Ironing out the flaws in RIP

[David Hansen]

While browsing I came across the article at 
<http://news.zdnet.co.uk/itmanagement/0,1000000308,39117681,00.htm> 
which is from the Tom, Dick and Harriet era of 2003.

The interesting bit is at the second half.

======================================================

These statutory instruments are being opposed by privacy groups who see 
them as a "snoopers' charter", and also by politicians who want the 
government to fix existing problems before widening RIPA's influence.

Baroness Blatch is concerned that government workers will be able to 
evade scrutiny and access details of Internet and mobile phone usage 
because of existing powers that she says the government is failing to 
tighten up.

"Under the law as it stands, if existing powers are not rescinded then 
people will be able to act within or outside the guidelines," said 
Baroness Blatch, who believes the government must tighten up some 
aspects of RIPA.

"There's a strong argument that government should go back and get it 
right," she insisted.

But according to the Home Office, it is important to press on and give 
more government agencies the right to intercept communications under 
RIPA, with the accompanying safeguards.

Simon Watkin of the Home Office rejected suggestions that these 
statutory instruments should be delayed. "It's better to do this now, 
and then iron out the flaws later," Watkin told the meeting.

======================================================

Has anyone seen any signs of the Home Office ironing out these flaws? I 
haven't noticed any, but it is perfectly possible that I have not 
noticed something. Any concrete examples?



-- 
  David Hansen, Edinburgh 
 I will *always* explain revoked encryption keys, unless RIP prevents 
me   
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2000/00023--e.htm#54