RIPA Part III

[David Hansen]

On 14 Jun 2006 at 11:46, Owen Lewis wrote:

> If I may say so, that's a neat summation of the case. The key concern is
> one of proportionality and not of principle.

Yes and no.

Having Toms, Dicks and Harriets decide to demand keys on a whim with no 
real oversight is a matter of principle.

Having some form of access to encrypted data is somewhat more a matter 
of proportionality. This could easily have been arranged. One obvious 
example is to use the, far from perfect, system currently employed for 
dealing with the far less intrusive police attacks on houses. It is 
notable that even magistrates balked at imprisoning the vicitms of the 
attack in Forest Gate further. The police were in favour of "detaining" 
them even further as I understand it. Thus a very flaky system of 
oversight has been shown to have some merit.

This system was advocated to the Home Office, but they decided to 
ignore it (presumably at the behest of those pulling their strings). 

The Home Office had the opportunity to come up with something sensible, 
but they botched it. They only have themselves to blame and I see no 
reason to help them.

> Can the use of the powers
> be fixed to investigation of offences of an established grade of
> seriousness? E.g. offences punishable by a maximum sentence of (say) not
> less than five year's imprisonment?

There was talk of "serious" offences in the early stages of RIP, but 
this seems to have been lost. Another cockup by the Home Office, but 
they have a long series of offence to be taken into consideration in 
this regard.



-- 
  David Hansen, Edinburgh 
 I will *always* explain revoked encryption keys, unless RIP prevents 
me   
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2000/00023--e.htm#54