NHS email encryption

[Roger Hayter]

In message <E1IOqH3-0003ue-00@mta2.cl.cam.ac.uk>, Ross Anderson 
<Ross.Anderson@cl.cam.ac.uk> writes
>> The new one is SSL to server, SSL from server to reader
>
>Which makes you feel more comfortable - unencrypted email about you sent
>from one doctor's demon account to another doctor's pipex account - or
>this encrypted thingy that uses a server maintained by the government?
>
>The same issue arose in the context of legal communications. While there
>may be no basic objection to a CPS solicitor communicating with a
>barrister he instructs using a Ministry of Justice webmail server, I
>would not be relaxed about my lawyers doing this were I a defendant.
>
>If the government is now saying that data protection law means you have
>to share your private data with the government, then the wheels have
>come off.

I think the Government are saying all NHS data belongs to them:  except 
possibly GP data which they acknowledge might be confidential, but still 
probably ought to belong to them. GP data is of course the only source 
of comprehensive health data on the general population.  The latest plan 
is for all GP systems to run on PCT-owned server farms.  My take on this 
is that all GP data will then be available to the security services, but 
less covert access will need further negotiation.  Is this unduly 
cynical?  This is a question about how safely you can run an encrypted 
database on someone else's server, so I suppose is slightly on topic.

-- 
Roger Hayter