Jack Straw' View

[Roland Perry]

In article <1.5.4.32.20000704064437.00f21bcc@192.168.0.65>, Donald
Ramsbottom <donald@ramsbottom.co.uk> writes
>"That case **provides us with a difficulty in respect of this Bill**. A narrow
>definition of "detection" is **satisfactory in the case of interception**,
>though
>we have tried to ensure even here that the law is as clear as possible. But
>the same formulation of "prevention and detection" exists in each of the
>five other powers of the Bill where ****we most certainly do want the
>ph(r)ase to
>have a wider meaning and to include gathering evidence****.

I'm afraid I read it quite differently. Notwithstanding all the advice
I've had throughout this process from the HO that they *don't* want to
have intercept product admissible as evidence.

What I see here is a problem with the ECHR and the transposed definition
of "preventing and detecting crime". If you aren't engaged in one of
these two, then you aren't supposed to be intercepting at all.

Now, if you want to benefit from the products of interception after the
point at which you've noticed the crime took place (the minimalist
definition of "detecting") then you need to define "prevention and
detection" to last further into the process than that. 

For example, in a kidnapping the detection of the crime happens when the
parents ring up and say "my kid was seized" - I'm sure the police would
want the power to intercept the mobile phones of the kidnappers in order
to release the child [1].

That doesn't mean the intercept product is required as *court* evidence,
even if it's referred to loosely as "gathering evidence".

[1] For the moment, let's overlook that this might be allowed under
"preventing a murder".
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