MTAS and other NHS websites

[Peter Tomlinson]

Ian G Batten wrote:
>
>  On 8 May 2007, at 21:54, James Davis wrote:
>
> > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1
> >
> > vickyvicky@egypt.com wrote:
> >
> >> The point that I was trying to make, though, is that this was a
> >> one-off goof. A mistake like this would not in itself have led to
> >> the site being off line for 10 days.
> >
> > It's difficult to understand how it can be described as a "one-off
> > goof" when the problem, solution, and risk is obvious to anyone
> > with a small amount of experience in the field.
>
>  You and I know that one-off goofs are no such thing, but are evidence
>  of deeper process failure. You and I know that behind a security
>  incident that gets found by a third party there are a hundred that
>  went unseen, and should have been followed up as `near misses' but
>  rarely are.
>
>  But you're talking to the profession that has resisted clinical audit
>  for generations, and is only in recent years waking up to the idea
>  that you can't just dismiss things as one-off goofs. Vickyvicky
>  would presumably have sat in meetings in Bristol and said ``one-off
>  goof'' of each child that didn't make it. Or if s/he wouldn't,
>  perhaps s/he could explain why this case is any less of an example of
>  a deeper failure.
>
There is a lot about MTAS at http://ferretfancier.blogspot.com/. It 
appears to be rotten through and through.

The post at 
http://ferretfancier.blogspot.com/search/label/MTAS%20point%20what 
comments on the 10th May state of the MTAS web site.

Peter