Regina v Loveridge

[Donald ramsbottom]

From Todays Times Law report. As ever ignore if you do not like law.

In this one illegal video evidence was admitted at trial. The silly thing
is that the other evidence was said to be "overwhelming" so why allow dodgy
evidence in, in the first place. Still it is another example where an LEA
does not abide by the statutory rules or codes of practice, and the courts
have chosen to endorse rather than censure. It does not lead to confidence
in the system or the Laws enacted by Parliament and their associated
"safeguards".  TA,RIPA, and a host of other Acts discussed on this list all
have watchdogs, safeguards and CoPs, but this sort of decision shows how
little weight is actually attached to these things.

The only way to stop this sort of abuse is ensure that any dodgy evidence
is excluded from any trial, and even if the remaining evidence is
"overwhelming" quash any conviction which is tainted by "illegal" evidence.
How can the state expect citizens to abide by its laws when it openly
flouts them and gets away with it.? Real life I suppose, ho hum.





Regina v Loveridge (William) Regina v Lee (Charles
Sonny) Regina v Loveridge (Christine)
Before Lord Woolf, Lord Chief Justice, Mr Justice Douglas
Brown and Mr Justice Astill
Judgment April 11, 2001
Secret filming by the police of defendants in the cell area of a
magistrates' court was unlawful and a breach of their right to
privacy which, since it was not in accordance with the law, could
not be justified. However, a judge had been entitled to admit the
film in evidence at the defendants' trial as it had not interfered with
the fairness of the trial.

The Court of Appeal, Criminal Division, so held in a reserved
judgment dismissing the appeals of William Loveridge, Charles
Sonny Lee and Christine Loveridge against their convictions at
Teesside Crown Court (Judge Briggs and a jury) on March 9,
2000 for robbery and taking a motor vehicle without consent.

Mr Martyn Levett for William Loveridge; Mr Roderick Hunt for
Lee; Mr Colin Aylott for Christine Loveridge, all assigned by the
Registrar of Criminal Appeals; Mr Peter Johnson for the Crown.

THE LORD CHIEF JUSTICE, giving the judgment of the court,
said that the principal issue raised by the applications for leave to
appeal against conviction arose out of the fact that the police had
arranged for the Loveridge defendants to be filmed by a video
camera, without their knowledge, while they were at a magistrates'
court.

The purpose of that was to be able to compare those pictures with
pictures which had been taken earlier by closed circuit television
cameras, so as to connect the defendants with the robbery.

The film taken at the court was admitted in evidence and used by
an expert called by the Crown to establish that the Loveridge
defendants were pictured on the video film taken by the closed
circuit television cameras.

In support of their contention that the evidence should not have
been admitted, the defendants relied upon their right to respect for
their private life under article 8 of the European Convention on
Human Rights.

They also relied on the fact that they were filmed at the court
contrary to section 41 of the Criminal Justice Act 1925, which
prohibits photography in court, and Codes D4.1 and D4.2 of the
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (s.66) Codes of
Practice and section 78 of the 1984 Act.

The defendants had expressed a willingness to stand on an
identification parade but had been told there would be no
identification procedures.

The judge had overruled the defendants' submissions and had
allowed the evidence to be given. He had, however, considered
that the video pictures taken at the magistrates' court probably
contravened section 41 of the 1925 Act.

The judge did not consider that the taking of the photographs was
conduct which should be approved of or be encouraged but he felt
no unfairness was caused which operated so as to adversely affect
the fairness of the proceedings.

Admissibility of video recordings The language of section 41
was very wide. The prosecution would have liked to argue that the
language of the section should not be applied to video recordings
but agreed that it would be strange if the section applied to a single
photograph and not to filming which would have a more serious
impact on the administration of justice than the taking of a still
photograph.

Obviously when the Act was passed in 1925, video cameras were
not in contemplation. However, their Lordships had no doubt that
the section should be applied in a way which took into account the
modern developments in photography.

Accordingly, their Lordships had come to the conclusion that a
filming which took place at the court contravened section 41. The
conduct was therefore unlawful.

The defendants had also placed reliance upon Code D on the
practice for the identification of persons by police officers.

The prosecution had submitted that the necessary authority had
been obtained to comply with Code D4.2 (taking a photograph of
an arrested person without consent). The evidence that that was
the position was not entirely satisfactory.

However, if there was any defect in relation to compliance with
Code D, it would be of a technical nature. The defendants would
not have been prejudiced and their Lordships agreed with the
judge that there had been no unfairness involved.

That left the defendants' reliance on the Human Rights Act 1998.
Article 8 of the Convention provided a right to respect for private
and family life. It was argued that to film the Loveridge defendants
as happened here was an infringement of article 8.

Although the court was a public place, where the defendants were
photographed was part of the building where members of the
public did not have access.

It had always been the position at common law, that a prisoner
retained all his rights as a citizen other than those which were
inconsistent with his status as a prisoner. The position was no
different with regard to someone who was in custody awaiting
trial.

Quite apart from the provisions of the 1925 Act, their Lordships
were of the opinion that it was not desirable for filming to take
place within the precinct of a court for the purposes of assisting the
defendants' prosecution.

A court should be a building to which those who had been, or
might be charged could attend without concerns as to activities of
that nature. Their Lordships would therefore readily conclude that
the conduct complained of infringed article 8.1.

In any event, secret filming in a place to which the public had free
access could amount to an infringement even where there was no
private element to the events filmed.

Secret filming was considered objectionable, because it was not
open to those who were the subject of the filming to take any
action to prevent it: see R v Broadcasting Standards
Commission, Ex parte British Broadcasting Corporation (The
Times April 12, 2000; (2000) 3 WLR 1327).

Article 8.2 provided an exception where the interference was for
the prevention of disorder or crime. However, it was a
requirement of article 8.2 that the interference should be in
accordance with the law.

The filming was contrary to law. Their Lordships therefore had no
hesitation in coming to the conclusion that there had been a breach
of article 8.

However, so far as the outcome of the appeal was concerned, the
breach of article 8 was only relevant if it interfered with the right of
the defendants to a fair hearing.

Giving full weight to the breach of the Convention, their Lordships
were satisfied that the contravention of article 8 did not interfere
with the fairness of the hearing. The judge had been entitled to rule
as he did. The position was the same so far as section 78 of the
1984 Act was concerned.

Collectively the evidence of the involvement of each of the
defendants was overwhelming. Their Lordships were satisfied the
trial was perfectly fair and the convictions were not in any way
unsafe.

Donald Ramsbottom BA LLb (Hons) PGdip
Ramsbottom & Co Solicitors
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