From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk Mon Jul 2 16:00:16 2007 From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Peter Tomlinson) Date: Mon, 02 Jul 2007 16:00:16 +0100 Subject: National IA Strategy Message-ID: <46891300.2080001@iosis.co.uk> >From http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/csia/ : "News National Information Assurance Strategy launched On 27th June, a National Information Assurance Strategy was launched at the IA07 event in Brighton. The annual event is hosted by CESG and brings together key players in industry and government to work in partnership to address the UK’s needs in safeguarding information and ICT." The document is available at: http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/csia/national_ia_strategy/index.asp . I haven't read it yet, and so cannot comment, but in a related area I'm puzzled: having heard that Cabinet Office will be supporting Cabinet, I wonder what will happen to all the technical stuff such as Govt Gateway and even CSIA. Peter From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk Wed Jul 4 09:11:47 2007 From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Ross Anderson) Date: Wed, 04 Jul 2007 09:11:47 +0100 Subject: RIP and surveillance Message-ID: We've suspected for many years that the security and intelligence services have a database containing the UK's itemised phone bills. Confirmation may just have slipped out in one of the breathless 'terror' briefings, reported in today's Guardian: http://www.guardian.co.uk/terrorism/story/0,,2117874,00.html "Counter-terrorism officials say data from the phones and email traffic was checked on the database used by MI5, MI6 and GCHQ, the government's eavesdropping centre. Connections were found linking that information and communications abroad, which enabled the police and security services to speed up their investigations in Britain." When in the "hunting" rather than "gathering" stage of signals intelligence, a powerful technique is the "snowball search" where you look at everyone your target communicated with, then recursively, whitelisting high-order nodes as you can and looking for collisions further down. This is not really feasible if you have to go through a SPOC with a production order at each stage of the algorithm. Also, we use common technology with the Americans, and recent revelations there point to AT&T having handed over traffic data for decades. I wonder what sort of email traffic data they get, and from where? It's just about feasible that they're pulling headers off the backbone - email is a tiny fraction of all the traffic and you could build custom hardware to do the harvesting well enough. What does this mean for (a) civil liberties and IT policy (b) practical countersurveillance? Ross From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk Wed Jul 4 10:10:56 2007 From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Rodney Tillotson) Date: Wed, 04 Jul 2007 10:10:56 +0100 Subject: RIP and surveillance In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <468B6420.9040901@ja.net> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Ross Anderson wrote: > I wonder what sort of email traffic data they get, and from where? > It's just about feasible that they're pulling headers off the > backbone - email is a tiny fraction of all the traffic and you could > build custom hardware to do the harvesting well enough. I agree about the technology, but what links would constitute a "backbone" for this purpose? That is, from how many monkeys would you need to buy deafness, blindness and inaction? I suspect 95% could be covered by taps at or near a handful (well, a hands-and-feetful) of UK exchange points. Were I a person seeking not to be noticed, I think even I could find ways to be invisible to that at reasonable cost; and covering the remaining 5% would be hard and indeterminate. > What does this mean for > (a) civil liberties and IT policy Nothing new, surely? Most but not all Internet resources are beyond the control of people not in positions of power and influence. > (b) practical countersurveillance? Turn up the noise by a few orders of magnitude. Suddenly spam from botnets is your friend ... I realise Ross also mentioned phones, where the issues are not quite the same (at least in dedicated networks). Rodney Tillotson, JANET-CERT 01235 822 255. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.6 (GNU/Linux) iD8DBQFGi2OtzHL8ns8C6+kRAgtXAKDeL3j0GaGYJFaRbOM3n1dTwxydQwCfVV3j oInChmcOvUxtsBLcFYkIQrk= =uv1v -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk Wed Jul 4 19:22:09 2007 From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Peter Fairbrother) Date: Wed, 04 Jul 2007 19:22:09 +0100 Subject: RIPA PT 3 Message-ID: <468BE551.6020305@zen.co.uk> I just got this email: Draft Code of Practice for the Investigation of Protected Electronic Information Please find below the Home Office link to the draft order and explanatory memorandum with regard to securing approval for the draft Code of Practice for the Investigation of Protected Electronic Information. You can also access the final revised draft code of practice from this link. The provisions of Part III will not come into force until Parliament has had the opportunity to consider and approve the code of practice. The Government intend to commence the provisions of Part III on 1st October subject to Parliamentary approval of the Code. http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/ripa/encryption/code-of-practice/ -- Peter Fairbrother From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk Wed Jul 4 19:49:26 2007 From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Peter Fairbrother) Date: Wed, 04 Jul 2007 19:49:26 +0100 Subject: RIP and surveillance In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <468BEBB6.4020309@zen.co.uk> Ross Anderson wrote: Here is the first half of the paragraph: "Though MI5 insists none of the suspects arrested in connection with the plot were under surveillance, the mobile phones detectives recovered from the would-be car bombs contained details that matched material on the security service database." > "Counter-terrorism officials say data from the phones and email > traffic was checked on the database used by MI5, MI6 and GCHQ, the > government's eavesdropping centre. Connections were found linking that > information and communications abroad, which enabled the police and > security services to speed up their investigations in Britain." This could simply mean that the services have matched eg numbers called or email adresses to those of people already on their database from prior investigations. I don't imagine anyone thinks for a moment that they haven't got such a database - for instance I have been told that I am on it (though not as a terrorist suspect, I hope!). However I don't see any implication there that they have a record of all UK 'phone bills - though eg BT is known to cooperate readily, and they may well have a very large dataset. -- Peter Fairbrother From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk Wed Jul 4 20:21:13 2007 From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Roland Perry) Date: Wed, 4 Jul 2007 20:21:13 +0100 Subject: RIP and surveillance In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <1$S2x1epM$iGFA3k@perry.co.uk> In article , Ross Anderson writes >When in the "hunting" rather than "gathering" stage of signals >intelligence, a powerful technique is the "snowball search" where you >look at everyone your target communicated with, then recursively, >whitelisting high-order nodes as you can and looking for collisions >further down. This is not really feasible if you have to go through a >SPOC with a production order at each stage of the algorithm. Luckily (for some) the police don't need production orders for comms data, they have RIPA - which in circumstances like last week can be turned around pretty rapidly I'd expect. Well, you saw the timeline, a day and half from beginning to end, but ultimately it seems half an hour too late. If that was all on one big system already, and seeing as there were only one or two levels of indirection involved, might it not have been done a little quicker? Coincidentally, things are afoot (I'm told) with new RIPA Orders and Codes of Practice - well worth a read. And not just for Comms Data, also Encryption . -- Roland Perry From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk Wed Jul 4 10:05:38 2007 From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Andrew Sutcliffe) Date: Wed, 04 Jul 2007 10:05:38 +0100 Subject: RIP and surveillance In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <200707041352.GMI45872@C2bthomr05.btconnect.com> Ross, In the UK I understand that there is a large 'bunker' in Hampshire that routes all emails. It is the Government Technical Assistance Centre. This is likely the source of email traffic for this database. As for the phones, well there are a few installations here that have the capability to get that data if needed. Andrew From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk Wed Jul 4 20:45:42 2007 From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Brian Morrison) Date: Wed, 4 Jul 2007 20:45:42 +0100 Subject: RIP and surveillance In-Reply-To: <200707041352.GMI45872@C2bthomr05.btconnect.com> References: <200707041352.GMI45872@C2bthomr05.btconnect.com> Message-ID: <20070704204542.66636da6@peterson.fenrir.org.uk> --Sig_nTq2qPbMQ2JQUB.E/lNaAcp Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable On Wed, 04 Jul 2007 10:05:38 +0100 Andrew Sutcliffe wrote: > Ross, >=20 > In the UK I understand that there is a large 'bunker' in Hampshire=20 > that routes all emails. It is the Government Technical Assistance=20 > Centre. This is likely the source of email traffic for this database.=20 And how does it get there? Through tap points in places like Linx? It seems a tall order for them to cover all email traffic, especially since a fair number of MTAs use opportunistic encryption wherever possible. --=20 Brian Morrison bdm at fenrir dot org dot uk "Arguing with an engineer is like wrestling with a pig in the mud; after a while you realize you are muddy and the pig is enjoying it." =20 GnuPG key ID DE32E5C5 - http://wwwkeys.uk.pgp.net/pgpnet/wwwkeys.html --Sig_nTq2qPbMQ2JQUB.E/lNaAcp Content-Type: application/pgp-signature; name=signature.asc Content-Disposition: attachment; filename=signature.asc -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.7 (GNU/Linux) iD8DBQFGi/jm9BNjUd4y5cURAnfNAKCwxsUm6kx6RA1DJRdQKGlCKjIDigCfbPGh k8SB7XTuUtpETkSVwJfcxi0= =UMEJ -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- --Sig_nTq2qPbMQ2JQUB.E/lNaAcp-- From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk Wed Jul 4 20:48:29 2007 From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Roland Perry) Date: Wed, 4 Jul 2007 20:48:29 +0100 Subject: RIP and surveillance In-Reply-To: <200707041352.GMI45872@C2bthomr05.btconnect.com> References: <200707041352.GMI45872@C2bthomr05.btconnect.com> Message-ID: In article <200707041352.GMI45872@C2bthomr05.btconnect.com>, Andrew Sutcliffe writes >Ross, > >In the UK I understand that there is a large 'bunker' in Hampshire that >routes all emails. It is the Government Technical Assistance Centre. You could at least get the name right :) [NTAC] >This is likely the source of email traffic for this database. And readily identifiable by the black helicopters circling above. -- Roland Perry From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk Thu Jul 5 02:42:28 2007 From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Peter Fairbrother) Date: Thu, 05 Jul 2007 02:42:28 +0100 Subject: RIPA CoP and pt3 introduction, and m-o-o-t Message-ID: <468C4C84.4070701@zen.co.uk> This is originally meant for Caspar - does anyone have a current email address for him? thx Dear Caspar, Hope you don't mind, I've cc'd this to ukcrypto. I have been looking for the revised version of the RIPA draft CoP with the NTAC additions which we talked about in Ottawa, but I have been overtaken by events. The HO has laid the revised draft CoP before Parliament, and intend to bring in Pt 3 of RIPA on 1st October: http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/ripa/encryption/code-of-practice/ and "The Government intend to commence the provisions of Part III on 1st October subject to Parliamentary approval of the Code" (HO, semi-private email). I wonder whether another SfS (Scrambling for Safety, rather than stego file system :) - or a similar, or even totally different campaign, might have any chance of preventing Parliamentary acceptance of the CoP - after all, I don't see how the CoP in any way fulfills or even addresses the expressed concerns of Parliament. And even if it did, didn't a related CoP (or was it a SI?) get withdrawn before? Egg-marketing? Being resource-limited I fear I could not contribute greatly to such a campaign - I am a technologist after all, and though I would much prefer that we had electronic emancipation and privacy from Government (or even a reasonable facsimile thereof) as a human right, I think I will be more effective spending my immediate energies to ensure that we will still have electronic emancipation and privacy through technological means. In Ottawa we also talked momentarily about the problem of ensuring that a person's correspondent used m-o-o-t rather than another program, and ensuring that the CD's were not compromised - I can't say it will guarantee anything much, but I have found a partial solution. Actually I found it a while ago, but I had forgotten about it when we talked. It's rather simple - encrypt the CD using an asymetric key algorithm, and discard the private key. The public key is on the CD, in a very small program which decrypts the files on the CD - the rest of the CD is encrypted and uncompressable. To prove that the user has an uncorrupted CD he needs to use the raw encrypted contents of the CD - and as the private key has been discarded, he can't recreate them from a compressed plaintext version. m-o-o-t is ongoing, and reasonably well - three months should be enough to at least have something useful available, although I would have preferred more time to work on the online SFS (got bogged down by some Belgian girls, whose work was impressive but incorrect -ah well). I don't know whether I can fix it in time, though I do have some ideas. I'm also a bit surprised at how much work it will take to do it well, my earlier estimates of a few weeks now seem rather optimistic. Three months - well, we'll see, but I am still hopeful that it might turn out rather good. I also don't know whether we will have any (semi-) untraceable comms servers in place on 1st October, but the crypto for untraceable comms should be on the m-o-o-t CD :) -- Peter Fairbrother From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk Thu Jul 5 05:44:03 2007 From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Peter Fairbrother) Date: Thu, 05 Jul 2007 05:44:03 +0100 Subject: RIP and surveillance In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <468C7713.4050505@zen.co.uk> Ross Anderson wrote: [...] > When in the "hunting" rather than "gathering" stage of signals > intelligence, a powerful technique is the "snowball search" where you > look at everyone your target communicated with, then recursively, > whitelisting high-order nodes as you can and looking for collisions > further down. This is not really feasible if you have to go through a > SPOC with a production order at each stage of the algorithm. True enough - but remember the "six degrees of seperation" between any two persons too. After a short while, it all becomes meaningless. Now if you are talking to OBL (obviously bad lad) himself it's probably important to know that, and if you are talking to someone who talks to him then you might well be worthy of suspicion - or even if you talk to someone who talks to someone who talks to OBL - but after a few more steps it don't mean much in terms of probable suspected-ness. There are too many people, and there is insufficient suspicion to go around. Of course timing and volume, and perhaps even content if available, play a part Hmm, wonder whether there's a paper there? How far is "significant"? Not for me though, too busy with RIPA for a while. -- Peter From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk Thu Jul 5 09:17:31 2007 From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (PeteM) Date: Thu, 05 Jul 2007 09:17:31 +0100 Subject: RIP and surveillance In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <468CA91B.3060007@callnetuk.com> Ross Anderson wrote: > We've suspected for many years that the security and intelligence > services have a database containing the UK's itemised phone bills. > Confirmation may just have slipped out in one of the breathless > 'terror' briefings, reported in today's Guardian: > > http://www.guardian.co.uk/terrorism/story/0,,2117874,00.html > > "Counter-terrorism officials say data from the phones and email > traffic was checked on the database used by MI5, MI6 and GCHQ, the > government's eavesdropping centre. Connections were found linking that > information and communications abroad, which enabled the police and > security services to speed up their investigations in Britain." > Is there a lawful method by which they could have compiled this information? -- Pete Mitchell From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk Thu Jul 5 10:27:37 2007 From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Ian G Batten) Date: Thu, 5 Jul 2007 10:27:37 +0100 Subject: RIP and surveillance In-Reply-To: <20070704204542.66636da6@peterson.fenrir.org.uk> References: <200707041352.GMI45872@C2bthomr05.btconnect.com> <20070704204542.66636da6@peterson.fenrir.org.uk> Message-ID: <260FDA70-0E3F-4DDF-97D6-AAE9A9793EA3@uk.fujitsu.com> On 4 Jul 2007, at 20:45, Brian Morrison wrote: > especially > since a fair number of MTAs use opportunistic encryption wherever > possible. Yesterday, FTEL sent or received 4639 items of (largely opportunistically) encrypted mail. Our outward-facing servers will negotiate SSL if you ask for it, and will request it where it appears to be available. 669 MTAs were involved, and this accounts for about 25% of our traffic by volume. Amongst the domains using opportunistic encryption are MessageLabs, mailwallremote, 123-reg, hosts.co.uk and webhosting.uk.com, which (if I could be bothered to correlate the relay= lines in the logs with the ennvelope senders) would represent some hundreds of further domains. Notably, all mail to and from BT, the NHS and Fujitsu Services (a large portion of whose business is UK government) is encrypted. Were the government to be concerned about encrypted email, I suspect these companies would be under some pressure to at the very least not negotiate SSL with everyone who asks for it. Stripping the first component of each domain name, to aggregate outbound mailers of large enterprises yields 373 domains, and the most common are (by unique items of email): 22 mx.123-reg.co.uk 23 nokia.com 25 hosts.co.uk 25 mail.eds.com 26 ieee.org 26 webhosting.uk.com 33 nhs.uk 34 douglascomms.co.uk. 37 zen.co.uk 51 mailwallremote.com 54 infineon.com 56 gc.com. 88 asidua.com 91 fujitsu.com.sg 129 eu.messagelabs.com 562 uk.fujitsu.com 662 smtp.bt.com These are hardly cypherpunks with a large collection of William Gibson novels and a need to spend some time with a pair of pliers prior to going airside. Getting some real crypto onto ukcrypto, it's interesting to look at the variety of ciphersuites being negotiated: 204 AES128-SHA 350 DES-CBC3-SHA 3 DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA 3309 EDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA 738 RC4-MD5 35 RC4-SHA I presume I could fingerprint remote mailers and operating systems based on this. Obviously, given opportunistic encryption doesn't check certificates in any meaningful way, the black helicopter brigade can argue that the spooks are man-in-the-middle-ing all SMTP+SSL mail. Although I _am_ checking certificates on one flow passing to another EU country, and the certificates were installed at the remote end by my taking them on a memory stick, and there's no sign of disturbance to that flow. ian From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk Thu Jul 5 11:04:21 2007 From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Roland Perry) Date: Thu, 5 Jul 2007 11:04:21 +0100 Subject: RIP and surveillance In-Reply-To: <468CA91B.3060007@callnetuk.com> References: <468CA91B.3060007@callnetuk.com> Message-ID: In article <468CA91B.3060007@callnetuk.com>, PeteM writes >> We've suspected for many years that the security and intelligence >> services have a database containing the UK's itemised phone bills. >> Confirmation may just have slipped out in one of the breathless >>'terror' briefings, reported in today's Guardian: >> http://www.guardian.co.uk/terrorism/story/0,,2117874,00.html >> "Counter-terrorism officials say data from the phones and email >> traffic was checked on the database used by MI5, MI6 and GCHQ, the >> government's eavesdropping centre. Connections were found linking that >> information and communications abroad, which enabled the police and >> security services to speed up their investigations in Britain." > >Is there a lawful method by which they could have compiled this >information? Which information? There seem to be two sets: 1) A database inside the Security Services listing (where known) the contact details of people they "have an interest in". I expect this has existed for a long time, on paper before computers existed. Legally? Well, one hopes so. 2) A list of calls made and received, and probably some sort of address book, inside a mobile phones [1] found at the scene of a crime and lawfully examined (iirc) under provisions for "interference with property". Maybe a longer [2] list of calls made and received, lawfully obtained through RIPA from the telco on enquiry about that specific phone. Then you can match them up as much as possible, and start filling in the gaps (like phoning the lettings agency to ask who they are, and why they had a relationship with the phone owner). [1] Of course, if the phone was locked with a PIN, you might feel the need to ask the owner (if you have him in custody) if he wouldn't mind telling you what the PIN was (under, one day, RIPA pt3; or otherwise). [2] Depending on data retention; and it might be a new SIM, while the phone probably stores call details and addressbook, from a previous one. -- Roland Perry From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk Thu Jul 5 10:43:55 2007 From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Florian Weimer) Date: Thu, 05 Jul 2007 11:43:55 +0200 Subject: RIP and surveillance In-Reply-To: <468CA91B.3060007@callnetuk.com> (PeteM's message of "Thu, 05 Jul 2007 09:17:31 +0100") References: <468CA91B.3060007@callnetuk.com> Message-ID: <87ir8z9odg.fsf@mid.deneb.enyo.de> * PeteM: > Is there a lawful method by which they could have compiled this > information? Lawful as far as the authorities are concerned? Sure, ISPs could share the data voluntarily. From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk Thu Jul 5 10:59:07 2007 From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Andrew Sutcliffe) Date: Thu, 05 Jul 2007 10:59:07 +0100 Subject: RIP and surveillance In-Reply-To: <20070704204542.66636da6@peterson.fenrir.org.uk> References: <200707041352.GMI45872@C2bthomr05.btconnect.com> <20070704204542.66636da6@peterson.fenrir.org.uk> Message-ID: <200707050957.CYH92619@c2bthomr11.btconnect.com> Brian, please see this link to the BBC article on the NTAC - (OK , I got it wrong the first time!) http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/sci/tech/2027377.stm Andrew At 20:45 04/07/2007, you wrote: >On Wed, 04 Jul 2007 10:05:38 +0100 >Andrew Sutcliffe wrote: > > > Ross, > > > > In the UK I understand that there is a large 'bunker' in Hampshire > > that routes all emails. It is the Government Technical Assistance > > Centre. This is likely the source of email traffic for this database. > >And how does it get there? Through tap points in places like Linx? It >seems a tall order for them to cover all email traffic, especially >since a fair number of MTAs use opportunistic encryption wherever >possible. > >-- > >Brian Morrison > >bdm at fenrir dot org dot uk > > "Arguing with an engineer is like wrestling with a pig in the mud; > after a while you realize you are muddy and the pig is enjoying it." > >GnuPG key ID DE32E5C5 - http://wwwkeys.uk.pgp.net/pgpnet/wwwkeys.html > From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk Thu Jul 5 15:25:14 2007 From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Ian G Batten) Date: Thu, 5 Jul 2007 15:25:14 +0100 Subject: RIP and surveillance In-Reply-To: <200707050957.CYH92619@c2bthomr11.btconnect.com> References: <200707041352.GMI45872@C2bthomr05.btconnect.com> <20070704204542.66636da6@peterson.fenrir.org.uk> <200707050957.CYH92619@c2bthomr11.btconnect.com> Message-ID: On 5 Jul 2007, at 10:59, Andrew Sutcliffe wrote: > Brian, please see this link to the BBC article on the NTAC - (OK , > I got it wrong the first time!) > > http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/sci/tech/2027377.stm You'll have noticed the ``Despite being included in the RIP Act, no internet service provider (ISP) has yet been required by government to install such a surveillance system. Officials now admit that secondary legislation will be necessary before ISPs can be made to install black boxes.'' bit. So far as I'm aware, it's still true. It also doesn't address the issue of encryption, unless (as I said this morning) it's your contention that all mail between BT and its suppliers is being m-i-t- m'd as we speak. ian > > > Andrew > > > At 20:45 04/07/2007, you wrote: >> On Wed, 04 Jul 2007 10:05:38 +0100 >> Andrew Sutcliffe wrote: >> >> > Ross, >> > >> > In the UK I understand that there is a large 'bunker' in Hampshire >> > that routes all emails. It is the Government Technical Assistance >> > Centre. This is likely the source of email traffic for this >> database. >> >> And how does it get there? Through tap points in places like Linx? It >> seems a tall order for them to cover all email traffic, especially >> since a fair number of MTAs use opportunistic encryption wherever >> possible. >> >> -- >> >> Brian Morrison >> >> bdm at fenrir dot org dot uk >> >> "Arguing with an engineer is like wrestling with a pig in the mud; >> after a while you realize you are muddy and the pig is >> enjoying it." >> >> GnuPG key ID DE32E5C5 - http://wwwkeys.uk.pgp.net/pgpnet/wwwkeys.html >> > > From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk Thu Jul 5 15:47:55 2007 From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Peter Tomlinson) Date: Thu, 05 Jul 2007 15:47:55 +0100 Subject: New National Information Assurance Strategy from CSIA Message-ID: <468D049B.4040206@iosis.co.uk> Previously Ross helped us with his comments on the draft new Information Assurance Strategy from CSIA, and now we see the final version at http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/csia/national_ia_strategy/index.asp. This follows on from the (invitation only and £660 each please) launch conference in Brighton last week. If any subscriber to this (free, and thanks to those who operate it) ukcrypto list was present at that conference, care to report on it? Having waded through the turgid draft on which it was very difficult to make progress with comments, I cannot bring myself to study this final text until we see some sign that spending depts are going to have to implement it. Peter From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk Thu Jul 5 16:12:20 2007 From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (PeteM) Date: Thu, 05 Jul 2007 16:12:20 +0100 Subject: RIP and surveillance In-Reply-To: <87ir8z9odg.fsf@mid.deneb.enyo.de> References: <468CA91B.3060007@callnetuk.com> <87ir8z9odg.fsf@mid.deneb.enyo.de> Message-ID: <468D0A54.2060403@callnetuk.com> Florian Weimer wrote: > * PeteM: > >> Is there a lawful method by which they could have compiled this >> information? > > Lawful as far as the authorities are concerned? Sure, ISPs could > share the data voluntarily. That would be a very serious breach of their duty of confidence to their clients. Perhaps the police could then be held liable for inducing that breach of confidence. But maybe I am fussing over nothing. The time for worrying about the law is past. Evil doctors are trying to kill us all. -- Pete Mitchell From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk Thu Jul 5 16:13:08 2007 From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Richard Clayton) Date: Thu, 5 Jul 2007 16:13:08 +0100 Subject: RIP and surveillance In-Reply-To: References: <200707041352.GMI45872@C2bthomr05.btconnect.com> <20070704204542.66636da6@peterson.fenrir.org.uk> <200707050957.CYH92619@c2bthomr11.btconnect.com> Message-ID: -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 In article , Ian G Batten writes >> http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/sci/tech/2027377.stm > >You'll have noticed the > >``Despite being included in the RIP Act, no internet service provider >(ISP) has yet been required by government to install such a >surveillance system. >Officials now admit that secondary legislation will be necessary >before ISPs can be made to install black boxes.'' > >bit. So far as I'm aware, it's still true. which bit ? the need for secondary legislation ?? that was certainly true, and you can find it as "The Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Maintenance of Interception Capability) Order 2002" (that's SI 1931) http://www.opsi.gov.uk/si/si2002/20021931.htm - -- richard Richard Clayton They that can give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety. Benjamin Franklin -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGPsdk version 1.7.1 iQA/AwUBRo0KhJoAxkTY1oPiEQJjXACg8wClgbzfujusdyftLOiMiop7aikAoIgd vvEj2J4FTMoVf5+gzdeNe3Ra =ZLBB -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk Thu Jul 5 16:13:37 2007 From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Clive D. W. Feather) Date: Thu, 5 Jul 2007 16:13:37 +0100 Subject: RIP and surveillance In-Reply-To: <200707041352.GMI45872@C2bthomr05.btconnect.com> References: <200707041352.GMI45872@C2bthomr05.btconnect.com> Message-ID: -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- In article <200707041352.GMI45872@C2bthomr05.btconnect.com>, Andrew Sutcliffe writes >In the UK I understand that there is a large 'bunker' in Hampshire that >routes all emails. That will be a surprise to our Network Management Centre. - -- Clive D.W. Feather | Home: Tel: +44 20 8495 6138 (work) | Web: Fax: +44 870 051 9937 | Work: Please reply to the Reply-To address, which is: -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP SDK 3.0.2 iQEVAwUBRo0KoCNAHP3TFZrhAQHg5Af+PP0swYsplkhPrpYp1Uz2IeO2X5vmy9lt Y06w36DaDzbm9ZkycfXKRD2bo8p+/nk4vR0m/gskUj9ZgLTVR1/d4ULWeI9iM9KT 2MA7AX2bAtRMunb4hj83cXfe0+suTYq2AhFSk53XzDDPBnndEl7qYSUIZG7VaHqF i9VNhNuzSmi1SFDo3nMpA1bmIT1SusSzeiQRLSFiU0m5PhU4wlEKHmciIFa+t3Pj /p792bm/0Hot4d6hnAOeSgkm3TBHtaAUPo7UOMoguUnfEpoeHk6KkDhZMKMiLN+9 500BkqbwyvYo1zFojcaEVma4b33laef6pda1Sm61vwP2h+M7CafwSw== =HdUT -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk Thu Jul 5 16:32:15 2007 From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Clive D. W. Feather) Date: Thu, 5 Jul 2007 16:32:15 +0100 Subject: RIP and surveillance In-Reply-To: <468C7713.4050505@zen.co.uk> References: <468C7713.4050505@zen.co.uk> Message-ID: -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- In article <468C7713.4050505@zen.co.uk>, Peter Fairbrother writes >True enough - but remember the "six degrees of seperation" between any >two persons too. After a short while, it all becomes meaningless. > >Now if you are talking to OBL (obviously bad lad) himself it's probably >important to know that, and if you are talking to someone who talks to >him then you might well be worthy of suspicion - or even if you talk to >someone who talks to someone who talks to OBL - but after a few more >steps it don't mean much in terms of probable suspected-ness. It turns out that Number One Son knows one of the Glasgow Airport gang, since he works in the same place that the latter used to. So where does that put all of us? - -- Clive D.W. Feather | Home: Tel: +44 20 8495 6138 (work) | Web: Fax: +44 870 051 9937 | Work: Please reply to the Reply-To address, which is: -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP SDK 3.0.2 iQEVAwUBRo0O+SNAHP3TFZrhAQGsngf/VaKaUaeIpQEH9lCBe5mzwHYez2UbvvDN V9JwvEW4q7arn52tIme4+jvwOcqsr+R2n67qiuylz/TGOL7aHj7c7vT/NVPKXpfl CrS66uhkGS0jOF/+qbeny/9AWmHvAfpZCcDRWPNhRifVYiLYeeV4qKy/U/R/uCSb zfh9p9DHyAk1BCF0N+FZuc2dMn753ORcDcJqUCMEYy9CyGgTSsmLx9sGhEpCUmCb 4Yxe7CzSqRi5wUTTBGQePUXOnSBqzAW1HS9a1PzPU6O5iGkJLTJ3FYTWZe+wa/QL R77J4DIXnFooh1HnOaxO9A4Zp+qQLVTu8I4bTnlNYz/3lZx41calTg== =6FXj -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk Thu Jul 5 18:41:46 2007 From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Caspar Bowden) Date: Thu, 5 Jul 2007 18:41:46 +0100 Subject: RIPA CoP and pt3 introduction, and m-o-o-t In-Reply-To: <468C4C84.4070701@zen.co.uk> References: <468C4C84.4070701@zen.co.uk> Message-ID: (FYI the list, have replied to Peter) There doesn't seem to have been any Summary of Responses to Consultation pu= blished. Simon - is that in the works? -- Caspar Bowden -----Original Message----- From: ukcrypto-admin@chiark.greenend.org.uk [mailto:ukcrypto-admin@chiark.g= reenend.org.uk] On Behalf Of Peter Fairbrother Sent: 05 July 2007 03:42 Cc: ukcrypto@chiark.greenend.org.uk Subject: RIPA CoP and pt3 introduction, and m-o-o-t From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk Thu Jul 5 18:24:47 2007 From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Caspar Bowden) Date: Thu, 5 Jul 2007 18:24:47 +0100 Subject: RIP and surveillance In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Apropos various on the subsequent thread... - under RIPA Pt.1 Ch.2, it isn't necessary to serve a Notice on a comms pro= vider via a SPOC. An alternate path is for the agency to write an Authorisa= tion to itself, and go and get the data by itself (if it physically can). S= ee 3.21 http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/ripa/publication-search/ripa-cop/= acquisition-disclosure-cop.pdf?view=3DBinary. One of the questions left han= ging from 7 years ago is under what circumstances it might be proportionate= to use this power to acquire traffic data in bulk, and whether the prospec= t of public disclosure of use of this modality would trigger the test that = "the investigation or operation may be prejudiced if notice is given to a C= SP to obtain or disclose the data" - Data Protection Act 1998 S.28 "(1) Personal data are exempt from any of the provisions of- (a) the data protection principles, (b) Parts II, III and V, and (c) section 55, if the exemption from that provision is required for the purpose of= safeguarding national security." - This may be relevant http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article1899= 345.ece Data sharing powers for the intelligence agencies (including CT DNA= database on a Statutory Footing) 11. We would like to legislate to provide statutory data sharing po= wers for the intelligence and security agencies that are similar to those a= lready provided for the Serious and Organised Crime Agency. Sections = 32 - 34 of the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 (SOCPA) gave the= Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) specific data sharing powers an= d we would like to provide something similar for the intelligence and secur= ity agencies. Specifically, the provisions remove barriers to individua= ls and organisations sharing with the intelligence and security agencies in= formation that is necessary for the proper discharge of the agencies' s= tatutory functions. 12. We would also like to put the police's counter-terrorist data b= ase on a similar statutory footing to the National Police Database. 13. Neither of these measures will alter the powers of the Police a= nd Security Services to collect material - and also.. http://www.parliament.uk/parliamentary_committees/home_affairs= _committee/hacpn070627no33.cfm "The Home Affairs Committee today announced that it will hold a sho= rt inquiry into the Government's proposals for new counter-terrorism legisl= ation, set out in the Home Secretary's statement to the House on 7 = June... * Data-sharing powers for the intelligence and security services= placed on a statutory basis" -- Caspar Bowden -----Original Message----- From: ukcrypto-admin@chiark.greenend.org.uk [mailto:ukcrypto-admin@chiark.g= reenend.org.uk] On Behalf Of Ross Anderson Sent: 04 July 2007 10:12 To: ukcrypto@chiark.greenend.org.uk Subject: RIP and surveillance We've suspected for many years that the security and intelligence services have a database containing the UK's itemised phone bills. Confirmation may just have slipped out in one of the breathless 'terror' briefings, reported in today's Guardian: http://www.guardian.co.uk/terrorism/story/0,,2117874,00.html "Counter-terrorism officials say data from the phones and email traffic was checked on the database used by MI5, MI6 and GCHQ, the government's eavesdropping centre. Connections were found linking that information and communications abroad, which enabled the police and security services to speed up their investigations in Britain." When in the "hunting" rather than "gathering" stage of signals intelligence, a powerful technique is the "snowball search" where you look at everyone your target communicated with, then recursively, whitelisting high-order nodes as you can and looking for collisions further down. This is not really feasible if you have to go through a SPOC with a production order at each stage of the algorithm. Also, we use common technology with the Americans, and recent revelations there point to AT&T having handed over traffic data for decades. I wonder what sort of email traffic data they get, and from where? It's just about feasible that they're pulling headers off the backbone - email is a tiny fraction of all the traffic and you could build custom hardware to do the harvesting well enough. What does this mean for (a) civil liberties and IT policy (b) practical countersurveillance? Ross From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk Thu Jul 5 21:47:11 2007 From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Ross Anderson) Date: Thu, 05 Jul 2007 21:47:11 +0100 Subject: RIP and surveillance Message-ID: Pete: > The time for worrying about the law is past. Evil doctors are trying > to kill us all. Medical researchers told the health committee that doctors should get all medical data of everyone in the country. When asked why they should have information that even the police can't get. not even when investigating terrorism, they were dismissive (Q 344-5): http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmselect/cmhealth/c422-iii/c42202.htm Clive: > It turns out that Number One Son knows one of the Glasgow Airport gang, > since he works in the same place that the latter used to. So where does > that put all of us? And now we're told that, like Burgess and McLean, they met at Cambridge. It's nice to know that there are some pleasing invariants in this time of turbulent change :-) Ross From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk Fri Jul 6 09:34:52 2007 From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Roland Perry) Date: Fri, 6 Jul 2007 09:34:52 +0100 Subject: RIP and surveillance In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: In article , Caspar Bowden writes >- under RIPA Pt.1 Ch.2, it isn't necessary to serve a Notice on a comms >provider via a SPOC. An alternate path is for the agency to write an >Authorisation to itself, and go and get the data by itself (if it >physically can). A process that still involves the SPoC, if not the CSP. >http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/ripa/publication-search/ripa- cop/acquisition-disclosure-cop.pdf?view=Binary. >One of the questions left hanging from 7 years ago is under what >circumstances it might be proportionate to use this power This is spelt out in the CoP. It starts with the circumstance where the CSP is unable to get the data (which is understood to mean "isn't sufficiently well trained to, so needs a policeman to press the buttons for him"). Then moves onto discuss the situation where the CSP might "tip off" the subject (although it's not clear to me what covert methods for obtaining the comms data, by authorisation, exist at that point). >to acquire traffic data in bulk, Tests of proportionality (which embrace a need-to-know about specified individuals) should be the same for notices and authorisations. > and whether the prospect of public disclosure of use of this modality >would trigger the test that "the investigation or operation may be >prejudiced if notice is given to a CSP to obtain or disclose the data" Are you hinting that an authorisation might be used if there's a possibility that a CSP might tip off a newspaper about the existence of bulk disclosures, when somehow they couldn't if they were the subject of bulk (and covertly executed) authorisations? -- Roland Perry From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk Fri Jul 6 09:43:29 2007 From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (PeteM) Date: Fri, 06 Jul 2007 09:43:29 +0100 Subject: RIP and surveillance In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <468E00B1.6010700@callnetuk.com> Caspar Bowden wrote: > Apropos various on the subsequent thread... > > - under RIPA Pt.1 Ch.2, it isn't necessary to serve a Notice on a > comms provider via a SPOC. An alternate path is for the agency to > write an Authorisation to itself, and go and get the data by itself > (if it physically can). See 3.21 > http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/ripa/publication-search/ripa-cop/acquisition-disclosure-cop.pdf?view=Binary. > One of the questions left hanging from 7 years ago is under what > circumstances it might be proportionate to use this power to acquire > traffic data in bulk, and whether the prospect of public disclosure > of use of this modality would trigger the test that "the > investigation or operation may be prejudiced if notice is given to a > CSP to obtain or disclose the data" > > - Data Protection Act 1998 S.28 "(1) Personal data are exempt from > any of the provisions of- (a) the data protection principles, (b) > Parts II, III and V, and (c) section 55, if the exemption from that > provision is required for the purpose of safeguarding national > security." ... in the opinion of the Minister, although the Minister's certificate can be appealed by anyone affected by the disclosure. If the Tribunal agrees with the challenge, it can quash the certificate. DPA doesn't say what happens then. Presumably nothing. The already- disclosed data will be retained, and since there are no penalties for issuing a phoney certificate, the Minister can just sign a new one so as to keep new data coming in. Not that such a challenge could ever be issued in practice, because (as Caspar hints) the authorities would probably keep it secret. -- Pete Mitchell From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk Fri Jul 6 10:10:46 2007 From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Caspar Bowden) Date: Fri, 6 Jul 2007 10:10:46 +0100 Subject: RIP and surveillance In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: >From: ukcrypto-admin@chiark.greenend.org.uk [mailto:ukcrypto-admin@chiark.= greenend.org.uk] On Behalf Of Roland Perry >Are you hinting that an authorisation might be used if there's a >possibility that a CSP might tip off a newspaper about the existence of >bulk disclosures, when somehow they couldn't if they were the subject of >bulk (and covertly executed) authorisations? There's no specific secrecy provision for Pt.1 Ch.2, but I believe somewher= e a long time ago it was mentioned that it would fall under Official Secret= s Act. Also, if S.16(3) was in use to capture content, the traffic data would be a= vailable also http://www.fipr.org/rip/#Overlapping http://www.fipr.org/rip/Bassam%20reply%20to%20Phillips%20on%20S.15.3.htm -- Caspar Bowden Chief Privacy Advisor EMEA Microsoft EMEA Technology Office +44 (0) 7801 881371 From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk Fri Jul 6 10:36:27 2007 From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Roland Perry) Date: Fri, 6 Jul 2007 10:36:27 +0100 Subject: RIP and surveillance In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: In article , Caspar Bowden writes >>From: ukcrypto-admin@chiark.greenend.org.uk >>[mailto:ukcrypto-admin@chiark.greenend.org.uk] On Behalf Of Roland Perry > >>Are you hinting that an authorisation might be used if there's a >>possibility that a CSP might tip off a newspaper about the existence of >>bulk disclosures, when somehow they couldn't if they were the subject of >>bulk (and covertly executed) authorisations? > >There's no specific secrecy provision for Pt.1 Ch.2, but I believe >somewhere a long time ago it was mentioned that it would fall under >Official Secrets Act. That doesn't answer the question. Despite the probable protection of OSA, are you suggesting that bulk authorisations are likely to happen as a result of an ambition to avoid a CSP tipping off the media? >Also, if S.16(3) was in use to capture content, the traffic data would >be available also >http://www.fipr.org/rip/#Overlapping >http://www.fipr.org/rip/Bassam%20reply%20to%20Phillips%20on%20S.15.3.htm If you are intercepting things, then some contemporaneous comms data will come along too. But not the sort of historic comms data or reverse-DQ material needed for the majority of investigations. -- Roland Perry From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk Fri Jul 6 10:02:52 2007 From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Watkin Simon) Date: Fri, 6 Jul 2007 10:02:52 +0100 Subject: RIP and surveillance Message-ID: > From: Roland Perry [mailto:lists@internetpolicyagency.com] > Sent: 06 July 2007 9:35 AM > > >One of the questions left hanging from 7 years ago is under what > >circumstances it might be proportionate to use this power [Authorisation] > > This is spelt out in the CoP. It starts with the circumstance where the > CSP is unable to get the data (which is understood to mean "isn't > sufficiently well trained to, so needs a policeman to press the buttons > for him"). Then moves onto discuss the situation where the CSP might > "tip off" the subject (although it's not clear to me what covert methods > for obtaining the comms data, by authorisation, exist at that point). Actually we've got rid of the tipping-off point. The code presented to Parliament reads: 3.26 An authorisation may be appropriate where: * a CSP is not capable of obtaining or disclosing the communications data [footnote: Where possible, this assessment will be based upon information provided by the CSP]; * there is an agreement in place between a public authority and a CSP relating to appropriate mechanisms for disclosure of communications data, or * a designated person considers there is a requirement to identify a person to whom a service is provided but a CSP has yet to be conclusively determined as the holder of the communications data. > >to acquire traffic data in bulk, > > Tests of proportionality (which embrace a need-to-know about specified > individuals) should be the same for notices and authorisations. Absolutely. Simon Watkin Home Office ********************************************************************** This email and any files transmitted with it are private and intended solely for the use of the individual or entity to whom they are addressed. If you have received this email in error please return it to the address it came from telling them it is not for you and then delete it from your system. This email message has been swept for computer viruses. ********************************************************************** The original of this email was scanned for viruses by the Government Secure Intranet Anti-Virus service supplied by Cable&Wireless in partnership with MessageLabs. (CCTM Certificate Number 2006/04/0007.) On leaving the GSi this email was certified virus free. Communications via the GSi may be automatically logged, monitored and/or recorded for legal purposes. From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk Fri Jul 6 16:07:59 2007 From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Ian G Batten) Date: Fri, 6 Jul 2007 16:07:59 +0100 Subject: RIP and surveillance In-Reply-To: References: <468C7713.4050505@zen.co.uk> Message-ID: <7C4354C9-C0F4-49FD-8AA3-CDFB365AD23A@uk.fujitsu.com> On 5 Jul 2007, at 16:32, Clive D. W. Feather wrote: > > It turns out that Number One Son knows one of the Glasgow Airport > gang, since he works in the same place that the latter used to. So > where does that put all of us? In Milton Keynes nick next Saturday, I suspect. Nigel buying some BBQ lighting fuel will be the last straw. ian From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk Fri Jul 6 13:11:04 2007 From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Caspar Bowden) Date: Fri, 6 Jul 2007 13:11:04 +0100 Subject: RIP and surveillance In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: >From: ukcrypto-admin@chiark.greenend.org.uk [mailto:ukcrypto-admin@chiark.= greenend.org.uk] On Behalf Of Watkin Simon >> From: Roland Perry [mailto:lists@internetpolicyagency.com] >>>to acquire traffic data in bulk, >> Tests of proportionality (which embrace a need-to-know about specified >> individuals) should be the same for notices and authorisations. >Absolutely. Wow. Simon, if you are endorsing this new formulation, that cannot meet a P= t.1 Ch.2 proportionality test without "a need-to-know about specified indiv= iduals" (Roland's phrase), that is a vastly more concrete test than anythin= g hitherto in legislation or a CoP? I wonder do they have to be specified by name, or can they be specified fun= ctionally, like the outputs to Ross' "snowball search" (subject to match cr= iteria)? There seems to be a parallel in the arguments over warrantless wiretapping = in US, and role of "probable cause" http://glenngreenwald.blogspot.com/2006/01/administrations-new-fisa-defense= -is.html http://glenngreenwald.blogspot.com/2006/01/bad-law-defense.html Also, this seems germane, but impenetrable, if you try to consider the poss= ible interaction between communications data acquired under either Ch.1 and= /or Ch.2. http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/ripa/publication-search/ripa-cop/acquisit= ion-disclosure-cop.pdf?view=3DBinary "1.10 Related communications data may be used as a basis for the acquisition of other related data for intelligence purposes6 only, if there= is sufficient intercept product or non-intercept material available to a desig= nated person to allow that person to consider the necessity and proportionality o= f acquiring the other related data. The application to the designated person = and the resultant data acquired should be treated as product of the interceptio= n" ??!?! -- Caspar Bowden From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk Fri Jul 6 13:11:15 2007 From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Caspar Bowden) Date: Fri, 6 Jul 2007 13:11:15 +0100 Subject: RIP and surveillance In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: >From: ukcrypto-admin@chiark.greenend.org.uk [mailto:ukcrypto-admin@chiark.= greenend.org.uk] On Behalf Of Roland Perry >>Also, if S.16(3) was in use to capture content, the traffic data would >>be available also >>http://www.fipr.org/rip/#Overlapping >>http://www.fipr.org/rip/Bassam%20reply%20to%20Phillips%20on%20S.15.3.htm >If you are intercepting things, then some contemporaneous comms data >will come along too. But not the sort of historic comms data or >reverse-DQ material needed for the majority of investigations. How long can a 16(3) flavour 8(3) warrant last and is it renewable? -- Caspar Bowden From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk Fri Jul 6 16:52:07 2007 From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Roland Perry) Date: Fri, 6 Jul 2007 16:52:07 +0100 Subject: RIP and surveillance In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: In article , Caspar Bowden writes >>> Tests of proportionality (which embrace a need-to-know about specified >>> individuals) should be the same for notices and authorisations. > >>Absolutely. > >Wow. Simon, if you are endorsing this new formulation, that cannot meet >a Pt.1 Ch.2 proportionality test without "a need-to-know about >specified individuals" (Roland's phrase), that is a vastly more >concrete test than anything hitherto in legislation or a CoP? As far as I'm concerned this isn't new at all, it's the way it has always been. >I wonder do they have to be specified by name, or can they be specified >functionally, like the outputs to Ross' "snowball search" (subject to >match criteria)? The application forms have been available for years, despite the Home Office webmasters moving them around from time to time. Currently they, and some guidance notes, can be found here: -- Roland Perry From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk Sat Jul 7 10:49:41 2007 From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Caspar Bowden) Date: Sat, 7 Jul 2007 10:49:41 +0100 Subject: RIP and surveillance In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: And where in the form or guidance does it say anything about "specified ind= ividuals"? The form (Box 9) says "Describe the COMMUNICATIONS DATA, specifying, where = relevant, any historic or future date(s) and, where appropriate, time perio= d(s)" The guidance says: "It MAY be appropriate for this section to include 'text boxes' to enable t= he applicant to set out the: a) telephone number, email address, etc b) where appropriate the 'between times / dates' of the data set required c) type of data required e.g. subscriber details, outgoing calls, incoming = calls etc" It also says: "It may be preferable for a public authority to have application forms that= are specifically for subscriber checks, itemised billings etc." ...so evidently public authorities can have their own customised forms... -- Caspar Bowden -----Original Message----- From: ukcrypto-admin@chiark.greenend.org.uk [mailto:ukcrypto-admin@chiark.g= reenend.org.uk] On Behalf Of Roland Perry Sent: 06 July 2007 17:52 To: ukcrypto@chiark.greenend.org.uk Subject: Re: RIP and surveillance In article , Caspar Bowden writes >>> Tests of proportionality (which embrace a need-to-know about specified >>> individuals) should be the same for notices and authorisations. > >>Absolutely. > >Wow. Simon, if you are endorsing this new formulation, that cannot meet >a Pt.1 Ch.2 proportionality test without "a need-to-know about >specified individuals" (Roland's phrase), that is a vastly more >concrete test than anything hitherto in legislation or a CoP? As far as I'm concerned this isn't new at all, it's the way it has always been. >I wonder do they have to be specified by name, or can they be specified >functionally, like the outputs to Ross' "snowball search" (subject to >match criteria)? The application forms have been available for years, despite the Home Office webmasters moving them around from time to time. Currently they, and some guidance notes, can be found here: -- Roland Perry From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk Sat Jul 7 11:45:08 2007 From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Florian Weimer) Date: Sat, 07 Jul 2007 12:45:08 +0200 Subject: RIP and surveillance In-Reply-To: <468D0A54.2060403@callnetuk.com> (PeteM's message of "Thu, 05 Jul 2007 16:12:20 +0100") References: <468CA91B.3060007@callnetuk.com> <87ir8z9odg.fsf@mid.deneb.enyo.de> <468D0A54.2060403@callnetuk.com> Message-ID: <877ipc7arv.fsf@mid.deneb.enyo.de> * PeteM: > Florian Weimer wrote: >> * PeteM: >> >>> Is there a lawful method by which they could have compiled this >>> information? >> Lawful as far as the authorities are concerned? Sure, ISPs could >> share the data voluntarily. > > That would be a very serious breach of their duty of confidence to > their clients. Their clients have expressed their consent. | We may access and/or disclose your personal information if we | believe such action is necessary to: (a) comply with the law or | legal process served on Microsoft; (b) protect and defend the rights | or property of Microsoft (including the enforcement of our | agreements); or (c) act in urgent circumstances to protect the | personal safety of users of Microsoft services or members of the | public. | Google only shares personal information with other companies or | individuals outside of Google in the following limited | circumstances: [...] We have a good faith belief that access, use, | preservation or disclosure of such information is reasonably | necessary to (a) satisfy any applicable law, regulation, legal | process or enforceable governmental request, (b) enforce applicable | Terms of Service, including investigation of potential violations | thereof, (c) detect, prevent, or otherwise address fraud, security | or technical issues, or (d) protect against imminent harm to the | rights, property or safety of Google, its users or the public as | required or permitted by law. | We believe it is necessary to share information in order to | investigate, prevent, or take action regarding illegal activities, | suspected fraud, situations involving potential threats to the | physical safety of any person, violations of Yahoo!'s terms of use, | or as otherwise required by law. (I don't know if there are any other popular webmail provider in the UK.) From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk Sat Jul 7 14:43:34 2007 From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Roland Perry) Date: Sat, 7 Jul 2007 14:43:34 +0100 Subject: RIP and surveillance In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: In article , Caspar Bowden writes >And where in the form or guidance does it say anything about "specified >individuals"? That's a consequence of specifying a phone number or email address, and having satisfied yourself that the collateral damage caused by any possible sharing of that phone number or email address is proportionate to whatever it is that's being investigated. >It also says: > >"It may be preferable for a public authority to have application forms >that are specifically for subscriber checks, itemised billings etc." > >...so evidently public authorities can have their own customised forms... As such a form would only make it even clearer what is being requested and why, I cannot see how it detracts from the issue of proportionality. -- Roland Perry From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk Mon Jul 9 07:30:07 2007 From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (David Hansen) Date: Mon, 09 Jul 2007 07:30:07 +0100 Subject: RIP and surveillance In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <4691E3FF.15010.5726D0@localhost> On 6 Jul 2007 at 13:11, Caspar Bowden wrote: > How long can a 16(3) flavour 8(3) warrant last and is it renewable? -- As we have seen with so-called anti-terrorist stop and search it doesn't really matter. The rogues in Westminster generally seemed surprised when they discovered (and it only came out in in the courts, officials hadn't bothered to tell anyone before) that these time- limited things were being operated continuously, by the simple trick of a new piece of paper at the appropriate time. The rogues were not surprised enough to do anything about this abuse, but that is one of the reason why they are rogues. "Minor details", including that the police have never caught a terrorist with these things, are not allowed to interfere. Thus it is clear that terrorism is simply a convenient peg for the Home Office to hang them on, the real aim is to cause inconvenience to those who disagree with government activities and also, like photographing, to deter the same group of people from expressing their opinions. The police also abuse these things by telling people they must supply their name and address and also looking through people's wallets and papers. That is how officials abuse something which is visible. It is most unlikely that they abuse less something which is invisible, like grabbing communications. It is far more likely that they abuse invisible things more. Reducing such abuse is why it was and is necessary to expose these officials to the daylight, for example by telling victims that they have been nosed by officials. This could easily be done, for example by a line on a telephone bill. The fact that the Home Office didn't want the officials exposed to daylight is a clear indication that things are going on which us plebs wouldn't like if we knew about it. The fact that big business was and is keen for their involvement with officials not to be made known to their customers is also no surprise. Customers have always been a nuisance to them, what they really prize are their nice cosy relationships with officials. -- David Hansen, Edinburgh I will *always* explain revoked encryption keys, unless RIP prevents me http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2000/00023--e.htm#54 From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk Mon Jul 9 10:38:18 2007 From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Ian G Batten) Date: Mon, 9 Jul 2007 10:38:18 +0100 Subject: RIP and surveillance In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On 6 Jul 2007, at 13:11, Caspar Bowden wrote: >> From: ukcrypto-admin@chiark.greenend.org.uk [mailto:ukcrypto- >> admin@chiark.greenend.org.uk] On Behalf Of Watkin Simon >>> From: Roland Perry [mailto:lists@internetpolicyagency.com] >>>> to acquire traffic data in bulk, > >>> Tests of proportionality (which embrace a need-to-know about >>> specified >>> individuals) should be the same for notices and authorisations. > >> Absolutely. > > Wow. Simon, if you are endorsing this new formulation, that cannot > meet a Pt.1 Ch.2 proportionality test without "a need-to-know about > specified individuals" (Roland's phrase), that is a vastly more > concrete test than anything hitherto in legislation or a CoP? Except it doesn't really matter. UK law doesn't have the concept of the fruit of the poison tree. In the aftermath of a terrorist incident, an ISP balancing ``will resisting this dubious notice make us heroes to the civil liberty aware?'' versus ``will resisting this dubious notice get as dubbed a friend of terrorism in the redtops?'' will probably favour the latter strategy. Clive can comment on how successful resisting accusations like that in newspapers is. Once the information is handed over, a UK judge will usually accept illegally gathered evidence, and will almost always accept legally gathered evidence where the warrant was issued in response to an earlier illegal search. So from a police perspective, in the aftermath of terrorist attacks, they can gather initial `intelligence' evidence without too much concern for all that nasty proportionality business, and then use that evidence to leverage later search warrants. In the US that's harder, although that protection is being underminded, because of the `fruit of the poison tree' doctrine: everything that flows from an illegal search is inadmissible, not just the initial search. ian From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk Mon Jul 9 12:04:16 2007 From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Ian G Batten) Date: Mon, 9 Jul 2007 12:04:16 +0100 Subject: Donald Michie Dead Message-ID: <03AB370E-FB54-4125-967B-D8FD681B2438@uk.fujitsu.com> http://www.theregister.co.uk/2007/07/09/car_crash/ ``Bletchley Park code-breaker Professor Donald Michie, 84, and his ex- wife, geneticist Dame Anne McLaren, 80, were killed in a car crash this Saturday.'' From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk Mon Jul 9 19:41:15 2007 From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Charles Lindsey) Date: Mon, 9 Jul 2007 19:41:15 +0100 (BST) Subject: Things could be much worse than RIPA Message-ID: <200707091841.l69IfFax004401@clerew.man.ac.uk> http://rawstory.com/showarticle.php?src=http%3A%2F%2Fsfgate.com%2Fcgi-bin%2Farticle.cgi%3Ffile%3D%2Fc%2Fa%2F2007%2F07%2F07%2FBAGMNQSJDA1.DTL%26type%3Dprintable An example of what they can get away with in the USA. At least two things there that RIPA would not allow them to do. -- Charles H. Lindsey ---------At Home, doing my own thing------------------------ Tel: +44 161 436 6131 Fax: +44 161 436 6133 Web: http://www.cs.man.ac.uk/~chl Email: chl@clerew.man.ac.uk Snail: 5 Clerewood Ave, CHEADLE, SK8 3JU, U.K. PGP: 2C15F1A9 Fingerprint: 73 6D C2 51 93 A0 01 E7 65 E8 64 7E 14 A4 AB A5 From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk Mon Jul 9 20:57:25 2007 From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Peter Fairbrother) Date: Mon, 09 Jul 2007 20:57:25 +0100 Subject: Things could be much worse than RIPA In-Reply-To: <200707091841.l69IfFax004401@clerew.man.ac.uk> References: <200707091841.l69IfFax004401@clerew.man.ac.uk> Message-ID: <46929325.8010708@zen.co.uk> Charles Lindsey wrote: > http://rawstory.com/showarticle.php?src=http%3A%2F%2Fsfgate.com%2Fcgi-bin%2Farticle.cgi%3Ffile%3D%2Fc%2Fa%2F2007%2F07%2F07%2FBAGMNQSJDA1.DTL%26type%3Dprintable > > An example of what they can get away with in the USA. At least two things > there that RIPA would not allow them to do. I'm confused. What might those be? No warrant is needed under RIPA to obtain email addresses or web pages (anent possibly some matters about the first (third?) slash). And traffic data is useable in Court. Can't see anything else ... -- Peter Fairbrother From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk Tue Jul 10 10:11:27 2007 From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Charles Lindsey) Date: Tue, 10 Jul 2007 10:11:27 +0100 Subject: Things could be much worse than RIPA In-Reply-To: <46929325.8010708@zen.co.uk> References: <200707091841.l69IfFax004401@clerew.man.ac.uk> <46929325.8010708@zen.co.uk> Message-ID: On Mon, 09 Jul 2007 20:57:25 +0100, Peter Fairbrother wrote: > Charles Lindsey wrote: >> http://rawstory.com/showarticle.php?src=http%3A%2F%2Fsfgate.com%2Fcgi-bin%2Farticle.cgi%3Ffile%3D%2Fc%2Fa%2F2007%2F07%2F07%2FBAGMNQSJDA1.DTL%26type%3Dprintable >> An example of what they can get away with in the USA. At least two >> things >> there that RIPA would not allow them to do. > > I'm confused. What might those be? > > > No warrant is needed under RIPA to obtain email addresses or web pages > (anent possibly some matters about the first (third?) slash). And > traffic data is useable in Court. Can't see anything else ... Yes, maybe I misread some of it. It seems they can find the web site you visited, but not the page you asked to see - essentially the same as RIP. But the procedures for obtaining traffic data under RIP seem stronger. Granted it does not require an interception warrant, but it still seems to require a specific notice to be given specifying exactly what is being sought, and the USA ruling seemed weaker on that. -- Charles H. Lindsey ---------At Home, doing my own thing------------------------ Tel: +44 161 436 6131     Web: http://www.cs.man.ac.uk/~chl Email: chl@clerew.man.ac.uk      Snail: 5 Clerewood Ave, CHEADLE, SK8 3JU, U.K. PGP: 2C15F1A9      Fingerprint: 73 6D C2 51 93 A0 01 E7 65 E8 64 7E 14 A4 AB A5 From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk Tue Jul 10 10:31:01 2007 From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Peter Tomlinson) Date: Tue, 10 Jul 2007 10:31:01 +0100 Subject: Fwd: Talon Database (USA) Message-ID: <469351D5.7000000@iosis.co.uk> The link to and extract from an article in the Washington Post was posted on a USA comms list. It seems that a trawling activity, collecting data on many more people than those intended, has been stopped. Peter William M. Arkin on National and Homeland Security http://blog.washingtonpost.com/earlywarning/2007/07/an_end_to_domestic_spying_or_n_1.html Trimming the Government's Talons -- Or Not Ever since I revealed the existence of the Pentagon's Talon database and the military's collection of information on anti-war protests, the story has careened in all directions. The sinister interpretation is that the Defense Department was or is keeping any anti-military protesters under surveillance and suppressing the First Amendment rights of American citizens under the guise of counterterrorism. The American Civil Liberties Union has sued and Congress has demanded information and accountability. Now comes a Defense Department Inspector General report on Talon (thanks to Steve Aftergood at FAS). Talon, as I suspected, got into trouble because of the unregulated machinations of overzealous military police, not because it was the product of some military conspiracy. Since the December 2005 revelations in these pages and on NBC News, three prominent officials have been fired, the database has been scrubbed, and the program has been redirected. The Defense Department's decisive response, in fact, should serve as proof even for the skeptical that the military was caught unaware and took swift action to comply with the law. From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk Tue Jul 10 18:11:48 2007 From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Caspar Bowden) Date: Tue, 10 Jul 2007 18:11:48 +0100 Subject: RIP and surveillance In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: >From: ukcrypto-admin@chiark.greenend.org.uk [mailto:ukcrypto-admin@chiark.= greenend.org.uk] On Behalf Of Roland Perry >>And where in the form or guidance does it say anything about "specified >>individuals"? >That's a consequence of specifying a phone number or email address, and >having satisfied yourself that the collateral damage caused by any >possible sharing of that phone number or email address is proportionate >to whatever it is that's being investigated. Not necessarily - it depends on the meaning of collateral intrusion. This i= s discussed in an excellent new paper from Dan Solove ("I've Got Nothing to= Hide" and Other Misunderstandings of Privacy - http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3= /papers.cfm?abstract_id=3D998565#PaperDownload) (quoting Richard Posner): "The collection, mainly through electronic means,= of vast amounts of personal data is said to invade privacy. But machine co= llection and processing of data cannot, as such, invade privacy. Because of= their volume, the data are first sifted by computers, which search for nam= es, addresses, phone numbers, etc., that may have intelligence value. This = initial shifting, far from invading privacy (a computer is not a sentient b= eing), keeps most private data from being read by any intelligence officer" ISTR Lord Lloyd said something similar in the first IOCA Commissioner's Rep= ort in 1987 (not online unfortunately - but still important because it's th= e origin of doctrine on "overlapping" warrants) The point is that such methods don't necessarily specify INDIVIDUALS, they = specify data - and there appears to be nothing in RIPA limiting the abstrac= tion of the selection algorithm. So in extremis, if the entire corpus of tr= affic data in UK was analysed, but the search was *intended* to find data p= ertaining only to a small number of unidentified persons who fit some patte= rn, then Posner's reasoning would say "wonderful - negligible collateral in= trusion, so here's your Authorisation". I recommend the rest of Solove's paper for a refutation of this view -- Caspar Bowden From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk Tue Jul 10 19:05:14 2007 From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Roland Perry) Date: Tue, 10 Jul 2007 19:05:14 +0100 Subject: RIP and surveillance In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: In article , Caspar Bowden writes >>That's a consequence of specifying a phone number or email address, and >>having satisfied yourself that the collateral damage caused by any >>possible sharing of that phone number or email address is proportionate >>to whatever it is that's being investigated. > >Not necessarily - it depends on the meaning of collateral intrusion. In this case the meaning is simple - how many other people do we think are using the same phone number or email address, and what's the consequences for them if we see their element of the phone bill as well as the target's. -- Roland Perry From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk Thu Jul 12 08:45:09 2007 From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Caspar Bowden) Date: Thu, 12 Jul 2007 08:45:09 +0100 Subject: RIP and surveillance In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: >From: ukcrypto-admin@chiark.greenend.org.uk [mailto:ukcrypto-admin@chiark.= greenend.org.uk] On Behalf Of Roland Perry >>Not necessarily - it depends on the meaning of collateral intrusion. >In this case the meaning is simple - how many other people do we think >are using the same phone number or email address, and what's the >consequences for them if we see their element of the phone bill as well >as the target's. (Sigh) I'm beginning to wonder why you are so interested in arguing the leg= islation/CoP/guidance says things which they do not in fact say, but one la= st try What do you mean by "this case"? The points I've made about Pt.1 Ch.2 cover= ing data (not individuals), and the uncertain interpretation of "collateral= intrusion" (only the Interception Commissioner's opinion really matters - = and on past form he's not going to tell us), in principle apply to any stat= utory purpose and any public authority. Who are "we"? (I didn't know you were a designated person) -- Caspar Bowden From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk Thu Jul 12 21:52:46 2007 From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Roland Perry) Date: Thu, 12 Jul 2007 21:52:46 +0100 Subject: RIP and surveillance In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <4XI1b7neSplGFAsz@perry.co.uk> In article , Caspar Bowden writes >>From: ukcrypto-admin@chiark.greenend.org.uk >>[mailto:ukcrypto-admin@chiark.greenend.org.uk] On Behalf Of Roland Perry >>>Not necessarily - it depends on the meaning of collateral intrusion. > >>In this case the meaning is simple - how many other people do we think >>are using the same phone number or email address, and what's the >>consequences for them if we see their element of the phone bill as well >>as the target's. > >What do you mean by "this case"? A query which specifies a single phone number or email address as the starting point. >Who are "we"? The SPoC (although the designated person will believe the same if he signs it). >(I didn't know you were a designated person) I'm not. -- Roland Perry From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk Thu Jul 12 22:00:17 2007 From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Roland Perry) Date: Thu, 12 Jul 2007 22:00:17 +0100 Subject: RIP and surveillance In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: In article , Caspar Bowden writes >an excellent new paper from Dan Solove ("I've Got Nothing to Hide" and >Other Misunderstandings of Privacy - >http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=998565#PaperDownload) I ploughed through this yesterday, and it has some interesting insights into the American privacy position. For example, the concept that anyone who gives data to third party like a company cannot expect any privacy because they volunteered the information. Including telling the bank by cheque "please pay Debbie from Dallas $100", or your phone company "Please connect me to ", although there are few statutory exceptions like renting a video called "Debbie does Dallas" when apparently there *is* an expectation of privacy involved. And that companies who make generic promises about privacy can't in practice be sued for a breach because it's so difficult to quantify a monetary damage. Again, this seems odd when anecdotally you can sue for all kinds of personal distress in the USA. And no general concept of a duty of confidentiality in the commercial sector, it seems. As for "having nothing to hide", I stumbled into a conversation about that yesterday, when mentioning crypto (in the context of signing not privacy, as it happens, but my audience went off in a rant before I'd finished my sentence). Subsequently I was outnumbered by those who said that they had no expectation of privacy when on the Internet, therefore were not concerned about eavesdropping. Which they might wish to reflect upon as more transactions become in effect Internet-only. But it seems to me that what people fail to realise is that it's *partial* disclosure that can be the most damaging. Partial disclosures can cause people to leap to conclusions (just as my audience did when I mentioned crypto), which can spiral out of control before it's feasible (which may not even be possible) to provide full information in order to refute such an assumption. So they might not think they have anything to fear, but have not considered the situation where others only have half the story. -- Roland Perry From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk Fri Jul 13 09:02:56 2007 From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (ukcrypto@chiark.greenend.org.uk) Date: Fri, 13 Jul 2007 04:02:56 -0400 Subject: Iannotti, Tony is out of the office. Message-ID: --0__=0ABBF984DFBFB0508f9e8a93df938690918c0ABBF984DFBFB050 Content-type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII I will be out of the office starting 07/13/2007 and will not return until 07/23/2007. I will respond to your message when I return. --0__=0ABBF984DFBFB0508f9e8a93df938690918c0ABBF984DFBFB050 Content-type: text/html; charset=US-ASCII Content-Disposition: inline

I will be out of the office starting 07/13/2007 and will not return until 07/23/2007.

I will respond to your message when I return. --0__=0ABBF984DFBFB0508f9e8a93df938690918c0ABBF984DFBFB050-- From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk Fri Jul 13 21:07:48 2007 From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Adrian Midgley) Date: Fri, 13 Jul 2007 21:07:48 +0100 Subject: RIP and surveillance In-Reply-To: References: <468CA91B.3060007@callnetuk.com> Message-ID: <4697DB94.7030608@defoam.net> Roland Perry wrote: > > 1) A database inside the Security Services listing (where known) the > contact details of people they "have an interest in". I expect this > has existed for a long time, on paper before computers existed. > Legally? Well, one hopes so. Queen Elizabeth said she wanted it... QE 1 that is. I expect. From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk Sat Jul 14 00:18:05 2007 From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Caspar Bowden) Date: Sat, 14 Jul 2007 00:18:05 +0100 Subject: RIP and surveillance In-Reply-To: <4697DB94.7030608@defoam.net> References: <468CA91B.3060007@callnetuk.com> <4697DB94.7030608@defoam.net> Message-ID: >From: ukcrypto-admin@chiark.greenend.org.uk [mailto:ukcrypto-admin@chiark.= greenend.org.uk] On Behalf Of Adrian Midgley >> 1) A database inside the Security Services listing (where known) the >> contact details of people they "have an interest in". I expect this >> has existed for a long time, on paper before computers existed. >> Legally? Well, one hopes so. >Queen Elizabeth said she wanted it... >QE 1 that is. > >I expect. Cromwell certainly http://www.preparingforpeace.org/espionage___.htm -- Caspar Bowden From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk Sun Jul 15 16:52:55 2007 From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (PeteM) Date: Sun, 15 Jul 2007 16:52:55 +0100 Subject: RIP and surveillance In-Reply-To: <877ipc7arv.fsf@mid.deneb.enyo.de> References: <468CA91B.3060007@callnetuk.com> <87ir8z9odg.fsf@mid.deneb.enyo.de> <468D0A54.2060403@callnetuk.com> <877ipc7arv.fsf@mid.deneb.enyo.de> Message-ID: <469A42D7.8070608@callnetuk.com> Florian Weimer wrote: > * PeteM: > >> Florian Weimer wrote: >>> * PeteM: >>> >>>> Is there a lawful method by which they could have compiled this >>>> information? >>> Lawful as far as the authorities are concerned? Sure, ISPs could >>> share the data voluntarily. >> That would be a very serious breach of their duty of confidence to >> their clients. > > Their clients have expressed their consent. > > | We may access and/or disclose your personal information if we > | believe such action is necessary to: (a) comply with the law or > | legal process served on Microsoft; (b) protect and defend the rights > | or property of Microsoft (including the enforcement of our > | agreements); or (c) act in urgent circumstances to protect the > | personal safety of users of Microsoft services or members of the > | public. > > | Google only shares personal information with other companies or > | individuals outside of Google in the following limited > | circumstances: [...] We have a good faith belief that access, use, > | preservation or disclosure of such information is reasonably > | necessary to (a) satisfy any applicable law, regulation, legal > | process or enforceable governmental request, (b) enforce applicable > | Terms of Service, including investigation of potential violations > | thereof, (c) detect, prevent, or otherwise address fraud, security > | or technical issues, or (d) protect against imminent harm to the > | rights, property or safety of Google, its users or the public as > | required or permitted by law. > > | We believe it is necessary to share information in order to > | investigate, prevent, or take action regarding illegal activities, > | suspected fraud, situations involving potential threats to the > | physical safety of any person, violations of Yahoo!'s terms of use, > | or as otherwise required by law. None of that constitutes an agreement by Google's email customers that Google can disclose their traffic data willy-nilly. Inasmuchas it is relevant it refers only to *enforceable* government requests or "legal process served on Microsoft". Not ad hoc requests for voluntary disclosure. > > (I don't know if there are any other popular webmail provider in the > UK.) I don't think we are interested only in webmail providers here, are we? I thought it was all email service providers. I see nothing in my Demon T&Cs that assumes I have consented to arbitrary disclosure of my traffic data to the plods. But admittedly the typeface is very small and my eyes aren't what they were. My Madasafish account T&Cs do include the following ambiguous passage: "We will disclose personal information to comply with all applicable laws and lawful requests by the appropriate authorities." Hmm. Is a "lawful request" one that the authorities can make without actually committing a criminal offence? Or is it a request with which the respondent is legally obliged to comply? I'd like to think a court would say it should be the latter; but what I would like to think, and what the courts of this benighted country would think, are two different things. -- Pete Mitchell From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk Wed Jul 11 13:48:22 2007 From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (ken) Date: Wed, 11 Jul 2007 13:48:22 +0100 Subject: RIP and surveillance In-Reply-To: <468C7713.4050505@zen.co.uk> References: <468C7713.4050505@zen.co.uk> Message-ID: <4694D196.7040707@students.bbk.ac.uk> > True enough - but remember the "six degrees of seperation" between any > two persons too. After a short while, it all becomes meaningless. Not really, because the strength of the connections between two people can be important, not just their existence. I may be only six handshakes from every peasant in the Mato Grosso, but only by a few routes to each. I likely to be am six handshakes from the subscribers to this list in many more ways (probably trillions of them) I'm four handshakes from Osama bin Laden as far as I know, But its one link (someone who worked for me's Dad used to work for the Sultan of Oman who has met OBL). There are presumably others I don't know about - maybe vast numbers of others - but not very many robust connections. Now if suspect A never (well, hardly ever) talks to suspect Z but A regularly communicates with B, C, D, and E; and Z phones W, X, and Y often, and {WXY} all know {BCDE} we might have a robust link from A to Z. Sort of. It begin more complicated than that in real life. But you can do statistics on it. The same sort of statistics that we use for looking for genes and proteins in the masses of sequence data we have now (or maybe even in codebreaking, not that I know much about that) So you can have stronger and weaker links and check out the strongest first. Of course Bad People who know what they are doing organise their affairs to make that sort of analysis harder, and may well drop out of social networks that could include their fellow operatives. (though too spectacular a drop-out might also be a Clue) So Techno-Plod might find themselves wanting to see who the suspects used to know back in college or whatever. Time to harvest Facebook. Actually it probably wouldn't be hard to knock up something from wget and a few little scripts that might show me if there are any unexpected clusters of connections between the Facebook Friends of my Facebook Friends. From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk Mon Jul 16 11:15:09 2007 From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Charles Lindsey) Date: Mon, 16 Jul 2007 11:15:09 +0100 Subject: RIP and surveillance In-Reply-To: <469A42D7.8070608@callnetuk.com> References: <468CA91B.3060007@callnetuk.com> <87ir8z9odg.fsf@mid.deneb.enyo.de> <468D0A54.2060403@callnetuk.com> <877ipc7arv.fsf@mid.deneb.enyo.de> <469A42D7.8070608@callnetuk.com> Message-ID: On Sun, 15 Jul 2007 16:52:55 +0100, PeteM wrote: > I see nothing in my Demon T&Cs that assumes I have consented to > arbitrary disclosure of my traffic data to the plods. But admittedly the > typeface is very small and my eyes aren't what they were. OTOH, it Demon observe suspicious patterns of activity amongst their clients, are they not allowed to investigate further, and if it turns out that National Security is at stake, are they not duty bound, as good citizens, to report the matter to the proper authorities? And, at a somewhat lower level, would we not expect it to be normal practice for competent ISPs (such as there are) to notice levels of email activity that might signify spamming, and even to detect when their clients appeared to have been overtaken by bots, so that said clients could be warned/advised to get their machines cleaned? -- Charles H. Lindsey ---------At Home, doing my own thing------------------------ Tel: +44 161 436 6131     Web: http://www.cs.man.ac.uk/~chl Email: chl@clerew.man.ac.uk      Snail: 5 Clerewood Ave, CHEADLE, SK8 3JU, U.K. PGP: 2C15F1A9      Fingerprint: 73 6D C2 51 93 A0 01 E7 65 E8 64 7E 14 A4 AB A5 From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk Mon Jul 16 11:29:54 2007 From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Ian G Batten) Date: Mon, 16 Jul 2007 11:29:54 +0100 Subject: RIP and surveillance In-Reply-To: References: <468CA91B.3060007@callnetuk.com> <87ir8z9odg.fsf@mid.deneb.enyo.de> <468D0A54.2060403@callnetuk.com> <877ipc7arv.fsf@mid.deneb.enyo.de> <469A42D7.8070608@callnetuk.com> Message-ID: <7EF63FC3-E996-40F5-8C22-BB801080EC2F@uk.fujitsu.com> On 16 Jul 2007, at 11:15, Charles Lindsey wrote: > On Sun, 15 Jul 2007 16:52:55 +0100, PeteM wrote: > >> I see nothing in my Demon T&Cs that assumes I have consented to >> arbitrary disclosure of my traffic data to the plods. But >> admittedly the typeface is very small and my eyes aren't what they >> were. > > OTOH, it Demon observe suspicious patterns of activity amongst > their clients, are they not allowed to investigate further, An interesting question, multi-dimensionally. Do they have DPA cover to do that? If they do so, and report their suspicions to the police, where to they stand on libel? What about if they don't report it to the police? Is the evidence that they gather sufficient grounds for warrants? > and if it turns out that National Security is at stake, are they > not duty bound, as good citizens, to report the matter to the > proper authorities? Moral duty or legal duty? There are people who are legally bound to report suspicious events (financials, solicitors). But if I see my neighbour mixing sugar and diesel, am I obligated to report it? What happens if he was instead mixing sugar and molasses after reading a book by Heston Blumenthal? ian From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk Mon Jul 16 11:43:29 2007 From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (PeteM) Date: Mon, 16 Jul 2007 11:43:29 +0100 Subject: RIP and surveillance In-Reply-To: References: <468CA91B.3060007@callnetuk.com> <87ir8z9odg.fsf@mid.deneb.enyo.de> <468D0A54.2060403@callnetuk.com> <877ipc7arv.fsf@mid.deneb.enyo.de> <469A42D7.8070608@callnetuk.com> Message-ID: <469B4BD1.9000308@callnetuk.com> Charles Lindsey wrote: > On Sun, 15 Jul 2007 16:52:55 +0100, PeteM wrote: > >> I see nothing in my Demon T&Cs that assumes I have consented to >> arbitrary disclosure of my traffic data to the plods. But admittedly >> the typeface is very small and my eyes aren't what they were. > > OTOH, it Demon observe suspicious patterns of activity amongst their > clients, That's not relevant. We are discussing whether an ISP is acting lawfully in disclosing the traffic data on *all* its subscribers in response to a non-binding request from the authorities. are they not allowed to investigate further, No, except in the special case that it affects Demon itself, such as in the spam case you cite below, which wasn't what Ross was talking about. and if it turns > out that National Security is at stake, Are you being ironic? are they not duty bound, as good > citizens, to report the matter to the proper authorities? No. Emphatically not. Neither by a legal duty nor IMHO a moral duty. In fact their moral duty is to protect the data. And probably their legal duty too. > > And, at a somewhat lower level, would we not expect it to be normal > practice for competent ISPs (such as there are) to notice levels of > email activity that might signify spamming, and even to detect when > their clients appeared to have been overtaken by bots, so that said > clients could be warned/advised to get their machines cleaned? > Yes, but that's nothing to do with disclosing subscribers' personal information to the security services. -- Pete Mitchell From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk Mon Jul 16 12:03:07 2007 From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Roger Hird) Date: Mon, 16 Jul 2007 12:03:07 +0100 Subject: RIP and surveillance In-Reply-To: <469B4BD1.9000308@callnetuk.com> References: <468CA91B.3060007@callnetuk.com> <87ir8z9odg.fsf@mid.deneb.enyo.de> <468D0A54.2060403@callnetuk.com> <877ipc7arv.fsf@mid.deneb.enyo.de> <469A42D7.8070608@callnetuk.com> <469B4BD1.9000308@callnetuk.com> Message-ID: <4ffffb2a57roger.hird@argonet.co.uk> In article <469B4BD1.9000308@callnetuk.com>, PeteM wrote: > That's not relevant. We are discussing whether an ISP is acting lawfully > in disclosing the traffic data on *all* its subscribers in response to a > non-binding request from the authorities. > are they not allowed to investigate further, > No, except in the special case that it affects Demon itself, such as in > the spam case you cite below, which wasn't what Ross was talking about. > and if it turns > > out that National Security is at stake, > Are you being ironic? > are they not duty bound, as good > > citizens, to report the matter to the proper authorities? > No. Emphatically not. Neither by a legal duty nor IMHO a moral duty. "Emphatically not"? Really? Really? You seem to imply that personal data of a somewhat abstract nature must be protected even if the ISP has a reasonable suspicion of a threat to National Security - or, in the context of the present discussion, a threat to public safety. > In fact their moral duty is to protect the data. And probably their > legal duty too. Well, if the latter, laws can, thankfully, be changed. -- Roger Hird roger.hird@argonet.co.uk Running RISCOS 4.39 on an Acorn StrongARM RiscPC From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk Mon Jul 16 13:52:57 2007 From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (PeteM) Date: Mon, 16 Jul 2007 13:52:57 +0100 Subject: RIP and surveillance In-Reply-To: <4ffffb2a57roger.hird@argonet.co.uk> References: <468CA91B.3060007@callnetuk.com> <87ir8z9odg.fsf@mid.deneb.enyo.de> <468D0A54.2060403@callnetuk.com> <877ipc7arv.fsf@mid.deneb.enyo.de> <469A42D7.8070608@callnetuk.com> <469B4BD1.9000308@callnetuk.com> <4ffffb2a57roger.hird@argonet.co.uk> Message-ID: <469B6A29.2070701@callnetuk.com> Roger Hird wrote: > In article <469B4BD1.9000308@callnetuk.com>, > PeteM wrote: > >> That's not relevant. We are discussing whether an ISP is acting lawfully >> in disclosing the traffic data on *all* its subscribers in response to a >> non-binding request from the authorities. > >> are they not allowed to investigate further, > >> No, except in the special case that it affects Demon itself, such as in >> the spam case you cite below, which wasn't what Ross was talking about. > >> and if it turns >>> out that National Security is at stake, > >> Are you being ironic? > >> are they not duty bound, as good >>> citizens, to report the matter to the proper authorities? > >> No. Emphatically not. Neither by a legal duty nor IMHO a moral duty. > > "Emphatically not"? Really? Really? You seem to imply that personal data > of a somewhat abstract nature must be protected even if the ISP has a > reasonable suspicion of a threat to National Security - or, in the context > of the present discussion, a threat to public safety. How could an ISP develop a reasonable suspicion that all of its subscribers are a threat to public safety? I am struggling to imagine how it could come to suspect even *one* of them, unless it is itself carrying out traffic analysis, which it has no business doing except in the very special case of spammers. > >> In fact their moral duty is to protect the data. And probably their >> legal duty too. > > Well, if the latter, laws can, thankfully, be changed. > They certainly can. I was just reading in Bruce Schneier's newsletter about how the US government changed the law on police access to census data in WWII. Previously individual census records had been guaranteed confidential. Then they decided to peek at these records so as to round up Japanese-Americans and intern them for the duration of the war. For the last sixty years they have lied about it, but don't let that shake your faith in their trustworthiness. -- Pete Mitchell From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk Mon Jul 16 12:27:10 2007 From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (David Hansen) Date: Mon, 16 Jul 2007 12:27:10 +0100 Subject: Whining about RIP Message-ID: <469B641E.22820.20278F@localhost> http://scotlandonsunday.scotsman.com/index.cfm?id=1102602007 is a long article on the "evils" of RIP. The tone if is summed up in the first bit, "SUSPECTED terrorists are slipping through the net because security services and police are so badly bogged down by bureaucracy, intelligence sources have claimed." One of the more amusing bits is, "He continued: "Applications for telephone intercepts are even worse. If you want to do this, then it will take you a day to fill in the form, at least." It seems to me that anyone who takes at least a day to fill out a RIP form should be presented with a P45. They are clearly incapable of doing a useful job. It may take more than a day to gather the information, though I doubt it, but filling in the forms I have seen wouldn't take that long. Is there some secret form we haven't been told about? -- David Hansen, Edinburgh I will *always* explain revoked encryption keys, unless RIP prevents me http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2000/00023--e.htm#54 From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk Mon Jul 16 16:25:06 2007 From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (David Hansen) Date: Mon, 16 Jul 2007 16:25:06 +0100 Subject: RIP and surveillance In-Reply-To: <469B6A29.2070701@callnetuk.com> References: <4ffffb2a57roger.hird@argonet.co.uk> Message-ID: <469B9BE2.18399.BA10B@localhost> On 16 Jul 2007 at 13:52, PeteM wrote: > How could an ISP develop a reasonable suspicion that all of its > subscribers are a threat to public safety? If one leaves out "reasonable" then they could do so by believing the utterings of many party politicians and officals, for example the official who spoke of wanting internment at the weekend (though he is now trying to pretend that is not what he called for). I note that the same sort of people in Australia have prevented someone getting bail for the "crime" of giving a SIM card to a distant relative. -- David Hansen, Edinburgh I will *always* explain revoked encryption keys, unless RIP prevents me http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2000/00023--e.htm#54 From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk Mon Jul 16 16:31:31 2007 From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Peter Tomlinson) Date: Mon, 16 Jul 2007 16:31:31 +0100 Subject: RIP and surveillance In-Reply-To: <469B9BE2.18399.BA10B@localhost> References: <4ffffb2a57roger.hird@argonet.co.uk> <469B9BE2.18399.BA10B@localhost> Message-ID: <469B8F53.4050809@iosis.co.uk> David Hansen wrote: > On 16 Jul 2007 at 13:52, PeteM wrote: > > > How could an ISP develop a reasonable suspicion that all of its > > subscribers are a threat to public safety? > > > If one leaves out "reasonable" then they could do so by believing the > utterings of many party politicians and officals, for example the > official who spoke of wanting internment at the weekend (though he is > now trying to pretend that is not what he called for). > > I note that the same sort of people in Australia have prevented > someone getting bail for the "crime" of giving a SIM card to a > distant relative. > > Alleged crime, David. As I understand it, he has been granted bail but has now been detained under a different law. Peter From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk Mon Jul 16 21:54:49 2007 From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Roland Perry) Date: Mon, 16 Jul 2007 21:54:49 +0100 Subject: Whining about RIP In-Reply-To: <469B641E.22820.20278F@localhost> References: <469B641E.22820.20278F@localhost> Message-ID: In article <469B641E.22820.20278F@localhost>, David Hansen writes >"Applications for telephone intercepts are even worse. If you want to >do this, then it will take you a day to fill in the form, at least." You should read the rest of the article which does a good job of describing the justifications required, especially for the more serious surveillance activities. I would have thought that you would approve of the way in which this stuff isn't just signed off on a whim. >It may take more than a day to gather the information, though I doubt >it, but filling in the forms I have seen wouldn't take that long. Is >there some secret form we haven't been told about? If it's interception, a case has to be made locally, and then co-ordinated through various bods, many in London, (in a bid to make them consistent and thoroughly justified), and ultimately signed by the Home Secretary. I can see why some people could have the impression that this might take a day if it wasn't a "life at risk" scenario. -- Roland Perry From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk Tue Jul 17 10:59:01 2007 From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (David Hansen) Date: Tue, 17 Jul 2007 10:59:01 +0100 Subject: Whining about RIP In-Reply-To: References: <469B641E.22820.20278F@localhost> Message-ID: <469CA0F5.12192.8F232@localhost> On 16 Jul 2007 at 21:54, Roland Perry wrote: > You should read the rest of the article You appear to be assuming that I have not. > which does a good job of > describing the justifications required, especially for the more serious > surveillance activities. I would have thought that you would approve of > the way in which this stuff isn't just signed off on a whim. If I believed the article then I might be mildly reassured. However, unless it really takes at least a day to fill in a piece of paper (even a tax return doesn't take that long to fill in) I'm not convinced by the article. -- David Hansen, Edinburgh I will *always* explain revoked encryption keys, unless RIP prevents me http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2000/00023--e.htm#54 From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk Tue Jul 17 11:50:24 2007 From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Charles Lindsey) Date: Tue, 17 Jul 2007 11:50:24 +0100 Subject: RIP and surveillance In-Reply-To: <7EF63FC3-E996-40F5-8C22-BB801080EC2F@uk.fujitsu.com> References: <468CA91B.3060007@callnetuk.com> <87ir8z9odg.fsf@mid.deneb.enyo.de> <468D0A54.2060403@callnetuk.com> <877ipc7arv.fsf@mid.deneb.enyo.de> <469A42D7.8070608@callnetuk.com> <7EF63FC3-E996-40F5-8C22-BB801080EC2F@uk.fujitsu.com> Message-ID: On Mon, 16 Jul 2007 11:29:54 +0100, Ian G Batten wrote: > Moral duty or legal duty? There are people who are legally bound to > report suspicious events (financials, solicitors). But if I see my > neighbour mixing sugar and diesel, am I obligated to report it? What > happens if he was instead mixing sugar and molasses after reading a book > by Heston Blumenthal? Hasn't some muslim doctor just been charged with possessing knowledge that a terrorist act was being planned, and with failing to report it? -- Charles H. Lindsey ---------At Home, doing my own thing------------------------ Tel: +44 161 436 6131     Web: http://www.cs.man.ac.uk/~chl Email: chl@clerew.man.ac.uk      Snail: 5 Clerewood Ave, CHEADLE, SK8 3JU, U.K. PGP: 2C15F1A9      Fingerprint: 73 6D C2 51 93 A0 01 E7 65 E8 64 7E 14 A4 AB A5 From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk Tue Jul 17 13:13:27 2007 From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Ian G Batten) Date: Tue, 17 Jul 2007 13:13:27 +0100 Subject: RIP and surveillance In-Reply-To: References: <468CA91B.3060007@callnetuk.com> <87ir8z9odg.fsf@mid.deneb.enyo.de> <468D0A54.2060403@callnetuk.com> <877ipc7arv.fsf@mid.deneb.enyo.de> <469A42D7.8070608@callnetuk.com> <7EF63FC3-E996-40F5-8C22-BB801080EC2F@uk.fujitsu.com> Message-ID: <2CE25977-5F70-4A78-ADE7-FD4CC4EAF72A@uk.fujitsu.com> On 17 Jul 2007, at 11:50, Charles Lindsey wrote: > On Mon, 16 Jul 2007 11:29:54 +0100, Ian G Batten > wrote: > >> Moral duty or legal duty? There are people who are legally bound >> to report suspicious events (financials, solicitors). But if I >> see my neighbour mixing sugar and diesel, am I obligated to report >> it? What happens if he was instead mixing sugar and molasses >> after reading a book by Heston Blumenthal? > > Hasn't some muslim doctor just been charged with possessing > knowledge that a terrorist act was being planned, and with failing > to report it? I think the definition of that offence is rather more than suspicion, though: it's not far from requiring you to be a co-conspiritor. The cases I've seen reported are essentially where A tells B that A intends to carry out a terrorist crime, describes it, and asks for a bit of advice here and there. Is there a lawyer in the house? ian From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk Tue Jul 17 13:54:04 2007 From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Roland Perry) Date: Tue, 17 Jul 2007 13:54:04 +0100 Subject: Whining about RIP In-Reply-To: <469CA0F5.12192.8F232@localhost> References: <469B641E.22820.20278F@localhost> <469CA0F5.12192.8F232@localhost> Message-ID: <+cmE5UAsvLnGFA9l@perry.co.uk> In article <469CA0F5.12192.8F232@localhost>, David Hansen writes >On 16 Jul 2007 at 21:54, Roland Perry wrote: > >> You should read the rest of the article > >You appear to be assuming that I have not. It was a figure of speech :) >> which does a good job of >> describing the justifications required, especially for the more serious >> surveillance activities. I would have thought that you would approve of >> the way in which this stuff isn't just signed off on a whim. > >If I believed the article then I might be mildly reassured. However, >unless it really takes at least a day to fill in a piece of paper (even >a tax return doesn't take that long to fill in) I'm not convinced by >the article. It's not the filling in that takes time, but deciding what to fill in; based on collecting quite a lot of justification for what you are entitled to ask for. -- Roland Perry From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk Tue Jul 17 15:09:52 2007 From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (PeteM) Date: Tue, 17 Jul 2007 15:09:52 +0100 Subject: RIP and surveillance In-Reply-To: <2CE25977-5F70-4A78-ADE7-FD4CC4EAF72A@uk.fujitsu.com> References: <468CA91B.3060007@callnetuk.com> <87ir8z9odg.fsf@mid.deneb.enyo.de> <468D0A54.2060403@callnetuk.com> <877ipc7arv.fsf@mid.deneb.enyo.de> <469A42D7.8070608@callnetuk.com> <7EF63FC3-E996-40F5-8C22-BB801080EC2F@uk.fujitsu.com> <2CE25977-5F70-4A78-ADE7-FD4CC4EAF72A@uk.fujitsu.com> Message-ID: <469CCDB0.1080707@callnetuk.com> Ian G Batten wrote: > > On 17 Jul 2007, at 11:50, Charles Lindsey wrote: > >> On Mon, 16 Jul 2007 11:29:54 +0100, Ian G Batten >> wrote: >> >>> Moral duty or legal duty? There are people who are legally bound to >>> report suspicious events (financials, solicitors). But if I see my >>> neighbour mixing sugar and diesel, am I obligated to report it? >>> What happens if he was instead mixing sugar and molasses after >>> reading a book by Heston Blumenthal? >> >> Hasn't some muslim doctor just been charged with possessing knowledge >> that a terrorist act was being planned, and with failing to report it? > > I think the definition of that offence is rather more than suspicion, > though: it's not far from requiring you to be a co-conspiritor. The > cases I've seen reported are essentially where A tells B that A intends > to carry out a terrorist crime, describes it, and asks for a bit of > advice here and there. It's much more disgusting than that: "... had information which [she] knew or believed might be of material assistance in preventing the commission of another person [] of an act of terrorism and failed to disclose it as soon as reasonably practicable (contrary to Section 38B (1) (a) and (2) of the Terrorism Act 2000)". Note that "believed might be". -- Pete Mitchell From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk Tue Jul 17 23:03:34 2007 From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (TheGodSplinter) Date: Tue, 17 Jul 2007 23:03:34 +0100 Subject: Whining about RIP References: <469B641E.22820.20278F@localhost> Message-ID: <001201c7c8be$542e2440$613e7ad5@nh7mts5etf5os9> Hello... The form is unlikely to be classified material as it is asking for input of information, rather than being a document giving information. If the length of the form is a genuine complaint and if it such a burdensome thing to fill it in, then POST A COPY OF THE FORM, SOMEWHERE...and, post a link to it so that we can view it for ourselves. Ian. ----- Original Message ----- From: "David Hansen" To: Sent: Monday, July 16, 2007 12:27 PM Subject: Whining about RIP > http://scotlandonsunday.scotsman.com/index.cfm?id=1102602007 is a long > article on the "evils" of RIP. The tone if is summed up in the first > bit, "SUSPECTED terrorists are slipping through the net because > security services and police are so badly bogged down by bureaucracy, > intelligence sources have claimed." > > One of the more amusing bits is, "He continued: "Applications for > telephone intercepts are even worse. If you want to do this, then it > will take you a day to fill in the form, at least." > > It seems to me that anyone who takes at least a day to fill out a RIP > form should be presented with a P45. They are clearly incapable of > doing a useful job. > > It may take more than a day to gather the information, though I doubt > it, but filling in the forms I have seen wouldn't take that long. Is > there some secret form we haven't been told about? > > > > -- > David Hansen, Edinburgh > I will *always* explain revoked encryption keys, unless RIP prevents > me > http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2000/00023--e.htm#54 > > > > From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk Tue Jul 17 22:39:12 2007 From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Ian Mason) Date: Tue, 17 Jul 2007 22:39:12 +0100 Subject: RIP and surveillance In-Reply-To: References: <468CA91B.3060007@callnetuk.com> <4697DB94.7030608@defoam.net> Message-ID: <201A98A1-1ABF-4078-BCE3-32ADD825D665@sourcetagged.ian.co.uk> On 14 Jul 2007, at 00:18, Caspar Bowden wrote: >> From: ukcrypto-admin@chiark.greenend.org.uk [mailto:ukcrypto- >> admin@chiark.greenend.org.uk] On Behalf Of Adrian Midgley >>> 1) A database inside the Security Services listing (where known) the >>> contact details of people they "have an interest in". I expect this >>> has existed for a long time, on paper before computers existed. >>> Legally? Well, one hopes so. > >> Queen Elizabeth said she wanted it... >> QE 1 that is. >> >> I expect. > > Cromwell certainly > http://www.preparingforpeace.org/espionage___.htm Does this mean that at some point in the future we can look forward to a former Home Secretary being exhumed, decapitated and their head being left on a pike outside Parliament for all to see? :-) From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk Wed Jul 18 09:24:21 2007 From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (David Hansen) Date: Wed, 18 Jul 2007 09:24:21 +0100 Subject: Whining about RIP In-Reply-To: <001201c7c8be$542e2440$613e7ad5@nh7mts5etf5os9> Message-ID: <469DDC45.6468.B5BD0@localhost> On 17 Jul 2007 at 23:03, TheGodSplinter wrote: > The form is unlikely to be classified material as it is asking for input > of information, rather than being a document giving information. ISTR copies of various forms have been presented to us plebs. There may well be somethign on the Home Office web site too. > If the > length of the form is a genuine complaint and if it such a burdensome > thing to fill it in, then POST A COPY OF THE FORM, SOMEWHERE...and, post > a link to it so that we can view it for ourselves. Those who are whining could do that, if they were interested in discussing the issues. However, as with their other involvement in RIP, it appears that the last thing officials, in general, want to do is discuss the issues. They would rather mislead the rogues in Westminster. -- David Hansen, Edinburgh I will *always* explain revoked encryption keys, unless RIP prevents me http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2000/00023--e.htm#54 From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk Wed Jul 18 09:29:12 2007 From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Ian G Batten) Date: Wed, 18 Jul 2007 09:29:12 +0100 Subject: RIP and surveillance In-Reply-To: <469CCDB0.1080707@callnetuk.com> References: <468CA91B.3060007@callnetuk.com> <87ir8z9odg.fsf@mid.deneb.enyo.de> <468D0A54.2060403@callnetuk.com> <877ipc7arv.fsf@mid.deneb.enyo.de> <469A42D7.8070608@callnetuk.com> <7EF63FC3-E996-40F5-8C22-BB801080EC2F@uk.fujitsu.com> <2CE25977-5F70-4A78-ADE7-FD4CC4EAF72A@uk.fujitsu.com> <469CCDB0.1080707@callnetuk.com> Message-ID: On 17 Jul 2007, at 15:09, PeteM wrote: > > > It's much more disgusting than that: "... had information which > [she] knew or believed might be of material assistance in > preventing the commission of another person [] of an act of > terrorism and failed to disclose it as soon as reasonably > practicable (contrary to Section 38B (1) (a) and (2) of the > Terrorism Act 2000)". > > Note that "believed might be". Yes, but that's not ``should have believed'' or ``a reasonable person would have believed''. I don't really know what the difference is between knowing something to be true and believing something to be true. Epistomology and it's only 0930. ian From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk Wed Jul 18 10:18:34 2007 From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (David Hansen) Date: Wed, 18 Jul 2007 10:18:34 +0100 Subject: RIP and surveillance In-Reply-To: References: <469CCDB0.1080707@callnetuk.com> Message-ID: <469DE8FA.19559.2A4934@localhost> On 18 Jul 2007 at 9:29, Ian G Batten wrote: > I don't really know what the difference is > between knowing something to be true and believing something to be > true. Epistomology and it's only 0930. Mr Liar appears to think there is no difference. Having told us repeatedly that the evidence for the "weapons of mass destruction" was solid, reliable and so on he has for some time hidden behind the excuse that he believed the evidence was solid, reliable and so on. -- David Hansen, Edinburgh I will *always* explain revoked encryption keys, unless RIP prevents me http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2000/00023--e.htm#54 From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk Wed Jul 18 11:55:54 2007 From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Richard Clayton) Date: Wed, 18 Jul 2007 11:55:54 +0100 Subject: Whining about RIP In-Reply-To: References: <469B641E.22820.20278F@localhost> Message-ID: -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 In article , Roland Perry writes >If it's interception, a case has to be made locally, and then >co-ordinated through various bods, many in London, (in a bid to make >them consistent and thoroughly justified), and ultimately signed by the >Home Secretary. In Scotland, the First Minister's signature would be required - -- richard Richard Clayton They that can give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety. Benjamin Franklin -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGPsdk version 1.7.1 iQA/AwUBRp3xupoAxkTY1oPiEQIBhgCg6XC4GVfv3RXso3Y1pMILGwikjRkAoJWH INJ4J500PqTTvh01FjnTSeg7 =VRY5 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk Wed Jul 18 12:17:06 2007 From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Richard Clayton) Date: Wed, 18 Jul 2007 12:17:06 +0100 Subject: Lords debate on RIPA SIs Message-ID: -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 House of Lords, Tuesday 17 Jul 2007 Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Investigation of Protected Electronic Information: Code of Practice) Order 2007 also Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Acquisition and Disclosure of Communications Data: Code of Practice) Order 2007 One got used to complete misapprehensions on this topic back in the 1990s, but in 2007 ?? Lord Bassam of Brighton: "The power to require disclosure of key material can be expected to be used only where a person who is able to put protected information into an intelligible form indicates that they will not exercise that ability either voluntarily or on compulsion." So, if you commit the criminal offence of failing to comply with a s49 notice and put encrypted material into an intelligible form, Lord Bassam (or his scriptwriters) believe that you will then be served a further s49 notice requiring you to produce the keys ? Of course the failure to comply with that will also be an offence, but one with the same maximum tariff.... So will the sentences run concurrently? - -- richard Richard Clayton They that can give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety. Benjamin Franklin -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGPsdk version 1.7.1 iQA/AwUBRp32spoAxkTY1oPiEQJUDQCg+9A6x17EGYAb50PDB1XtGixBWMgAn0VB inmxwRfWwdImXU5Xf6hNiWk5 =JgNX -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk Wed Jul 18 14:57:22 2007 From: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk (David Hansen) Date: Wed, 18 Jul 2007 14:57:22 +0100 Subject: Lords debate on RIPA SIs In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <469E2A52.4748.129926C@localhost> On 18 Jul 2007 at 12:17, Richard Clayton wrote: > 17-gc0001.htm#07071763000003> > > Lord Bassam of Brighton: I didn't realise his inability to cope with the issues had not been spotted. Mostly depressing reading. They generally do a better job in other fields. Quotes below are from the page linked to above. >Exercise of the provisions is under the vigilant oversight of the >Interception of Communications Commissioner, Sir Paul Kennedy, I see from his biography that he is another Hutton. Not someone to be trusted without being vouched for by a respectable member of society. >assisted by a team of inspectors who scrutinise public authorities’ >conduct to obtain communications data. So, where can the public scrutinise these bods and Mr Kennedy? If they have nothing to hide they have nothing to fear from being scrutinised. >The code presented to Parliament sets out procedures that ensure >proper respect for individuals’ human rights Incorrect. >The code also makes clear, and reflects operational practice over many >years that, where the connection of a 999 emergency call is lost and >information is needed to provide emergency assistance to the caller >within the so-called “golden hour”, that is outside the arrangements >of the Act. A nice example of shroud waving, typical of party politicians and officials when they don't have any real arguments. However, someone without oxygen circulating in their blood is not going to be revived an hour later. >The code makes clear that only appropriately trained and accredited >investigators who understand the legislation can engage with >communications service providers and spare them from ill informed, >impractical or unlawful inquiries. There is still no penalty for any Tom, Dick or Harriet "engaging", though they might get a hard stare from the Home Office. >The code of practice addresses issues on which Parliament sought >clarification when the primary legislation was considered and debated. >It takes account of the comments of respondents to the public >consultation. Incorrect. It only takes account of the comments of respondents which officials wanted to listen to. Any other comments have been totally ignored. >The power to require disclosure of key material can be expected to be >used only where a person who is able to put protected information into >an intelligible form indicates that they will not exercise that >ability either voluntarily or on compulsion. So, every Tom, Dick and Harriet now has a God like ability to decide when their victim "will not exercise that ability"? Fascinating. >In direct response to concern expressed in public consultation that >technical expertise is required to understand and apply this >legislation appropriately, the code of practice makes it clear that no >public authority may serve on any person a Part 3 notice without the >prior written approval of NTAC. So, how do I scrutinise these bods to ensure that I have confidence in them? >In this way, NTAC will have the crucial role of ensuring that >the provisions are used appropriately, expertly and with the highest >regard for compliance with the requirements and principles of the Act >and the code. Without any oversight of these bods, Mr Bassam's bullshit is not convincing. >NTAC will also help to assure the various oversight commissioners of >that. A Hutton and his underlings "as