BBC 'vague' reporting again!

Dave Howe ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk
Tue, 02 Dec 2008 08:37:37 +0000


Roland Perry wrote:
> In article <493404C4.8000007@pmsommer.com>, Peter Sommer
> <peter@pmsommer.com> writes
>> I do recognise, though,  there'd be an interesting case to be made in
>> respect of an email delivered to the PC but not yet read by the owner
>> - a fact which could be established by looking at the flags within the
>> email archive.
> 
> How many different email clients would a typical trojan be able to
> extract individual messages from?
> 
> For example: a relatively well known, but low volume client such as
> Turnpike. I am led to believe that the messagebase itself is encrypted,
> and would be surprised if the algorithms required to unpack and examine
> individual emails were 'in the wild', even if the encryption key could
> be discovered/broken.
> 
> Therefore, the only way to read the emails might be to intercept (sic)
> them as they arrived.

I would have thought the opposite could well be true - while a first
"wave" of reconnaissance could identify installed packages, a second
tailored "module" could presumably be written to do actual package
analysis (and once written, can be deployed to other instances of that
client) intercepting using dll injection the actual password used the
next time the instance is run.

On the other hand, interception would not get them historic message
traffic, and if there were any use of TLS, not even get them current
traffic without having to demand the TLS keypair from the ISP (and not
even then, if PFS modes are in use)