Army signals security & "Clansmen" series radios

Dave Bird ukcrypto at maillist.ox.ac.uk
Fri, 8 Sep 2000 00:32:36 +0100


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In article <002601c01900$6a2555e0$3e0a989e@eloka>, Owen Lewis
<oml@eloka.demon.co.uk> writes
>In the case of a ship one might reason that there is no need to encipher the
>flow of information below the ship's command level (Captain). This may not
>be the case in a land force unit of equivalent size where small fighting
>sub-units and elements of their logistical support will be dispersed over
>many square kilometers.
>
>On what basis would you propose that the variant messages be organised? 


 Hi, Owen, the situation I had envisaged was not the of a land 
 battlefield but situations (a) which are rather more slow-moving
 so more open to infiltration or theft of keys, and (b) where
 the natural means of transmitting information is not listening
 to a shared command frequency but repeated one-to-one transmission
 via repeated individual telegram, courier, or email sending 
 to the various stations.  

 This is more like the situation in the diplomatic service, or 
 in  civil society  with pressure groups  opposed to a foreign
 dictatorships or whatever.  It might also apply at a slightly
 higher level of commanding armies, i.e. national coordination
 to general staff in individual theatres to the extent anything
 is told in common to all theatres [water-marking would then tell
 you which general staff had a spy leaking its material].

 
 The points you make against water-marking also apply in general
 to public key crypto.... it is not best suited to very fluid
 situations, it suits more permanent and stable situations where
 the enemy has time to try compromising individual stations long-term.

 In police terms, there is a separate consideration of public-to-
 police communications. If they expect people to tip them off about
 the activities of terrorists or large scale organised crime, where
 there is a real chance of information leaking back out and killing
 the informant, the provision of public keys at suitable central
 points might be a very good idea.


 The point is well-made that the communication system should be tailor
 made to the flows of information expected in the particular case
 [and, of course, the transmission channels available].


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