Courts and bug product

[Peter Fairbrother]

Watkin Simon wrote:
>> From: Peter Fairbrother 
>> Sent: 08 February 2008 5:37 PM
>>
>> S.17 of RIPA excludes interception product from legal proceedings -
> but
>> afaict there are no provisions in RIPA to protect the product of
> "bugs",
>> or other covert surveillance.
>>
>>
>> Anyone?
> 
> That's correct.
> 
> Simon Watkin

The latest "counter-terrorism" Bill includes a provision for secret 
inquests, in order that interception evidence may be considered by the 
Coroner, following the Azelle Rodney case - but what I want to know is why?

Why is it in that Bill rather than any other, why didn't the Coroner 
just tell them to f+++ of, and most important, why is interception 
product, or the fact that interception has occurred, excluded from legal 
proceedings?

As far as I know there are only developed countries which exclude 
interception product (and I don't know which the second country, but 
see: http://www.michaelhowardmp.com/speeches/queensspeech071107.htm ).

He says: "What is the reason for that surprising state of affairs? The 
Government have advanced a number of reasons for their continuing 
opposition to taking the necessary measures to effect a change, despite 
their acceptance of its desirability in principle. First, they say that 
such evidence is likely to be ineffective in securing the conviction of 
terrorists. Secondly, they say that it has, thus far at least, proved 
impossible to devise safeguards that are strong enough to protect 
sensitive methods of investigation from disclosure to criminals or 
suspected criminals who would exploit and abuse that knowledge 
thereafter. Thirdly, on occasion reliance is placed on the alleged 
burdensome nature of the procedure which would have to be followed if 
such evidence were to be used in court."


"Ineffective in securing the conviction of terrorists" ? I can't believe 
that, unless the UK interception regime is seriously backward.

"The alleged burdensome nature of the procedure" - - nonsense.


And now we come to "protect sensitive methods of investigation". What 
"sensitive methods of investigation"???

The extent of interception is public knowledge (it's in the IoCC's 
annual report), as are the methods - BT do most of it, and you can't 
tell when it's being done.


There is nothing to hide.


(though the IoCC's report for 1995 says there were 871 telephone 
interception warrants issued, while a "person who would know at BT" told 
me at that time that the number of telephones intercepted was nearer 
10,000 ... but that's another story ...)



Gordon Brown has recently said that he will allow interception product 
in "some" cases - but the "someness" of that will attract ECtHR 
attention at best, and the attention of the UK Courts as well, and the 
"someness" will be, and should be, removed.

Let's remove the blanket exclusion of interception product from Court 
proceedings, and treat it just like any other evidence - there is 
nothing to hide, and if there is then a PIIC will do the job.



-- Peter Fairbrother

(more than a bit drunk now)