Identity-based public key cryptography

[Peter Fairbrother]

> M Taylor wrote:
[snip]
> When you combine ID-PKC with the EU Electronic Signature Directive, you
> end up with a system that allows colloborating administrators (or
> administrator if both machines are controlled by the same person as
> it would be in any NHS Trust) can forge a non-reputible advanced
> digital signature. As well under RIP Act, a corrupt law enforcement
> or intelligence agency could force the administrator(s) to reveal
> the private key information, which could be abused to generate
> non-reputable yet forged signatures.

The proposed id-pki isn't a signature scheme. It has no signature function.

In any case, an advanced digital sig needs to be under the sole control of
the signer, this isn't, so it couldn't be used as an advanced digital sig
anyway.

[snip]
> The system suffers from failures in the real world, the CESG
> is being irresponsible towards the people it is suppose to be helping
> by not allowing open access to experts to examine *and criticize*
> the technology, the NDA agressment waives this ability, making it a
> waste of time for me to exaimine the details since if I find a
> weakness I cannot furfill my ethical responsibility to notify the public
> using or considering to use the system of the discovered weakness.

Yeah, same old STOOL (security through obscurity or leglislation) bullshit.
I would have thought they would have known better, but maybe they do... I
can't imagine CESG ever proposing anything that they (or GCHQ) can't break.
And if they can break it, so can we - they aren't _that_ good, or if they
are they won't admit it.

-- Peter Fairbrother