RIPA Part III

[Peter Fairbrother]

Richard Clayton wrote:
 
> 2. There's the "shall we have a power to decrypt" where the argument for
> is that otherwise people will "get away with it" and the argument
> against is that this is forcing people to incriminate themselves and
> besides, everyone will claim to have forgotten their keys and so the
> juries will just convict by judging all the other evidence and what they
> think of the defendant's taste in suits.
> 
> 3. Finally, there's the "shall we have GAK" where the argument for is
> that it's much simpler for the police that way and the argument against
> is that it will seriously damage the economy...
> 
> There's other for/against arguments for all of these three aspects of
> course, but as you can see, the weight of these arguments in each
> direction -- and whether the arguments are practical, principled, or
> economic -- varies considerably.
> 
> So I do think it's worth responding that, in particular, (2) and (3) are
> NOT inextricably linked, but should be split apart.

How so? And why?

I believe they are linked, if only because in order to show that a
decryption is valid, the key must be given.

Nor do I think it makes much if any real difference - whether by decryptions
or keys, ciphertext is vulnerable. Does it matter whether it's by some form
of verifiable decryption or by key?

I can't see why. Some small technical differences perhaps, but nothing
really significant.

The idea that it's somehow significantly less intrusive to demand
decryptions than keys has little or no merit, IMO. It makes no real
difference.


-- 
Peter Fairbrother