Striking the Balance

[Ian G Batten]

On Tue, 29 Oct 2002, Watkin Simon wrote:
> The question for the general public to consider and express a view upon, in
> consultation, is whether they are prepared to give up a little privacy
> through their communications data being retained in the collective public
> interest to enable the communications of terrorists and serious criminals to
> be identified - subject to proportionate and necessary access to data,
> proper oversight and accountability over access to the data and sanctions
> for improper access to the data.

The trite answer is ``those that would give up a little freedom for a
little security deserve neither''.  The less trite answer is to point
out that there's every reason to believe that intrusions into privacy
will yield intrusions into privacy: to believe otherwise would be
bizarre.  However, the link between those self-same invasions of privacy
and the communications of ``terrorists and serious criminals'' is a
combination of proof by vigorous assertion, ``I could tell you, but then
I'd have to shoot you'' and slippery uses of the word ``serious''.
Echelon failed to prevent 9/11 and Bali.  Perhaps had the US NSA been
less keen to play people tapes of Bin Laden talking to his mother they
might have been, but their internal security was lax.

There are endless cases of bombings in Northern Ireland which were not
prevented.  Until the government produces concrete examples of serious
terrorist incidents that were prevented by communications surveillance,
I'm afraid I just don't buy it.  All the cases the Home Office have
quoted here have stretched ``serious'' to breaking point.  Will I accept
a few cars being clocked in exchange for more personal privacy?  Yes:
how much is an HPI check anyway?

Anyway, how will you retain data if people just use Hotmail?

ian