PGP and HMG

[Owen Lewis]

-----Original Message-----
From: ukcrypto-admin@chiark.greenend.org.uk
[mailto:ukcrypto-admin@chiark.greenend.org.uk]On Behalf Of Werner Koch
Sent: 04 May 2001 13:26
To: ukcrypto@chiark.greenend.org.uk
Subject: Re: PGP and HMG

On Fri, 4 May 2001, Ben Laurie wrote:

> As well as relying on crypto that is not yet mature!

Do you mean AES?  Well the _recipient_ can choose the symmetric
algorithm a sender has to choose.  Do you think that 3-DES is not
matured?

	For over twenty years, it has been generally appreciated that, with a 56
bit key, DES was vulnerable to a brute force attack (albeit there were few
with computational power necessary to exploit the weakness). A 3 DES
implementation, the current method of choice for overcoming the 56 bit key
limitation to DES security, could have been implemented by any from the
publication of DES. Yet it was only when advances in computational power
substantially broadened to a commonplace the number of organisations with a
capability to crack DES enciphered traffic that 3-DES came into use. 3-DES
received backing from USG as a means of extending the common usage of DES.
Discuss?
Owen


ciao,

  Werner


--
Werner Koch        Omnis enim res, quae dando non deficit, dum habetur
g10 Code GmbH      et non datur, nondum habetur, quomodo habenda est.
Privacy Solutions                                        -- Augustinus