PGP and HMG

[Q G Campbell]

> -----Original Message-----
> From: David_Biggins@usermgmt.com [mailto:David_Biggins@usermgmt.com]=20
> Sent: 08 May 2001 08:59
> To: ukcrypto@chiark.greenend.org.uk
> Subject: RE: PGP and HMG
>=20
>=20
> I'd be slightly kinder to HMG here (I know, it's against my nature,
> but...)
>=20
> Here is one suggestion of several I could offer:
[snip]

Another suggestion is that HMG have adopted an unspoken policy of key
recovery for encryption systems carrying the bulk of inter-departmental
message traffic and would prefer not to have to acknowledge this.

While on this topic, does anyone have information on the current state
of development within the US Administration of its stated policy on the
adoption of key recovery within federal government? Denning in her book
"Information Warfare and Security" [*] refers to thirteen pilot projects
being selected to test key recovery in federal systems.=20


[*] Information Warfare and Security, Dorothy E. Denning, ACM Press,
    1999, ISBN 0-201-43303-6, pp413.

  =20
Quentin
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    =20