trivia

[Owen Lewis]

> -----Original Message-----
> From: ukcrypto-admin@chiark.greenend.org.uk
> [mailto:ukcrypto-admin@chiark.greenend.org.uk]On Behalf Of Adrian
> Midgley
> Sent: 12 July 2001 15:16
> To: ukcrypto@chiark.greenend.org.uk
> Subject: Re: trivia
>
>
> From: Owen Lewis <oml@eloka.demon.co.uk>
>
> >Really? You might be surprised ar what still lurks in the depths of
> the PC
> >on which you created it?
>
> I might be, however I downloaded and compiled Apache shortly after
> deleting it, and routinely defragmenting the drive.  So SQUIDs apart,
> I think it is unlikely to be hanging around by accident.
> Rather more to the point though, it is well known that PGP can encrypt
> messages to the recipient only, and although we are saying in public
> that you have never had the key which was labelled with your identiy,
> and that if it could be found on one of the machines on one of my
> networks this is not because you sent it to me by an unapparent
> channel...

Why *on earth* should I send you my secret key? The fact that there is a
*public* key sculling about with my name on it proves nothing whatsoever and
their masters, if not junior plods and plodesses, understand that. Of did
you destroy the public key as well?

I have had for years a public key that claims its association with Bill
Clinton. Do you suppose that Bill Clinton knows any thing about it? Do you
suppose that a judge is going to take my possession of it as evidence that I
an in secret correspondence with Bill Clinton?

> I don't have to prove that, and under RIPA by the meaning I believe is
> generally agreed on this list _you_ might have to try.
>
> >Besides, you now need to conspire to pervert the course of justice if
> you
> >are going to get a notice served on the recipient.
>
> How so?  Seems to me that it would only be necessary for me to commit
> a crime for you to appear in the list of people with whom I have
> corresponded, encryptedly, and that is not normally described as
> perverting the course of justice.  Alternatively, if somebody else
> perverts or otherwise influences justice, they might trigger that
> notice.  Irritated anyone recently?

Not infrequently and some of them are genuinely to be supped with using a
spoon tied to the end of a long bargepole. However I remain unimpressed by
the threat you hypothecate.

> A local doctor was recently arrested in relation to material in
> storage on his computer, now I know of no reason why anyone should
> connect me to him, since we have few interests in common, however if
> they did for reasons only known to themselves, they might then choose
> to follow that trail onward, might they not.
> And not from my intention.

I think your fears as unnecessary. As I understand it, there must be good
reason to demand a key and no balance of probability that such a demand is
being unreasonably defied.

How is A to put B into such a position inadvertently? I think that if A is
suspected of a serious crime and has been in enciphered correspondence with
B, then B might be asked to deliver up correspondence or key. Fair enough.
There *has* been correspondence and there *is* (or has been) a secret key
that was once in my possession. Were I 'B', I'd have the key and would
deliver as demanded (albeit without the best of grace).

But you suggest something else. That A will create a secret key and destroy
it, using its public twin to send a string of unsolicited correspondence to
B with the intention of having him suffer falsely at the hands of the law.
Whether A is ever able to do this will depend much on the actions of B.

Should you propose that such consequences for B might be brought about by a
single mail (rendering quite limited any reaction by B), I suggest that A
(mens rea already existing from the creation of the false key pair?) before
this point is reached A must elaborate a conspiracy to bring the matter to
the attention of the authorities and have them act upon it.

Wow! A must want B's scalp badly enough to risk a couple of years in jail
for the satisfaction of making waves (for B that still are unlikely to pass
close scrutiny). Or else A's as thick as two short planks and doesn't bother
to consider the chances that his conspiracy will fail.

Since A is clearly of a criminal bent, he should find it direct, certain and
with less possibility of comeback to have B found, intoxicated and in bed
with his strangled wife. If B were a GP, the whole world knows about doctors
and drug abuse and therefore a rich palette of intoxicants makes itself
available and the events all the more credible?

Yes, people will commit crime. Yes some of those who do get away with it but
I think your proposition is definitely high risk. If you think otherwise,
let us depersonalise it, lay out a plot and dissect it here. Start with the
creation of a key pair with the intent to pervert the course of justice.
Next the delivery of an unsolicited mail in furtherance of the conspiracy
(containing does it matter what?). What does A do next to develop his plan?
Say too A has destroyed one or both parts of the key pair created. Was the
public key signed, by whom and do they know A? Is it necessary to buy their
perjured evidence in due course?

For the moment, the one point that comes across out of your proposition is
that it gives yet another reason for why one should ever facilitate
enciphered traffic from strangers. Of course B might find that A was his
partner and that would be rather more tricky to manage. However, there are
enough ideas here for the time being, should you wish to take a scenario
further.

Owen