"Palladium" and TCPA

[Ben Laurie]

David Wagner wrote:
> Graham Murray  wrote:
> 
>>So should DRM be an application rather than OS issue. Would it not be
>>a better idea to have some form of (strong) encryption[1] on files,
>>have no technical mechanism for restricting copying them, but have to
>>"prove" that you are authorised (to whatever level) before the
>>application will decrypt the file?
> 
> 
> Better for whom?  Content providers would likely consider this as
> providing insufficient security for their high-value digital content
> (and reasonably so, in my mind).  Keep in mind that, in your proposal,
> one rogue consumer can spread infinitely many copies of the content in
> unencrypted form.  This is unlikely to be acceptable to content providers.

Not to mention that unless the OS (and hence the hardware) secures the 
application, you can "prove" authorisation with a debugger.

Cheers,

Ben.

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