Highlights from the Interception Commissioner's report

[Ian Brown]

On 31/10/02, Sir Swinton wrote:
http://www.official-documents.co.uk/document/deps/hc/hc1243/1243.pdf

"I have been very impressed by the quality and the dedication and the
enthusiasm of the personnel carrying out [interception]" (s.6)

He was also impressed by the care of the authorising Secretaries of State
and the Communication Service Providers. (s.8 and s.9)

Those silly paranoid citizens! "Many members of the public are suspicious
about the interception of communications, and some believe that their own
conversations are subject to unlawful interception by the security,
intelligence or law enforcement agencies. To an extent this may be
understandable, because people do tend to be suspicious of what takes place
in secret, and are worried by the 'big brother' concept. Interception for
lawful purposes, of course, and inevitably, takes place in secret. In my
oversight work I am conscious of these concerns. However, I am as satisfied
as I can be that the concerns are, in fact, unfounded." (s.10)

Although some citizens don't seem to believe him: "The Investigatory Powers
Tribunal received 102 new [complaints] from the day of its formation on 2
October 2000 to the end of December 2001." (s.65)

Maybe they aren't quite as paranoid as Sir Swinton appears to believe: "A
significant number of errors and breaches have been reported to me during
the course of the year - 43 in all." (s.67)

Here are some of the more interesting errors and breaches:

GCHQ: "the target had cancelled his mobile telephone and, as is normal
practice, the CSP held the number in 'storage' for four months before
reallocating it to a new subscriber. A period of unlawful interception
therefore took place. There were, in total, 184 intercepts of this number:
none were looked at by GCHQ and none were transcribed." (s.77)

Northern Ireland: "The second [mistake] was a report of a breach of security
for which the Northern Ireland Office was not responsible and which is
detailed more fully in the confidential annex. This is currently the subject
of an investigation by the Belfast Special Branch." (s.79).

NCIS: "officers became aware of a new mobile telephone number for the
target. A modification to the new warrant to add this mobile telephone was
obtained and interception commenced. However, it became clear from the first
call intercepted that the telephone was not in the possession of the target.
An investigation revealed that the telephone number of one of the
investigating police officers was forwarded to be included in the
modification rather than the target’s number. The interception was suspended
and monitoring ceased. The wrong number was cancelled with the PTO and the
correct number added to the warrant. Unlawful interception occurred for less
than one day and arose out of human error." (s.81)

Finally, Sir Swinton is obviously a master of understatement:

"The Home Office sees no particular disadvantages flowing from RIPA." (s.23)
(David Blunkett might disagree, at least where his career prospects are
concerned.)

"Chapter II of Part I is not yet in force. It was anticipated that it would
come into force in October 2001, but for various reasons the commencement
date has had to be postponed." (s.58)