Ironing out the flaws in RIP

[Roland Perry]

In article <48159F40.31555.8E8EEF@davidh.spidacom.co.uk>, David Hansen
<davidh@spidacom.co.uk> writes
>While browsing I came across the article at
><http://news.zdnet.co.uk/itmanagement/0,1000000308,39117681,00.htm>
>which is from the Tom, Dick and Harriet era of 2003.

Another story that starts off talking about wiretapping, then slides
seamlessly into traffic data issues. Treat with suspicion.

>Baroness Blatch is concerned that government workers will be able to
>evade scrutiny and access details of Internet and mobile phone usage
>because of existing powers that she says the government is failing to
>tighten up.

Sounds to me like the "legacy powers" to acquire traffic data by a
multitude of existing laws.

>"Under the law as it stands, if existing powers are not rescinded then
>people will be able to act within or outside the guidelines," said
>Baroness Blatch, who believes the government must tighten up some
>aspects of RIPA.

With codes of practice, rather than repealing legacy powers, perhaps.

>Has anyone seen any signs of the Home Office ironing out these flaws? I
>haven't noticed any, but it is perfectly possible that I have not
>noticed something. Any concrete examples?

        "Richard Clayton, a computer security expert at the Cambridge
        University Computer Laboratory, said this [August 2006] draft
        version of the new code improves the definition of
        communications data, which includes the likes of addresses and
        dates, as opposed to content of messages, and ends legacy powers
        used by some public authorities outside Ripa. Furthermore, it is
        public, unlike the previous manual which was used by the police
        from 2003 but never openly published."

Scrambling for Safety 8.
-- 
Roland Perry