Minister promises that Part III is coming

[Caspar Bowden]

>admin@chiark.greenend.org.uk] On Behalf Of Peter Fairbrother
=20
>> c) it must be justifiable as a preventative measure against that
>> individual criminal's future risk of causing harm (and not as a
>> punishment)

>Then it would be unfair, and should not be allowed.

>It must be seen as a punishment=20

I think that is the wrong way round, and is not justifiable under ECHR.
If you are going to treat some convicts differently from others, there
should be a better reason than retribution (risk of escape, risk of harm
if released on parole)

>- else it is being imposed on someone for
>reasons of expediency, and it can equally be imposed for reasons of
>expediency on anyone else, ie on everybody.

Expediency is the wrong word, but that takes us into the territory of
control orders.

My proposal is subtly stable against extension to non-convicts (i.e.
someone suspected but not convicted). LEAs would probably not want to
alert suspects that they were under suspicion by imposing a DODO.

Conversely, by using DODOs appropriately, LEAs would probably achieve
both a deterrent effect and a better capability to access data when
needed than the byzantine blunderbuss aimed at Joe Public that is RIP
Pt.III

But I have to admit, given the legislation the Home Office has passed
since 2000 which they consider is HRA compliant, they could well try to
enact a DODO which applied to non-convicts. If they did so, then all the
old arguments about presumption of innocence would return, but with the
legal twist that somebody had been individually warned about the loss of
that presumption previously, and that they could therefore alter their
conduct accordingly. Seems to me *if* ASBOs for non-convicts are HRA
compliant, then DODOs maybe are also. But an ASBO requires someone to
refrain from noxious conduct, and a DODO requires them to not let data
become inaccessible (which is not by itself noxious).=20

But that is still a lot better than the indiscriminate effect of Pt.III
as it stands

>A likelihood of comitting an offence is a reason to watch people
carefully >-but not a reason to impose upon their behaviour.=20
>Having committed an offence may well be justification for such
impositions >- but not the likelihood that the person might commit an
offence in future.

See thread with Owen re: Anthony Rice case. What you are proposing is
the curtailment of all parole conditions which e.g. restrict travel

...
>If I had driven while banned I woud have been punished for that -
driving
>while banned - but I would not have been punished for driving per se.
>Driving would not be an offence - the offence would be driving while
>banned.

Exactly

>> Substitute ~ "failing to decrypt" for "driving a car"
>>=20
>> The "option" of not using a computer at all is theoretically there.
The
>> individual criminal can stay in jail or accept the parole condition
that
>> future unwise computer use will put them in jeopardy.

>Yes. If the parole condition is clearly seen as a punishment,

I still think it has to be justifiable as
risk-control/surveillance/deterrent not as punishment

>and failing to decrypt is a crime only insofar as not complying with a=20
>parole condition is a crime (which afaik it isn't - but I am no
expert), >then I don't object. The term of parole should typically end
too.

>But failing to decrypt should not be a crime in itself. Any further
>punishment should be for the original crime.

>Otherwise we are punishing people for what we think they might do,
rather
>then for what they have done.

Agreed
--=20
Caspar Bowden