Forms of identity (Was RE: Open versus closed PKI systems)
Adam Shostack
adam at homeport.org
Thu, 17 May 2001 09:43:55 -0400
On Thu, May 17, 2001 at 01:34:49PM +0100, Julian T. J. Midgley wrote:
| To put it another way, would you rather they did not check your passport,
| and so allowed a known terrorist on to the flight with you, when a
| passport check might have stopped him?
Yes. The passport check is incredibly unlikely to stop a terrorist.
Even a known terrorist, travelling, is unlikely to be carrying a
bomb. The current methodology seems to be giving unsuspecting
tourists bombs, because someone who knows they are carrying one tends
to act a little funny.*
I'd prefer that the extra bit of time be spent with higher quality
technical countermeasures (xrays, nitrate sniffers) and applying those
to service personell than looking at passports. Quality passports
only cost a few thousand dollars.
Adam
(Speaking of people carrying bombs and acting funny, see
http://www.theonion.com/onion3632/terrorist_annoyed.html)
--
"It is seldom that liberty of any kind is lost all at once."
-Hume