SFS2000

Michael Bacon MBacon at snci.co.uk
Thu, 23 Mar 2000 11:24:17 -0000


> -----Original Message-----
> From: Richard Clayton [mailto:richard@turnpike.com]
> Sent: 23 March 2000 09:52
> To: UKcrypto@maillist.ox.ac.uk
> Subject: Re: SFS2000
> 
[snip]
> 
> The other practical point I was making was that it is inherently more
> straightforward to intercept in the Telco domain than in the 
> ISP domain.
> 
> There is only one phone line from the house to the exchange - but as
> soon as the traffic enters the IP domain it will have arrived on many
> different "modem" banks, travel redundant routes and will be mixed in
> with a very great deal of other traffic. 

I agree, assuming a BT (style) local loop, only noting that where the "phone
line" is a cable serving a community the problem _tends_ back to the ISP
(type).

> The only time you cannot
> intercept in the Telco domain is when the suspect is mobile - using
> different lines for every call. I would suggest that this is rare.

The use of cellular phones (pre-pay) by some criminals exploits the
perception of difficulty in intercepting mobile calls.  The so-called
"Camilla-gate tapes" would suggest otherwise - regardless of how and where
that alleged interception took place, and by whom.

Michael (Streaky) Bacon
  ____
~(____)>
  "  "
The views expressed herein are my own and
do not necessarily reflect those of my employer