Jack Straw' View

[Owen Lewis]

----- Original Message -----
From: "David Swarbrick" <david@swarb.freeuk.com>
To: <ukcrypto@maillist.ox.ac.uk>
Cc: "Roland Perry" <roland@linx.net>
Sent: 04 July 2000 07:39
Subject: Re: Jack Straw' View


> In message <200007031855.TAA08270@clw.cs.man.ac.uk>, Charles Lindsey
> <chl@clw.cs.man.ac.uk> writes
> >       On Mon, 03 Jul 2000 18:40:44 +0100
> >       Donald Ramsbottom <donald@ramsbottom.co.uk> said...
> >
> >
> >> Sorry Guys, I have not been keeping up with this thread, (bloody real
world
> >> keeps intruding), what was the question in a nutshell and I will see
whether
> >> I can help. Sorry to be a pain.
> >
> >Essentially, please look at the following piece of Hansard, and tell
> >ukcrypto what it is all about.
> >
>
> 'Traditionally' the results of intercepts have not been available to the
> prosecution as evidence. It follows from the ideas that
> 1 It might not be admitted as unfair anyway, and
> 2 It leaves too many questions open to a defence about how the
> information was gathered, which the prosecution would not want to
> answer.
>
> An unanswered (to me) question. Is such material disclosable to the
> defence?


The following is a worm's eye view. The product of warranted interception is
not submitted in evidence. Therefore as far as the court and both sides are
concerned, it does not exist.

A sensitive review of the sometimes extensive amount taped material obtained
by other means with is listed as evidential material admits the possibility
that the unwarranted collection has been 'steered' by information obtained
by other means. This is perhaps only to be expected because it is a major
function of intelligence to steer operations.

Where material is gathered by unwarranted eavesdropping of conversations,
the means by which that eavesdropping was effected may or may not be
protected from disclosure by a PIC granted by a judge. Other than where the
means are trivial, such certificates seem always to be granted. This
complicates somewhat an expert review of such material for the defence but
by no means makes it impossible. However, for the sake of ensuring that
important and sometimes expensive means of eavesdropping and the associated
operational techniques are not disclosed to the criminal fraternity, there
is an additional burden placed on the defence in assessing the validity of
information produced from the  surveillance operation.

> He is saying that this has, traditionally, caused difficulties. The
> whole point about the need to update IOCA, was that it had become ragged
> at the edges. This is a process of justification under HRA by
> clarification. Thus the new definition.
>
> Whilst this applies to the results of interception of communications,
> there is no reason, as the law stands, why this should apply the
> products of traffic analysis and obliged decryption. Neither is seen to
> be inherently unfair, and neither invites too close a questioning of
> Intelligence service practices.
>

True. Traffic analysis is traffic analysis. Be it electronic messages,
vehicles on motorways or persons in a shopping precinct, there is no reason,
it seems to me, to think any one of these to be more unfair or intrusive on
privacy than the other.

Owen Lewis