Why "carnivore" type systems can't be (entirely) open source
Owen Lewis
oml at eloka.demon.co.uk
Wed, 7 Feb 2001 20:24:37 -0000
----- Original Message -----
From: "Brian Gladman" <brg@gladman.plus.com>
To: "UK Crypto Posting" <stevee+brg@slimy.greenend.org.uk>
Sent: 07 February 2001 15:54
Subject: Re: Why "carnivore" type systems can't be (entirely) open source
> To be as precise as possible, I believe that the use of STO to hide a
> security design [*] from those who are to rely on it is overwhelmingly
more
> likely to create a detriment to their security interests than any
> enhancement of them.
>
> [*] the design itself, not the techniques used to achieve it.
>
> This is not absolute - it is the probability that this will work to their
> advantage or disdvantage in practice when averaged over many typical uses
of
> STO. And it is because I believe this probability is so skewed towards
> insecurity that I consider it to be a completely discredited technique
when
> used to hide designs from those who will be asked to rely on them.
Then perhaps the many employees in those departments of many governments
that use use govt ciphers should all consider themselves - their lives in
some instances put deliberately and cynically at risk by their employers.
Somehow, I don't think so :-) In the above, You appear simply to ignore fact
that is inconvenient because it is contrary to your position.
I don't think we can drive this any further. The wheels have fallen off.
> ... (GSM)... In fact making the cipher fully secure
> would help some users but I agree not many. In a sense this was the
biggest
> con trick of all - putting the crypto in was giving an impression of good
> security where there was none.
It provides a good element of privacy. As detailed in other posts, the
complex modulation, TDM and frequency agility in GSM would alone and without
any cipher provide reasonable privacy against amateur earwiggers on grounds
of cost of equipment alone. To provide privacy against 'lesser' govt snoops
(DSS, etc) who are well enough funded to buy a technical solution, the
medium strength crypto assures that they still can't get to listen unless
they are permitted to under due process. Also the likes of (say) Kroll
Associates are well enough heeled to purchase a technical solution if they
wished. The cipher (+STO) has kept such as them out too
>
> > - Despite the conditional nature of the privacy afforded to B
> in
> > GSM, B has flocked en masse to the system and finds that, in the main,
the
> > level of privacy provided suits his need. That you and some others
> > vehemently disagree with B in this matter has not influenced B's desire
to
> > adopt GSM in the least. It is B's wishes and none other than has
> determined
> > both the past success and assured the future of GSM type cellular
wireless
> > telecom system design.
>
> Yes but because it offered a convenient way of communicating, not because
it
> offered any real security.
In my view, not so. TACS/ETACS was convenient (and had better range than
GSM). Joe Soap got very teed off with the pandemic SIM card cloning and the
lack of all privacy. Even with more frequent drop-outs, GSM gave him what he
felt he needed most and he migrated quickly and willingly to GSM. He got the
privacy he felt he needed.
If there is ever a choice between security and
> functionality, the latter will win in the market (now at least).
That is certainly true.
Owen