FW: AL Digital Acquires Second Nuclear Bunker

David Hansen davidh at spidacom.co.uk
Mon, 1 Oct 2001 15:46:41 +0100


On 1 Oct 2001 at 3:02, John Doe Number Two wrote:

> PRESS RELEASE
> The Bunker and The Other Bunker were designed and built during the
> Cold War as physically secure communications centres. Both offer the
> ultimate in protection from a myriad of attacks including; crackers,
> terrorist attack, electro-magnetic pulse, HERF weapons, electronic
> eavesdropping and solar flares.

Nonsense.

As someone who (in a previous career) designed, built and maintained such buildings I'm fed up 
of such writing spouted by PR companies and others.

Such a building will provide a level of protection against some of the forms of attack listed. 
However, like any other form of protection, that protection is not ultimate. The protection provided 
depends on the installation design, maintenance and operation.

For example, a terrorist attack could take many forms, groups of people on foot for example. I 
doubt whether these buildings will have troops to resist groups of attackers from getting close. 
Doors (and I have seen some very impressive doors) can always be opened with suitable tools 
and time, or bypassed if that is easier. Unless the buildings are run in closed down mode all the 
time (expensive on electricity and filters, not the way to attract staff due to the limited air) a 
simple gas attack on the air inlets would disable the building easily anyway.

While these buildings undoubtedly provide a far more secure environment than the typical tin 
shed (with or without single-skin block walls) that most "secure" computer spaces are inside, it is 
deceitful to talk about "the ultimate protection". By all means the company should offer the 
service, but they should not mis-sell what they offer.

There is no such thing as a physically secure building. Even the most important military 
headquarters in "the west", which are still in use for their original purpose, can be destroyed by a 
suitable attack.

Yes, I have pointed this out to the company before in private.


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