Phorm, privacy, RIPA and interception

Ian Batten ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk
Wed, 27 Feb 2008 20:32:37 +0000


On 27 Feb 2008, at 20:04, Charles Lindsey wrote:

> On Wed, 27 Feb 2008 14:24:19 -0000, Ian Batten <igb@batten.eu.org>  
> wrote:
>
>> Moreover, the question is `prove it'.  If, as appears likely from  
>> the links I posted, this is transparent proxying [[ which,  by the  
>> way, will provide a goldmine of RIPA issues from its logging ]],  
>> then irrespective of the cookie the traffic is still being re- 
>> routed.  It is then merely the assurance of the tracking company,  
>> best known for spyware, and its customer, who have limited access  
>> to the systems involved, that data is in fact not being collected.
>
> I think it is more likely to be examining your IP packets as they  
> pass through, rather than transparent proxying (which is  
> interception, of course).

Descriptions of what appears to be pilots of the technology (postings  
passim) show Squid being involved.  Although a Squid cache powerful  
enough and resilient enough to take the BT Clickstream would, I agree,  
be a non-trivial undertaking.  Moreover, my employer will have strong  
words to say to BT if users of our Extranet, whose accounts are locked  
to the IP range associated with their organisation, suddenly all start  
appearing with the IP number of the cache...

ian