Wired: Echelon Furor Ends in a Whimper

[Brian Gladman]

From: "Peter Fairbrother" <peter.fairbrother@ntlworld.com>
To: <ukcrypto@chiark.greenend.org.uk>
Sent: Sunday, July 22, 2001 9:17 AM
Subject: Re: Wired: Echelon Furor Ends in a Whimper


> > David Wagner at daw@mozart.cs.berkeley.edu wrote:
>
> > Owen Lewis wrote:
> >> The real problem with "universal end to end encryption" is that its
> >> universality must depend on:
> >> a. Universal adoption of a single PKC.
> >
> > I think it might not be so hard as you imagine, in some contexts.
> > Consider what it would take to institute universal end-to-end
> > encryption for cellphones to protect against passive eavesdropping.
> > The technological infrastructure is well within our reach, and it
doesn't
> > require a global PKI where every cellphone user must have a certified
> > public key.
>
>
> Implementing protections against passive-only interception is a bit like
> installing a reinforced, fortified door and leaving the windows unlocked.
It
> might deter the casual passerby from theft but it's not going to seriously
> inconvenience determined thieves. Without meaning to give offence, I
> generally regard honest advocates of such systems as either babes in the
> woods or ********* ******.

Well, I guess that makes me a ********* ****** since I doubt that I am a
'babe in the woods' and I am certainly an advocate of such systems as one
component within our overall security approach.

Of course I agree that other weaknesses can be more important in many threat
scenarios.

    Brian Gladman