Striking the Right Balance between Privacy and Public Protection

[Dave Bird]

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In article <l03102807b9db13b8b632@[192.168.1.2]>, Ian Miller writes:
>At 15:07 +0100 22/10/02, Roland Perry wrote:
>>So what you are really saying is that courts are doing a bad job testing
>>the evidence put in front of them?
>>
>One problem with oversight by courts or a commissioner is that whereas they
>can reasonably determine whether the evidence justifies intrusion, it is
>very much harder to determine whether the right people are being targeted
>especially if some of the targeting is on the basis of informers or
>anonymous tip-offs.
>
>If a bent copper (or Trading Standards Officer, etc.) has a list of
>phone-numbers, internet accounts or similar with good reason for them to be
>investigated, there will be very little to stop them slipping in an extra
>one of personal interest.  If queried, this can be passed off as a mistake.
>The courts and the commissioner stand next to no chance of detecting this,
>as they lack the information necessary to do so.  However if the subjects
>of the intrusion are ultimately informed, this may reveal to them (for
>example) how their ex found out who they were seeing, giving them the
>opportunity to complain accordingly.
>
>I worry that the Home Office in considering how useful these powers will
>against criminals are failing to consider how useful they may be TO
>criminals, and hence how important it is to ensure that they are properly
>regulated.

 Does anyone have any practical experience of the Police National 
 Computer and how the system (fails to ?) work on improper accesses,
 that might cast some light on the present debate?

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