US Mass Market Crypto Exportable

[Owen Lewis]

> -----Original Message-----
> From: ukcrypto-admin@chiark.greenend.org.uk
> [mailto:ukcrypto-admin@chiark.greenend.org.uk]On Behalf Of Ian Brown
> Sent: 10 June 2002 15:39
> To: ukcrypto
> Subject: RE: US Mass Market Crypto Exportable
>
>
> > To prohibit the export to a specific state of certain items but
> > to allow the
> > 'export' to that state of the means to make the prohibition
> nugatory would
> > simply be a nonsense - as the current regulations recognise.
>
> The information required to create an item does not equal "the
> means to make
> the prohibition nugatory", but trying to stop the transfer of information
> given the existence of the Internet certainly is a nonsense.

That may be your view. In my view, to permit provision to a party all that
they need, to make what is otherwise prohibited to supply to them, would be
to render nugatory any prohibition on the supply of finished product. I
think that a variety of states, including ours, share the latter view.

Internet or not, you are quite right when you infer that to make a
regulation by no means ensures that all will comply with it. As a matter of
everyday experience, we all know that it is not so. OTOH, whilst the
majority comply with regulations - and particularly where the penalty for
breach of them is condign - most regulations remain effective to some
greater or lesser extent.

Returning specifically to the embargo on Iraq, as a case in point. The
Security Council of the UN has for many years comprised of 15 members, not
all of whom can be described as friends of the US by any stretch of the
imagination. The original resolution arising from Iraq/Kuwait had no
dissenters and only one abstention - Yemen. If you look at earlier
resolutions prejudicial to Iraq in the context of the Iraq/Iran war, you
will find similar levels of agreement - as with post-1990 resolutions
prejudicial to Iraq.

No, in this matter, if you want to tilt at the rationale and/or the
effectiveness of such resolutions, direct your lance towards the UN and not
at Uncle Sam.

> I claim that the impetus for the prohibition of intangible transfers of
> dual-use technology such as cryptographic code comes not from the UN but
> previous US govt policies.

Most of the detailed argument in this matter have been rehearsed here
before. In this instance, I think that your castigation of the US is open to
question. The logic is as follows:

	-	Neither technology nor products are intrinsically 'good' or 'bad' (though
some here would disagree).

	-	These things are neutral but take on the flavour of the purpose to which
they are put.

	-	The export control (DUEC) of those items which are suited to military use
include many crypto products and crypto science.

	-	Cryptological items which are not suited to and cannot be readily adapted
for military use are specifically exempted from DUEC - as now are mass
market items.

The foregoing is not a recitation of any govts policy but is distilled from
life experience. Military forces exist for the purpose of wholesale killing
when it is required of them. With the skilful conduct of government,
military forces are but infrequently required to fulfil their raison d'etre
but rather spend their time in planning, preparation and training for the
day when they will be called upon to do so. Effective use of ciphers by
military forces will both save lives and enable the most efficient killing
of others. Usually, both ends are effected hand in hand. Whether one finds
the ends 'good' or bad' depends entirely, I suggest, on whether one is being
saved or being killed. When matters reach such a state, I assure you that
philosophy goes out of the window and the overriding aim is to do one's job
and, with as many of one's comrades as possible, to return home safely. In
'peace' all governments, not just Uncle Sam, generally plan and act to see
that, come time of war, as many as possible of its servants shall be able to
return safely.

Owen