ZA approves RIP analog

[Roland Perry]

In message
<AFB26DF151B3D511BB2B009027C2C7A90BBB98@controller1.ukerna.ac.uk>,
Andrew Cormack <A.Cormack@ukerna.ac.uk> writes
>As far as I know the discussion on this list exhausted the issue - I'm
>convinced that any scanning system that doesn't pass content to a human is
>lawful - but I don't know whether the final version of the guidance will
>still contain that unfortunate statement.

Having now spoken to one of the officials who set the policy behind
RIPA, that's what they intended. They never thought of the situation
where a corporate person "made available" the data to himself.

Nevertheless, going by the wording of the Act, it's lawful. (Although
from a common sense point of view, you can argue that an intermediate
virus checker is the intended recipient of an email sent to a subscriber
whose email system is known to include one... but perhaps that can of
worms is best left unopened.)

The only 'difficulty' this leaves is that all email (and by analogy of
eavesdropping technology built into both the public PSTN and a corporate
PBX all voice calls) are subjected to legal interception.

All we need now is a different name for what NTAC does....

ps. I very much appreciate the input in the adjacent thread, and will
attempt to answer the various points made as soon as I can.
-- 
             Roland Perry | tel: +44 20 7645 3505 | roland@linx.org
Director of Public Policy | fax: +44 20 7645 3529 | http://www.linx.net
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