Striking the Right Balance between Privacy and Public Protect ion

Ian G Batten I.G.Batten at ftel.co.uk
Tue, 22 Oct 2002 17:53:54 +0100


On Tue, 22 Oct 2002, Watkin Simon wrote:
> > The only logical purpose that RIP seems to 
> > serve is to keep mass surveilance of the public general going.
> 
> Not sure I can follow the logic.  Who does all this mass surveiling and why
> are they doing it?

Echelon.  ``Because they can''.  Government holds personal privacy as
existing only to shield criminal or subversive activity, and genuinely
believes that those with nothing to hide have nothing to fear.  However,
then their personal privacy is at state, they shout so loud you need
earplugs.  As Ross Anderson points out, data security in the NHS is a
sick joke, and the MMR vaccination status of my children is something
that is unlikely to be kept secure.  When it's the Prime Minister's
child, the game is suddenly very different indeed, and information the
government does nothing to secure --- and wants to be able to enforce
collection from GPs --- is close to a state secret.

If the government don't want the power to engage in mass surveillance,
why did your department, without (you say) the knowledge of the Home
Secretary, publish a statutory instrument which essentially gave them
that power?  Your explanation is that a major government department,
filled with all those people with double starred firsts in PPE (and the
guy I know in the cabinet office is without doubt one of the cleverest
people I've ever met), ``blundered''.  I'm sorry, but I think you need
to do better than that.

> > I do hope that 
> > Simon is reporting the whole discussion back to others. What is 
> > needed is a change of attitude amongst those that are supposed to 
> > serve us, but in reality lord it over us.
> 
> Attitudinal change works both ways.

How?  You happily say that the ``blunder'' had nothing to do with
elected officials.  How can we change the attitudes of the Home Office,
if you and other civil servants can bypass the Home Secretary and
publish statutory instruments without his involvement?  What possible
reason is there to believe that the Home Office wants other than massive
powers of unwarranted (in both senses) interception, when they publish
documents arrogating to themselves precisely that power?

If you want me to believe in your bona fides, give me a reason.  Who
blundered?  Why?  What happened to them?  What lessons were learnt?
Will someone who has been elected be involved in the next iteration?

ian