A dead duck? (Was RIP s22 notices SI)

[Matthew Byng-Maddick]

On Tue, Jun 18, 2002 at 04:09:09PM +0100, Owen Lewis wrote:
> Now, in personal terms, I have felt for a long time that the goals of most
> privacy activists, worthy though they might be, were either unrealistic or
> unattainable - basically because of a lack of general knowledge of and

No.

> interest in the issues at stake by the general public. Also, unlike some
> privacy campaigners, I *know* that the security and well-being of a people
> requires that the people's government can, from time to time and when

No. There are things that the government perhaps ought to keep secret, but
I think this smells a bit like post-facto rationalisation. If you're going
to have covert ops, you don't enshrine it in law.

> properly authorised, access communications data and, where possible, the

The RIPA extends the meaning of ``properly authorised'', and this is the
entire problem.

> content of communications. In this country, with only minority opinion
> against it, we adopted our Regulation of Investigatory  Practices Act 2000.

The only reason that ``minority opinion'' was the case is that it was
rushed through in a debate at 10 o'clock at night, the night before the
Easter Recess, and hence many MPs had headed to their constituencies, and
were not present at the debate.

> Despite the fuss in some quarters, the truth is that this was little more
> than tidying up and placing under the law what had been occurring informally
> for many years. A few people knew this but many, I think, sensed the truth

I don't agree. It allowed for legal principles which presumed you were
guilty (not something that had been occurring, either formally or informally)
and provided for gagging orders in explaining to others that your connections
were being intercepted. It also allows for less review in intercepting
communications (things that had been judiciary are now authorised with a
lot less), and it has allowed for this whole row about the traffic data.

All in all, I think it's pretty obviously a dreadful piece of legislation.

> of it as a matter of commonsense. We Brits have no written constitution and

Bollocks! Most people didn't know and didn't care what cryptography *WAS*.
A large number of them present the bogus argument of "If I have nothing to
hide, then no one will look for me", which is an obviously bogus argument,
analogous, in my opinion, to "I don't need to patch my server, because no
one is going to hack it", which, I hope you will agree is false.

> have been accustomed to and generally comfortable with many informal
> arrangements.

Do you *really* trust the security services and the police? Fully? Are
you absolutely happy with them knowing who you called and when, and who
called you? As an ex-Army Communications Officer, you're probably under
more surveillance than most, I mean, after all, you might divulge state
secrets, and put "National Security" in jeopardy.

> What we now have in the UK with this damned Draft Order is an attempt to
> massively increase the dominance of government at all levels - including
> some which are not democratically accountable - over the citizens. This, in

This is already the case in the legislation. I don't believe the old MIx
departments are ``democratically accountable''. And certainly, recent events
have seemed to suggest that ministers don't appear to be particularly
either.

> my view is dangerous and actually reduces rather than serves the well-being
> of the people. Now, that's the intellectual argument and I don't think it
> will 'sell' to the man in the street any more than any of the earlier
> attempts have.

Yes. People seem to be unable to understand that just because Tony Blair
looks like a grinning loony, he's not actually, and in reality he's quite
dangerous. Even if you don't consider that, the actions of empowering the
governments in this way enable future governments to abuse such privileges
with impunity.

> What I hope the difference here may be is that, when it is drawn to their
> attention, people from all walks of life will react with irritation against
> this enormous extension of intrusion into their affairs. This is why I think
> a simple analogy with one's local council being empowered to decide when,
> for how long and for what purpose it will stare in through your
> bedroom/bathroom window is a good one. It is, pretty exactly, the sense of
> irritation and 'You get the hell out of here!' that one may be able to
> conjure up for the many with no interest in the abstracts of electronic
> privacy per se.

I'm not sure that you're correct about this. The analogy is false, anyway,
as it's more to do with standing outside your front gate, and watching who
goes in and out of your house, and noting down all the times when you do.
They're not hearing what is discussed, but they're still keeping an eye.
Of course, this data is also what calls you made to whom and when, and
who you sent email to and when. The reason I feel the need to make this
distinction is that the government have already been trying to counter the
accusations of the ``Snoopers' Charter'' as it has come to be referred in
the media, by saying "well, it's only traffic data". It is important that
the public at large feel that this is just as bad as them snooping the
content. As it is, the authority needed to snoop on the content is much
reduced by RIPA2000, which is not a good thing.

> Ah.... as my friends (and some others) would tell you, I'm not a great
> believer in any concept of 'rights'. I do however believe in treating others
> decently and with a minimum interference into their lives and personal
> affairs.

I have the right not to be hassled, if I'm minding my own business. I have
the right not to have a nanny state look over all my affairs if I carry on
my business in a way which doesn't negatively impact on anyone else. I
think the RIPA2000 and the above extension impinges on both of these.

Not to necessarily get at you personally, but I think that having this
state run in the way that an army might be run is probably a bad idea.
Within the army, yes, it's probably important that things are regimented,
and that communications are tracked, and that people are aware of this. In
a state. No.

MBM

-- 
Matthew Byng-Maddick         <mbm@colondot.net>           http://colondot.net/