Privacy, security and public opinion

[Pete Mitchell]

Owen Lewis wrote:
> 
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: "Systems Dept" <pete@dmed.demon.co.uk>
> To: <ukcrypto@maillist.ox.ac.uk>
> Sent: 06 June 2000 11:32
> Subject: Re: Privacy, security and public opinion
> 
> > Owen Lewis wrote:
> > > From: "Peter Mitchell" <pete@dmed.demon.co.uk>
> > >
> > > > Essentially the authorities are saying, "We need these powers. But we
> > > > can't tell you why we need them, even though we may use them against
> > > > you, citizen, at some time. You must just trust us to use them in a
> way
> > > > of which you would approve."
> > > >
> > > > That attitude is not appropriate in a supposedly democratic society.
> > >
> > > You may say so. Now come up with an alternative.
> 
> > It was in my earlier posting. When the government proposes a law, it
> > must produce its *real* reasons to anyone who cares to ask for them. If
> > it does not wish to publish the real reasons, and as a result the
> > legislation does not meet with the approval of parliament and the
> > public, then the proposed legislation must be scrapped, though the sky
> > fall.
> 
> Well, that's a view, firmly expressed. Do you know of any nation where it is
> plain that the standards you prescibe are applied and under what law is the
> prescription enforced? 

No. Not that it matters: I don't know of any nation with a zero murder
rate, either, but I still reserve the right to oppose murder. 

[...]
> 
> > Also remember that much of the content of these policy decisions is
> > moral, on which policymakers have no special claim to expertise, yet
> > still prefer not to consult us. Vide the Belgrano affair. Or Chevaline.
> > Or telephone tapping generally, for that matter.
> 
> That's quite a mixed bag :-) To stay with telephone tapping (as closest to
> the purposes of this list), I would say that the law is plain enough for all
> to see. It is not secret. 

Not now it isn't, but I was thinking mainly of its history. For many
years before IOCA, the cosy relation between Dollis Hill and the law was
secret. And it is only very recently that the "special functions" of
public exchange switching equipment have been revealed. It was only
because of Malone that the thing came out in the open at all. 


> It's language is largely self explanatory and
> where it is not satisfactory inferences can be drawn. 


Not good enough. If the govt of the time was confident that the bill
would command public support, why not make the rationale clear? And if
it wasn't confident, what was it doing enacting it?

> In relation to
> telephine tapping specifically and IoCA 85 and RIP, what do you not have
> that you would have, if you could, in terms of public scrutiny? 

The full stats of IOCA warrants. How many are issued against how many
subscriber lines; how many lead to prosecutions of how many people; how
many of these are successful; how many people suffer interception
without any subsequent prosecution; *exactly* what grounds the HO have
accepted as justification for interception; how many times applications
for warrants have been refused; and so on. Without this information it
is hard to do a moral cost-benefit analysis of whether telephone tapping
is an essential LE technique of last resort, or a convenience for idle
coppers, or whether it lies somewhere in between. As long as coppers --
idle or not -- have the power to control this information, we will never
know it. 

Getting back to RIP, the things we would like to know begin with
Nicholas Bohm's question: Under *exactly* what circumstances would
private keys be required, and why? 

> I note that
> you do not comment on my suggestion of parliamentary Select Committees with
> enhanced investigatory powers  and re-inforced by ad hoc sub-committes of
> co-opted experts from outside of govt service.

I'm all in favour of that. Since a useful FOIA is highly unlikely under
the current administration, it's probably the best practical solution
for the time being. However, that doesn't change my opinion of what
*ought* to be. 

--
Pete Mitchell