Intel to include DRM in new Pentium 4 series processors

[Pete Chown]

Brian Gladman wrote:

> It is true that a company can take GPL'd software and provide it in a form
> that allows the user to say that it is _this_ particular version of the
> software that they want to run.

I don't have a problem with this.  I would have a problem if this was 
extended over the network, so the program could satisfy its peers that 
it was unmodified.  With some programs this would remove your ability to 
modify the code in any meaningful sense, since it would become useless.

Are you saying that TCPA can do this, but you don't mind, or that TCPA 
actually cannot do this?

> A key feature of TCPA is that, subject to the PC owner's permission, remote
> agents can set up 'trusted boxes' for their use on an owner's PC.

There has been a lot of talk about the implications of this for systems 
like DRM, but I wonder how practical it is too.  Imagine the scenario -- 
a critical computer system fails, but the security policy won't let you 
find out why.  Are IT managers going to tolerate this?  I know I would 
be very reluctant.  A system with mandatory access controls is one 
thing, but you need to be able to override them if you have to.

> (c) At the point of a contract between a PC owner and such an agent (e.g. a
> software supplier) the full consequences of the contract will be set out
> (e.g. no later changes to what the trusted box can do).

Do you mean a legal contract, or are you using the word in the 
"programming by contract" sense?  In other words, will the restrictions 
applying to the box be enforced technologically?

> But I also have additional worries.  While it is true that some TCPA
> features can help in a limited way to prevent virii, worms etc., other
> features might well prove to be a hacker's paradise.

Also it seems to me that the existence of these boxes makes audit very 
difficult.  For example, how can computer based evidence be acceptable 
to a court if there are aspects of the machine which cannot be probed?

 > I am also worried that these features might actually
> help very powerful forms of attack ...

I don't really see how TCPA is going to stop viruses or outside break- 
ins.  On systems that have the latest security technology, you can be 
very specific about what behaviour is allowed and what is not.  However, 
this does not make the system "secure".  Suppose Security-Enhanced Linux 
had a buffer overflow which allowed attackers to run arbitrary code with 
kernel privilege.  You would then be able to restrict users' access with 
great precision -- but anyone who knew about the bug could cruise 
straight in.

I think there is likely to be a similar problem here.  The bugs used by 
virus writers and script kiddies will still be around.  All that will 
have changed is that there will be a few very specific restrictions that 
don't cause them much of a problem in practice.

I also share your concern about TCPA being used as a way of cloaking 
malicious activities.

-- 
Pete