The Smith Report
Ian BROWN
I.Brown at cs.ucl.ac.uk
Thu, 01 Jun 2000 11:35:55 +0100
>Consider how an ISP/ASP could offer a differentiated service by redirecting
all
>SMTP through a virus scanner, which then offers a point for content
monitoring.
One reason we should be telling users why such a "service" might have
unintended consequences.
>I am gravely disturbed by the suggestion that we can afford to be smug about
>this issue because we are technically skilled, run a particular operating
>system, or for that matter, have a number of PGP keyrings, nym addresses, and
>run anonymous remailers in our spare time.
I was not intending to be smug, simply pointing out that if the (obvious) fact
that SSL between sendmails leaves the end-points vulnerable concerns you, move
the end-points.
Netscape 4 has an option to run SSL to an SMTP server. If it also allowed mail
to be delivered direct to the recipient's server, it would remove one
end-point. That certainly doesn't require a root password.
Ian.