Excerpts from leaked Draft ECHELON EP Ctte report

[Owen Lewis]

> -----Original Message-----
> From: ukcrypto-admin@chiark.greenend.org.uk
> [mailto:ukcrypto-admin@chiark.greenend.org.uk]On Behalf Of Caspar Bowden
> Sent: 24 May 2001 10:14
> To: Ukcrypto (E-mail)
> Subject: Excerpts from leaked Draft ECHELON EP Ctte report
>
>
>
> http://fas.org/irp/program/process/europarl_draft.pdf
>
> pp.19	The practical implication for the ECHELON states (the
> alliance formed
> for the purposes of interception) is that communications can be
> intercepted
> at acceptable cost only at the terminals of the underwater cables
> which land
> on their territory. Essentially, therefore, they can only tap incoming or
> outgoing cable communications! In other words, their ACCESS TO CABLE
> COMMUNICATIONS IN EUROPE IS RESTRICTED TO THE TERRITORY OF THE UNITED
> KINGDOM, since hitherto internal communications have mostly been
> transmitted
> via the domestic cable network.


It's hard to get the true meaning of this out from behind the polemic
(perhaps this was the intention).

What cables land in the UK? Mainly transatlantic ones ISTR. What about the
Mediterranean cables that land in Italy and France?. What about the mass of
EU land cables, microwave shots and satellite links?

They need to do be rather more concise than this, I think.


> pp.20	A small proportion of intra-European communications are routed VIA A
> SWITCH IN LONDON TO WHICH THE BRITISH MONITORING STATION GCHQ HAS ACCESS.
> The majority of communications do not leave the continent: for
> example, more
> than 95% of German Internet communications are routed via a switch in
> Frankfurt.

These, of course, are subject to monitoring by the French, Italian, Spanish,
German and other national agencies. The extent to which they may choose to
trade (like schoolboys swapping fag cards) all or some of their take, under
bi-lateral or some other arrangements, is to remain a matter of conjecture?

> pp.51 If a Member State were to promote the use of an interception system,
> which was also used for industrial espionage, by allowing its own
> intelligence service to operate such a system or by giving foreign
> intelligence services access to its territory for this purpose, IT WOULD
> UNDOUBTEDLY CONSTITUTE A BREACH OF EC LAW. Under Article 10 TEC,
> the Member
> States are committed to acting in good faith and, in particular, from
> abstaining from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the
> objectives of the Treaty.

Well, that's good to know. And when is France to be arraigned for bugging
all the first class seats in its state own and state controlled national
airline? That will do for a start, no need to mention  the quaint practice
of attending closely to the security requirements of guests in the VIP
suites of French five star hotels.

> pp.53 Privacy thus enjoys special protection: potential violations are
> authorised only following analysis of the legal considerations and in
> accordance with the principle of proportionality. The ECHELON states are
> also well aware of the problem. However, these states' PROTECTION
> PROVISIONS
> ARE GEARED TO RESPECT FOR THE PRIVACY OF THEIR OWN INHABITANTS,
> so that as a
> rule European citizens do not benefit from them in any way. For
> example, the
> US provisions which lay down the conditions governing electronic
> surveillance DO NOT SET THE STATE'S INTEREST IN OPERATING A PROPERLY
> FUNCTIONING INTELLIGENCE SERVICE AGAINST THE INTERESTS OF
> EFFECTIVE, GENERAL
> PROTECTION FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, BUT RATHER AGAINST THE NEED TO PROTECT THE
> PRIVACY OF 'US PERSONS'

That really is a bit turgid. Must have been drafted by a German. States make
laws that apply to all within their jurisdiction except by exception. The
exceptions in US law are up front. In French and German law they may not be
so obvious but they are there, so I believe.

>
> pp.58	...must comply with a set of conditions in order to demonstrate that
> the activities of their intelligence services are compatible with
> Article 8
> of the ECHR. IT IS QUITE OBVIOUS THAT INTELLIGENCE SERVICES CANNOT BE
> ALLOWED TO CIRCUMVENT THESE REQUIREMENTS BY EMPLOYING ASSISTANCE
> FROM OTHER
> INTELLIGENCE SERVICES subject to less stringent rules.

Oh dear, and fag card swapping is such a popular pastime.
>
> pp.59 If a state allows another countrys intelligence service to work on
> its territory...MUST CARRY OUT CHECKS TO ENSURE THAT THE ACTIVITIES OF
> INTELLIGENCE SERVICES ON THEIR TERRITORY DO NOT REPRESENT A VIOLATION OF
> HUMAN RIGHTS.

Q. Have you had, do you have or will you have a formed intention to violate
human rights?
A. No.
Response: That's all right then.
>
> Under the terms of the ECHR, interference in the exercise of the right to
> privacy may only be carried out on the basis of legal rules which are
> generally accessible and whose implications for individuals are
> foreseeable.
> This requirement can be met only if the USA DISCLOSES TO THE PUBLIC IN
> EUROPE HOW AND UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES INTELLIGENCE-GATHERING IS CARRIED
> OUT. If incompatibilities with the ECHR emerge, US rules must be brought
> into line with the level of protection provided in Europe.

I find the last phrase positively droll.
>
> pp.61 The American authorities have repeatedly tried to justify the
> interception of telecommunications by accusing the European authorities of
> corruption and taking bribes2.

Which a few do.

> It should be pointed out to the Americans
> that all EU Member States have properly functioning criminal justice
> systems.

In which case, why do they condone it?

> ...US telecommunications surveillance operations carried out on European
> territory are consistent with human rights only if the USA introduces
> appropriate, effective checks on such operations carried out for
> the purpose
> of safeguarding its national security or if the NSA MAKES ITS
> OPERATIONS ON
> EUROPEAN TERRITORY SUBJECT TO THE AUTHORITY OF THE CONTROL BODIES
> SET UP BY
> THE HOST STATE, i.e. Germany or the United Kingdom.

Well, it would cut down on the need to swap fag cards if one party was just
allowed to grab a handful from the other whenever it liked.

> Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC)3,...Unlike the monitoring
> committees set up by other states, which are generally elected by the
> national parliament or appointed by the Speaker of that
> parliament, they are
> appointed by the Prime Minister after consulting the Leader of the
> Opposition.

My ribs hurt. I can't take much more of this.

> pp.67 Moreover, the issue of the protection of European citizens will be
> placed in an entirely new context when, under a common security
> policy, the
> first moves are made towards cooperation among the Member States
> intelligence services. Citizens will then look to the European
> institutions
> to adopt adequate protection provisions. The European Parliament, as an
> advocate of constitutional principles, will then have the task of lobbying
> for the powers it needs, as a democratically elected body, to carry out
> appropriate monitoring. In this connection, the European Parliament will
> also be required to establish conditions under which the confidential
> processing of sensitive data of this kind and other secret documents by a
> special committee whose members are bound by a duty of discretion can be
> guaranteed. Only once these conditions have been met will it be realistic,
> and, with a view to EFFECTIVE COOPERATION AMONG INTELLIGENCE SERVICES  THE
> SINE QUA NON OF A SERIOUS COMMON SECURITY POLICY  responsible, to
> press for
> these monitoring rights.

They need to grow up.

There is 'effective cooperation', of a case by case, fag card swapping kind.
More requires an integration of aims and operations that simple cannot
(should not, must not) come before there is a strong and effective structure
of federal government in place and coherent and unitary foreign and federal
domestic security policies thoroughly developed and implemented.

> pp.83 E-MAILS CAN AND SHOULD BE ENCRYPTED BY EVERYONE. THE OFT-REPEATED
> CLAIM THAT A PERSON HAS NO SECRETS AND THUS HAS NO NEED TO
> ENCRYPT MESSAGES
> MUST BE COUNTERED BY POINTING OUT THAT WRITTEN MESSAGES ARE NOT NORMALLY
> SENT ON POSTCARDS. However, an unencrypted e-mail is nothing other than a
> letter without an envelope. The encryption of e-mails is secure and
> relatively straightforward and user-friendly systems, such as
> PGP/GnuPG, are
> already available, even free of charge, to private individuals on the
> Internet. Unfortunately, they are not yet sufficiently widely distributed.
> The public authorities should set a good example and themselves employ
> encryption as a standard practice in order to demystify the process.

PK ZIP secures information better than does a paper envelope. To pretend
differently is simply dishonest or ignorant. There are good arguments for
encryption; this is not one of them. This detracts from the credibility of
the group that promulgates it.

> pp.84 the European Security and Defence Initiative. This
> initiative aims at
> the creation of a multinational force of between 50 000 and 60
> 000 troops by
> the second half of 2003. THE EXISTENCE OF SUCH A MULTINATIONAL FORCE WILL
> MAKE THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN AUTONOMOUS INTELLIGENCE CAPACITY
> INEVITABLE.

Quite so. Now, for the love of sweet Jesus, get an effective and
authoritative governmental structure in place first, before someone gets
hurt!

> IT IS INCONCEIVABLE THAT THE
> INTELLIGENCE SERVICES WILL BE THE LAST AND ONLY AREA NOT AFFECTED BY THE
> PROCESS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION.

Au contraire, it is essential that such integration be among the very last
of the steps. Those who argue otherwise are dangerous through either
ignorance or malice.

> pp.88 That a system for intercepting communications exists, operating by
> means of cooperation proportionate to their capabilities among
> the USA, the
> UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, IS NO LONGER IN DOUBT. It has been
> established that this system is operated on the basis of the UKUSA
> Agreement.

That a system for intercepting communications exists, operating by
means of cooperation proportionate to their capabilities and national
desires
between many countries including most of the EU (I make an honourable
exception for Luxembourg) is certainly not in doubt.


Conclusions:

	1. This document, if genuine, is partisan and is substantially either
politically and intellectually dishonest or extraordinarily ignorant.

	2. It is not possible to disentangle the dishonesty from the ignorance.
This is likely not to be coincidental.

	3. Whether through dishonesty or ignorance, its aims are dangerous in so
far as they aim to bring into being powerful forces before there is an
effective and unitary government in place to control them. This must lead
directly either to the castration of such forces or risk their unwise use
under less than certain democratic control. Neither option is in any way
acceptable.

	4. Intentionally or otherwise, this document if taken seriously by any, is
only mischief making. It needs to me filed and brought forward again in
revised and refined form at a time when the requisite unitary political
structures are either in place or, at the very least, there is a quorum of
states that have a detailed agreement as to how to work within such a
federated structure.

	5 The current form of European Parliament needs to concentrate more on the
activities of all its current and aspirant member states before it tries to
remove the mote from the eye of any other. It may be little more than a sign
of its weakness and ineffectuality that it chooses not to do so and prefers
to issue documents such as this. It is certainly to its shame that it
chooses to do so.

	6. It does nothing towards the creation of a stronger, more secure and
unified Europe.


I am still a European federalist. Dangerous rubbish like this is sufficient
to make one consider one's position. Documents such as this risk giving
federalism an unjustifiably bad name.

Owen