Jack Straw' View
Owen Lewis
oml at eloka.demon.co.uk
Wed, 5 Jul 2000 22:18:37 +0100
----- Original Message -----
From: "David Swarbrick" <david@swarb.freeuk.com>
To: <ukcrypto@maillist.ox.ac.uk>
Sent: 05 July 2000 06:47
Subject: Re: Jack Straw' View
> In message <003b01bfe5b8$5322dc80$3e0a989e@eloka>, Owen Lewis
> <oml@eloka.demon.co.uk> writes
>
> >True. Traffic analysis is traffic analysis. Be it electronic messages,
> >vehicles on motorways or persons in a shopping precinct, there is no
reason,
> >it seems to me, to think any one of these to be more unfair or intrusive
on
> >privacy than the other.
>
> Traffic analysis is not a closely defined idea.
True. It covers many different things. However, all have in common that
information is obltained from observive patterns of movement, without
particular regard to whatever may being moved.
An officer would not
> need a warrant to follow a suspect about and to create a list of places
> visited by him, including sex shops brothels red light areas, children
> playgrounds and whatever.
True. Or even if he visits his mother, priest or accountant.
>The limits to such activity are drawn
> naturally and historically by practical reality and by special respect
> for private communications.
Where traffic analysis is applied to communications, there seems to be no
invasion of privacy more that is involved where a cross referencing is made
of video recordings in a city centre, to detect patterns of movement. It is
widely practiced for a variety of purposes. Plod practices it, BT practices
it (as does every other PSTN provider). Facilities and communications
managers practice it. I practice it. ISPs may or may not yet practice it but
those that don't, as they grow up, will find good reasons why they should
practice it.
> It is inevitable in defining communications data for this Act that the
> same division will not easily be made. This list has demonstrated the
> weakness of the present proposed definitions, but I would favour a
> simple if in some ways unfair definition, to one which is so complicated
> that nobody will ever know whether it applies.
At its simplest, the pracess has two parts. Firstly, records are made of
every communicication into or out from a specific list of addresses/numbers.
Various algorithms are then applied to the data to search for various
patterns of interest. Some of these algorithms are very simple and others
are quire sophiticated. All pay no attention to the *informative content*
but only to the pattern of communication between terminals or nodes.
The concept seems quite straight forward to me and quite unexceptional in
the world we live in.
>
> I was struck by the very considerable difference in complexity between
> IOCA and RIP. The one was part of a chapter, the other has become a very
> unhealthy book.
I take that point. Fashion it thus. There is a history of over 100 years in
the monitoring and control of electronic communications, whether provided
for public use or large private systems.From time to time the police have
made use of this form of information. Two things have happened:
- Firstly, fast computers and special purpose software have made
TA a much more powerful and useful tool that it ever was prior to the late
80s. The first police coup using an enhanced analytical capability was about
89/90 when they busted a ring of bent solicitors and estate agents operating
a massive mortgage fraud.
- The HRA now makes necessary that many practices of
intelligence gathering and investigation be stated and be authorised by
statute. To what extent this is 'A Good Thing' remains to be seen and may
take 25 years or so to determine. Frankly, I take leave to doubt that the
quality of life will be in the least improved for it.
If traffic analysis is to be regulated by statute, it will border on the
farcical and, as for much modern regulation, be honoured largely in the
breach. Consider. If one uses one's own communication system it is
reasonable to assume that one knows what one is doing and when one is doing
it and for how long one is doing it. If one conducts the same activity via a
communication system that one does not own that one must accept that
another, perhaps several parties will hold details of that information.
Owen Lewis