Juries 'should hear phone taps' to nail crime gangs
Owen Lewis
Owen Lewis" <oml at sysrx.uk.com
Thu, 12 Sep 2002 12:52:39 +0100
----- Original Message -----
From: Charles Lindsey <chl@clw.cs.man.ac.uk>
To: <ukcrypto@chiark.greenend.org.uk>
Sent: 12 September 2002 09:58
Subject: Re: Juries 'should hear phone taps' to nail crime gangs
> On Wed, 11 Sep 2002 17:39:10 +0100
> "Owen Lewis" <oml@sysrx.uk.com> said...
>
> > So is A. I have no figures but I'd be tempted to say that A is almost as
> > commonplace as popping E :-) And that is without considering the near
> > universal use of video surveillance, overt and covert.
> >
> > Watch out for sweaty 'adolescent' raving away to house music with a
bottle
> > of water in one hand and a baseball cap worn back to front, a la mode.
Its
> > the cap that is the giveaway. It's likely to contain a 2.4GHz A/V
'pin-hole'
> > transmitter (colour with stereo mics), lithium power pack and gently
cooking
> > the wearer's brain (not so fast as the house music at 1kW o/p though).
>
> Exactly. There may be a good argument for keeping secret the fact
> that "they" utilise pin-holes in baseball caps. But the argument that
> is being used is that RIPA interception must not be used in evidence
> because it might give away such secrets.
Suffice it to say that if one turns over a stone to reveal all underneath it
is surprising what sometimes is revealed. The argument runs that unwelcome
(and unnecessary?) revelation is least likely if stones cannot be turned
over in the first place.
> But RIPA does not apply to the basball cap.
Quite so. And why not, one may well ask! Why is the 'regulation of
investigatory practices' so partial? Those who focus only on the application
of surveillance to communications in some form of conduit help obfuscate
further the underlying principles of balance between surveillance in the
interest of society and the very human need for privacy (and mercy).
> OTOH, for case B, where RIPA does apply, there is no secret to keep.
> We all know how it was done. They walked into the telephone exchange
> / telehouse / sorting office, waved their warrant, and attached their
> crock clips / monitored the traffic through the routers / looked into
> the POP mailboxes / opened the envelopes, and all with the active
> assistance of the technical staff at those locations. It is no secret
> that, given that sort of access (and the Official Secrets Act to keep
> the facts concealed) you can do *anything*, and in a nice comfortable
> environment with cups of coffee brought round too.
If you say so. However, I'm strangely unre-assured.
>
> So what is there to hide, beyond the fact that a warrant had been issued
> and acted upon?
Indeed? Then, if that is all there is to know, a defence needs no further
information in that regard, does it ;-)
Owen