RIPA Part III

[Peter Fairbrother]

Owen Lewis wrote:

> 
> 
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: ukcrypto-admin@chiark.greenend.org.uk
>> [mailto:ukcrypto-admin@chiark.greenend.org.uk]On Behalf Of Peter
>> Fairbrother
>> Sent: 16 June 2006 12:25
>> To: ukcrypto@chiark.greenend.org.uk
>> Subject: Re: RIPA Part III
>> 
>> 
>> Roland Perry wrote:
>> 
>>> In article <C0B84589.CC79F%zenadsl6186@zen.co.uk>, Peter Fairbrother
>>> <zenadsl6186@zen.co.uk> writes
>>>> 
>>>>> The crypto war was still in full swing in 1996 and was only
>> finally won
>>>>> internationally in 1999 after the Wassenaar restrictions on
>> cryptography
>>>>> collapsed.
>>>> 
>>>> The crypto war continues to this day - or what do you think
>> Part III of RIPA
>>>> is all about?
>>> 
>>> Different war.
>> 
>> How so?
>> 
>> The first battle was about using crypto at all, the second about
>> escrow, the
>> third is now about demands for keys.
>> 
>> From the government point of view, all are about preventing their citizens
>> from being able to keep secrets from governments by the use of
>> cryptography.
>> That hasn't changed. They are still fighting the same old war.
>> 
>> Governments have always wanted to be able to see their citizens' encrypted
>> secrets. That doesn't mean we should let them.
> 
> That's simply not so, Peter.
> 
> -    There has, in this country, never been a battle over the use of crypto at
> all. 

I did not mention the UK, or any nation. That battle was mostly fought in
the US. 

> -    There is absolutely no evidence to support the oft-made claim that UKG
> 'wants to see citizens' secrets', with the implication of 'all secrets' and
> 'all the time'. 

I did not make that claim either. I claimed that governments want to be able
to see all secrets, all the time.

There is plenty of evidence for that in general, and specifically for the UK
government as well. Eg, part III of RIPA.

> What is true that the maintenance of good law and order
> requires from time to time selective searches of personally held information
> (as well as goods etc.), such searches being conducted in strict accordance
> with the legal safeguards that hedge them in.

It requires no such thing.

> It follows that the present consultation re. RIPA Pt III is best construed
> as an invitation to consider and develop  such hedging of the powers. I
> think that any who chose to treat the consultation as an invitation to the
> removal of the powers  are doomed to an absolute failure of an absolutist
> position.

I expect so. But at least we'll try.

Then comes the last stand of the vanguard, the parliamentary votes.

And if they fail then the gloves come off and we deploy gak-proof crypto.
Not that there is a lot of need now, much of it is already available, and
we'll soon see gak-resistance in mainstream crypto products.

Even Skype is said to be gak- and interception-proof (and if isn't, it's
only a bit of work to write an internet telehony program which is).

If you were a Chief Security Officer of a multinational, you would not be
doing your job if you didn't deploy some form of gak-resistance.


Then there is the ECtHR route, and more.


We have not yet begun to fight. In this case, really, we are still at the
talking stage.


-- 
Peter Fairbrother