Phorm, privacy, RIPA and interception
Ian Batten
ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk
Wed, 27 Feb 2008 20:32:37 +0000
On 27 Feb 2008, at 20:04, Charles Lindsey wrote:
> On Wed, 27 Feb 2008 14:24:19 -0000, Ian Batten <igb@batten.eu.org>
> wrote:
>
>> Moreover, the question is `prove it'. If, as appears likely from
>> the links I posted, this is transparent proxying [[ which, by the
>> way, will provide a goldmine of RIPA issues from its logging ]],
>> then irrespective of the cookie the traffic is still being re-
>> routed. It is then merely the assurance of the tracking company,
>> best known for spyware, and its customer, who have limited access
>> to the systems involved, that data is in fact not being collected.
>
> I think it is more likely to be examining your IP packets as they
> pass through, rather than transparent proxying (which is
> interception, of course).
Descriptions of what appears to be pilots of the technology (postings
passim) show Squid being involved. Although a Squid cache powerful
enough and resilient enough to take the BT Clickstream would, I agree,
be a non-trivial undertaking. Moreover, my employer will have strong
words to say to BT if users of our Extranet, whose accounts are locked
to the IP range associated with their organisation, suddenly all start
appearing with the IP number of the cache...
ian