Public Anonymity

[Dave Bird]

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In article <B7F9137E.F05C%peter.fairbrother@ntlworld.com>, 
Peter Fairbrother <peter.fairbrother@ntlworld.com> writes:
>> Dave Bird wrote:
>[snip] 
>> We are missing each other here.  Your solution is a way that messages
>> can be adress-hidden in a public place, because all readers of that
>> place download all messages then privately "tune out" what is for them.
>
>That is one PA technique, but there are several more. Stego is one, as are
>public remailers (which remail secretly but not privately, ie it is
>impossible for them to tell what they remailed or who to/from, but they do
>it in public), 

 It may be content-hidden if they have no decrypt key.  They have to 
 know who they got it from and who they sent it to, which of course
 may be other forwarders, but then the input remailer would know
 the true sender and the output remailer would know where it was
 sending to (which might be an alt.anonymous.messages type setup).
 
 How do you mean secretly but not privately? How does it work??

>or any system where the recipient or sender cannot be
>identified, eg the use of internet cafes or public libraries with hotmail
>accounts, or reception of radio signals (or even snailmail when Post Office
>boxes can't all be monitored).

 A sending or receiving place which is "the village bike", anyone
 can use it.  Right.  As in using phoneboxes to send, and a nominated
 phonebox to receive; or using lots of different pay-as-you-go mobiles. 
 
>
>> My solution is that the blockade is broken by some stations defying
>> the ban and being honest and proper with information they forward
>> despite the mandated dishonesty... either because they are out of
>> reach, or because there are too many of them to attack effectively.
>
>mandated _honesty_, do you mean?

 No, I mean the governement is mandating them to swindle their users;
 if I meant "openness" or "disclosure" I would have used such a term.
>
>One problem with this is that users have to trust someone else, over whom
>they have no control, to act dishonestly in their favour, and not in favour
                              honestly
>of the FBI etc. 

>Another is if the system is broken by compromise of the
>remailers it is not obvious.
                                         True.  
>
>A third is that it may become even harder to find trustable people to do
>this in the present climate, cf the closure of the ZK anonymity service, and
>disclosure orders being served on remailers such as penet. The FBi are
>installing Carnivore as fast as they can, and laws to prevent/control
>anonymous remailers are being discussed.
                                          Understood.
>
>With PA systems neither of the first two applies, and when the third applies
>it can be gotten around (sometimes). The main problem is that PA systems for
>internet use are not yet well-developed, which is why I trying to promote
>and develop them.

 I'd be interested in learning more of the basic theory, if I am not
 wasting other readers' time.
 

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