BD8@EA-EXMSG-C333.europe.corp.microsoft.com>
References: <20080907064730.24759.87793.Mailman@chiark.greenend.org.uk> <WyQfFhAjA5wIFwL3@tigers.demon.co.uk> <2298D4476FA2F44591690E423F07C37B2195995BD8@EA-EXMSG-C333.europe.corp.microsoft.com>
Message-ID: <48C62388.8060609@ja.net>

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Hash: SHA1

Caspar Bowden wrote:

> FYI - there's a Microsoft command-line utility which can be used to overwrite deleted data
> http://support.microsoft.com/kb/315672/en-us

They also have SDelete, an ex-sysinternals tool that's available at

http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb897443.aspx

Regards,

James

- --
James Davis	+44 1235 822 229    	   PGP: 0x890F159E
JANET CSIRT	0870 850 2340	        (+44 1235 822 340)
Lumen House, Library Avenue, Didcot, Oxfordshire, OX11 0SG
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From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk  Tue Sep  9 17:45:54 2008
From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (James Cox)
Date: Tue, 9 Sep 2008 17:45:54 +0100
Subject: The Great Zero Challenge
In-Reply-To: <48C64917.7040706@ernest.net>
References: <20080907064730.24759.87793.Mailman@chiark.greenend.org.uk> <0D17FE74-C5FB-462F-866F-E9C201C7870D@batten.eu.org> <48C3AB85.4060301@pmsommer.com> <48C3BEB9.23122.123C36@davidh.spidacom.co.uk> <3452E045-84B4-4ABA-A319-4D379CA1E44A@sourcetagged.ian.co.uk> <Cy3Rp2BTmDxIFAQk@perry.co.uk> <48C46E1B.6090709@zen.co.uk> <48C50180.1000409@ernest.net> <48C5BE71.8070700@zen.co.uk> <48C64917.7040706@ernest.net>
Message-ID: <B92D1224-9791-43EA-98BF-F9ED85F6A9B6@imaj.es>

On 9 Sep 2008, at 10:59, Nicholas Bohm wrote:

> Peter Fairbrother wrote:
>> Nicholas Bohm wrote:
>>> Peter Fairbrother wrote:
>>>> Roland Perry wrote:
>>>>> In article <3452E045-84B4-4ABA-A319-4D379CA1E44A@sourcetagged.ian.co.uk 
>>>>> >, Ian Mason <ukcrypto@sourcetagged.ian.co.uk> writes
>>>>>> I have the appended signature in my armoury for  replies to  
>>>>>> those who send such ludicrous legalese.
>>>>>
>>>
>>> Last time I thought I understood "breach of confidence" (which was  
>>> before it began its recent strenuous morphing into a basis for a  
>>> remedy for breach of privacy), the answer was that marking things  
>>> "Private" or "Confidential" did not by itself impose a duty on the  
>>> recipient.  It might, if consistently used in the course of a  
>>> continuing relationship, especially if used by both parties,  
>>> provide evidence that a "relationship of confidence" had come into  
>>> existence.  If so, disclosure of information exchanged within that  
>>> relationship, as long as it was information of an intrinsically  
>>> confidential kind, would be a breach of confidence.  Marking may  
>>> also act to designate something as part of a class protected under  
>>> a prior agreement.
>> Is it correct that, for a breach of confidence, there has to be an  
>> agreement beforehand that that matters will be kept confidential,  
>> and absent such an agreement there is no duty to keep matters  
>> confidential?
>
> No; the traditional requirement was that there must be a  
> confidential relationship - contract could establish that, but so  
> could other things.  Communications between spouses, for example,  
> are confidential.

under which legal provision? and how does that apply to divorce  
proceedings?

>> Would that then mean that a continued marking as "private" may (or  
>> may not) simply be evidence of such an agreement?
>
> It might indeed help to show that things so marked were sent in the  
> course of a confidential relationship - although, as others have  
> pointed out, persistent inappropriate use of such markings would  
> undermine the possibility of sustaining such an inference.
>
>> This leads on, or back, to RIPA and Phorm and the need for  
>> bilateral consent to an interception.
>> Under RIPA consent is needed from *both* the sender and the  
>> recipient of a communication while it is in transit (which I take  
>> generally to mean before the intended recipient has received it)  
>> for it to be legally intercepted by consent. This is actually quite  
>> good, though I don't know how far it is being applied, eg in the  
>> Police investigation of BT's Phorm trials.
>> So post-RIPA an (un?)articled clerk might be committing a RIPA  
>> offense in opening an envelope marked "for addressee only" if it  
>> was clear that it was meant only for the senior partner (assuming  
>> it was still technically in transit in a public communications  
>> system - but see Lord Bassam's doormat, maybe the internal mail  
>> system of a solicitor's office is a private comms system).
>> But if there is a private comms system in the path, how can I send  
>> someone a communication which won't be, and would be illegal (not  
>> just actionable) to be, read by third parties?
>> I might well want to do that. Can't think why offhand, but it's  
>> possible.
>
> As Roland says, RIPA wasn't designed to help you.

Yeah, i think it's time to stop trying to apply RIPA to everything.


From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk  Tue Sep  9 17:56:08 2008
From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Nicholas Bohm)
Date: Tue, 09 Sep 2008 17:56:08 +0100
Subject: The Great Zero Challenge
In-Reply-To: <B92D1224-9791-43EA-98BF-F9ED85F6A9B6@imaj.es>
References: <20080907064730.24759.87793.Mailman@chiark.greenend.org.uk> <0D17FE74-C5FB-462F-866F-E9C201C7870D@batten.eu.org> <48C3AB85.4060301@pmsommer.com> <48C3BEB9.23122.123C36@davidh.spidacom.co.uk> <3452E045-84B4-4ABA-A319-4D379CA1E44A@sourcetagged.ian.co.uk> <Cy3Rp2BTmDxIFAQk@perry.co.uk> <48C46E1B.6090709@zen.co.uk> <48C50180.1000409@ernest.net> <48C5BE71.8070700@zen.co.uk> <48C64917.7040706@ernest.net> <B92D1224-9791-43EA-98BF-F9ED85F6A9B6@imaj.es>
Message-ID: <48C6AAA8.3050809@ernest.net>

James Cox wrote:
> 
> On 9 Sep 2008, at 10:59, Nicholas Bohm wrote:
> 
>> Peter Fairbrother wrote:
>>> Nicholas Bohm wrote:
>>>> Peter Fairbrother wrote:
>>>>> Roland Perry wrote:
>>>>>> In article 
>>>>>> <3452E045-84B4-4ABA-A319-4D379CA1E44A@sourcetagged.ian.co.uk>, Ian 
>>>>>> Mason <ukcrypto@sourcetagged.ian.co.uk> writes
>>>>>>> I have the appended signature in my armoury for  replies to those 
>>>>>>> who send such ludicrous legalese.
>>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Last time I thought I understood "breach of confidence" (which was 
>>>> before it began its recent strenuous morphing into a basis for a 
>>>> remedy for breach of privacy), the answer was that marking things 
>>>> "Private" or "Confidential" did not by itself impose a duty on the 
>>>> recipient.  It might, if consistently used in the course of a 
>>>> continuing relationship, especially if used by both parties, provide 
>>>> evidence that a "relationship of confidence" had come into 
>>>> existence.  If so, disclosure of information exchanged within that 
>>>> relationship, as long as it was information of an intrinsically 
>>>> confidential kind, would be a breach of confidence.  Marking may 
>>>> also act to designate something as part of a class protected under a 
>>>> prior agreement.
>>> Is it correct that, for a breach of confidence, there has to be an 
>>> agreement beforehand that that matters will be kept confidential, and 
>>> absent such an agreement there is no duty to keep matters confidential?
>>
>> No; the traditional requirement was that there must be a confidential 
>> relationship - contract could establish that, but so could other 
>> things.  Communications between spouses, for example, are confidential.
> 
> under which legal provision? 

Common law - Argyll v Argyll [1967] Ch 302.

> and how does that apply to divorce proceedings?

No relevant effect (it doesn't prevent a spouse disclosing information 
for the purpose of divorce proceedings, if that's what you had in mind).

Nick
-- 
Salkyns, Great Canfield, Takeley,
Bishop's Stortford CM22 6SX, UK

Phone  01279 870285    (+44 1279 870285)
Mobile  07715 419728    (+44 7715 419728)

PGP public key ID: 0x899DD7FF.  Fingerprint:
5248 1320 B42E 84FC 1E8B  A9E6 0912 AE66 899D D7FF


From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk  Tue Sep  9 10:06:18 2008
From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Jim Murray)
Date: Tue, 09 Sep 2008 10:06:18 +0100
Subject: The Great Zero Challenge
In-Reply-To: <NbkJPEG0yhxIFwDX@tigers.demon.co.uk>
References: <20080909021901.18551.33748.Mailman@chiark.greenend.org.uk> <NbkJPEG0yhxIFwDX@tigers.demon.co.uk>
Message-ID: <48C63C8A.5060901@digitaldaemons.co.uk>

Mary Hawking wrote:

> I wasn't really thinking about CESG.
> Does anyone know how good Nigerian (and other) scammers are at reading
> discs supposedly erased?
> Mary Hawking
> PS as I said, this is personal data - and as the problem is to safely
> erase data before dumping the computers, I don't really care whether the
> disc could be re-used.

There is a good paper covering most of this stuff to be found here :

http://cmrr.ucsd.edu/people/Hughes/DataSanitizationTutorial.pdf

For personal or even commercially confidential data, DBAN is generally
accepted as being 'good enough'. A disk wiped this way is beyond trivial
recovery. It MAY not be totally erased but the difficulty level of
recovering any data remaining on the disk is high enough to be beyond
the reach of casual opponents (such as nigerian scammers buying drives
off of e-bay or scrounging them from dumps).

A more complete wipe can be obtained by using a little-known ATA command
already supported in almost all modern disks (including SATA, excluding
SCSI). This requires more technical knowledge to achieve, since many
BIOS's block the required command from reaching the hard drive. The best
solution is to put the drive into an external enclosure known to support
passing of the ATA secure erase command (most e-SATA enclosures do, some
USB->IDE enclosures also do, check with the manufacturer) then us a
program to activate the secure erase function of the drive. One such
utility can be found here -
http://cmrr.ucsd.edu/people/Hughes/SecureErase.shtml

This method is more effective as it is internal to the drive itself and
thus able to overwrite normally inaccessible areas of the platters (such
as remapped or faulty sectors).

The best way of course is to plan for the day you decommission your
drives before you start using them. Use encrypting hard drives and
enable the encryption key before you start storing any data on them.
Then when you want to erase the data all you need do is change the key
and the data is totally & completely erased (unless you know someone who
can either recover overwritten keys from EEPROMs or can break AES
encryption..). I understand Hitachi manufacture such drives, generally
intended from notebook computers but check BIOS compatibility to ensure
they'll work in your machines.
Another alternative is to use encrypting IDE/SATA controllers and
standard drives. Doing that you don't need to erase a drive - it's
useless without the decryption key & controller. Even if the machine or
drive is stolen it's still useless unless they also manage to steal the
encryption key.

As you can see here,
http://www.addonics.com/products/ruby_cipher/ruby_exd.asp encrypting
enclosures aren't even expensive any more, they are well within the
reach of all organizations and even most home or casual users.
Encrypting data on hard disk really should be standard already....

Securely storing (and erasing) data isn't rocket science, which just
makes me even more furious at just HOW careless some people/agencies
seem to be!

Jim.

-- 
      DigitalDaemons IT Services.
---------------------------------------
   E-Mail : jim@digitaldaemons.co.uk
       PGP Key ID : 0xB7066495



From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk  Wed Sep 10 13:01:43 2008
From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Jim Murray)
Date: Wed, 10 Sep 2008 13:01:43 +0100
Subject: The Great Zero Challenge
In-Reply-To: <NbkJPEG0yhxIFwDX@tigers.demon.co.uk>
References: <20080909021901.18551.33748.Mailman@chiark.greenend.org.uk> <NbkJPEG0yhxIFwDX@tigers.demon.co.uk>
Message-ID: <48C7B727.3090504@digitaldaemons.co.uk>

Mary Hawking wrote:
> Does anyone know how good Nigerian (and other) scammers are at reading
> discs supposedly erased?
> Mary Hawking
> PS as I said, this is personal data - and as the problem is to safely
> erase data before dumping the computers, I don't really care whether the
> disc could be re-used.

(note to self - post from the subscribed address in future, it works
better!)

There is a good paper covering most of this stuff to be found here :

http://cmrr.ucsd.edu/people/Hughes/DataSanitizationTutorial.pdf

For personal or even commercially confidential data, DBAN is generally
accepted as being 'good enough'. A disk wiped this way is beyond trivial
recovery. It MAY not be totally erased but the difficulty level of
recovering any data remaining on the disk is high enough to be beyond
the reach of casual opponents (such as nigerian scammers buying drives
off of e-bay or scrounging them from dumps).

A more complete wipe can be obtained by using a little-known ATA command
already supported in almost all modern disks (including SATA, excluding
SCSI). This requires more technical knowledge to achieve, since many
BIOS's block the required command from reaching the hard drive. The best
solution is to put the drive into an external enclosure known to support
passing of the ATA secure erase command (most e-SATA enclosures do, some
USB->IDE enclosures also do, check with the manufacturer) then us a
program to activate the sec