From donald@ramsbottom.co.uk Tue, 01 Feb 2000 08:29:19 +0000 Date: Tue, 01 Feb 2000 08:29:19 +0000 From: Donald Ramsbottom donald@ramsbottom.co.uk Subject: "Enigma" meets "Titanic" - Hollywood does Cryptography again... At 19:33 31/01/00 GMT, you wrote: > >This is probably a bit *TOO* far off-topic to discuss on the list, >but I thought some people might like the pointer: > > http://www.u-571.com/ > > From the creators of the hit > thriller Breakdown comes > Universal Pictures? U-571, a > white-knuckle World War II > suspense drama about a > American submarine crew?s > battle against time-and their > own fears-while carrying out > a daring mission to capture a > top-secret encrypting device > from a Nazi U-boat. > saw this some months ago (reported), there was an interview with the midshipman (RN) (sorry name escapes me this morning) who was quite sanguine about the fact it was a USN Corvette rather than a RN one, and that he had changed Nationality. He was apparently a technical advisor, and was told the only way the "story" would be told by Hollywood, was if it were undertaken by Americans. So now we know how history is to recorded in the future, very Henry VII and Richard III. It would also appear from the above press release that the USN had "Hunter Killer" class subs in WWII !! Its a bit like a French History book I once read on the Napoleonic wars which got through the whole thing without mentioning a little affair 18 miles south of Brussels in June 1815! Ah well c'est la Guerre, c'est la vie. Donald Ramsbottom LL.B, BA (Hons). RAMSBOTTOM & Co. Solicitors Internet Law & Global Cryptology Law Specialists From davidh@spidacom.co.uk Tue, 1 Feb 2000 09:10:36 -0000 Date: Tue, 1 Feb 2000 09:10:36 -0000 From: David Hansen davidh@spidacom.co.uk Subject: Electronic voting - Tomorrows World item On 30 Jan 00, at 17:24, Nigel Hickson wrote: > So civil servants are just "duff" advisers and MPs just "generalists" Something of an interpretation of my message that I don't think helps a serious discussion. I did not make a personal attack on anyone. One of the examples I gave came from the NHS which is semi-detached from the civil service. I could have added that senior civil servants tend to be keen to describe themselves as generalists, which most of them are. It remains a fact that there has been duff advice, two examples being the non-encryption of the NHS network and key escrow. That does not mean that duff advice comes from duff advisors. Life is far too complicated for that sort of assumption. The decision makers may ignore the advice, there may be dubious and sinister people lurking in the background who do not want to see the light of day (a feature of the encryption debate), the organisation within which the advisor works may be inefficient or have its own agenda. All sorts of things may make the advice of even a very good advisor duff. However the advice remains duff, as in the two examples I have given. > No hope for any of us then. There is plenty of hope, provided individuals and organisations are grown up enough to recognise what has gone wrong in the past and resolve to do better in the future. My thoughts on the Chinese are a bit off topic. I will only say that I found it absolutely disgusting when the police in the UK made Chinese leaders feel at home by treating demonstrating dissidents in the sort of way that they are treated in China. People may infer my views on China from this. David Hansen | davidh@spidacom.co.uk | PGP email preferred Edinburgh | CI$ number 100024,3247 | key number F566DA0E From MBacon@snci.co.uk Tue, 1 Feb 2000 09:26:17 -0000 Date: Tue, 1 Feb 2000 09:26:17 -0000 From: Michael Bacon MBacon@snci.co.uk Subject: Electronic voting - Tomorrows World item > -----Original Message----- > From: David Hansen [mailto:davidh@spidacom.co.uk] > Sent: 01 February 2000 09:11 > > On 30 Jan 00, at 17:24, Nigel Hickson wrote: > > > So civil servants are just "duff" advisers and MPs just > "generalists" > > Something of an interpretation of my message that I don't > think helps a > serious discussion. [snip] > I could have added that senior civil servants > tend to be > keen to describe themselves as generalists, which most of > them are. [snip] Will the seeming intention to sack senior civil servants and appoint government 'cronies' in their stead improve the position, or otherwise? If 'specialists' are appointed it would seem likely - given the comments on this topic; otherwise : otherwise. Now ... Brian or Ross to head up crypto/e-commerce policy unit? Michael (Streaky) Bacon ____ ~(____)> " " The views expressed herein are my own and do not necessarily reflect those of my employer From davidh@spidacom.co.uk Tue, 1 Feb 2000 10:17:31 -0000 Date: Tue, 1 Feb 2000 10:17:31 -0000 From: David Hansen davidh@spidacom.co.uk Subject: Electronic voting - Tomorrows World item On 31 Jan 00, at 9:30, Michael Bacon wrote: > > Our 'masters' are essentially generalists. It's only in the House of > > Lords where one tends to find someone who knows a lot about a subject. > > Even with our 'reformed' HoL? I would have agreed before, but now ... The people who know a lot about a subject tend to be the Life Peers. David Hansen | davidh@spidacom.co.uk | PGP email preferred Edinburgh | CI$ number 100024,3247 | key number F566DA0E From brian.gladman@btinternet.com Tue, 1 Feb 2000 12:57:15 -0000 Date: Tue, 1 Feb 2000 12:57:15 -0000 From: Brian Gladman brian.gladman@btinternet.com Subject: Consultation on Security I apologise if people are already aware of this but Alan Burkett-Grey kindly sent me a note about the consultation on security that has been announced here: http://www.iagchampions.gov.uk/whatsnew.htm SInce neither Alan nor I can recall this being mentioned on this list we thought it would be worth making a posting in case others have missed this. The deadline for input is this Friday! Brian Gladman From ben@algroup.co.uk Tue, 01 Feb 2000 13:56:42 +0000 Date: Tue, 01 Feb 2000 13:56:42 +0000 From: Ben Laurie ben@algroup.co.uk Subject: Consultation on Security Brian Gladman wrote: > > I apologise if people are already aware of this but Alan Burkett-Grey kindly > sent me a note about the consultation on security that has been announced > here: > > http://www.iagchampions.gov.uk/whatsnew.htm > > SInce neither Alan nor I can recall this being mentioned on this list we > thought it would be worth making a posting in case others have missed this. > > The deadline for input is this Friday! I'm sorry? We're supposed to pay their blasted taxes _and_ give them free security consultancy? What planet are they on? BTW, why are they measuring document sizes in kelvin-bits? More hot air, I guess. :-) Cheers, Ben. -- SECURE HOSTING AT THE BUNKER! http://www.thebunker.net/hosting.htm http://www.apache-ssl.org/ben.html Y19100 no-prize winner! http://www.ntk.net/index.cgi?back=2000/now0121.txt From davidh@spidacom.co.uk Tue, 1 Feb 2000 15:53:06 -0000 Date: Tue, 1 Feb 2000 15:53:06 -0000 From: David Hansen davidh@spidacom.co.uk Subject: Electronic voting - Tomorrows World item On 1 Feb 00, at 9:26, Michael Bacon wrote: > Will the seeming intention to sack senior civil servants and appoint > government 'cronies' in their stead improve the position, or otherwise? We would have to decide whether Brian or Ross are among Tony's Cronies:-) Actually there is nothing wrong with bringing people into senior civil service positions from outside the service, provided the job is advertised and people inside and outside get a chance. My impression is that this is the case currently, as it has been under other conservative governments. Special advisors are a different matter. The aim of these seems to be so the party politician can surround themselves with people who will tell them what they want to hear. These posts are not advertised. David Hansen | davidh@spidacom.co.uk | PGP email preferred Edinburgh | CI$ number 100024,3247 | key number F566DA0E From davidh@spidacom.co.uk Tue, 1 Feb 2000 15:53:06 -0000 Date: Tue, 1 Feb 2000 15:53:06 -0000 From: David Hansen davidh@spidacom.co.uk Subject: Electronic voting - Tomorrows World item On 31 Jan 00, at 10:06, Brian Gladman wrote: > I think it is rather unfair to blame just one party to the > process when it is the process as a whole that is at fault. I'm not sure that I did blame just one party. If I did then that would be I venture party politicians which I criticised for knowing less and less about anything and instead becoming machines. > I agree with some of this analysis but I do not think that the advisors > always get it wrong. No, but many will recall the paper on the NHS. This claimed that it was only now technically possible to install encryption on the NHS network. Given that teleprinter networks were encrypted in the early 1940s this claim is, to be very generous, slightly at variance with reality. I'm not suggesting that devices with pin wheels should be attached to every computer in the NHS and set every day, but it was technically possible to encrypt the NHS network before such a beast existed. > My experience has often been that the > 'generalists' get it wrong, not because they have been badly advised > (although I am sure this sometimes happens), but rather because they do > not have the knowledge needed to understand the advice they are > receiving. They can also lack the knowledge to ask the specialist the right question in the first place. The specialist then goes away and solves the question they think they were asked. > The consequence is > that bad advice is often adopted even though good advice has also been > provided because the receiver has not the slightest idea how to tell > what is good from what is bad. This is a feature of many government decisions. > it might encourage 'ordinary' > people to seek involvement in policy formulation processes and we can't > have that. I think that is a war that has been lost. The cosy relationships of the past are being slowly exposed to the light of day. The road lobby, Shell over the Brent Spar, BP in Nigeria, Monsanto and GM foods are examples where government and big business went on in its own cost little clique without bothering about anybody else. I'll add that that is essentially what Shell says about the Brent Spar in their aftermath documents. > It is the 'system' that is wrong and its quite unfair to blame those > 'indians' who are caught up in it for its failings. That is what I was trying to get at, but on the other hand it is quite unfair for 'indians' to get away with the "it's nothing to do with me mister" defence of claiming that all faults are those of the system. > But this list, and > organisations like the Foundation for Information Policy Research > (FIPR), show that things can be changed if people are willing to get > involved. I agree. I enjoy reading it and making the occasional contribution. David Hansen | davidh@spidacom.co.uk | PGP email preferred Edinburgh | CI$ number 100024,3247 | key number F566DA0E From arj@burntwood.net Wed, 02 Feb 2000 11:01:17 +0000 Date: Wed, 02 Feb 2000 11:01:17 +0000 From: Adrian Ridley-Jones arj@burntwood.net Subject: Electronic voting - Tomorrows World item What an excellent idea. Either of these two august gentlemen could do an excellent job even with their eyes closed..... certainlly far better than the current incumbents and sick sham of a government behind them. Clearly an idea that has no hope of flying !!! Regards Adrian >government 'cronies' in their stead improve the position, or otherwise? If >'specialists' are appointed it would seem likely - given the comments on >this topic; otherwise : otherwise. Now ... Brian or Ross to head up >crypto/e-commerce policy unit? > >Michael (Streaky) Bacon > ____ >~(____)> From arj@burntwood.net Wed, 02 Feb 2000 11:01:17 +0000 Date: Wed, 02 Feb 2000 11:01:17 +0000 From: Adrian Ridley-Jones arj@burntwood.net Subject: Electronic voting - Tomorrows World item What an excellent idea. Either of these two august gentlemen could do an excellent job even with their eyes closed..... certainlly far better than the current incumbents and sick sham of a government behind them. Clearly an idea that has no hope of flying !!! Regards Adrian >government 'cronies' in their stead improve the position, or otherwise? If >'specialists' are appointed it would seem likely - given the comments on >this topic; otherwise : otherwise. Now ... Brian or Ross to head up >crypto/e-commerce policy unit? > >Michael (Streaky) Bacon > ____ >~(____)> From rupesh.jain@cdac.ernet.in Thu, 3 Feb 2000 16:09:03 +0530 (IST) Date: Thu, 3 Feb 2000 16:09:03 +0530 (IST) From: Rupesh Sureshchandra Jain rupesh.jain@cdac.ernet.in Subject: how to use pgp for trust cases Hi Pgp user's guide does't give much information how to use pgp for certification & trust cases of signatures and there commands.Please anyone knowing help me out? Rupesh From rupesh.jain@cdac.ernet.in Thu, 3 Feb 2000 16:11:38 +0530 (IST) Date: Thu, 3 Feb 2000 16:11:38 +0530 (IST) From: Rupesh Sureshchandra Jain rupesh.jain@cdac.ernet.in Subject: how to use pgp for email Hi Can anyone give me commands for using pgp with mail clinet software like pine. Rupesh From whgu0007@ermine.ox.ac.uk Thu, 3 Feb 2000 10:54:13 +0000 (GMT) Date: Thu, 3 Feb 2000 10:54:13 +0000 (GMT) From: Ian Goodyer whgu0007@ermine.ox.ac.uk Subject: how to use pgp for email On Thu, 3 Feb 2000, Rupesh Sureshchandra Jain wrote: > Hi > Can anyone give me commands for using pgp with mail clinet software like > pine. > Rupesh Just a quick reminder that this list is set up to discuss cryptography policy and law. There are dozens of lists and newsgroups that talk about how to use PGP. Please reply to Rupesh off list so that this list stays 'a little bit different'. Thanks, Ian. UKCrypto owner From nick.battle@icl.com Thu, 03 Feb 2000 10:53:04 +0000 Date: Thu, 03 Feb 2000 10:53:04 +0000 From: Nick Battle nick.battle@icl.com Subject: how to use pgp for email Rupesh Sureshchandra Jain wrote: > Can anyone give me commands for using pgp with mail clinet software > like pine. May I recommend the PGP users mail list? (http://pgp.rivertown.net/). That list is better for a detailed discussion of the use of PGP's options. Cheers, -nick From DHowe@Hawkswing.Demon.Co.Uk Thu, 3 Feb 2000 19:21:39 -0000 Date: Thu, 3 Feb 2000 19:21:39 -0000 From: David Howe DHowe@Hawkswing.Demon.Co.Uk Subject: Fw: Thawte and Verisign - Important Announcement Thought some of those on the list might be interested in this announcement.... ---------- > From: Mark Shuttleworth > To: DHowe@Hawkswing.demon.co.uk > Subject: Thawte and Verisign - Important Announcement > Date: 03 February 2000 05:10 PM > > February 1, 2000 > > Dear Thawte Customers and Future Customers: > > In December, VeriSign and Thawte announced their intentions > to join forces. We hope this letter addresses any questions > you may have about what this will mean for you. > > Please be assured that none of the things you love most about > Thawte will change after the acquisition. This includes: > > - Low prices for SSL Server and Personal Certificates > - The people you have dealt with at Thawte > - Our commitment to innovation > > VeriSign and Thawte are committed to providing a low entry > price for sites that wish to conduct secure e-commerce using > SSL. In fact, we guarantee that Thawte SSL Server Certificates > will continue to be available to both existing and new customers > for $125 (or less!) at least through February 1, 2001. This > is a firm offer which you can take advantage of at any time > during this period. You can print out this page and save it > as proof of our guarantee. > > Furthermore, existing Thawte customers will be entitled to > receive substantial discounts if they choose to take advantage > of one of VeriSign's premium certificate offerings, such as > the VeriSign Secure Site, Secure Site Plus, and Global Site > solutions. In addition to providing SSL functionality, these > offerings include popular additional features, such as up to > $250,000 of NetSure warranty protection, the Secure Site Seal, > automated performance monitoring through Keynote, free Web site > security scanning through Netcraft, and free listing of your > site in the Network Solutions dot.com directory. Look for > complete information about this discount program soon on > this site. > > For those of you who enjoy Thawte Personal Freemail certificates, > please rest assured that you will still be able to obtain free > personal certificates. VeriSign has offered free personal > certificates for over 4 years, and we intend to continue that > program, as well as Thawte's popular Web of Trust program. > > Thawte's vetting and support services will remain in place, so > that you will still deal with the same people as before when > you work with us to purchase and get help with certificates. > > Furthermore, Thawte and VeriSign have thoroughly reviewed both > companies' certificate issuance and support processes. We have > identified many areas in which the two companies can learn from > each other. By adapting the best aspects of each other's > operations and technology, we will be able to deliver even > more cost-effective services on a global basis. > > Thawte and VeriSign have also spent the past few weeks exploring > new product strategy for the coming years. Through our > relationship, we will be able to offer you a much broader > set of complementary products and services to help you enhance > your e-commerce site. Working together, Thawte and VeriSign > plan to introduce a number of exciting services, including > PKI solutions for the Wireless Web and new low-cost payment > processing services. > > VeriSign and Thawte recognize that there are many places where > you can obtain a certificate that enables SSL. We hope that you > will continue to do business with us now that we have joined > forces, as we are convinced that we offer the best service, > the best technology, the highest levels of trust, and the best > prices across a broad range of solutions. > > You also have our commitment that we will continue to tell you > about our plans for the future of online trust as they develop. > If you have any questions or concerns, please feel free to > write to either one of us. > > Sincerely: > > Mark Shuttleworth, > President and CEO > Thawte Consulting (Pty) Ltd. > marks@thawte.com > 12 Plein Street > Durbanville 7550 > South Africa > > Stratton Sclavos > President and CEO > VeriSign, Inc. > stratton@verisign.com > 1350 Charleston Rd. > Mountain View, CA 94043 > U.S.A. From johndoe2@mail.anonymizer.com Thu, 03 Feb 2000 14:59:03 -0800 Date: Thu, 03 Feb 2000 14:59:03 -0800 From: John Doe Number Two johndoe2@mail.anonymizer.com Subject: Food for Thawte Only slightly off-topic... As you may know, Thawte has=A0a=A0new-ish Web of Trust programme whereby a Thawte notary can sign one's PGP key and allocate a number of 'trust points= ' to one's PGP ID. Once one reaches 50 points, Thawte will change the Freemail signature they give to anyone (upon verification of the key's emai= l address) to the username of the key itself. Example: I verify my email address with Thawte. They sign my key with "Thawte Freemail Member ". After I've proved my identity to the requisite number of Thawte Notaries (between 2 and 5), Thawte will sign my key "John Doe, II " as well as issue me X-509 certs in my name. Although some may applaud Thawte's use of PGP, there's a major problem wit= h its implementation: there is no trust on their own signing key. A TA of Thawte's signing key (key ID 0xDE46F54F) shows a totals of 44 signatures, only one of which has a key on the main PGP cert server. That key belongs to Bruce Watermeyer (key ID 0x5804F465). His key has only one useful signature: Bill Scannell (key ID 0xF9773357). Scannell's key has Zimmerman's, Callas' and Lucky Green's sigs, among others. Scannell is also listed as a Thawte Web of Trust notary. I zapped him off a message asking him what the deal was with a Web of Trust programme that hinged on his sig. He responded, > I told Watermeier I wanted to confirm the Thawte signing key. he told me= to call some girl named Lisle in the support department. I called South Afric= a at my own expense and was told that she needed a minute to pull the public key off of the internet and read it back to me. No, I said, who has the key= ? The computer, she replied. And who controls the computer, I asked. Mister Shuttleworth, but he's in America right now. Well I asked, what happens if shuttleworth has a freak shaving accident...who can use the key. Ohh, said she, that's a security policy, I can't tell you that. i called Watermeier and told him the story. He sent me to , saying the site was secure and I could then sign the key from that. Thawte's Web of Trust program is patently bogus. Any fool could generate 50 keys, use them to sign a 51st key and then call it 'Trusted'. As far as I'= m concerned, this is illustrative as to why third party CAs are worthless to begin with. You pay them so that their 'root' becomes more valid. -JDII ____________________________________________________________ "Insert the usual disclaimer here." Key ID: 0x8EF048F5 4093 Bit DH/DSS Fingerprint: CC8F 8D2C E1A3 6555 7438 B456 D00E A83C 8EF0 48F5 From brucew@thawte.com Fri, 04 Feb 2000 09:36:53 +0200 Date: Fri, 04 Feb 2000 09:36:53 +0200 From: Bruce brucew@thawte.com Subject: Food for Thawte This is a cryptographically signed message in MIME format. --------------ms6E11EB220D521FF97E4A685E Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit > Thawte's Web of Trust program is patently bogus. Any fool could generate 50 > keys, use them to sign a 51st key and then call it 'Trusted'. As far as I'm > concerned, this is illustrative as to why third party CAs are worthless to > begin with. You pay them so that their 'root' becomes more valid. The trust assigned by Thawte is not based on signatures on a key at all. It has absolutely nothing to do with the number of signatures on a key! It is based on face to face Identity Assertions made by notaries who have had their identities physically checked by Thawte. I meet you, I check your identity documents, I keep a copy of them, you and I both sign a sworn affidavit regarding your identity (which I keep for 5 years along with the copy of your ID). Then I can issue you with up to 35 points. You still need another 15 to have your identity trusted, and another 65 to be able to issue points yourself. And not all notaries can issue as many as 35 points. Regarding the validity of the Thawte signing key, I grant you that there could be a more effective method of validation, but to suggest that a secure site presenting the information cannot be trusted as a source is to suggest that Thawte itself cannot be trusted. And that is an entirely different story! And to comment on your last line, there are no fees to become part of the Web of Trust or to benefit from it. Have a nice day, -- Bruce Watermeyer Thawte Certification Thawte now offers technical support 24 hours a day, 5 days a week: http://www.thawte.com/support/irc.html "It's better to regret something you did, Than something you didn't do!" --------------ms6E11EB220D521FF97E4A685E Content-Type: application/x-pkcs7-signature; name="smime.p7s" Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="smime.p7s" Content-Description: S/MIME Cryptographic Signature MIII0wYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIIIxDCCCMACAQExCzAJBgUrDgMCGgUAMAsGCSqGSIb3DQEHAaCC BqQwggOIMIIC8aADAgECAgMCB54wDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEEBQAwgZQxCzAJBgNVBAYTAlpBMRUw EwYDVQQIEwxXZXN0ZXJuIENhcGUxFDASBgNVBAcTC0R1cmJhbnZpbGxlMQ8wDQYDVQQKEwZU aGF3dGUxHTAbBgNVBAsTFENlcnRpZmljYXRlIFNlcnZpY2VzMSgwJgYDVQQDEx9QZXJzb25h bCBGcmVlbWFpbCBSU0EgMTk5OS45LjE2MB4XDTAwMDIwMTEwMDIwNFoXDTAxMDEzMTEwMDIw NFowge0xCzAJBgNVBAYTAlpBMRUwEwYDVQQIEwxXZXN0ZXJuIENhcGUxEjAQBgNVBAcTCUNh cGUgVG93bjEkMCIGA1UEChMbVGhhd3RlIENvbnN1bHRpbmcgKFB0eSkgTHRkMR0wGwYDVQQM ExRNYXJrZXRpbmcgRGVwYXJ0bWVudDETMBEGA1UEBBMKV2F0ZXJtZXllcjEVMBMGA1UEKhMM QnJ1Y2UgQWRyaWFuMSAwHgYDVQQDExdCcnVjZSBBZHJpYW4gV2F0ZXJtZXllcjEgMB4GCSqG SIb3DQEJARYRYnJ1Y2V3QHRoYXd0ZS5jb20wgZ8wDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADgY0AMIGJAoGB AOIUoPiQQ7CklpwdcORK/h8000YVcTaP69+X+dOkbsOK3TADEfDrFcziYtB7g1o4kXEw1qgZ yuxCrQM59u8XJdr50PXIywQKOUl88rAiaLPG17qa6rQJZhm3wl3PxpRNIRdxnyeZHxquge6y OvvAx3ZT0jss1IlFBPespvmNC60LAgMBAAGjgYwwgYkwOgYFK2UBBAEEMTAvAgEAMCowCwIB AQQGYnJ1Y2V3MBsCAQQEFms5VnhCZEg0R0t0Uk1iVGZrR25IM1EwHAYDVR0RBBUwE4ERYnJ1 Y2V3QHRoYXd0ZS5jb20wDAYDVR0TAQH/BAIwADAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBSIq/Fgg2ZV9ORYx0Yd wGG9I9fDjDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQQFAAOBgQAjt88+kOF7CBXKjK7E51Ls1P5V75zlohXw0Uwi I2BmN4pyQ8H6rdP2aTWmZVdk4KFnPOMFu+DXyP53x9eDzOIFPszzRxrjc+4NI7LUUHCAcgxp ngRFK/WkDRgYjPvWg5J7cErvdpuFoeOevqa7pGj3HlSZJNiTX0ha/7AsP4A04TCCAxQwggJ9 oAMCAQICAQswDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEEBQAwgdExCzAJBgNVBAYTAlpBMRUwEwYDVQQIEwxXZXN0 ZXJuIENhcGUxEjAQBgNVBAcTCUNhcGUgVG93bjEaMBgGA1UEChMRVGhhd3RlIENvbnN1bHRp bmcxKDAmBgNVBAsTH0NlcnRpZmljYXRpb24gU2VydmljZXMgRGl2aXNpb24xJDAiBgNVBAMT G1RoYXd0ZSBQZXJzb25hbCBGcmVlbWFpbCBDQTErMCkGCSqGSIb3DQEJARYccGVyc29uYWwt ZnJlZW1haWxAdGhhd3RlLmNvbTAeFw05OTA5MTYxNDAxNDBaFw0wMTA5MTUxNDAxNDBaMIGU MQswCQYDVQQGEwJaQTEVMBMGA1UECBMMV2VzdGVybiBDYXBlMRQwEgYDVQQHEwtEdXJiYW52 aWxsZTEPMA0GA1UEChMGVGhhd3RlMR0wGwYDVQQLExRDZXJ0aWZpY2F0ZSBTZXJ2aWNlczEo MCYGA1UEAxMfUGVyc29uYWwgRnJlZW1haWwgUlNBIDE5OTkuOS4xNjCBnzANBgkqhkiG9w0B AQEFAAOBjQAwgYkCgYEAs2lal9TQFgt6tcVd6SGcI3LNEkxL937Px/vKciT0QlKsV5Xje2F6 F4Tn/XI5OJS06u1lp5IGXr3gZfYZu5R5dkw+uWhwdYQc9BF0ALwFLE8JAxcxzPRB1HLGpl3i iESwiy7ETfHw1oU+bPOVlHiRfkDpnNGNFVeOwnPlMN5G9U8CAwEAAaM3MDUwEgYDVR0TAQH/ BAgwBgEB/wIBADAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBRyScJzNMZV9At2coF+d/SH58ayDjANBgkqhkiG9w0B AQQFAAOBgQBrxlnpMfrptuyxA9jfcnL+kWBI6sZV3XvwZ47GYXDnbcKlN9idtxcoVgWL3Vx1 b8aRkMZsZnET0BB8a5FvhuAhNi3B1+qyCa3PLW3Gg1Kb+7v+nIed/LfpdJLkXJeu/H6syg1v cnpnLGtz9Yb5nfUAbvQdB86dnoJjKe+TCX5V3jGCAfcwggHzAgEBMIGcMIGUMQswCQYDVQQG EwJaQTEVMBMGA1UECBMMV2VzdGVybiBDYXBlMRQwEgYDVQQHEwtEdXJiYW52aWxsZTEPMA0G A1UEChMGVGhhd3RlMR0wGwYDVQQLExRDZXJ0aWZpY2F0ZSBTZXJ2aWNlczEoMCYGA1UEAxMf UGVyc29uYWwgRnJlZW1haWwgUlNBIDE5OTkuOS4xNgIDAgeeMAkGBSsOAwIaBQCggbEwGAYJ KoZIhvcNAQkDMQsGCSqGSIb3DQEHATAcBgkqhkiG9w0BCQUxDxcNMDAwMjA0MDczNjUzWjAj BgkqhkiG9w0BCQQxFgQUIJSgAtzs0Fb3JS45NTOci+JKlKkwUgYJKoZIhvcNAQkPMUUwQzAK BggqhkiG9w0DBzAOBggqhkiG9w0DAgICAIAwBwYFKw4DAgcwDQYIKoZIhvcNAwICAUAwDQYI KoZIhvcNAwICASgwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQAEgYCTctcYbEZmJIpSvuGcD2nrHzzU9TBRRIjO CifuA2nHfr1ILEc2lU8CU/yKkyPEAtvMD7SnHHhF1wSY7ojEue3+GduIupHe3j4PHTZtw1kT 0WZAJ13PrxMDOsOZb8QAE1140blGUjrN+EEU1OuOJ9YIv+fKDzuHl47OdAvAtt/nUw== --------------ms6E11EB220D521FF97E4A685E-- From brian.gladman@btinternet.com Fri, 4 Feb 2000 10:38:47 -0000 Date: Fri, 4 Feb 2000 10:38:47 -0000 From: Brian Gladman brian.gladman@btinternet.com Subject: Food for Thawte >From: "John Doe Number Two" >To: >Cc: ; >Sent: Thursday, February 03, 2000 10:59 PM >Subject: Food for Thawte > >Only slightly off-topic... > [snip] >Thawte's Web of Trust program is patently bogus. Any fool could generate 50 >keys, use them to sign a 51st key and then call it 'Trusted'. As far as I'm >concerned, this is illustrative as to why third party CAs are worthless to >begin with. You pay them so that their 'root' becomes more valid. I certainly agree that there are some big issues concerning the true extent of the trust that can be placed in such services but I also think that there is a big question mark about their value for other reasons. In those situations where I have needed to relate a physical world identity with a cyberspace one my experience has been that the physical world relationship that I have with the individual or orgnaisation concerned has always provided me with enough information to do this. On the few occasions where I have relied on a mutually known third party to verify such a relationship it would have been possible to sustitute Thwarte for such purposes but I would consider the inspection of a few documents to be a relatively poor substitute for the personal trust relationships that I would much rather use. Most of the time my interest is much more about 'trust' than it is about 'identity' and this makes me rather doubtful about the value of identity linked certificates in principle. I am sure that the head of the Russian mafia has the documents that he or she needs to prove their identity to Thwarte but this says nothing about the extent to which I should trust them. Where I have found a need to know the something about a cyberspace entity that I am dealing with is when I visit an e-commerce site from which I want to make a purchase. Here I do want to know that when I visit a site that purports to be 'Company X's' site really is their site and not some crooked outfit masquerading as them. For a number of reasons I may have come to trust the 'real world' company even though I have no real world relationship with them and I do want to know that this trust will carry over into cyberspace. And, in contrast with my relationships with people, I will often have no easy way of confirming the relationship between the real world company and its cyberspace 'alter ego'. Probably becuase of government disapproval, companies have been much less willing to commit to PGP than individuals. Moreover, in the past, many governments have not wanted 'people popular' mechanisms for handling such issues since they do want citizen identity information for a combination of honest (but misguided) and malign purposes and want to ride on the back of e-commerce to obtain such information. When this is looked at in more detail what I really want from any countersignature on an e-commerce site certificate is not identity information but rather a guarantee from the counter-signatory that if anything goes wrong in my transactions with the site they will underwrite any losses or damage that I may incur. I want their couter-signature signature not to underwrite identity as such (although this is of some value here) but rather to carry insurance covering my risks. When Thwarte/Verisign and/or the banks provide e-commerce site certificates that carry good insurance against ***all*** my risks as a cyberspace consumer, that is, not only the financial ones but the privacy, security and safety ones as well, and without all the small print 'get outs' that are currently involved, then I will take these services more seriously. Carl Ellison, Nicholas Bohm and I have a paper covering aspects of this issue at: http://jya.com/bg/digsig.pdf and Carl and Bruce Schneier have written recently about the PKI issues in particular. Brian Gladman From brucew@thawte.com Fri, 04 Feb 2000 14:36:10 +0200 Date: Fri, 04 Feb 2000 14:36:10 +0200 From: Bruce brucew@thawte.com Subject: [PGP]: FWD: Food for Thawte This is a cryptographically signed message in MIME format. --------------msBA174675CB24836C50B6788B Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Hi All, > My favorite line below is "that's a security policy, I can't tell you > that." That's OUTRAGEOUS: a security policy on such matters as affect > the root of an entire web of trust MUST be public. Extremely public. Would it be considered prudent to make known the list of people who have control over the keys? Yes, from a trust point of view perhaps it would be, but from a security point of view most certainly not. No one is going to hold a gun to your head and demand use of your keys, because, in the big picture there would be very little to gain from this. Doing the same to someone who has control of Thawte's keys however, would have some serious repercussions. -- Bruce Watermeyer Thawte Certification Thawte now offers technical support 24 hours a day, 5 days a week: http://www.thawte.com/support/irc.html "It's better to regret something you did, Than something you didn't do!" --------------msBA174675CB24836C50B6788B Content-Type: application/x-pkcs7-signature; name="smime.p7s" Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="smime.p7s" Content-Description: S/MIME Cryptographic Signature MIII0wYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIIIxDCCCMACAQExCzAJBgUrDgMCGgUAMAsGCSqGSIb3DQEHAaCC BqQwggOIMIIC8aADAgECAgMCB54wDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEEBQAwgZQxCzAJBgNVBAYTAlpBMRUw EwYDVQQIEwxXZXN0ZXJuIENhcGUxFDASBgNVBAcTC0R1cmJhbnZpbGxlMQ8wDQYDVQQKEwZU aGF3dGUxHTAbBgNVBAsTFENlcnRpZmljYXRlIFNlcnZpY2VzMSgwJgYDVQQDEx9QZXJzb25h bCBGcmVlbWFpbCBSU0EgMTk5OS45LjE2MB4XDTAwMDIwMTEwMDIwNFoXDTAxMDEzMTEwMDIw NFowge0xCzAJBgNVBAYTAlpBMRUwEwYDVQQIEwxXZXN0ZXJuIENhcGUxEjAQBgNVBAcTCUNh cGUgVG93bjEkMCIGA1UEChMbVGhhd3RlIENvbnN1bHRpbmcgKFB0eSkgTHRkMR0wGwYDVQQM ExRNYXJrZXRpbmcgRGVwYXJ0bWVudDETMBEGA1UEBBMKV2F0ZXJtZXllcjEVMBMGA1UEKhMM QnJ1Y2UgQWRyaWFuMSAwHgYDVQQDExdCcnVjZSBBZHJpYW4gV2F0ZXJtZXllcjEgMB4GCSqG SIb3DQEJARYRYnJ1Y2V3QHRoYXd0ZS5jb20wgZ8wDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADgY0AMIGJAoGB AOIUoPiQQ7CklpwdcORK/h8000YVcTaP69+X+dOkbsOK3TADEfDrFcziYtB7g1o4kXEw1qgZ yuxCrQM59u8XJdr50PXIywQKOUl88rAiaLPG17qa6rQJZhm3wl3PxpRNIRdxnyeZHxquge6y OvvAx3ZT0jss1IlFBPespvmNC60LAgMBAAGjgYwwgYkwOgYFK2UBBAEEMTAvAgEAMCowCwIB AQQGYnJ1Y2V3MBsCAQQEFms5VnhCZEg0R0t0Uk1iVGZrR25IM1EwHAYDVR0RBBUwE4ERYnJ1 Y2V3QHRoYXd0ZS5jb20wDAYDVR0TAQH/BAIwADAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBSIq/Fgg2ZV9ORYx0Yd wGG9I9fDjDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQQFAAOBgQAjt88+kOF7CBXKjK7E51Ls1P5V75zlohXw0Uwi I2BmN4pyQ8H6rdP2aTWmZVdk4KFnPOMFu+DXyP53x9eDzOIFPszzRxrjc+4NI7LUUHCAcgxp ngRFK/WkDRgYjPvWg5J7cErvdpuFoeOevqa7pGj3HlSZJNiTX0ha/7AsP4A04TCCAxQwggJ9 oAMCAQICAQswDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEEBQAwgdExCzAJBgNVBAYTAlpBMRUwEwYDVQQIEwxXZXN0 ZXJuIENhcGUxEjAQBgNVBAcTCUNhcGUgVG93bjEaMBgGA1UEChMRVGhhd3RlIENvbnN1bHRp bmcxKDAmBgNVBAsTH0NlcnRpZmljYXRpb24gU2VydmljZXMgRGl2aXNpb24xJDAiBgNVBAMT G1RoYXd0ZSBQZXJzb25hbCBGcmVlbWFpbCBDQTErMCkGCSqGSIb3DQEJARYccGVyc29uYWwt ZnJlZW1haWxAdGhhd3RlLmNvbTAeFw05OTA5MTYxNDAxNDBaFw0wMTA5MTUxNDAxNDBaMIGU MQswCQYDVQQGEwJaQTEVMBMGA1UECBMMV2VzdGVybiBDYXBlMRQwEgYDVQQHEwtEdXJiYW52 aWxsZTEPMA0GA1UEChMGVGhhd3RlMR0wGwYDVQQLExRDZXJ0aWZpY2F0ZSBTZXJ2aWNlczEo MCYGA1UEAxMfUGVyc29uYWwgRnJlZW1haWwgUlNBIDE5OTkuOS4xNjCBnzANBgkqhkiG9w0B AQEFAAOBjQAwgYkCgYEAs2lal9TQFgt6tcVd6SGcI3LNEkxL937Px/vKciT0QlKsV5Xje2F6 F4Tn/XI5OJS06u1lp5IGXr3gZfYZu5R5dkw+uWhwdYQc9BF0ALwFLE8JAxcxzPRB1HLGpl3i iESwiy7ETfHw1oU+bPOVlHiRfkDpnNGNFVeOwnPlMN5G9U8CAwEAAaM3MDUwEgYDVR0TAQH/ BAgwBgEB/wIBADAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBRyScJzNMZV9At2coF+d/SH58ayDjANBgkqhkiG9w0B AQQFAAOBgQBrxlnpMfrptuyxA9jfcnL+kWBI6sZV3XvwZ47GYXDnbcKlN9idtxcoVgWL3Vx1 b8aRkMZsZnET0BB8a5FvhuAhNi3B1+qyCa3PLW3Gg1Kb+7v+nIed/LfpdJLkXJeu/H6syg1v cnpnLGtz9Yb5nfUAbvQdB86dnoJjKe+TCX5V3jGCAfcwggHzAgEBMIGcMIGUMQswCQYDVQQG EwJaQTEVMBMGA1UECBMMV2VzdGVybiBDYXBlMRQwEgYDVQQHEwtEdXJiYW52aWxsZTEPMA0G A1UEChMGVGhhd3RlMR0wGwYDVQQLExRDZXJ0aWZpY2F0ZSBTZXJ2aWNlczEoMCYGA1UEAxMf UGVyc29uYWwgRnJlZW1haWwgUlNBIDE5OTkuOS4xNgIDAgeeMAkGBSsOAwIaBQCggbEwGAYJ KoZIhvcNAQkDMQsGCSqGSIb3DQEHATAcBgkqhkiG9w0BCQUxDxcNMDAwMjA0MTIzNjEwWjAj BgkqhkiG9w0BCQQxFgQUiLVjQ834PL5MFqs+gH7x0Eh92YYwUgYJKoZIhvcNAQkPMUUwQzAK BggqhkiG9w0DBzAOBggqhkiG9w0DAgICAIAwBwYFKw4DAgcwDQYIKoZIhvcNAwICAUAwDQYI KoZIhvcNAwICASgwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQAEgYAl01BYr/M+GvK0BoOiC3HvZwYzmKDPL9n+ 1RK9tYv9bFZX72RckEB7o4WO/my/3qG/5go9YfNp53bmcJ+AK3vWM20lM+RinazkuYiwrX5q YzLhvBhfKA8g8MZH1a2IfKzIa/S9D4CO8c3E5VGQ4/Z5739QJAZWs7Uno4ZrC8pKSA== --------------msBA174675CB24836C50B6788B-- From ben@algroup.co.uk Fri, 04 Feb 2000 13:10:27 +0000 Date: Fri, 04 Feb 2000 13:10:27 +0000 From: Ben Laurie ben@algroup.co.uk Subject: [PGP]: FWD: Food for Thawte Bruce wrote: > > Hi All, > > > My favorite line below is "that's a security policy, I can't tell you > > that." That's OUTRAGEOUS: a security policy on such matters as affect > > the root of an entire web of trust MUST be public. Extremely public. > > Would it be considered prudent to make known the list of people who have control > over the keys? Yes, from a trust point of view perhaps it would be, but from a > security point of view most certainly not. No one is going to hold a gun to your > head and demand use of your keys, because, in the big picture there would be very > little to gain from this. Doing the same to someone who has control of Thawte's > keys however, would have some serious repercussions. Do you really think that you can keep that secret? From a man with a gun? Cheers, Ben. -- SECURE HOSTING AT THE BUNKER! http://www.thebunker.net/hosting.htm http://www.apache-ssl.org/ben.html Y19100 no-prize winner! http://www.ntk.net/index.cgi?back=2000/now0121.txt From bdm@fenrir.demon.co.uk Fri, 04 Feb 2000 13:27:33 Date: Fri, 04 Feb 2000 13:27:33 From: Brian Morrison bdm@fenrir.demon.co.uk Subject: [PGP]: FWD: Food for Thawte On Fri, 04 Feb 2000 13:10:27 +0000, Ben Laurie wrote: >> security point of view most certainly not. No one is going to hold a gun to your >> head and demand use of your keys, because, in the big picture there would be very >> little to gain from this. Doing the same to someone who has control of Thawte's >> keys however, would have some serious repercussions. > >Do you really think that you can keep that secret? From a man with a >gun? I think that what is necessary is for the man with a gun to know that holding the gun to the head of someone with control of Thawte's keys will achieve nothing. You need a mechanism where suborning an individual or group of individuals does not allow access to those keys. Whether that is a realistic prospect I'm not sure. -- Brian Morrison bdm@fenrir.demon.co.uk do you know how far this has gone? just how damaged have I become? 'Even Deeper' by Nine Inch Nails From jya@pipeline.com Fri, 04 Feb 2000 09:03:56 -0500 Date: Fri, 04 Feb 2000 09:03:56 -0500 From: John Young jya@pipeline.com Subject: [PGP]: FWD: Food for Thawte Brian Morrison wrote: >I think that what is necessary is for the man with a gun to know that >holding the gun to the head of someone with control of Thawte's keys >will achieve nothing. You need a mechanism where suborning an >individual or group of individuals does not allow access to those keys. > >Whether that is a realistic prospect I'm not sure. But isn't the primary reason for Trusted Third Parties and CAs to assure that an authorized gun will be able to get what is wanted? Otherwise the PRC model must be instituted to forbid inaccessible encryption, or rather, maintained. As with other "trusted" institutions. It is the trust that's up for grabs, in particular if it is institutionalized and faced with an impeccable facade, a visage that by god is as believably sound as the unshakeable pound. As the proponents of trust ever aver, my god, man, how much do you want, be reasonable, now, don't ask for the impossible. Tis upon hearing those words of "reasonable" assurance that you must be careful to watch your wallet and the assurer's twitches. From johndoe2@mail.anonymizer.com Fri, 04 Feb 2000 07:54:24 -0800 Date: Fri, 04 Feb 2000 07:54:24 -0800 From: John Doe Number Two johndoe2@mail.anonymizer.com Subject: Food for Thawte Dear Bruce, Thank you for your replies. You wrote: > Would it be considered prudent to make known the list of people who have > control over the keys? Yes, from a trust point of view perhaps it would be, >but from a security point of view most certainly not. No one is going to hold a >gun to your head and demand use of your keys, because, in the big picture >there would be very little to gain from this. Doing the same to someone who has >control of Thawte's keys however, would have some serious repercussions. The people in charge of those uniformed chaps in silos had similar concerns, but rather than leave things to chance, they set things up so that it would take three (3) people turning their keys at the appropriate time to turn Vladivostok into a nuclear wasteland. In the world of digital security, this is called 'splitting a key'. Your fears of ThawteCrime would be lowered if you didn't have to base your entire threat model on concerns about Shuttleworth being waylaid by Zulus. Assuming for the moment I'm exaggerating, would it not be a Good Thing to tell us who controls the keys and how (in a general sense) control is exercised? Explaining how the root is tethered would be a wonderful start. Or is it not tethered at all? In a second message you wrote: > The trust assigned by Thawte is not based on signatures on a key at all. It > has absolutely nothing to do with the number of signatures on a key! Are you aware how absurd these twenty-nine words look strung together? I suggest you reread Phil Zimmerman's Web of Trust documentation. Signatures are everything in PGP. If a sig only runs one way then it is at best a cult and at worst untrusted by the recipients of the signature. There must be a way for people to verify Thawte's key and no, a secure site does not cut it. Later in the message you add: > Regarding the validity of the Thawte signing key, I grant you that there could be a more effective method of validation, but to suggest that a secure site > presenting the information cannot be trusted as a source is to suggest that >Thawte itself cannot be trusted. And that is an entirely different story! By implementing a Web of Trust programme based on a hierarchical (and possibly untethered) CA you are trying to square a circle. PGP simply does not work the way you'd like it to work. As things currently stand, your signing key has no value simply because it is validated only unto itself and merely indirectly signed by someone (Scannell) with a clue. In order to make your scheme work, you must do the following: 1. Explain how and by whom your signing key is controlled. 2. Allow PGP users (your notaries?) to sign Thawte's key by confirming the signer properties with a human being with access to the private key. -JDII PS: You might consider adding your surname to your email 'from' line. In the world of crypto, there is only one Bruce and you are not him. ____________________________________________________________ "Insert the usual disclaimer here." Key ID: 0x8EF048F5 4093 Bit DH/DSS Fingerprint: CC8F 8D2C E1A3 6555 7438 B456 D00E A83C 8EF0 48F5 From davidh@spidacom.co.uk Fri, 4 Feb 2000 16:20:44 -0000 Date: Fri, 4 Feb 2000 16:20:44 -0000 From: David Hansen davidh@spidacom.co.uk Subject: Food for Thawte On 4 Feb 00, at 7:54, John Doe Number Two wrote: > The people in charge of those uniformed chaps in silos had similar > concerns, but rather than leave things to chance, they set things up so > that it would take three (3) people turning their keys at the > appropriate time to turn Vladivostok into a nuclear wasteland. They always said it was two. David Hansen | davidh@spidacom.co.uk | PGP email preferred Edinburgh | CI$ number 100024,3247 | key number F566DA0E From rabbi@quickie.net Fri, 4 Feb 2000 11:29:33 -0500 (EST) Date: Fri, 4 Feb 2000 11:29:33 -0500 (EST) From: L. Sassaman rabbi@quickie.net Subject: [PGP]: Re: Food for Thawte -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On Fri, 4 Feb 2000, John Doe Number Two wrote: > PS: You might consider adding your surname to your email 'from' line. In > the world of crypto, there is only one Bruce and you are not him. That was uncalled for. __ L. Sassaman System Administrator | "All of the chaos Technology Consultant | Makes perfect sense..." icq.. 10735603 | pgp.. finger://ns.quickie.net/rabbi | --Joe Diffie -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.0.1 (GNU/Linux) Comment: OpenPGP Encrypted Email Preferred. iD8DBQE4mv59PYrxsgmsCmoRAlF2AKCNwUd+QhYTjrP8eO/E1I4cXbN95gCfbzsl hJWOxeoocOlym9rv9tsBlYU= =fgec -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From rabbi@quickie.net Fri, 4 Feb 2000 11:29:33 -0500 (EST) Date: Fri, 4 Feb 2000 11:29:33 -0500 (EST) From: L. Sassaman rabbi@quickie.net Subject: [PGP]: Re: Food for Thawte -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On Fri, 4 Feb 2000, John Doe Number Two wrote: > PS: You might consider adding your surname to your email 'from' line. In > the world of crypto, there is only one Bruce and you are not him. That was uncalled for. __ L. Sassaman System Administrator | "All of the chaos Technology Consultant | Makes perfect sense..." icq.. 10735603 | pgp.. finger://ns.quickie.net/rabbi | --Joe Diffie -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.0.1 (GNU/Linux) Comment: OpenPGP Encrypted Email Preferred. iD8DBQE4mv59PYrxsgmsCmoRAlF2AKCNwUd+QhYTjrP8eO/E1I4cXbN95gCfbzsl hJWOxeoocOlym9rv9tsBlYU= =fgec -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From donald@ramsbottom.co.uk Fri, 04 Feb 2000 17:38:34 +0000 Date: Fri, 04 Feb 2000 17:38:34 +0000 From: Donald Ramsbottom donald@ramsbottom.co.uk Subject: DVD -deCSS Court case Just a spurious thought. As has been pointed out by others the object of the case must have been to intimidate those who would disseminate the code over the net AND to prevent that dissemination. Now the code itself is an exhibit to a court document lodged by the Plaintiffs. That court document is now a public record and is freely downloadable anywhere in the world. The terms of the interim injunctive relief were to stop the defendants by themselves or their agents from further postings as well as anyone else (you see where this is going), so logically there are two possible breaches of that injunction. Firstly the court itself ;), but more importantly the plaintiffs by lodging the code and the court disseminating it have breached the terms of that injunction and should be held in contempt themselves! Not sustainable I know but curious nonetheless. BTW does any body have any further info on the unfortunate 16 year old now charged with criminal offences in respect of that very matter which has now been put into the public domain by the Plaintiffs themselves and their agents the Court sytem of NYS? Donald Ramsbottom LL.B, BA (Hons). RAMSBOTTOM & Co. Solicitors Internet Law & Global Cryptology Law Specialists From brian.gladman@btinternet.com Fri, 4 Feb 2000 17:03:24 -0000 Date: Fri, 4 Feb 2000 17:03:24 -0000 From: Brian Gladman brian.gladman@btinternet.com Subject: Food for Thawte From: "Bruce" To: Sent: Friday, February 04, 2000 7:36 AM Subject: Re: Food for Thawte [snip} > Regarding the validity of the Thawte signing key, I grant you that there could be > a more effective method of validation, but to suggest that a secure site > presenting the information cannot be trusted as a source is to suggest that Thawte > itself cannot be trusted. And that is an entirely different story! I really don't understand your logic here - are you seriously suggesting that if I don't trust a computer system operated by a company then it always follows that I should not trust the company? Computer systems are quite often seriously flawed in security terms and this means that there are cogent reasons for not trusting a computer system even if the company running it is considered trustworthy. Moreover, the prospects that Internet connected computer systems are truly secure against the sort of attacks that sophisticated and well resourced organisations and agencies can mount against them is in my view very low indeed. And this will not change until we can have a high degree of confidence in the security properties of operating systems, which I believe is a long way off. Brian Gladman From james@cloud9.co.uk Fri, 4 Feb 2000 17:06:30 +0000 Date: Fri, 4 Feb 2000 17:06:30 +0000 From: James Fidell james@cloud9.co.uk Subject: DVD -deCSS Court case Quoting Donald Ramsbottom (donald@ramsbottom.co.uk): > BTW does any body have any further info on the unfortunate 16 year old now > charged with criminal offences in respect of that very matter which has now > been put into the public domain by the Plaintiffs themselves and their > agents the Court sytem of NYS? Last I heard, the plaintiffs had applied to the judge to keep the deCSS code secret (and were granted that right by the judge). James. -- "Yield to temptation -- | Consultancy: james@cloud9.co.uk it may not pass your way again" | http://www.cloud9.co.uk/james | - Lazarus Long | James Fidell From bdm@fenrir.demon.co.uk Fri, 04 Feb 2000 17:42:19 Date: Fri, 04 Feb 2000 17:42:19 From: Brian Morrison bdm@fenrir.demon.co.uk Subject: Food for Thawte On Fri, 4 Feb 2000 17:03:24 -0000, Brian Gladman wrote: >And this will not change until we can have a high degree of confidence in >the security properties of operating systems, which I believe is a long way >off. And of course one has to ask why OS security is so poor thus far. Some people sticking their oars in methinks. -- Brian Morrison bdm@fenrir.demon.co.uk do you know how far this has gone? just how damaged have I become? 'Even Deeper' by Nine Inch Nails From donald@ramsbottom.co.uk Fri, 04 Feb 2000 18:51:11 +0000 Date: Fri, 04 Feb 2000 18:51:11 +0000 From: Donald Ramsbottom donald@ramsbottom.co.uk Subject: DVD -deCSS Court case SNIP >Last I heard, the plaintiffs had applied to the judge to keep the deCSS >code secret (and were granted that right by the judge). > >James. >-- Ok I was wrong I obviously did not get the statement of the plaintiff from the site below which only has the Injunction and now a form of preliminary Judgement. My mistake. sorry. Mind you that does not appear to cover paper pleadings. (the injunction that is). The judgement does conclude with these words : "For the foregoing reasons, the Court granted plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction and entered such an order on January 20, 2000. The foregoing, ****together with those made on the record on that date****, constitute the Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law. SO ORDERED. Dated: February 2, 2000" *** is my emphasis*** http://www.nysd.uscourts.gov/courtweb/ Anyhow, the thoughts were mere musings and I shall leave them at that. Donald Ramsbottom LL.B, BA (Hons). RAMSBOTTOM & Co. Solicitors Internet Law & Global Cryptology Law Specialists From rabbi@quickie.net Fri, 4 Feb 2000 13:58:34 -0500 (EST) Date: Fri, 4 Feb 2000 13:58:34 -0500 (EST) From: L. Sassaman rabbi@quickie.net Subject: [PGP]: Re: Food for Thawte -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On Fri, 4 Feb 2000, John Doe Number Two wrote: > Dear Bruce, > > Thank you for your replies. You wrote: > Would it be considered > prudent to make known the list of people who have > control over the > keys? Yes, from a trust point of view perhaps it would be, >but from a > security point of view most certainly not. No one is going to hold a > >gun to your head and demand use of your keys, because, in the big > picture >there would be very little to gain from this. Doing the same > to someone who has >control of Thawte's keys however, would have some > serious repercussions. > > The people in charge of those uniformed chaps in silos had similar concerns, > but rather than leave things to chance, they set things up so that it would > take three (3) people turning their keys at the appropriate time to turn > Vladivostok into a nuclear wasteland. This is a good suggestion, and should be used for corporate or high level security signing keys... but the FreeMail system IMHO doesn't warrant this level of [inconvenience] security... and would make automation for this [free] service impossible [making it impractical as a free service]. Higher level Freemail keys (see end of this email) should be split, provided they adapt that model. > In the world of digital security, this is called 'splitting a key'. Your > fears of ThawteCrime would be lowered if you didn't have to base your entire > threat model on concerns about Shuttleworth being waylaid by Zulus. > Assuming for the moment I'm exaggerating, would it not be a Good Thing to > tell us who controls the keys and how (in a general sense) control is > exercised? Explaining how the root is tethered would be a wonderful start. > Or is it not tethered at all? That would be important to know. > In a second message you wrote: > > > The trust assigned by Thawte is not based on signatures on a key at all. It > > has absolutely nothing to do with the number of signatures on a key! > > Are you aware how absurd these twenty-nine words look strung together? I > suggest you reread Phil Zimmerman's Web of Trust documentation. Signatures > are everything in PGP. If a sig only runs one way then it is at best a cult > and at worst untrusted by the recipients of the signature. There must be a > way for people to verify Thawte's key and no, a secure site does not cut > it. I think Bruce's point here is that the Thawte Web of Trust has little to do with PGP. It is a proprietary model that merely shares the same name (hence the confusion) as Phil's model. Remember, Thawte's business is x509 certificate verification. PGP signatures are secondary (obviously, because they haven't figured out how to properly sign keys yet. More on that in a moment.) > Later in the message you add: > > > Regarding the validity of the Thawte signing key, I grant you that > there could be a more effective method of validation, but to suggest > that a secure site > presenting the information cannot be trusted as a > source is to suggest that >Thawte itself cannot be trusted. And that > is an entirely different story! > > By implementing a Web of Trust programme based on a hierarchical (and > possibly untethered) CA you are trying to square a circle. PGP simply does > not work the way you'd like it to work. As things currently stand, your > signing key has no value simply because it is validated only unto itself and > merely indirectly signed by someone (Scannell) with a clue. In order to make > your scheme work, you must do the following: It *is* untethered, but Thawte views itself as a top-level, infallible entity, so they seem to view this as a non-issue. > 1. Explain how and by whom your signing key is controlled. Full disclosure is good. I could make a reasonably educated guess based on the job descriptions on the website as to who has the passphrases and keys at Thawte, so the "security through [obscurity] nondisclosure" is a weak attempt at best. > 2. Allow PGP users (your notaries?) to sign Thawte's key by confirming the > signer properties with a human being with access to the private key. There is no reason this should not and could not be done. Also, Thawte should actually sign the user's existing keyids, rather than creating new keyids. This obfuscates the keyring data and is simply annoying, for there is no reason to do signing the way that they do. When I became a trusted notary, I was given a new keyid with my full name attached to it (which, first of all, I perfer not to advertise in favor of my first initial and last name, for personal, non-security reasons), and my email address: uid Leonard Harris Sassaman sig 3CE4352F 1999-08-10 Thawte Personal Freemail RSA Issuer 1998.9.16 Rather than signing my primary uid, on which I collect all of my signatures: pub 1024D/09AC0A6A 1998-07-14 L. Sassaman sig 09AC0A6A 1998-07-14 L. Sassaman This is just silly. They are signing the same key, with the same email address bound to it. And simply signing the key would be far less complicated development wise for them than generationg a new uid for my key. In addition, my new UID and signature that was assigned to me before I was trusted is this: uid Thawte Freemail Member sig 3CE4352F 1999-07-09 Thawte Personal Freemail RSA Issuer 1998.9.16 Notice that the signing key is the same. What Thawte apparently has failed to realise is that the trust system of PGP is configured by the user with regard to which signing keys to trust. I *cannot* trust Thawte's PGP signatures on Thaete notaries, even though I may like to, because the same key is used to sign the generic "Freemail" users (for which no verification is done initially. If Thawte wanted to do this right, they would generate signing keys for each levels of points they use in their WoT system, and sign based on that. Suppose they use their existing Freemail key to sign the 0 trust Freemail members. When a member obtains 50 points (the level at which Thawte will grant the ability to have one's name listed in certificates) Thawte will sign with a different key "Thawte Personal 50 Point Freemail RSA Issuer". And when a member reaches 100 points, and becomes a notary, Thawte will sign with a third key "Thawte Personal Freemail Notary RSA Issuer". That way, I can chose to trust only notaries, or only the 50-pointers, by trusting the respective key as in introducer. As it is right now, the signatures are functionally useless, even if we ignore the "untethered key" issue altogether. __ L. Sassaman System Administrator | "All of the chaos Technology Consultant | Makes perfect sense..." icq.. 10735603 | pgp.. finger://ns.quickie.net/rabbi | --Joe Diffie -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.0.1 (GNU/Linux) Comment: OpenPGP Encrypted Email Preferred. iD8DBQE4myFiPYrxsgmsCmoRAqkJAKDUWOND4lBBH1mpZ8BT2uxjPq6kmgCfT9nM JlwIkBDBPUuPlu4ya1hY+VQ= =+vpM -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From jya@pipeline.com Fri, 04 Feb 2000 14:49:26 -0500 Date: Fri, 04 Feb 2000 14:49:26 -0500 From: John Young jya@pipeline.com Subject: DVD -deCSS Court case There are two DeCSS court cases, one in California, at the state court level, and one in New York, at the federal district court level. The plaintiff in California is the DVD CCA organization set up recently to promote DVD and enforce its licensing provisions. It is linked to, but not the same as, the New York plaintiff, MPAA, the Motion Picture Association of America, or, rather eight members of MPAA. Both plaintiffs have Web sites: http://www.dvdcca.org http://www.mpaa.org The premier collection of documents on the two cases is on the EFF site: http://www.eff.org For shorthand, the California case is referred to as "DVD CCA," the New York, "MPAA." Both involve DeCSS, a program which allegedly decrypts CSS -- the Content Scrambling System which does something to DVD disks, exactly what it does is disputed. The California suit claims trade secret violations by DeCSS; the New York suit claims violation by DeCSS of the DVD copyright protection system -- the Content Scrambling System (CSS) -- under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), a recently enacted law which extended copyright protection. It was in the California court that CSS, a trade secret, was mistakenly filed as an exhibit to a plaintiff declaration as an open public record and was then subsequently sealed after the error was revealed by publishing the open document on the Web. The order to seal is applicable only to members of the bar and court officials who are forbidden to copy CSS. The order does not apply to any citizen who may freely copy the court record and CSS, nor does the order apply to the online version (which we can report as the host has been downloaded now 70,000 times). Beyond this nutshell I'd better not go, for the technical and legal issues involve interpretations beyond my abilities -- but not beyond my stupid convictions: we continue to offer DeCSS on our site, and remain one of 521 defendants in the California case. Not yet sued in New York, our majestic squat. From lists@notatla.demon.co.uk Fri, 4 Feb 2000 22:01:57 GMT Date: Fri, 4 Feb 2000 22:01:57 GMT From: lists@notatla.demon.co.uk lists@notatla.demon.co.uk Subject: Food for Thawte From: "Brian Morrison" > And of course one has to ask why OS security is so poor thus far. Some > people sticking their oars in methinks. This is getting seriously off-topic, but I'll say that there's no need to speculate about interference when there are adequate explanations in the areas of laziness and ignorance. And there's no reason I know to think Thawte have contributed to poor OS security. From rabbi@quickie.net Fri, 4 Feb 2000 13:58:34 -0500 (EST) Date: Fri, 4 Feb 2000 13:58:34 -0500 (EST) From: L. Sassaman rabbi@quickie.net Subject: [PGP]: Re: Food for Thawte -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On Fri, 4 Feb 2000, John Doe Number Two wrote: > Dear Bruce, > > Thank you for your replies. You wrote: > Would it be considered > prudent to make known the list of people who have > control over the > keys? Yes, from a trust point of view perhaps it would be, >but from a > security point of view most certainly not. No one is going to hold a > >gun to your head and demand use of your keys, because, in the big > picture >there would be very little to gain from this. Doing the same > to someone who has >control of Thawte's keys however, would have some > serious repercussions. > > The people in charge of those uniformed chaps in silos had similar concerns, > but rather than leave things to chance, they set things up so that it would > take three (3) people turning their keys at the appropriate time to turn > Vladivostok into a nuclear wasteland. This is a good suggestion, and should be used for corporate or high level security signing keys... but the FreeMail system IMHO doesn't warrant this level of [inconvenience] security... and would make automation for this [free] service impossible [making it impractical as a free service]. Higher level Freemail keys (see end of this email) should be split, provided they adapt that model. > In the world of digital security, this is called 'splitting a key'. Your > fears of ThawteCrime would be lowered if you didn't have to base your entire > threat model on concerns about Shuttleworth being waylaid by Zulus. > Assuming for the moment I'm exaggerating, would it not be a Good Thing to > tell us who controls the keys and how (in a general sense) control is > exercised? Explaining how the root is tethered would be a wonderful start. > Or is it not tethered at all? That would be important to know. > In a second message you wrote: > > > The trust assigned by Thawte is not based on signatures on a key at all. It > > has absolutely nothing to do with the number of signatures on a key! > > Are you aware how absurd these twenty-nine words look strung together? I > suggest you reread Phil Zimmerman's Web of Trust documentation. Signatures > are everything in PGP. If a sig only runs one way then it is at best a cult > and at worst untrusted by the recipients of the signature. There must be a > way for people to verify Thawte's key and no, a secure site does not cut > it. I think Bruce's point here is that the Thawte Web of Trust has little to do with PGP. It is a proprietary model that merely shares the same name (hence the confusion) as Phil's model. Remember, Thawte's business is x509 certificate verification. PGP signatures are secondary (obviously, because they haven't figured out how to properly sign keys yet. More on that in a moment.) > Later in the message you add: > > > Regarding the validity of the Thawte signing key, I grant you that > there could be a more effective method of validation, but to suggest > that a secure site > presenting the information cannot be trusted as a > source is to suggest that >Thawte itself cannot be trusted. And that > is an entirely different story! > > By implementing a Web of Trust programme based on a hierarchical (and > possibly untethered) CA you are trying to square a circle. PGP simply does > not work the way you'd like it to work. As things currently stand, your > signing key has no value simply because it is validated only unto itself and > merely indirectly signed by someone (Scannell) with a clue. In order to make > your scheme work, you must do the following: It *is* untethered, but Thawte views itself as a top-level, infallible entity, so they seem to view this as a non-issue. > 1. Explain how and by whom your signing key is controlled. Full disclosure is good. I could make a reasonably educated guess based on the job descriptions on the website as to who has the passphrases and keys at Thawte, so the "security through [obscurity] nondisclosure" is a weak attempt at best. > 2. Allow PGP users (your notaries?) to sign Thawte's key by confirming the > signer properties with a human being with access to the private key. There is no reason this should not and could not be done. Also, Thawte should actually sign the user's existing keyids, rather than creating new keyids. This obfuscates the keyring data and is simply annoying, for there is no reason to do signing the way that they do. When I became a trusted notary, I was given a new keyid with my full name attached to it (which, first of all, I perfer not to advertise in favor of my first initial and last name, for personal, non-security reasons), and my email address: uid Leonard Harris Sassaman sig 3CE4352F 1999-08-10 Thawte Personal Freemail RSA Issuer 1998.9.16 Rather than signing my primary uid, on which I collect all of my signatures: pub 1024D/09AC0A6A 1998-07-14 L. Sassaman sig 09AC0A6A 1998-07-14 L. Sassaman This is just silly. They are signing the same key, with the same email address bound to it. And simply signing the key would be far less complicated development wise for them than generationg a new uid for my key. In addition, my new UID and signature that was assigned to me before I was trusted is this: uid Thawte Freemail Member sig 3CE4352F 1999-07-09 Thawte Personal Freemail RSA Issuer 1998.9.16 Notice that the signing key is the same. What Thawte apparently has failed to realise is that the trust system of PGP is configured by the user with regard to which signing keys to trust. I *cannot* trust Thawte's PGP signatures on Thaete notaries, even though I may like to, because the same key is used to sign the generic "Freemail" users (for which no verification is done initially. If Thawte wanted to do this right, they would generate signing keys for each levels of points they use in their WoT system, and sign based on that. Suppose they use their existing Freemail key to sign the 0 trust Freemail members. When a member obtains 50 points (the level at which Thawte will grant the ability to have one's name listed in certificates) Thawte will sign with a different key "Thawte Personal 50 Point Freemail RSA Issuer". And when a member reaches 100 points, and becomes a notary, Thawte will sign with a third key "Thawte Personal Freemail Notary RSA Issuer". That way, I can chose to trust only notaries, or only the 50-pointers, by trusting the respective key as in introducer. As it is right now, the signatures are functionally useless, even if we ignore the "untethered key" issue altogether. __ L. Sassaman System Administrator | "All of the chaos Technology Consultant | Makes perfect sense..." icq.. 10735603 | pgp.. finger://ns.quickie.net/rabbi | --Joe Diffie -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.0.1 (GNU/Linux) Comment: OpenPGP Encrypted Email Preferred. iD8DBQE4myFiPYrxsgmsCmoRAqkJAKDUWOND4lBBH1mpZ8BT2uxjPq6kmgCfT9nM JlwIkBDBPUuPlu4ya1hY+VQ= =+vpM -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From jya@pipeline.com Fri, 04 Feb 2000 18:18:41 -0500 Date: Fri, 04 Feb 2000 18:18:41 -0500 From: John Young jya@pipeline.com Subject: DVD -deCSS Court case I failed to mention a third, and equally important, DeCSS case. That involves a Norwegian, Jon Johansen, 16, and his father Per Johansen, who have had a complaint filed against them by a Norwegian corporation with ties to MPAA for being the first to put DeCSS on the Internet. They have been formally interrogated by Norwegian officials and an investigation is underway to determine if the complaint against them has merit. Jon's computer equipment and Nokia cellphone were seized for searching (yes, the phone held files). Jon is an adept hacker and participated in online discussions about DeCSS, and might or might not know who authored the program. Some news accounts and MPAA allege that Jon is the author but it is clear from mail list archives and his denieals that he is not. A squeeze of Jon and his father appears to be underway to reveal the author or to find leads on Jon's equipment. For an informative interview of Jon on his involvement in DeCSS and the official investigation see: http://linuxworld.com/linuxworld/lw-2000-01/lw-01-dvd-interview.html Thanks to B for noting my oversight of Jon's exemplary role. From rabbi@quickie.net Fri, 4 Feb 2000 19:55:59 -0500 (EST) Date: Fri, 4 Feb 2000 19:55:59 -0500 (EST) From: L. Sassaman rabbi@quickie.net Subject: [PGP]: Re: Food for Thawte [PGP integration] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On Fri, 4 Feb 2000, Frederick Wamsley wrote: > > >Also, Thawte should actually sign the user's existing keyids, rather than > >creating new keyids. This obfuscates the keyring data and is simply > >annoying, for there is no reason to do signing the way that they do. > > > I remember that they raised my eyebrows with that approach, but why > is it the wrong thing to do? It creates unnecessary cruft on the user's key-ring, mainly, and makes it hat much more confusing to determine the signers a key has. > Thawte's obeying the principle of signing only what they know. If you > claim to be somebody and they ping your address, they only know > your address. In that situation, isn't it better for them to sign a > "Thawte Freemail Member" ID than to have them sign an existing > key ID with a low-assurance key? Suppose it were a masquerade. Why? A low assurance key would be marked as such, and properly disrgarded by people who did not trust it. Though the "Freemail Member" uid doesn't bother me. It is the actual, full name certification that I have a problem with. The main keyid should be the one to bear the signature. > Wouldn't you hate to be Thawte in the position of explaining "Yeah, > we signed it without verifying the name, but we *said* we weren't sure"? Again, a signature by a key saying "Zero Level Trust" or some such imparts just that: zero trust (except for the fact that they do ping the email address.) But again, I don't see this as the problem. It is the next point that I would like to see changed. > For the higher levels, where they do know your name, they could indeed > check the primary ID and sign it if it matches the information they have > on file. For a primary ID as straightforward as yours it should even be > possible to automate the recognition that "L. Sassaman" is a synonym > for "Leonard Sassaman". But in general, wouldn't it require human > intervention to check that the name in the primary ID really meant the > same as the name in the Thawte WoT database? Not that I'm objecting > to humans, some of my best friends are humans, but they do raise the > cost of everything they touch. RealHumans[tm] at Thawte do intervene every time an ID assertion is made by a notary. The only true automation is with the initial "Thawte Freemail Member" key. Having L. Sassaman examined and determined to be the equivalent of Leondard Harris Sassaman would take no additional effort on the part of Thawte. > The point about poor usability with PGP is well taken. I've got a few > people > on my keyring who have only one valid userID, where the valid userID is > not the primary one. If I try to send encrypted email to such a person, the > valid ID (e..g Thawte Freemail Member ) doesn't show up > in the key selection dialog. I have to manually expand someone's key to > see if any secondary ID's are valid. Icky indeed. Nod. > The point about separate signing keys for different levels of assurance > is well taken too. I have a separate signing key for people like my > relatives and long-term friends, to signal that I have more than just a > driver's license worth of confidence in their identity. It amazes me that they are so obtuse with the idea of security by not signing main key IDs, but have not yet implemented a mechanism for destinguishing between their "0 Point Trust Members" and their "100 Point Trust Members" As I have stated before, I would be very willing to discuss a revamped model of signing with the Thawte folks, so that their PGP verification efforts can be improved. The ball is in their court.. > Fred the information sponge > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------- > To retrieve this thread, e-mail: pgp-users-thread-12770@joshua.rivertown.net > To unsubscribe, e-mail: pgp-users-unsubscribe@joshua.rivertown.net > For additional commands, e-mail: pgp-users-help@joshua.rivertown.net > DO NOT send administrative requests/command to the list! Thanks. > __ L. Sassaman System Administrator | "All of the chaos Technology Consultant | Makes perfect sense..." icq.. 10735603 | pgp.. finger://ns.quickie.net/rabbi | --Joe Diffie -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.0.1 (GNU/Linux) Comment: OpenPGP Encrypted Email Preferred. iD8DBQE4m3UkPYrxsgmsCmoRAlW7AJ9pboWBGHYoitWbQU9kb1kGeF6/3ACg5NDb jR40njbH5c0GGXePorvjD5I= =NcXn -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From padgett@gdi.net Fri, 04 Feb 2000 23:32:51 -0500 Date: Fri, 04 Feb 2000 23:32:51 -0500 From: Padgett 0sirius padgett@gdi.net Subject: [PGP]: Re: Food for Thawte Suspect that the necessary disclosure is just the schema - (x of y keys and valid only inside secure location z). That is how those on this side of the pond do it and is not that difficult. Doubt that anyone really care *who* the "y" people are. One comment though: hasn't history shown that reliance on proprietary things (security by obscurity) just does not work ? (or does only until the right less-than-gruntled employee is found). And companies that rely on such do not last ? In short, why would anyone "trust" someething proprietary when other companies offer the same thing using open and reviewed standards ? btw there may be only one "Bruce" but you can't read his signature. A. Padgett Peterson, P.E., CISSP: Cybernetic Psychophysicist Anti-Virus, Cryptographics, & Antique Radio Researcher http://www.freivald.org/~padgett/index.html mailto:padgett@gdi.net PGP 6.5 Key on request From jya@pipeline.com Sat, 05 Feb 2000 11:10:05 -0500 Date: Sat, 05 Feb 2000 11:10:05 -0500 From: John Young jya@pipeline.com Subject: How Old Is TEMPEST? We are researching a timeline for the history of TEMPEST technology and found an account which claims the earliest discovery of compromising emanations was in 1918 by Herbert Yardley and his American Black Chamber cryptology unit of the military.(1) David Kahn writes in The Codebreakers that Yardley went Europe in 1918 to be instructed on Allies techniques for cryptanalysis and other intelligence tools, in British methods of M.I. 1(b).(2) We would appreciate leads or pointers to information in Great Britain on earliest mentions of TEMPEST technology, in particular any that might reveal whether it might have been the English who told Yardley about it. This is not to discount the possiblity that the 'invention' was made in the US and that Yardley may have informed the Allies of it. We are putting contributions on the timeline at: http://cryptome.org/tempest.old Thanks very much. (1) http://www.tscm.com/TSCM101tempest.html "TEMPEST was 'invented' in 1918 when Herbert Yardley and his staff of the Black Chamber were engaged by the U.S. Army to develop methods to detect, intercept, and exploit covert radio transmitters. The initial research identified that "normal unmodified equipment" was allowing classified information to be passed to the enemy through a variety of technical weaknesses. A classified program was then created to develop methods to suppress these "compromising emanations". However, the actual acronym known as TEMPEST was only coined in the late 60's and early 70's (and is now considered an obsolete term, which has since, been replaced by the phrase "Emissions Security" or EMSEC)." About the author: "James M. Atkinson is one of a small number of people who have been formally certified and trained by the NSA as a TEMPEST Engineer, and Cryptographic Technician. He has extensive experience with the design and development of SIGINT systems to exploit and/or control compromising emanations. Additionally, he has many hours of experience working deep inside highly classified U.S. and NATO cryptographic, communications, and computer systems." (2) The Codebreakers, Chapter 12, p. 354. From proff@iq.org 06 Feb 2000 21:08:18 +1100 Date: 06 Feb 2000 21:08:18 +1100 From: Julian Assange proff@iq.org Subject: [PGP]: FWD: Food for Thawte Bruce writes: > little to gain from this. Doing the same to someone who has control of Thawte's > keys however, would have some serious repercussions. > -- > Bruce Watermeyer > Thawte Certification This is a symptom of the monopolisation of trust, and is one of the reasons CA's have to go. Cheers, Julian. -- Warren Air Force Base in Cheyenne, Wyoming, recorded a message that one of its Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles was about to launch from its silo due to a computer malfunction. To prevent the possible launch, an armored car was parked on top of the silo. - Shaun Gregory, The Hidden Cost of Deterrence: Nuclear Weapons Accidents, Brassey's UK, London, 1990, pp. 181-182. From midgley@mednetics.org Sun, 6 Feb 2000 00:52:52 -0000 Date: Sun, 6 Feb 2000 00:52:52 -0000 From: Adrian Midgley midgley@mednetics.org Subject: Re(2): How Old Is TEMPEST? Did I miss an expansion of the acronym TEMPEST? If so, apologies, and grateful if somebody would ... From proff@iq.org 06 Feb 2000 21:14:16 +1100 Date: 06 Feb 2000 21:14:16 +1100 From: Julian Assange proff@iq.org Subject: [PGP]: Re: Food for Thawte "L. Sassaman" writes: > On Fri, 4 Feb 2000, John Doe Number Two wrote: > > > PS: You might consider adding your surname to your email 'from' line. In > > the world of crypto, there is only one Bruce and you are not him. > > That was uncalled for. And yet unintentionally illustrative. Cheers, Julian -- Warren Air Force Base in Cheyenne, Wyoming, recorded a message that one of its Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles was about to launch from its silo due to a computer malfunction. To prevent the possible launch, an armored car was parked on top of the silo. - Shaun Gregory, The Hidden Cost of Deterrence: Nuclear Weapons Accidents, Brassey's UK, London, 1990, pp. 181-182. From mjdb@dorevale.demon.co.uk Sun, 6 Feb 2000 12:52:10 +0000 (GMT) Date: Sun, 6 Feb 2000 12:52:10 +0000 (GMT) From: M J D Brown mjdb@dorevale.demon.co.uk Subject: How Old Is TEMPEST? On Sat 05 Feb, John Young wrote: > We are researching a timeline for the history of TEMPEST > technology and found an account which claims the earliest > discovery of compromising emanations was in 1918 by > Herbert Yardley and his American Black Chamber > cryptology unit of the military.(1) > > David Kahn writes in The Codebreakers that Yardley went > Europe in 1918 to be instructed on Allies techniques for > cryptanalysis and other intelligence tools, in British > methods of M.I. 1(b).(2) The earliest mention of TEMPEST effects that I can recall relates to the interception by earth loop leakage of enemy field telephone conversations in late-1914. Prior to WW1, field telephones were connected using a single core insulated cable and earth return via ground spikes. This halved the weight and bulk of telephone cable to be laid; important considerations when keeping mobile brigade headquarters connected to rear divisional headquarters. The British Army used horse-drawn cable wagons from which cable could be laid at a full gallop; the most prized crew position being that of the horseman whose task was to guide the cable safely onto the top of a hedgerow or into a roadside ditch by means of a stick with a metal loop on its end. After the initial manoeuvres, WW1 quickly settled into static field siege warfare on the Western Front, in which units of the opposing sides were often entrenched within a very few hundred yards of each others' positions. As artillery fire direction became more important, telephone connections extended down to battalion/regimental level in the forward dugouts. It was very soon discovered that there was considerable crosstalk on field telephone circuits and that some of what could be heard emanated from the enemy side. Listening posts were quickly established to exploit the effect, using well-spaced earth spike pickups to maximise the strength of the intercepted signals. At the same time, of course, protective measures both procedural and technical were introduced; the latter including a massive programme to convert all field telephone circuits to a twin core cable configuration. All of the foregoing from memory of Major-General R F H Nalder's "History of the Royal Corps of Signals". I cannot recall the publication date, but probably middle-1950s, since I last saw a copy in 1964. The USA did not enter the WW1 until 1917, and I do not recall ever reading of any UK/USA intelligence cooperation prior to that date. Thus it seems improbable that the US Army could claim invention of TEMPEST technology per se, though there is no reason to dispute that Yardley and his colleagues were working in the radio effects field in 1918. It would be interesting to hear more about exactly what they were exploiting or protecting against; I think it would be too early for them to be direction-finding on superheterodyne oscillator signals radiated from spies' radio receivers. Regards to all, Mike. -- M J D Brown: Newhaven, Peterchurch, Herefordshire HR2 0RT, England From padgett@gdi.net Sun, 06 Feb 2000 10:08:55 -0500 Date: Sun, 06 Feb 2000 10:08:55 -0500 From: Padgett 0sirius padgett@gdi.net Subject: [PGP]: FWD: Food for Thawte > one of its Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles was > about to launch from its silo due to a computer malfunction. To > prevent the possible launch, an armored car was parked on top of > the silo. Given our level of efficiency they probably parked on the wrong silo... A. Padgett Peterson, P.E., CISSP: Cybernetic Psychophysicist Anti-Virus, Cryptographics, & Antique Radio Researcher http://www.freivald.org/~padgett/index.html mailto:padgett@gdi.net PGP 6.5 Key on request From bill@dial.pipex.com Sun, 6 Feb 2000 15:49:39 -0000 Date: Sun, 6 Feb 2000 15:49:39 -0000 From: Bill Thompson bill@dial.pipex.com Subject: Lottery To Run On PC Technology -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 It seems (http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/business/newsid_632000/632723.stm) that Bill Gates/Microsoft are to work with Richard Branson's proposed 'People's Lottery' to provide technology to run the draw on, assuming Branson's bid is successful. Gates told Breakfast With Frost: "The lottery terminals in the past have not used PC technology and there hasn't been a way of leveraging all the things which are going on with the internet'. So presumably we should all be re-reading our copies of Ross's paper on how to cheat at the lottery, looking forward to the day when the local newsagent's terminal is running Windows 2000 and we can buy tickets direct over the Web. With MS's crypto making sure it's all safe and secure. Am I the only one to be worried by this? Bill Thompson -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGPfreeware 6.5.1 Int. for non-commercial use iQA/AwUBOJ2XiVNT/DkNet0bEQLRzgCg2SkP5qZh6nwzohzD058AethwwxwAmgKc T4DVjPzd0UAADtD2NFlMm6ML =q6OY -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From brian.gladman@btinternet.com Sun, 6 Feb 2000 16:37:29 -0000 Date: Sun, 6 Feb 2000 16:37:29 -0000 From: Brian Gladman brian.gladman@btinternet.com Subject: Lottery To Run On PC Technology From: "Bill Thompson" To: "Ukcrypto@Maillist. Ox. Ac. Uk" Sent: Sunday, February 06, 2000 3:49 PM Subject: Lottery To Run On PC Technology [snip] > Gates told Breakfast With Frost: "The lottery terminals in the past > have not used PC technology and there hasn't been a way of leveraging > all the things which are going on with the internet'. So presumably > we should all be re-reading our > copies of Ross's paper on how to cheat at the lottery, looking > forward to the > day when the local newsagent's terminal is running Windows 2000 and > we can buy > tickets direct over the Web. With MS's crypto making sure it's all > safe and secure. > > Am I the only one to be worried by this? > > Bill Thompson > No - I groaned as well when this was said - high functionality, low assurance lottery terminals - just what we need. Richard Branson's claim that he would be able to create a millionaire a day may be right but not quite in the way he expects! Brian From hcorn@cix.co.uk Sun, 6 Feb 2000 18:42 +0000 (GMT Standard Time) Date: Sun, 6 Feb 2000 18:42 +0000 (GMT Standard Time) From: Peter Sommer hcorn@cix.co.uk Subject: Lottery To Run On PC Technology Sounds utterly unthought-out. Is the aim that *newsagents* will have PC-based lottery terminals or that *every* Internet-connected PC becomes a lottery terminal the moment it logs on to a National Lottery web-site? If the latter, how, among other things, are they going to prevent under-age purchase? |-> Peter Sommer -------------------------------------------------->| |-> hcorn@cix.co.uk P.M.Sommer@lse.ac.uk ------------------------->| |-> Academic URL: http://csrc.lse.ac.uk/People/SommerP/SommerP.htm ->| |-> Commercial URL: http://www.virtualcity.co.uk ------------------>| From 1tc@hehe.com Sun, 06 Feb 00 13:57:54 EST Date: Sun, 06 Feb 00 13:57:54 EST From: 1tc@hehe.com 1tc@hehe.com Subject: CHECK THIS OUT!!! THE NUDE CELEBRITY COLLECTION!!! Are You Tired of Spending Countless Hours Searching for Pictures of Nude Celebrities? Well The Search is Over!!!!!! Celebrite Nudes CD-Rom with 640+ Meg of Images Over 8500 Different Images Plus Many Extras!!! This CD-ROM contains some of the Hottest Actresses, Playboy Centerfolds, Singers, Models, and every Other Celebrity out there. Don't waste your time searching the net for pay sites when all you need is this CD. The CD includes over 640 Megs of different pictures with pictures of celebrities such as, Shannon Tweed, Uma Thurman, Virginia Madsen, Winona Ryder,Alice Krieg, Annett O'Toole, Angela Bassett, Anne Archer,Bridgette Fonda, Patricia Arquette, Penelope Anne Miller, Robin Wright, Salma Hayek, Vivica Fox, Leeza Gibbons, Sandra Bernhard, Diane Sawyer, Princess Di, Gennifer Flowers, Fergie, Angie Everhart, Anna Nicole Smith, The Barbi Twins, Bo Derek, Christie Brinkley, Christy Turlington, Cindy Crawford, Claudia Schiffer, Danielle House, Elle McPhearson, Jenny McCarthy, Jessica Hahn, Kate Moss, Kathy Ireland, Naomi Campbell, Niki Taylor, Pam Anderson, Stacy Sanches, Tawny Kitean, Tyra Banks, Vendela Kiirsenbaum, Booke Shields, Carol Alt, Paula Barbieri, Rebecca Romijn, Barbi Benton, Carmen Electra, Cline Dion, Cher, Courtney Love, Daisy Fuentes, Janet Jackson, Jewel, Lita Ford, Madonna, Mariah Carey, Samatha Fox, Spice Girls, Toni Braxton, Vaness Williams, Barbara Streisand, Fem 2 Fem, Stevie Nicks, TLC, Donna D'Errico, Gina Lee Nolin, Nicole Eggert, Yasmine Bleeth, Sharon Stone, Geena Davis, Halle Berry, Jennifer Lopez, Julia Roberts, Lauren Holly, Linda Hamilton, Lolita Davidovich, Marilu Henner, Marisa Tomei,Marla Maples Trump, Mary Elizabeth Masterantonio, Donna Mills, Heather Locklear, Kim Delaney, Linda Carter, Lucy Lawless, Nicolette Sheridan, Shannon Doherty, Tori Spelling, Gillian Anderson, Jennie Garth, Neve Campbell, Vanna White, Alicia Silverstone, Alyssa Milano, Goldie Hawn, Jennifer Anniston, Suzanne Sommers, Tiffany Amber-Thiessen, Christina Applegate, Courtney Cox, Julia- Lewis Dreyfuss, Lisa Kudrow, Phoebe Cates, Robin Givens, Ashley Judd, Bridgett Nielson, Cameron Diaz, Daryll Hannah, Demi Moore, Drew Barrymore, Elizabeth Shue, Farrah Fawcett, Gwyneth Paltrow, Jamie Lee Curtis, Jane Seymour, Jodie Foster, Kate Winslett, Kelly Preston, Kim Bassinger, Linda Carter, Live Tyler, Meg Ryan, Melanie Griffith, Michelle Pfeiffer, Natasha Kinski, Nicole Kidman, Renee Russo, Rosanna Arquette, Sandra Bullock, Whitney Houston, Adrienne Barbeau, Marilyn Monroe, Meryl Streep, Natalie Wood, Raquel Welch, Sophia Loren, Grace Kelley, Cheryl Tiegs, Monica Seles, Stefi Graf, Tonya Harding, Katarina Whitt, Maria Shriver and so much more. How could you go wrong? There are many many more on this CD. If I tried to name them all, I would still be typing. For all you Picture editors, there is a Fake Photos section on the cd. With over 8500 pictures to work with, you can come up with some pretty crazy pics. Also Included in This Great Collection is the Infamous Pamela and Tommy Lee Videos. Besides just having Pamela and Tommy Lee, the CD has a video section including videos of Jennifer Connelly, Lea Thompson, Patty Ford, Appolonia, Teri Hatcher, Jamie Lee Curtis, Alyssa Milano, Anna Nicole Smith, Jenny McCarthy, and Erika Elaynik. For a Bonus, there is a program included on the CD to make Screen Savers. With over 8500 pictures the options are limitless. There are many Nude Celebrity CD-ROMS on the Web, but this is by far the Biggest and the Best Collection out there. Cash, Checks, and Money Orders Accepted. You Must Be 18 Years or Older To Purchase this CD!!! Also Available: Nude Celebrity Videos, Collection # 1 & Collection # 2. Purchase each CD for $10.00 + $2.00 (U.S.) shipping & handling, or take advantage of This Great Offer: Purchase All 3 CD's for Only $29.95 (U.S) & Your Shipping & Handling is FREE!!! Please fill out the order form below and specify which CD's you are ordering. QUANTITY S&H TOTAL NUDE CELEBRITIES: COLLECTION #1 : COLLECTION #2 : TOTAL AMOUNT of PURCHASE: ___________ Please send concealed cash, check, or money order for your purchase of the above cd's to: P. Calderone P.O. Box 205 Brodheadsville, PA 18322-205 U.S.A. INTERNATIONAL ORDERS, PLEASE ADD $3.00 (U.S.) FOR ADDITIONAL SHIPPING & HANDLING. P.S. PLEASE INCLUDE YOUR E-MAIL ADDRESS Thank You & Have a Nice Day :o) This message complies with the proposed United States Federal requirements for commercial e-mail bill, Section 301. Per Section 301, Paragraph (a) (2) (c) of S.1618, further transmissions to you by the sender of this e-mail may be stopped at no cost to you by sending a reply to this e-mail on the subject line,or the above address for you to be removed from our mailing list. For additional info., see: http://www.senate.gov/~murkowski/commercialemail/EMailAmendText. html DUE TO CERTAIN RESTRICTIONS, THIS PRODUCT IS NOT AVAILABLE IN THE STATE OF WASHINGTON. From nigel@titley.com Mon, 07 Feb 2000 00:14:15 +0000 Date: Mon, 07 Feb 2000 00:14:15 +0000 From: Nigel Titley nigel@titley.com Subject: Lottery To Run On PC Technology Bill Thompson wrote: > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > Hash: SHA1 > > It seems > (http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/business/newsid_632000/632723.stm) > that Bill Gates/Microsoft are to work with Richard Branson's proposed > 'People's > Lottery' to provide technology to run the draw on, assuming Branson's > bid > is successful. > > Gates told Breakfast With Frost: "The lottery terminals in the past > have not used PC technology and there hasn't been a way of leveraging > all the things which are going on with the internet'. So presumably > we should all be re-reading our > copies of Ross's paper on how to cheat at the lottery, looking > forward to the > day when the local newsagent's terminal is running Windows 2000 and > we can buy > tickets direct over the Web. With MS's crypto making sure it's all > safe and secure. > > Am I the only one to be worried by this? Well, given that I've always regarded the lottery as a tax on stupidity, I can't say I'm overly worried. Nigel Titley From Q.G.Campbell@newcastle.ac.uk Mon, 7 Feb 2000 09:03:18 +0000 (GMT) Date: Mon, 7 Feb 2000 09:03:18 +0000 (GMT) From: Quentin Campbell Q.G.Campbell@newcastle.ac.uk Subject: Food for Thawte On Fri, 4 Feb 2000, Brian Morrison wrote: > >And this will not change until we can have a high degree of confidence in > >the security properties of operating systems, which I believe is a long way > >off. > > And of course one has to ask why OS security is so poor thus far. Some > people sticking their oars in methinks. > Brian Yes, but not in the way that you imply. Who needs spooks medling when you have MS designers, managers and system engineers doing a better job without realising it! Brian Gladman's point is well made as anyone with a practical or academic background in OS design, maintenance and development will tell you. OS security was a problem well before networks were in (common) use. There are members of this list who taught me operating system design principles as an under-graduate almost 30 years ago and the security problems they described then are still with us today. Quentin -- PHONE: +44 191 222 8209 Computing Service, University of Newcastle FAX: +44 191 222 8765 Newcastle upon Tyne, United Kingdom, NE1 7RU. ------------------------------------------------------------------------- "Any opinions expressed above are mine. The University can get its own." From I.Brown@cs.ucl.ac.uk Mon, 07 Feb 2000 09:55:36 +0000 Date: Mon, 07 Feb 2000 09:55:36 +0000 From: Ian Brown I.Brown@cs.ucl.ac.uk Subject: Some fun viewing for tonight... Privacy International Director to Host BBC Documentary PI Director General Simon Davies will present a prime-time television documentary on BBC2 at 7.30 PM, Monday February 7. "The Death of Privacy" explores a range of surveillance techniques, including Automatic Face Recognition, communications interception and database matching. The program also describes attempts to establish a UK national DNA database supplied with samples from traffic offenders and illegal protesters. Davies also spends time offering some subversive techniques to undermine privacy invasion. A web forum will follow the show at http://www.bbc.co.uk/knowledge About Privacy International Privacy International (PI) is a human rights group formed in 1990 as a watchdog on surveillance by governments and corporations. PI is based in London, England, and has an office in Washington, D.C. PI has conducted campaigns throughout the world on issues ranging from wire tapping and national security activities, to ID cards, video surveillance, data matching, police information systems, and medical privacy. More information on Privacy International is available at: http://www.privacyinternational.org/ From Rodney.Tillotson@ukerna.ac.uk Mon, 07 Feb 2000 10:56:23 +0000 Date: Mon, 07 Feb 2000 10:56:23 +0000 From: Rodney Tillotson Rodney.Tillotson@ukerna.ac.uk Subject: How Old Is TEMPEST? At 12:52 06/02/2000, Mike Brown wrote: > ... Prior to WW1, field telephones ... > ... The British Army used horse-drawn cable wagons ... I am not unspeakably ancient but I did this -- in the early 1960s, in the school Cadet Force along the lanes of Sussex and with teams of highly-trained runners instead of a horse. The handsets were 1939-45 or later and I believed at the time that single-wire working had been current practice during that war. > It was very soon discovered that there was considerable crosstalk > on field telephone circuits ... That too. No hint to the enthusiastic youngsters that twin-wire was normal in the field. Rodney. From donald@ramsbottom.co.uk Mon, 07 Feb 2000 12:38:52 +0000 Date: Mon, 07 Feb 2000 12:38:52 +0000 From: Donald Ramsbottom donald@ramsbottom.co.uk Subject: DVD -deCSS Court case SNIP > >It was in the California court that CSS, a trade secret, was mistakenly >filed as an exhibit to a plaintiff declaration as an open public record >and was then subsequently sealed after the error was revealed by >publishing the open document on the Web. > >The order to seal is applicable only to members of the bar and >court officials who are forbidden to copy CSS. The order does not apply >to any citizen who may freely copy the court record and CSS, nor >does the order apply to the online version (which we can report >as the host has been downloaded now 70,000 times). > >Beyond this nutshell I'd better not go, for the technical and >legal issues involve interpretations beyond my abilities -- but >not beyond my stupid convictions: we continue to offer DeCSS >on our site, and remain one of 521 defendants in the California >case. Not yet sued in New York, our majestic squat. > John, or anyone else who may know, What was the Court URL for the Calfiornian case? was it actually the Court who posted the exhibit to the declaration, or was it a third party obtaining a copy and then posting it. It is academic now I know, but it would be interesting if it were the Court as the de facto position is that the code has been published and is irretreivably in the public domain and even if the de jure position is different the claim would appear to unsustainable, especially if it were the Courts mistake or even better if the Plaintiff did not make it clear that the documentation was in camera. Just more musings which may or may not help. I do not know whether there is a "Spycatcher" defence available in Ca but with 70,000 downloads from a single site out of 521 known sites, if ever there was a case for it, it is this one. Perhaps a US/Ca Lawyer could comment. Donald Ramsbottom LL.B, BA (Hons). RAMSBOTTOM & Co. Solicitors Internet Law & Global Cryptology Law Specialists From jya@pipeline.com Mon, 07 Feb 2000 08:42:59 -0500 Date: Mon, 07 Feb 2000 08:42:59 -0500 From: John Young jya@pipeline.com Subject: DVD -deCSS Court case Donald Ramsbottom wrote: >What was the Court URL for the Calfiornian case? was it actually the Court >who posted the exhibit to the declaration, or was it a third party obtaining >a copy and then posting it. I don't believe the California Court has put any of the case documents online; if it has I would appreciate learning where. As far as I know, Cryptome was the first to put the declaration online, but there may have been others who did so, for several defendants were sent hardcopies by the plaintiffs. The copy to Cryptome was sent anonymously shortly after the court filing. Because we are not cryptographers we did not realize the significance of the CSS revelation until someone called attention to it on Slashdot a few days later and all hell broke loose with a tsunami of downloads. Based inaccurate notations on the CSS hardcopy I suspect that Mr. Hoy or his attorneys did not fully understand what code the exhibit revealed. According to those at the hearing to seal, the plaintiffs did not know of the error until news reports appeared; the court denied plaintiffs' request to order online removal. I have not seen a transript of the hearing. The impact of the disclosure will be contested before or during trial. The plaintiffs claim (in the press) that the mistake is insignificant; because the document now has been sealed, the trade secret remains properly protected and should not be publicized. Defendants claim open publication has undermined the trade secret. I've been told that the court is obliged to keep public records open, and once made public cannot be totally closed to public access. This is not the first weirdness of crypto law: In the Karn v. US suit involving digital versions of the algorithms in Bruce Schneier's "Applied Cryptography," the US has refused to officially permit online publication even though the files have been available online in Europe for over two years. I understand that the US position is that no matter the fact of foreign availability, permission has not been officially granted, thus any US online publication would be illegal. (Phil Karn says that a letter of permission is due shortly in response to latest US crypto export regs.) From ijackson@chiark.greenend.org.uk Mon, 7 Feb 2000 14:02:26 +0000 (GMT) Date: Mon, 7 Feb 2000 14:02:26 +0000 (GMT) From: Ian Jackson ijackson@chiark.greenend.org.uk Subject: Lottery To Run On PC Technology Nigel Titley writes ("Re: Lottery To Run On PC Technology"): > Well, given that I've always regarded the lottery as a tax on > stupidity, I can't say I'm overly worried. This is getting rather off-topic, but actually the lottery is an overpriced source of hope for those who otherwise have little or none. Or, to put it another way, playing the lottery is only stupid if your utility function for money has certain shapes, which are not the only possible sensible ones. People who already have good prospects (like most of those here on this list) are much more likely to have utility functions where playing the lottery is not helpful, but that doesn't extrapolate to the rest of society. Ian. From richard@turnpike.com Mon, 7 Feb 2000 14:47:18 +0000 Date: Mon, 7 Feb 2000 14:47:18 +0000 From: Richard Clayton richard@turnpike.com Subject: Food for Thawte -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 In article <002101bf6efc$2788bd70$30a8ac3e@fortytwo>, Brian Gladman writes >Where I have found a need to know the something about a cyberspace entity >that I am dealing with is when I visit an e-commerce site from which I want >to make a purchase. Here I do want to know that when I visit a site that >purports to be 'Company X's' site really is their site and not some crooked >outfit masquerading as them. I am less concerned about a mere visit. But my concern would rise if I was starting to consider placing an order or passing over some personal information to them. >For a number of reasons I may have come to >trust the 'real world' company even though I have no real world relationship >with them and I do want to know that this trust will carry over into >cyberspace. And, in contrast with my relationships with people, I will >often have no easy way of confirming the relationship between the real world >company and its cyberspace 'alter ego'. I agree that this relationship issue is a real problem... >When this is looked at in more detail what I really want from any >countersignature on an e-commerce site certificate is not identity >information but rather a guarantee from the counter-signatory that if >anything goes wrong in my transactions with the site they will underwrite >any losses or damage that I may incur. I want their couter-signature >signature not to underwrite identity as such (although this is of some value >here) but rather to carry insurance covering my risks. ... and that this is a possible practical response. However, I suspect that is going to push up the cost of such certificates considerably - there are many things that can go wrong with transactions besides giving your credit card number to an imposter, and I suspect that getting the small print right (viz: to engender trust in the consumer whilst excluding non-impersonation issues) is going to be complex. I am unconvinced that what ECommerce needs right now is higher costs of entry - which is what such certificates would mean. Another way of looking at Brian's point that identity certification is of limited value - is to look at one real example (and one could find thousands more, I found this one almost immediately when I looked). This example shows pretty clearly that identity per se is not especially useful: Let us suppose that you would like to purchase a game online from Electronics Boutique (whose shops one can see on many High Streets). A few moments with a search engine will lead you to www.eb.uk.com which is (a little clicking will show you) apparently owned by EB Stores Group Ltd. a company I had never heard of before and which, despite its grand title could be run by almost anyone. Is this or is this not the UK web site for "Electronics Boutique" ? I think I can answer that in the affirmative. The reason for that is that I believe that I have recognised their trade mark. Mind you... when I avoid the search engine and just try using the DNS as a search engine I then find a completely different site at www.electronicsboutique.com (redirected to www.ebworld.com). This is in fact the US site - and it has a pretty seal on it issued by Verisign. I can find no link on it to a UK site, and the top levels of the UK site appear to be a secret from Verisign as well... but at least the trademark looks the same... so perhaps one loses trust in Americans to believe in other countries rather than losing trust in the identity of the UK site. So to recap on this -- my trust, such as I need it to look at the site, seems to depend on the trademark and little else! If, however, I proceed to buy something, then, hidden away behind the scenes, my faith in the https: server can be placed in Verisign and British Telecommunications plc. (this is "trustwise", of which a certain amount has been written on this list). This might cheer one up (BT have issued a class 3 certificate), but of course all they have done is to verify that EB Stores Group Ltd are a real company, known to Dun and Bradstreet and contactable on the telephone. They have NOT attested to any relationship between that company and my friendly High Street shop. Perhaps what is needed to boost confidence is for the certificates to be issued to record the validity of (and permission to use) the trademark rather than certifying the identity of the merchant - which it turns out one never knew in the first place. However, is this actually a real problem ? In the High Street there would be rapid action if an imposter started copying store-fronts - the laws of passing-off and trademark infringement would be wheeled out as soon as anyone noticed. Similar action would be taken if an imposter started sending mailshots which plied for trade under false pretences. ie: commerce seems to have moved into other areas without having to build new infrastructures to support the use of trademarks in these new areas. Is cyberspace really so much faster and complex that we need to swap everything round and have the user doing the due diligence checks, whether these be on identity or trademarks or membership of ABTA or adherence to some E-Trust scheme ? Strong encryption does seem to make such things possible (though you need to concentrate on what was _actually_ proved) - but some days I think we're guilty of using a technology because we can, rather than because we actually need to. >Carl Ellison, Nicholas Bohm and I have a paper covering aspects of this >issue at: http://jya.com/bg/digsig.pdf and Carl and Bruce Schneier have >written recently about the PKI issues in particular. The paper is good, I was pleased to be prompted to reread it. - -- richard writing to inform and not as company policy fewer than 20 MPs still need adopting: http://www.stand.org.uk/ "Assembly of Japanese bicycle require great peace of mind" quoted in ZAMM -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGPsdk version 1.7.1 iQA/AwUBOJ7a9jH5BMWRRATGEQLSKwCdHwzNZ/NssDk6xljUZKXkHhD9GIIAnia8 eScS8IgJ8XJS/sp4++chz3KN =9tCa -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From ben@algroup.co.uk Mon, 07 Feb 2000 14:47:13 +0000 Date: Mon, 07 Feb 2000 14:47:13 +0000 From: Ben Laurie ben@algroup.co.uk Subject: RSA flier? Does anyone have a copy of the RSA flier going about with a picture of a car on the front, in which the scurrilous claim that free software is not supported or maintained is made? I had one, but its, err, in use by the ASA. :-) Cheers, Ben. -- SECURE HOSTING AT THE BUNKER! http://www.thebunker.net/hosting.htm http://www.apache-ssl.org/ben.html Y19100 no-prize winner! http://www.ntk.net/index.cgi?back=2000/now0121.txt From donald@ramsbottom.co.uk Mon, 07 Feb 2000 15:51:13 +0000 Date: Mon, 07 Feb 2000 15:51:13 +0000 From: Donald Ramsbottom donald@ramsbottom.co.uk Subject: DVD -deCSS Court case SNIP >I don't believe the California Court has put any of the case documents >online; if it has I would appreciate learning where. > OK, I surmise that if JY does not know, then it was never put up by the Court. >Because we are not cryptographers we did not realize the significance >of the CSS revelation until someone called attention to it on Slashdot >a few days later and all hell broke loose with a tsunami of downloads. >Based inaccurate notations on the CSS hardcopy I suspect that Mr. Hoy >or his attorneys did not fully understand what code the exhibit >revealed. Now this is interesting as if the attorneys exhibited the code without realising its significance, then (if they were based in the UK)they (the attorneys) would be potentially negligent. Now if I were those lawyers I'd be checking my professional indemnity insurance, as the MAP would then have a potential claim against them which could produce some real money rather than the absurd sabre rattling which is currently acheiving nothing other than make MAP look a little silly by locking the stable door aftert the horse (or code) has bolted. This would also get the executives at MAP off the hook because they could blame the debacle on the attorneys! > >According to those at the hearing to seal, the plaintiffs did not know of >the error until news reports appeared; the court denied plaintiffs' request >to order online removal. I have not seen a transript of the hearing. Would anyone care to post a copy of the transcript if they have it, or email it to me if they are worried. > >The impact of the disclosure will be contested before or during trial. >The plaintiffs claim (in the press) that the mistake is insignificant; >because >the document now has been sealed, the trade secret remains properly >protected and should not be publicized. Defendants claim open >publication has undermined the trade secret. I've been told that >the court is obliged to keep public records open, and once made >public cannot be totally closed to public access. The Djinn is out of the bottle. In the UK HMG were forced to stop their action in the Spy catcher case as it was patently absurd to continue. > >This is not the first weirdness of crypto law: In the Karn v. US suit >involving digital versions of the algorithms in Bruce Schneier's >"Applied Cryptography," the US has refused to officially permit online >publication even though the files have been available online in >Europe for over two years. I understand that the US position is that >no matter the fact of foreign availability, permission has not been >officially granted, thus any US online publication would be illegal. >(Phil Karn says that a letter of permission is due shortly in response >to latest US crypto export regs.) I have this case somewhere and will dig it out. But what we really need is a friendly US attorney to give a more informed opinion. Any takers out in cryptoland? Donald Ramsbottom LL.B, BA (Hons). RAMSBOTTOM & Co. Solicitors Internet Law & Global Cryptology Law Specialists From nbohm@ernest.net Mon, 07 Feb 2000 15:58:38 +0000 Date: Mon, 07 Feb 2000 15:58:38 +0000 From: Nicholas Bohm nbohm@ernest.net Subject: Food for Thawte In article <002101bf6efc$2788bd70$30a8ac3e@fortytwo>, Brian Gladman writes >Where I have found a need to know the something about a cyberspace entity >that I am dealing with is when I visit an e-commerce site from which I want >to make a purchase. Here I do want to know that when I visit a site that >purports to be 'Company X's' site really is their site and not some crooked >outfit masquerading as them. > >I am less concerned about a mere visit. But my concern would rise if I >was starting to consider placing an order or passing over some personal >information to them. > >>For a number of reasons I may have come to >>trust the 'real world' company even though I have no real world relationship >>with them and I do want to know that this trust will carry over into >>cyberspace. And, in contrast with my relationships with people, I will >>often have no easy way of confirming the relationship between the real world >>company and its cyberspace 'alter ego'. > >I agree that this relationship issue is a real problem... > >>When this is looked at in more detail what I really want from any >>countersignature on an e-commerce site certificate is not identity >>information but rather a guarantee from the counter-signatory that if >>anything goes wrong in my transactions with the site they will underwrite >>any losses or damage that I may incur. I want their couter-signature >>signature not to underwrite identity as such (although this is of some value >>here) but rather to carry insurance covering my risks. > >.... and that this is a possible practical response. > >However, I suspect that is going to push up the cost of such >certificates considerably - there are many things that can go wrong with >transactions besides giving your credit card number to an imposter, and >I suspect that getting the small print right (viz: to engender trust in >the consumer whilst excluding non-impersonation issues) is going to be >complex. > >I am unconvinced that what ECommerce needs right now is higher costs of >entry - which is what such certificates would mean. > >Another way of looking at Brian's point that identity certification is >of limited value - is to look at one real example (and one could find >thousands more, I found this one almost immediately when I looked). > >This example shows pretty clearly that identity per se is not especially >useful: > > Let us suppose that you would like to purchase a game online from > Electronics Boutique (whose shops one can see on many High Streets). > > A few moments with a search engine will lead you to www.eb.uk.com > which is (a little clicking will show you) apparently owned by EB > Stores Group Ltd. a company I had never heard of before and which, > despite its grand title could be run by almost anyone. > > Is this or is this not the UK web site for "Electronics Boutique" ? > > I think I can answer that in the affirmative. The reason for that is > that I believe that I have recognised their trade mark. > >Mind you... when I avoid the search engine and just try using the DNS as >a search engine I then find a completely different site at >www.electronicsboutique.com (redirected to www.ebworld.com). > >This is in fact the US site - and it has a pretty seal on it issued by >Verisign. I can find no link on it to a UK site, and the top levels of >the UK site appear to be a secret from Verisign as well... but at least >the trademark looks the same... so perhaps one loses trust in Americans >to believe in other countries rather than losing trust in the identity >of the UK site. > >So to recap on this -- my trust, such as I need it to look at the site, >seems to depend on the trademark and little else! > >If, however, I proceed to buy something, then, hidden away behind the >scenes, my faith in the https: server can be placed in Verisign and >British Telecommunications plc. (this is "trustwise", of which a certain >amount has been written on this list). This might cheer one up (BT have >issued a class 3 certificate), but of course all they have done is to >verify that EB Stores Group Ltd are a real company, known to Dun and >Bradstreet and contactable on the telephone. They have NOT attested to >any relationship between that company and my friendly High Street shop. > >Perhaps what is needed to boost confidence is for the certificates to be >issued to record the validity of (and permission to use) the trademark >rather than certifying the identity of the merchant - which it turns out >one never knew in the first place. > >However, is this actually a real problem ? > >In the High Street there would be rapid action if an imposter started >copying store-fronts - the laws of passing-off and trademark >infringement would be wheeled out as soon as anyone noticed. > >Similar action would be taken if an imposter started sending mailshots >which plied for trade under false pretences. > >ie: commerce seems to have moved into other areas without having to >build new infrastructures to support the use of trademarks in these new >areas. > >Is cyberspace really so much faster and complex that we need to swap >everything round and have the user doing the due diligence checks, >whether these be on identity or trademarks or membership of ABTA or >adherence to some E-Trust scheme ? > >Strong encryption does seem to make such things possible (though you >need to concentrate on what was _actually_ proved) - but some days I >think we're guilty of using a technology because we can, rather than >because we actually need to. > >>Carl Ellison, Nicholas Bohm and I have a paper covering aspects of this >>issue at: http://jya.com/bg/digsig.pdf and Carl and Bruce Schneier have >>written recently about the PKI issues in particular. > >The paper is good, I was pleased to be prompted to reread it. > >-- >richard writing to inform and not as company policy > fewer than 20 MPs still need adopting: http://www.stand.org.uk/ >"Assembly of Japanese bicycle require great peace of mind" quoted in ZAMM > > >*** END PGP VERIFIED MESSAGE *** > > > Regards, Nicholas Bohm Salkyns, Great Canfield, Takeley, Bishop's Stortford CM22 6SX, UK Phone 01279 871272 (+44 1279 871272) Fax 01279 870215 (+44 1279 870215) Mobile 07715 419728 (+44 7715 419728) PGP RSA 1024 bit public key ID: 0x08340015. Fingerprint: 9E 15 FB 2A 54 96 24 37 98 A2 E0 D1 34 13 48 07 PGP DSS/DH 1024/3072 public key ID: 0x899DD7FF. Fingerprint: 5248 1320 B42E 84FC 1E8B A9E6 0912 AE66 899D D7FF From nbohm@ernest.net Mon, 07 Feb 2000 16:05:45 +0000 Date: Mon, 07 Feb 2000 16:05:45 +0000 From: Nicholas Bohm nbohm@ernest.net Subject: Food for Thawte [Replaces previous message sent in error] In article <002101bf6efc$2788bd70$30a8ac3e@fortytwo>, Brian Gladman writes >Where I have found a need to know the something about a cyberspace entity >that I am dealing with is when I visit an e-commerce site from which I want >to make a purchase. Here I do want to know that when I visit a site that >purports to be 'Company X's' site really is their site and not some crooked >outfit masquerading as them. This assumes you have some useful knowledge of Company X (satisfactory to you) to start with. If so, you have probably been to their shops or bought from their website before. Both types of visit could (if retailers got the hang of it) enable you to note their public key fingerprint/id. Then you can later check you're dealing with the same person (or someone else in control of the same private key). Certificates seem to be a side issue. Regards, Nicholas Bohm Salkyns, Great Canfield, Takeley, Bishop's Stortford CM22 6SX, UK Phone 01279 871272 (+44 1279 871272) Fax 01279 870215 (+44 1279 870215) Mobile 07715 419728 (+44 7715 419728) PGP RSA 1024 bit public key ID: 0x08340015. Fingerprint: 9E 15 FB 2A 54 96 24 37 98 A2 E0 D1 34 13 48 07 PGP DSS/DH 1024/3072 public key ID: 0x899DD7FF. Fingerprint: 5248 1320 B42E 84FC 1E8B A9E6 0912 AE66 899D D7FF From brian.gladman@btinternet.com Mon, 7 Feb 2000 18:12:01 -0000 Date: Mon, 7 Feb 2000 18:12:01 -0000 From: Brian Gladman brian.gladman@btinternet.com Subject: Food for Thawte From: "Nicholas Bohm" To: Sent: Monday, February 07, 2000 4:05 PM Subject: Re: Food for Thawte > [Replaces previous message sent in error] > > In article <002101bf6efc$2788bd70$30a8ac3e@fortytwo>, Brian Gladman > writes > [snip] > This assumes you have some useful knowledge of Company X (satisfactory to > you) to start with. If so, you have probably been to their shops or bought > from their website before. Both types of visit could (if retailers got the > hang of it) enable you to note their public key fingerprint/id. Then you > can later check you're dealing with the same person (or someone else in > control of the same private key). > > Certificates seem to be a side issue. > In large measure I agree with you but I stop short of saying that certificates are of no value. As you suggest, when I deal with a company both 'in the high street' and in cyberspace I have a real world relationship that can provide the basis to establish a link to their cyberspace 'alter ego'. This is the easy case - certificates offer nothing here since both I and the company can exchange our keys without need for third parties. But what do I do when the only relationship I have with a company is in cyberspace? This is a real situation since I already buy computer hardware, software and books from US companies with which I have no real world relationship and I do take a risk in doing this. In the long term both I and the company can develop trust in each other and this will allow us to develop trust in the authentication keys that we have exchanged without certificates. Initially, however, there are risks. Hence it would be nice to have a way of trusting them from the outset and here I do see a possible value in certificates of a particular form. In this specific situation, if a third party company that I do know and trust provided a certificate which carried meaning: 'if you have any problems, financial or otherwise, in undertaking an electronic transaction with this company, we will fully compensate you' then I would derive some value from it. However, this certificate has ***nothing*** to do with identity - it is an authorisation certificate that gives the company I am dealing with the authorisation to trade with me under the terms of an insurance policy offerred by a third party. However, this certificate has nothing to do with identity and since the only thing that goverments and much of the CA industry seem interested in are identity linked certificates we seem to be in a state of complete disconnect! So I agree with your assessment - certificates as they are seen by the UK government, by the EU (i.e. the recent Directive) and by much of the CA industry are very much a side issue. I am just pleading for people to avoid translating 'identity linked certificates are a side issue for electronic commerce' into 'all forms of certificate are a side issue for electronic commerce'. Brian From Ian.Johnson@uwe.ac.uk Mon, 07 Feb 2000 18:20:03 +0000 Date: Mon, 07 Feb 2000 18:20:03 +0000 From: Ian Johnson Ian.Johnson@uwe.ac.uk Subject: Food for Thawte Richard Clayton wrote: > > >When this is looked at in more detail what I really want from any > >countersignature on an e-commerce site certificate is not identity > >information but rather a guarantee from the counter-signatory that if > >anything goes wrong in my transactions with the site they will underwrite > >any losses or damage that I may incur. I want their couter-signature > >signature not to underwrite identity as such (although this is of some value > >here) but rather to carry insurance covering my risks. > > ... and that this is a possible practical response. > > However, I suspect that is going to push up the cost of such > certificates considerably - there are many things that can go wrong with > transactions besides giving your credit card number to an imposter, and > I suspect that getting the small print right (viz: to engender trust in > the consumer whilst excluding non-impersonation issues) is going to be > complex. > > I am unconvinced that what ECommerce needs right now is higher costs of > entry - which is what such certificates would mean. Ross wrote a paper I remember reading where talking about banking practice he stressed the issue of "who has the liability". For *most* consumer ecommerce transactions, digital signatures are a red herring. I want to know I'll either get the goods I've ordered, or not get charged - a standard customer not present cc transaction. Whilst it would be useful to clarify some areas of the law in particular the jurisdiction that a transaction occurs in, together with v.a.t/duty issues, a system already exists which is fine for most consumers, if only they weren't scaremongered (e.g. the egg card advert). The cost of entry at this level should and could be trivial. Business to business transactions are a different issue however, as are some other personal transactions (electronic wills? land transfers?). I do feel however that a lot of smoke is being generated by marketing types who emphasise the importance of "brands" which is essentially what we're discussing verifying. Who cares? If a company has the product you want for sale at a price you're happy with, and if the trader is fraudulent you have no liability to pay, what else is needed? Or am I missing something? regards, Ian -- Ian Johnson Tel : +44 117 965 6261 x3167 Faculty of CSM, UWE Bristol Email: irj@acm.org Frenchay Campus, Bristol. BS16 1QY. UK. From ben@algroup.co.uk Mon, 07 Feb 2000 18:59:50 +0000 Date: Mon, 07 Feb 2000 18:59:50 +0000 From: Ben Laurie ben@algroup.co.uk Subject: Food for Thawte Brian Gladman wrote: > But what do I do when the only relationship I have with a company is in > cyberspace? This is a real situation since I already buy computer hardware, > software and books from US companies with which I have no real world > relationship and I do take a risk in doing this. In the long term both I > and the company can develop trust in each other and this will allow us to > develop trust in the authentication keys that we have exchanged without > certificates. Initially, however, there are risks. > > Hence it would be nice to have a way of trusting them from the outset and > here I do see a possible value in certificates of a particular form. In > this specific situation, if a third party company that I do know and trust > provided a certificate which carried meaning: 'if you have any problems, > financial or otherwise, in undertaking an electronic transaction with this > company, we will fully compensate you' then I would derive some value from > it. > > However, this certificate has ***nothing*** to do with identity - it is an > authorisation certificate that gives the company I am dealing with the > authorisation to trade with me under the terms of an insurance policy > offerred by a third party. I'd argue that linking a key with a company's identity is valuable in itself: it provides you with a target for legal action. It is not necessary for the CA to also engage in insurance, any more than Companies House does! Cheers, Ben. -- SECURE HOSTING AT THE BUNKER! http://www.thebunker.net/hosting.htm http://www.apache-ssl.org/ben.html Y19100 no-prize winner! http://www.ntk.net/index.cgi?back=2000/now0121.txt From padgett@gdi.net Mon, 07 Feb 2000 18:37:18 -0500 Date: Mon, 07 Feb 2000 18:37:18 -0500 From: Padgett 0sirius padgett@gdi.net Subject: Food for Thawte >> >And this will not change until we can have a high degree of confidence in >> >the security properties of operating systems, which I believe is a long way >> >off. Of course then there is the question of whether any OS the has not been made available for public scrutiny will ever be secure. Of course there are ways to achieve a realsonable level of security in any system: 1) servers on a dedicated subnet, no users allowed 2) servers only aaccessable from console 3) one server per service (good place for "obsolete" machines that user's won't touch). Gennerally need only open one port 4) other services removed from server (easy with UNIX, hard but often possible with NT) 5) strict ACL on the subnet, allow only service to specific server. No ICMP, No UDP (can be done). 6) IP spoofing disallowed in ACL 7) router console accessable only In other words, an internal DMZ (and a firewall instead of a router would not hurt). This provide two layers of security for the server farm alone, a good start for "Defense in Depth" OBCrypto - am going around with Netscape about flushing the keys from a CMS 4.1 server when not in use (are retained in memory even when unattended). Problem is the people at Netscape do not seem to understand why caching the keys is not a good idea (machine must remain up to receive requests/dispense certs 24/7 but only generates keys when attended. Can use two servers, shadow on special DMZ and real one offline (current solution) or hardware smart cards. First is not bad at root level but need something simple/cheap at company/program level. Easy/cheap solution might be A/B switch for floppy/network. Keys on floppy & memory flushed before switching back (layer three). Problem is the flush process being n/a. Opinions ? A. Padgett Peterson, P.E., CISSP: Cybernetic Psychophysicist Anti-Virus, Cryptographics, & Antique Radio Researcher http://www.freivald.org/~padgett/index.html mailto:padgett@gdi.net PGP 6.5 Key on request From donald@ramsbottom.co.uk Tue, 08 Feb 2000 09:04:46 +0000 Date: Tue, 08 Feb 2000 09:04:46 +0000 From: Donald Ramsbottom donald@ramsbottom.co.uk Subject: JY and DeCSS and MAP I suppose that it was inevitable, MAP have now descended on John Young and the Cryptome site. Below is the address of the letter he received from MAP. http://cryptome.org/dvd-mpaa-ccd.htm Below are some extracts which show that MAP far from trying to extract themselves from the stupidity of what they have done already, seem to be intent on proceeding even further and digging themselves into an even deeper hole. So let us see what they are demanding of John. >The Superior Court of Santa Clara County, California also recently granted a Preliminary >Injunction against the Internet posting >of DeCSS. Thankfully we have to be in their jurisdiction for this to apply. >If you are bound by an injunction, maintaining the DeCSS utility on your system or network >violates the above injunction[s] and >risks court sanctions for contempt. Usually fines but can be and/or imprisonment. Note this does not say publish a copy on the website, but mereley "maintain a copy on your system or network" This is not what the injunctions say. >We hereby demand that you: Don't you just love polite enquiry. > 1. take appropriate steps to cause immediate removal of DeCSS from the above identified >URL, along with such > other actions as may be necessary or appropriate to suspend this illegal activity; I am not sure what this means, the removal is clear enough, but such other actions etc, what are they and whose opinion are they necessary and appropriate? I suppose the obvious annswer and "the only way to be sure" is to shut down the site. > 2. provide appropriate notice to the subscriber or account holder responsible for the >presence of DeCSS on your > system or network, advising him/her of the contents of this notice and directing that >person to contact the > undersigned immediately at the e-mail address provided above; This is fair enough, apart from the "directing" bit. > > 3. advise us of the name and physical address of the person operating this site; and WHoah, there is nothing about this in the injunction, (which is to stop something happening by act/or ommission), allowing them to demand third party details. But as usual give them an inch and they will take a mile. This could be YOU. > > 4. maintain, and take whatever steps are necessary to prevent the destruction of, all records, including electronic > records, in your possession or control respecting this URL, account holder or subscriber. Ah so they also want the names and addresses of the third party and you are not allowed to exercise your right to destroy this info.It is not their data, but they are trying make it so. Again I have seen the injunctions and this edict is not included in the same. For the avoidance of doubt the NY Injunction says: "Defendants Shawn C. Reimerdes, Eric Corley a/k/a "Emmanuel Goldstein" and Roman Kazan, their officers, agents, servants, employees and attorneys and all persons in active concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of this order by personal service or otherwise be and they hereby are enjoined and restrained, pending the hearing and final determination of this action from: (a) posting on any Internet web site, or in any other way manufacturing, importing or offering to the public, providing, or otherwise trafficking in DeCSS, and (b) posting on any Internet web site, or in any other way manufacturing, importing or offering to the public, providing, or otherwise trafficking in any technology, product, service, device, component, or part thereof, that...." Also note that you have to have actual notice by personal service for the injunction to apply. >Thank you for your cooperation in this matter. Your immediate response is requested. Nice and polite at the end. What are MAP actually doing here, well they have an injunction against named persons in two states to prevent the dissemination of a bit of code known as DeCSS. As I understand it this code mereley allows DVDs to be played on a Linux based system and does not have all the attributes which have been assigned to it by MAP. As the arguements are technical and because the defendants do not have the resources of MAP, MAP have been able to hoodwink the Courts with scaremongering of piracy and billions of lost dollars. This is evidenced by Judge Kaplans "preliminary opinion" published 04.02.00 part of the conclusion of which states: >There is little room for doubting that broad >dissemination of DeCSS would seriously injure or destroy plaintiffs' ability to distribute their >copyrighted products on DVDs and, for that matter, undermine their ability to sell their products to >the "home video" market in other forms. The potential damages probably are incalculable, and these >defendants surely would be in no position to compensate plaintiffs for them if plaintiffs were remitted >only to post hoc damage suits. As can be seen from this extract the court may have been mislead somewhat as to the nature of the code in question. If it were a windows based decoder they **may** have an arguement, but linux is only used by a very small percentage as the OS on PCs. In any event it also ignores the fact that the code has already been widely disseminated as JY has told us in a previous post, 70,000 downloads in a few days from one site out of 512 sites in a single state. Why does all this matter to UKcrypto, because you can bet we (in UK) will be the first place outside US (other than Norway) where MAP tries to impose its will on the net and our Laws on the subject will probably allow for search and seizure of equipment and data. I would have thought the dissemination to date would allow a public domain defence, but you never know. Enough rambling, we all ought to give John and others such support as we are able. If that means technical help then post it up I am sure it will get through to the right parties in the end. Rant over. Donald Ramsbottom LL.B, BA (Hons). RAMSBOTTOM & Co. Solicitors Internet Law & Global Cryptology Law Specialists From I.Brown@cs.ucl.ac.uk Tue, 08 Feb 2000 10:10:45 +0000 Date: Tue, 08 Feb 2000 10:10:45 +0000 From: Ian BROWN I.Brown@cs.ucl.ac.uk Subject: Food for Thawte Brian wrote: >Hence it would be nice to have a way of trusting them from the outset and >here I do see a possible value in certificates of a particular form. In >this specific situation, if a third party company that I do know and trust >provided a certificate which carried meaning: 'if you have any problems, >financial or otherwise, in undertaking an electronic transaction with this >company, we will fully compensate you' then I would derive some value from >it. SET could actually do this for financial problems. If a website has a merchant certificate signed (directly or transitively) by Visa or Mastercard, in effect the credit card company is saying "our normal rules apply in your transactions with this company" -- goods delivered or no debit made to your account. Other areas might be more interesting. For instance, a privacy policy guarantee certificate that says "This merchant follows the rules of [EU data protection law][US safe harbor proposals][Better Business Bureau privacy program]..." etc. etc. and, more importantly, that the certificate issuer is able to follow up breaches with fines, public disclosure etc. *may* be useful. As Brian and Carl Ellison have said, certificates are fine if they come from an authority on the area they claim to certify. One of the problems with identity certificates is that CAs are *not* authorities on people's names: only you know who "Bob Jones" links to in your own individual namespace. But a credit card association *is* an authority on the behaviour of its member companies, because they would be expelled from the association just as a first step, followed no doubt by massive legal action, if the membership conditions were broken. And as Ben Laurie suggested, "this website->company name->address where documents can be served" certificates would be useful to provide a target for legal action. Companies House would be the authority there... Not that I'm suggesting that the UK government gets involved in certification again!!!! Ian :) From nbohm@ernest.net Tue, 08 Feb 2000 10:43:33 +0000 Date: Tue, 08 Feb 2000 10:43:33 +0000 From: Nicholas Bohm nbohm@ernest.net Subject: Food for Thawte At 06:12 PM 2/7/2000 -0000, Brian Gladman wrote: >From: "Nicholas Bohm" >> [Replaces previous message sent in error] >> >> In article <002101bf6efc$2788bd70$30a8ac3e@fortytwo>, Brian Gladman >> writes >> >[snip] >> This assumes you have some useful knowledge of Company X (satisfactory to >> you) to start with. If so, you have probably been to their shops or >bought >> from their website before. Both types of visit could (if retailers got >the >> hang of it) enable you to note their public key fingerprint/id. Then you >> can later check you're dealing with the same person (or someone else in >> control of the same private key). >> >> Certificates seem to be a side issue. >> > >In large measure I agree with you but I stop short of saying that >certificates are of no value. > >As you suggest, when I deal with a company both 'in the high street' and in >cyberspace I have a real world relationship that can provide the basis to >establish a link to their cyberspace 'alter ego'. This is the easy case - >certificates offer nothing here since both I and the company can exchange >our keys without need for third parties. > >But what do I do when the only relationship I have with a company is in >cyberspace? This is a real situation since I already buy computer= hardware, >software and books from US companies with which I have no real world >relationship and I do take a risk in doing this. In the long term both I >and the company can develop trust in each other and this will allow us to >develop trust in the authentication keys that we have exchanged without >certificates. Initially, however, there are risks. > >Hence it would be nice to have a way of trusting them from the outset and >here I do see a possible value in certificates of a particular form. In >this specific situation, if a third party company that I do know and trust >provided a certificate which carried meaning: 'if you have any problems, >financial or otherwise, in undertaking an electronic transaction with this >company, we will fully compensate you' then I would derive some value from >it. When a UK person uses a credit card in a UK (and perhaps overseas) transaction, the card issuer is jointly liable with the merchant for breach of the transaction contract (under the Consumer Credit Act) within certain financial limits (between =A3100 and =A315,000, from memory but not confidently). This isn't quite the width of cover you describe (although it's not bad). If extended to debit as well as credit cards, and with the doubt as to overseas transactions removed, it would do well enough for most purposes. What is interesting about this is that the card issuer is indeed issuing a sort of certificate for the merchant. And since you carry the card, you presumably trust the origin of the certificate (and could look at the issuer's key fingerprint as appearing in your monthly statement, for= example). There is much useful and usable certificate infrastructure in place. Most of the problems seem to come from attempts to reinvent what already exists, and to use it for unsuitable purposes, and perhaps to shift the balance of risks so far established. [snip] Regards, Nicholas Bohm Salkyns, Great Canfield, Takeley, Bishop's Stortford CM22 6SX, UK Phone 01279 871272 (+44 1279 871272) Fax 01279 870215 (+44 1279 870215) Mobile 07715 419728 (+44 7715 419728) PGP RSA 1024 bit public key ID: 0x08340015. Fingerprint: 9E 15 FB 2A 54 96 24 37 98 A2 E0 D1 34 13 48 07 PGP DSS/DH 1024/3072 public key ID: 0x899DD7FF. Fingerprint: 5248 1320 B42E 84FC 1E8B A9E6 0912 AE66 899D D7FF From nbohm@ernest.net Tue, 08 Feb 2000 10:55:48 +0000 Date: Tue, 08 Feb 2000 10:55:48 +0000 From: Nicholas Bohm nbohm@ernest.net Subject: Food for Thawte At 10:10 AM 2/8/2000 +0000, Ian BROWN wrote: [snip] >As Brian and Carl Ellison have said, certificates are fine if they come from >an authority on the area they claim to certify. One of the problems with >identity certificates is that CAs are *not* authorities on people's names: >only you know who "Bob Jones" links to in your own individual namespace. But a >credit card association *is* an authority on the behaviour of its member >companies, because they would be expelled from the association just as a first >step, followed no doubt by massive legal action, if the membership conditions >were broken. One might hope so; but primarily the card issuer's guarantee of the merchant is what would do the card holder most good. >And as Ben Laurie suggested, "this website->company name->address where >documents can be served" certificates would be useful to provide a target for >legal action. Companies House would be the authority there... Not that I'm >suggesting that the UK government gets involved in certification again!!!! In fact that's what it does and should do, in carefully limited contexts. Companies House can certify an address as the registered office (although it can't certify that you'll get anything even if you sue successfully). More usefully, the Land Registry can certify the name of the owner of land (and does), with a government guarantee against error. The problem tends to come when you try to be sure that you are dealing with the person named (which is the real question addressed by the concept of "identity": are two entities the same). Regards, Nicholas Bohm Salkyns, Great Canfield, Takeley, Bishop's Stortford CM22 6SX, UK Phone 01279 871272 (+44 1279 871272) Fax 01279 870215 (+44 1279 870215) Mobile 07715 419728 (+44 7715 419728) PGP RSA 1024 bit public key ID: 0x08340015. Fingerprint: 9E 15 FB 2A 54 96 24 37 98 A2 E0 D1 34 13 48 07 PGP DSS/DH 1024/3072 public key ID: 0x899DD7FF. Fingerprint: 5248 1320 B42E 84FC 1E8B A9E6 0912 AE66 899D D7FF From Ross.Anderson@cl.cam.ac.uk Tue, 08 Feb 2000 11:21:07 +0000 Date: Tue, 08 Feb 2000 11:21:07 +0000 From: Ross Anderson Ross.Anderson@cl.cam.ac.uk Subject: Food for Thawte > Ross wrote a paper I remember reading where talking about banking > practice he stressed the issue of "who has the liability". See http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/#Reliability and pick up `Liability and Computer Security - Nine Principles'. This was written halfway through the Munden case and presented at ESORICS 94 in Brighton. Three definitions of trust: Bob Morris / NSA : a trusted system is one which, when it breaks, can break your security policy Roger Needham: a trusted system is one which, when it breaks, doesn't get you fired (i.e., in the old days it was bought from IBM, now from Microsoft :-) Ross Anderson: a trusted system is one which can be insured so that you don't lose out financially when it breaks. A lot of the third type exist: * use an approved burglar alarm and get the insurance company to carry the residual risk; * get Bankers' Bond insurance to cover your bank against internal fraud and computer crime by passing an insurance inspection * use an approved credit card terminal, if you're a merchant, and have your credit card acquirer carry the risk of fraud * ... My own view is that what's sauce for the gander is sauce for the goose. If these are the terms of business expected by banks and merchants generally, and by Joe Public in his role of householder - then why should Joe Public in his role as credit card user and online shopper have to put up with less? Much as I'd like to sell a billion copies of the security engineering book I'm writing, so that there's a copy next to every PC and TV set-top box, it's unreasonable to expect it! Ross From nick.battle@icl.com Tue, 08 Feb 2000 11:27:57 +0000 Date: Tue, 08 Feb 2000 11:27:57 +0000 From: Nick Battle nick.battle@icl.com Subject: Some fun viewing for tonight... Ian Brown wrote: > PI Director General Simon Davies will present a prime-time television > documentary on BBC2 at 7.30 PM, Monday February 7. "The Death of > Privacy" [snip] > A web forum will follow the show at http://www.bbc.co.uk/knowledge Did anything interesting come up at the web forum? Cheers, -nick From junger@samsara.law.cwru.edu Tue, 08 Feb 2000 07:06:59 -0500 Date: Tue, 08 Feb 2000 07:06:59 -0500 From: Peter D. Junger junger@samsara.law.cwru.edu Subject: Deceptive demands by MPAA I have cross-posted this to the CYBERIA and ukcrypto lists. I hope that those of you who receive duplicate copies will forgive me. I have just read the demand that was sent by the Motion Picture Association of America to John Young, the maintainor of the invaluable Cryptome site: . In their demand letter the MPAA recite the following facts: On January 20, 2000, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted a Preliminary Injunction prohibiting the Internet posting or other provision of DeCSS, having found that DeCSS was a prohibited circumvention device within the meaning of §1201(a)(2) and that the offering, providing or trafficking of DeCSS on the Internet violated §1201(a)(2). That court thus enjoined: Posting on any Internet web site, or in any other way manufacturing, importing or offering to the public, providing, or otherwise trafficking in DeCSS, and (b) posting on any Internet web site, or in any other way manufacturing, importing or offering to the public, providing, or otherwise trafficking in any technology, product, service, device, component, or part thereof, that: (i) is primarily designed or produced for the purpose of circumventing, or circumvention the protection afforded by, CSS, or any other technological measure that effectively controls access to plaintiffs' copyrighted works or effectively protects the plaintiffs' rights to control whether an end user can reproduce, manufacture, adapt, publicly perform and/or distribute unauthorized copies of their copyrighted works or portions thereof. . . The Superior Court of Santa Clara County, California also recently granted a Preliminary Injunction against the Internet posting of DeCSS. And then they say, not untruthfully, If you are bound by an injunction, maintaining the DeCSS utility on your system or network violates the above injunction[s] and risks court sanctions for contempt. And finally they demand that John Young do all sorts of things that he would in most cases not be bound to do were he bound by one of the injunctions. What I find very disturbing is that the MPAA does not quote the portion of the SDNY's preliminary injunction that says who is bound to obey the language that they do quote, for if they had quoted that language it would have been clear that John Young is not bound in anyway by that injunction, which is, by its express terms and by the provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, binding only on named parties and their agents and others acting in concert with them. (Nor do they mention that John Young is not a party to the California suit.) Now after quoting the courts order, the MPAA just says ``if you are bound by an injunction'' and does not say that John Young is bound by one of the injunctions in question, although that is the clear implication of the rest of their letter, considering that there would be no basis for their demands were John not bound. To say directly that John is bound by either of the preliminary injunctions would be to tell a lie. To suggest it is, if not a lie, at least an effort to deceive. This seems to me to be a clear case of deliberately using misleading language to deceive John Young and other non-parties who received similar letters. I suppose that is why the demand comes from MPAA and not its attorneys, whom I hope would be, though I fear would not be, subject to sanctions if they had sent such a letter. -- Peter D. Junger--Case Western Reserve University Law School--Cleveland, OH EMAIL: junger@samsara.law.cwru.edu URL: http://samsara.law.cwru.edu NOTE: junger@pdj2-ra.f-remote.cwru.edu no longer exists From Q.G.Campbell@newcastle.ac.uk Tue, 8 Feb 2000 12:20:46 +0000 (GMT) Date: Tue, 8 Feb 2000 12:20:46 +0000 (GMT) From: Quentin Campbell Q.G.Campbell@newcastle.ac.uk Subject: Some fun viewing for tonight... On Tue, 8 Feb 2000, Nick Battle wrote: > > PI Director General Simon Davies will present a prime-time television > > documentary on BBC2 at 7.30 PM, Monday February 7. "The Death of > > Privacy" > [snip] > > A web forum will follow the show at http://www.bbc.co.uk/knowledge > > Did anything interesting come up at the web forum? What is interesting is that (so far) 76.4% of respondents to the "Virtual Vote" have answered "NO" to the question: Do you think law enforcement agencies should be monitoring our emails, faxes, and phone calls to help fight crime and terrorism? I suspect that the sample who have responded is small and not repre- sentative of voters at large. However, if it is a representative sample then the response is intriguing indeed! Quentin -- PHONE: +44 191 222 8209 Computing Service, University of Newcastle FAX: +44 191 222 8765 Newcastle upon Tyne, United Kingdom, NE1 7RU. ------------------------------------------------------------------------- "Any opinions expressed above are mine. The University can get its own." From Q.G.Campbell@newcastle.ac.uk Tue, 8 Feb 2000 12:52:18 +0000 (GMT) Date: Tue, 8 Feb 2000 12:52:18 +0000 (GMT) From: Quentin Campbell Q.G.Campbell@newcastle.ac.uk Subject: Some fun viewing for tonight... (fwd) Owen Blacker has asked me to forward the following response to the list. QGC --- UK Crypto post follows --- Quoting Quentin Campbell : > What is interesting is that (so far) 76.4% of respondents to the > "Virtual Vote" have answered "NO" to the question: > > Do you think law enforcement agencies should be monitoring our > emails, faxes, and phone calls to help fight crime and terrorism? > > I suspect that the sample who have responded is small and not repre- > sentative of voters at large. However, if it is a representative > sample then the response is intriguing indeed! The only available answers were Yes and No, however -- I voted No, but would have voted "Yes, but with strict oversight" or some such answer, had it been available. As any Market Research person will tell you, the trick of getting useful statistics is to ask the right question... :o/ ----- Owen Blacker Senior Internet Developer and Internet Security Consultant pres.co (working off site) DSS: 0x7e3c8eab | 2f45 c60d 6a0a 0007 193d d994 cd36 e021 7e3c 8eab RSA: 0x38fee6c3 | 7c41 e69c 5b8a 484d 22af 1859 f4c9 307b From ACR@als.co.uk Tue, 8 Feb 2000 14:38:22 -0000 Date: Tue, 8 Feb 2000 14:38:22 -0000 From: Alan Ramsbottom ACR@als.co.uk Subject: JY and DeCSS and MAP > From: Donald Ramsbottom [mailto:donald@ramsbottom.co.uk] > If it were a windows based decoder Oops.. DeCSS is Windows based. The author blamed a lack of Linux support for UDF (a filesystem used on DVDs) when DeCSS was developed. -Alan- From donald@ramsbottom.co.uk Tue, 08 Feb 2000 16:21:06 +0000 Date: Tue, 08 Feb 2000 16:21:06 +0000 From: Donald Ramsbottom donald@ramsbottom.co.uk Subject: JY and DeCSS and MAP At 14:38 08/02/00 -0000, you wrote: >> From: Donald Ramsbottom [mailto:donald@ramsbottom.co.uk] > >> If it were a windows based decoder > >Oops.. DeCSS is Windows based. > >The author blamed a lack of Linux support for UDF (a filesystem used on >DVDs) when DeCSS was developed. > >-Alan- > > Big, oops, but thats what you get for doing things first thing before the first coffee kicks in. Seriously it does not alter what I said that much. Owen has a had a good point regarding the dissemination of data of third parties in the demand in that it would contravene the Data protection Act (the demand of MAPs lawyers) as well as the European directives on data protection. Peter has put some of my ravings more eloquently in his posting. These are basically that the injunction is against named and served persons, and there is no requirement that even those named persons have to give up information about their confederates. The defendants have to stop publishing the code on the net and that is all. The letter is a meant to frighten and coerce. I suspect John will not be intimidated, but many others may be. Incidentally in the UK it may be a contempt to state or imply that a court order has a certain effect when you know that it does not have that effect. I wonder what the position is in NY/CA? It is also bad practice a s a solicitor to threaten something which you have no instructions to do or threaten something unlawful. As the letter seems to be requiring unlawful demands it may be that it would contravene the state bar rules.Probably not but possible. Donald Ramsbottom LL.B, BA (Hons). RAMSBOTTOM & Co. Solicitors Internet Law & Global Cryptology Law Specialists From s.simpson@mia.co.uk Tue, 8 Feb 2000 15:51:06 +0000 Date: Tue, 8 Feb 2000 15:51:06 +0000 From: Simpson, Sam s.simpson@mia.co.uk Subject: JY and DeCSS and MAP (Sorry if this question is gibberish...) A quick question: Doesn't it make sense for as many people as possible to mirror the sites, even if it is their intention to promptly remove the site once they receive a "cease and desist" letter? Also, is it recommended that indeed people do act upon these cease and desist letters? Cheers, Sam Simpson Communications Analyst -- http://www.scramdisk.clara.net/ for ScramDisk hard-drive encryption & Delphi Crypto Components. PGP Keys available at the same site. > -----Original Message----- > From: Donald Ramsbottom [mailto:donald@ramsbottom.co.uk] > Sent: 08 February 2000 15:39 > To: ukcrypto@maillist.ox.ac.uk > Subject: RE: JY and DeCSS and MAP > From I.G.Batten@ftel.co.uk Tue, 8 Feb 2000 16:00:46 GMT Date: Tue, 8 Feb 2000 16:00:46 GMT From: Ian G Batten I.G.Batten@ftel.co.uk Subject: JY and DeCSS and MAP This is a multi-part message in MIME format... ------------=_950025642-6535-0 Content-Type: text/plain Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Md5: JMV+a2h8oihIBUh9uQu+3g== > Thankfully we have to be in their jurisdiction for this to apply.=20 Those with an interest in these sorts of things will recall the JET Report saga. http://www.xs4all.nl/~yaman/jetusa.htm, for example. ian ------------=_950025642-6535-0 Content-Type: application/pgp-signature Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Content-Description: PGP Information -----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE----- Version: PGPfreeware 5.0i for non-commercial use MessageID: hDdim0yse9fhMrqsjNHQsG5FtQCvT5x3 iQB1AwUBOKA9qsoy0yij3IvtAQG8KwL9FIGoP0v/8xbZcW3A5QT+p1rZh0sVYkrk EfdXjHxe3ypW/XFlG+cCU86B9LRiVp2VfXkAXBRufoAKeVrKREy6ZYBbP9ezQh1z CMiYMMfqqC5fs3NutARF1eHRcMmVePFB =LbKs -----END PGP MESSAGE----- ------------=_950025642-6535-0-- From whgiii@openpgp.net Tue, 08 Feb 2000 10:38:17 -0600 Date: Tue, 08 Feb 2000 10:38:17 -0600 From: William H. Geiger III whgiii@openpgp.net Subject: JY and DeCSS and MAP In <518DAD95B9CFD111B46500104B42D0C954A797@chastity.als.co.uk>, on 02/08/00 at 02:38 PM, Alan Ramsbottom said: >> From: Donald Ramsbottom [mailto:donald@ramsbottom.co.uk] >> If it were a windows based decoder >Oops.. DeCSS is Windows based. >The author blamed a lack of Linux support for UDF (a filesystem used on >DVDs) when DeCSS was developed. IBM just come out with UDF for OS/2. -- --------------------------------------------------------------- William H. Geiger III http://www.openpgp.net Geiger Consulting Data Security & Cryptology Consulting Programming, Networking, Analysis PGP for OS/2: http://www.openpgp.net/pgp.html --------------------------------------------------------------- From donald@ramsbottom.co.uk Tue, 08 Feb 2000 18:07:28 +0000 Date: Tue, 08 Feb 2000 18:07:28 +0000 From: Donald Ramsbottom donald@ramsbottom.co.uk Subject: JY and DeCSS and MPAA SNIP >> Thankfully we have to be in their jurisdiction for this to apply. > >Those with an interest in these sorts of things will recall the JET >Report saga. http://www.xs4all.nl/~yaman/jetusa.htm, for example. I have just read this and confess I had not seen it before. I can imagine the County Solicitor being told by the County secreatry to "DO SOMETHING" and he did what many solicitors do which was at the behest of the client, fire off a letter full of indignation and threat. I suspect the solictor did not expect to get a reply, much less the reasoned opnion that he did. Notts County Council do not have the resources or will to pursue matters out of the jurisdiction (Unlike MPAA), and the reposte was probably filed quietly away. The MPAA do have the requisite resources to follow up their threats (where legal), and if they could further their cause by say, attempting to shut down this group I have no doubt they would. Sam has a point about disemination in his posting, and the more that do, the more pathetic the MPAA action looks and the less tenable; (there must come a point even in US copyright where the public knowledge of the so called trade secrets is so widespread they cannot sustain their arguement). What you do if you get a letter is a question for individuals. If you have weak nerves, comply for a quiet life, if on the other hand you are happy to "see what happens" then don't. personally I'd be happy to see what happened, but then I'm a lawyer who would like to put certain points in an English Court about what they were trying to do to me. Afterall, I am not a US citizen, I did not write the code or hack it (I am unable to do so), so the only thing that they could try and "pin" on me would be the dissemination in breach of copyright, but as it has been published hundreds of thousands of times by now I suspect they would get short shrift. that is my personal opinion, do not rely on it as defence! I hope there have been sufficient postings to give JY some food for thought, and we should all give him our support (where we can), as it may be not on this issue but another that you or I have need of assistance. Donald Ramsbottom LL.B, BA (Hons). RAMSBOTTOM & Co. Solicitors Internet Law & Global Cryptology Law Specialists From pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz Wed, 9 Feb 2000 06:53:22 (NZDT) Date: Wed, 9 Feb 2000 06:53:22 (NZDT) From: Peter Gutmann pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz Subject: JY and DeCSS and MAP "Simpson, Sam" writes: >A quick question: Doesn't it make sense for as many people as possible to >mirror the sites, even if it is their intention to promptly remove the site >once they receive a "cease and desist" letter? I've had the code (in the form of the Hoy declaration) up on my web page for awhile (http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~pgut001/misc/dvd-hoy-reply.html). The more people that post it, and the more juristictions it appears in, the harder it'll be for the MPAA - they can't fight it in every country on the planet (well, they can try I guess). >Also, is it recommended that indeed people do act upon these cease and >desist letters? I intend to ignore any legal blustering, the chances of them successfully defending a mechanism designed to enforce differential pricing in a New Zealand court is nil (DVD players sold in NZ usually have the region coding disabled because of this, so CSS is meaningless to begin with). On a related topic, has anyone looked at doing a clean-room copy of CSS a la RC2 and RC4 a few years back? I know one or two people have looked at this in an informal manner, but we couldn't find anyone who hadn't already seen the DeCSS code to act as the clean person (it says a lot for the status of their "trade secret" that we couldn't actually find anyone who didn't already know it). Peter. From cb@fipr.org Tue, 8 Feb 2000 18:01:41 -0000 Date: Tue, 8 Feb 2000 18:01:41 -0000 From: Caspar Bowden cb@fipr.org Subject: Want to ask Jack Straw about encryption policy? http://www.newsunlimited.co.uk/jackstraw/0,2759,130850,00.html Need to register with site, with e-mail address check - bit of a palaver. "Home Secretary Jack Straw will be live online here on Wednesday 9 February at 1.15pm for an hour - WHICH IS AN ALTERATION OF THE ORIGINAL TIME OF 12.30PM. You can find out more about his time as Home Secretary - and read an exclusive introduction by Guardian journalist Alan Travis - in a special report at: http://www.newsunlimited.co.uk/jackstraw NB THIS WILL BE A MODERATED DISCUSSION. While you can post your questions now (in fact, the earlier the better), this means they will not appear on screen until the debate begins at 1.15PM on the 9th." -- Caspar Bowden http://www.fipr.org Director, Foundation for Information Policy Research Tel: +44(0)171 354 2333 Fax: +44(0)171 827 6534 From marks@thawte.com Sat, 05 Feb 2000 00:47:08 GMT Date: Sat, 05 Feb 2000 00:47:08 GMT From: Mark Shuttleworth marks@thawte.com Subject: Thawte and Verisign - Important Announcement February 1, 2000 Dear Thawte Customers and Future Customers: In December, VeriSign and Thawte announced their intentions to join forces. We hope this letter addresses any questions you may have about what this will mean for you. Please be assured that none of the things you love most about Thawte will change after the acquisition. This includes: - Low prices for SSL Server and Personal Certificates - The people you have dealt with at Thawte - Our commitment to innovation VeriSign and Thawte are committed to providing a low entry price for sites that wish to conduct secure e-commerce using SSL. In fact, we guarantee that Thawte SSL Server Certificates will continue to be available to both existing and new customers for $125 (or less!) at least through February 1, 2001. This is a firm offer which you can take advantage of at any time during this period. You can print out this page and save it as proof of our guarantee. Furthermore, existing Thawte customers will be entitled to receive substantial discounts if they choose to take advantage of one of VeriSign's premium certificate offerings, such as the VeriSign Secure Site, Secure Site Plus, and Global Site solutions. In addition to providing SSL functionality, these offerings include popular additional features, such as up to $250,000 of NetSure warranty protection, the Secure Site Seal, automated performance monitoring through Keynote, free Web site security scanning through Netcraft, and free listing of your site in the Network Solutions dot.com directory. Look for complete information about this discount program soon on this site. For those of you who enjoy Thawte Personal Freemail certificates, please rest assured that you will still be able to obtain free personal certificates. VeriSign has offered free personal certificates for over 4 years, and we intend to continue that program, as well as Thawte's popular Web of Trust program. Thawte's vetting and support services will remain in place, so that you will still deal with the same people as before when you work with us to purchase and get help with certificates. Furthermore, Thawte and VeriSign have thoroughly reviewed both companies' certificate issuance and support processes. We have identified many areas in which the two companies can learn from each other. By adapting the best aspects of each other's operations and technology, we will be able to deliver even more cost-effective services on a global basis. Thawte and VeriSign have also spent the past few weeks exploring new product strategy for the coming years. Through our relationship, we will be able to offer you a much broader set of complementary products and services to help you enhance your e-commerce site. Working together, Thawte and VeriSign plan to introduce a number of exciting services, including PKI solutions for the Wireless Web and new low-cost payment processing services. VeriSign and Thawte recognize that there are many places where you can obtain a certificate that enables SSL. We hope that you will continue to do business with us now that we have joined forces, as we are convinced that we offer the best service, the best technology, the highest levels of trust, and the best prices across a broad range of solutions. You also have our commitment that we will continue to tell you about our plans for the future of online trust as they develop. If you have any questions or concerns, please feel free to write to either one of us. Sincerely: Mark Shuttleworth, President and CEO Thawte Consulting (Pty) Ltd. marks@thawte.com 12 Plein Street Durbanville 7550 South Africa Stratton Sclavos President and CEO VeriSign, Inc. stratton@verisign.com 1350 Charleston Rd. Mountain View, CA 94043 U.S.A. From junger@samsara.law.cwru.edu Tue, 08 Feb 2000 13:17:10 -0500 Date: Tue, 08 Feb 2000 13:17:10 -0500 From: Peter D. Junger junger@samsara.law.cwru.edu Subject: JY and DeCSS and MPAA Donald Ramsbottom writes: : SNIP : >> Thankfully we have to be in their jurisdiction for this to apply. : > : >Those with an interest in these sorts of things will recall the JET : >Report saga. http://www.xs4all.nl/~yaman/jetusa.htm, for example. : : I have just read this and confess I had not seen it before. I can imagine : the County Solicitor being told by the County secreatry to "DO SOMETHING" : and he did what many solicitors do which was at the behest of the client, : fire off a letter full of indignation and threat. I suspect the solictor did : not expect to get a reply, much less the reasoned opnion that he did. Notts : County Council do not have the resources or will to pursue matters out of : the jurisdiction (Unlike MPAA), and the reposte was probably filed quietly aw : ay. Nottinghamshire County Council had already obtained a restraining order or injunction against the reporters who originally posted the JET report on their web site, from which I, and many others, copied it when informed that the application for an injunction was pending and there was quite a bit of publicity about the matter, so they could not just file my letter away, though they did not, as I recall, respond to it. But they did withdraw their application for an injunction _and agreed to pay part of the defendant's legal fees_. : The MPAA do have the requisite resources to follow up their threats (where : legal), and if they could further their cause by say, attempting to shut : down this group I have no doubt they would. They do not seem to have any good sense as to what would further their cause, although they do have lots of resources. Remember that these are the characters who in the California case filed a copy of the ``trade secrets'' that they are trying to protect in the public court records. : : Sam has a point about disemination in his posting, and the more that do, the : more pathetic the MPAA action looks and the less tenable; (there must come a : point even in US copyright where the public knowledge of the so called trade : secrets is so widespread they cannot sustain their arguement). What you do : if you get a letter is a question for individuals. If you have weak nerves, : comply for a quiet life, if on the other hand you are happy to "see what : happens" then don't. personally I'd be happy to see what happened, but then : I'm a lawyer who would like to put certain points in an English Court about : what they were trying to do to me. Afterall, I am not a US citizen, I did : not write the code or hack it (I am unable to do so), so the only thing that : they could try and "pin" on me would be the dissemination in breach of : copyright, but as it has been published hundreds of thousands of times by : now I suspect they would get short shrift. that is my personal opinion, do : not rely on it as defence! The California case is based on the idea that the widely spread code that they want to suppress is still a ``trade secret'' under the definitions of the California trade secret law. I have difficulty in conceiving how they could charge someone in the UK with violating California trade secret law; perhaps there is a corresponding body of law in the UK that they could proceed under against UK subjects. The New York case is not based on copyright, but on a peculiar provision of the oddly named Digital Millenium Copyright Act that forbids the making of technology, which the Motion Picture Association claims includes the writing and publishing of the source code of computer programs, that can be used to circumvent scrambling and encryptions screens that prevent access to copyrighted materials---including programs that can be used by those who a right to access the copyrighted materials. I find it hard to imagine that the UK courts would be very eager to uphold the application of this Act to the activities of British subjects in the UK. And I doubt that there is any similar statute in force in the UK. Still, there is also the case out of Norway, where the criminal charges against the 16 year old defendant are apparently based on an improbable reading of an ``anti-hacking'' statute. The DeCSS code apparently can be used to hack into the DVD drive on one's own computer, but that is hardly the type of activity that ``anti-hacking'' statutes are intended to prevent. -- Peter D. Junger--Case Western Reserve University Law School--Cleveland, OH EMAIL: junger@samsara.law.cwru.edu URL: http://samsara.law.cwru.edu NOTE: junger@pdj2-ra.f-remote.cwru.edu no longer exists From sxw@dcs.ed.ac.uk Tue, 8 Feb 2000 19:01:56 GMT Date: Tue, 8 Feb 2000 19:01:56 GMT From: Simon Wilkinson sxw@dcs.ed.ac.uk Subject: JY and DeCSS and MPAA > The New York case is not based on copyright, but on a peculiar provision > of the oddly named Digital Millenium Copyright Act that forbids the > making of technology, which the Motion Picture Association claims includes > the writing and publishing of the source code of computer programs, that > can be used to circumvent scrambling and encryptions screens that prevent > access to copyrighted materials---including programs that can be used > by those who a right to access the copyrighted materials. I find it hard > to imagine that the UK courts would be very eager to uphold the application > of this Act to the activities of British subjects in the UK. And I > doubt that there is any similar statute in force in the UK. A UK national did the original work in writing css-cat (the bit of the Linux DVD suite that does the actual decoding). He published this code on a UK web site. He, and his service provider, were then sent a cease and desist order, claiming that the provision was in direct contravention of UK copyright law (specifically sections 296(1) and (2) of the Copyright Designs & Patents Act 1998), which contains a similar restriction on products designed to contravene copyright protection measures. He took down his copy of the css-cat code, and renounced his ownership of it. See : http://livid.on.openprojects.net/pipermail/livid-dev/1999-November/000870.html http://livid.on.openprojects.net/pipermail/livid-dev/1999-November/000876.html http://livid.on.openprojects.net/pipermail/livid-dev/1999-November/000957.html in particular, and other messages in that thread. Cheers, Simon. From brian.gladman@btinternet.com Tue, 8 Feb 2000 21:18:21 -0000 Date: Tue, 8 Feb 2000 21:18:21 -0000 From: Brian Gladman brian.gladman@btinternet.com Subject: JY and DeCSS and MAP From: "Peter Gutmann" To: Sent: Wednesday, February 09, 2000 6:53 AM Subject: Re: JY and DeCSS and MAP > "Simpson, Sam" writes: > > >A quick question: Doesn't it make sense for as many people as possible to > >mirror the sites, even if it is their intention to promptly remove the site > >once they receive a "cease and desist" letter? > > I've had the code (in the form of the Hoy declaration) up on my web page > for awhile (http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~pgut001/misc/dvd-hoy-reply.html). > The more people that post it, and the more juristictions it appears in, the > harder it'll be for the MPAA - they can't fight it in every country on the > planet (well, they can try I guess). > > >Also, is it recommended that indeed people do act upon these cease and > >desist letters? > [snip] Has anyone got any idea what position an ISP would take if a client put this up on their web page and refused to take it down when threatened? I am quite happy to put 'two fingers' up to people who challenge the rights of citizens but increasingly I find that when these 'evil empires' realise that they are on a lost cause in trying to bully someone they will often go for their ISP instead. Having just moved my ISP to take advantage of free weekend access I am not sure that I want to move again since it was traumatic getting everyone to notice that I had moved! If no-one has any answers to this maybe we should all contribute to the formation of some form of virtual web site (is there such a thing?) where we can all contribute this sort of stuff without fear of being got at by groups like the MPAA. Of course we should not have to do this in a sensible society but it would seem that our government has spent far too much time worrying about key escrow and far too little time protecting the rights of citizens and consumers from the evil intentions of groups like the MPAA. Worse than this it seems that our legislators may even have allowed the MPAA to sneek through laws that citizens would never have supported had they known about them. Is this true in the UK or Europe or both? If this is true then it seems that a talk shop like ukcrypto is no longer enough - we need to have an EFF(UK) or something similar with real muscle to fight against these undemocratic business interests before it is too late - if governments won't protect us we have no option but to do it for ourselves. Sort of explains why I shuddered when I heard that, in exchange for giving up key escrow, the UK government has establsihed a situation in which future encryption policy will be determined by a government/industry body with no independent public interest representation. Why is it that we have a government that preaches so continuously about the great benefits of cyberspace but consistently does so little to tackle the really important issues that will determine whether the vision of the information society turns out to be a pleasant dream or a very, very bad nightmare? Brian From Ross.Anderson@cl.cam.ac.uk Tue, 08 Feb 2000 22:08:04 +0000 Date: Tue, 08 Feb 2000 22:08:04 +0000 From: Ross Anderson Ross.Anderson@cl.cam.ac.uk Subject: JY and DeCSS and MAP > when these 'evil empires' realise that they are on a lost cause in > trying to bully someone they will often go for their ISP instead Like when John Major sued the Spectator's distributors after they'd said he was having it off with his cook. So what's new? > If no-one has any answers to this maybe we should all contribute to > the formation of some form of virtual web site (is there such a > thing?) where we can all contribute this sort of stuff without fear of > being got at That's precisely why I invented the Eternity Service. The original paper is at: http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/users/rja14/eternity/eternity.html Some related links are at: http://www.cypherspace.org/links.html There's even a mailing list. Searching my filespace for the somewhat Clint Eastwood-esque phrase `Welcome to Eternity' I find that you should send the message 'subscribe eternity' to: Majordomo@internexus.net The Eternity Service was motivated by the Scientologists' raid on penet.fi, and by my getting served with an injunction by a bank while I was digging out what went wrong with cash machines. Looks like the sooner someone can build and field such a thing, the better :-) Ross From padgett@gdi.net Tue, 08 Feb 2000 18:25:04 -0500 Date: Tue, 08 Feb 2000 18:25:04 -0500 From: Padgett 0sirius padgett@gdi.net Subject: JY and DeCSS and MPAA Am not a lawyer so do not know but how many times does a demand such as the one received need to be repeated to be considered "harassment" if the demand has no merit (but tries to look as if it has) ? A. Padgett Peterson, P.E., CISSP: Cybernetic Psychophysicist Anti-Virus, Cryptographics, & Antique Radio Researcher http://www.freivald.org/~padgett/index.html mailto:padgett@gdi.net PGP 6.5 Key on request From brian.gladman@btinternet.com Tue, 8 Feb 2000 23:55:55 -0000 Date: Tue, 8 Feb 2000 23:55:55 -0000 From: Brian Gladman brian.gladman@btinternet.com Subject: JY and DeCSS and MAP From: "Ross Anderson" To: Sent: Tuesday, February 08, 2000 10:08 PM Subject: Re: JY and DeCSS and MAP [snip] > > That's precisely why I invented the Eternity Service. The original > paper is at: > > http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/users/rja14/eternity/eternity.html > > Some related links are at: > > http://www.cypherspace.org/links.html > [snip] Thanks Ross. While using the links you kindly provided I found the following URL: http://www.anonymizer.com/3.0/services/index.shtml It looks like we should encourage them to offer their services here in the UK! But then maybe its a front company for you know who. Time for Richard to do more of his useful research on 'who's really who' on the Internet? Brian From donald@ramsbottom.co.uk Wed, 09 Feb 2000 07:36:36 +0000 Date: Wed, 09 Feb 2000 07:36:36 +0000 From: Donald Ramsbottom donald@ramsbottom.co.uk Subject: JY and DeCSS and MAP SNIP >Has anyone got any idea what position an ISP would take if a client put this >up on their web page and refused to take it down when threatened? At a guess and for a quiet life they will not want to "rock n roll" with the financial clout of MPAA or its ilk, and will take down the offending site. I suspect that a letter would be sufficient, probably pointing out the analogy that could be drawn with the Godfrey v Demon case. That is we put you on notice to remove the material, if you do not in a reasonable period of time then we will sue you the ISP, and not the offending site who is not worth suing in any event. > >I am quite happy to put 'two fingers' up to people who challenge the rights >of citizens but increasingly I find that when these 'evil empires' realise >that they are on a lost cause in trying to bully someone they will often go >for their ISP instead. Having just moved my ISP to take advantage of free >weekend access I am not sure that I want to move again since it was >traumatic getting everyone to notice that I had moved! Having put it up in the first place is good enough. Donald Ramsbottom LL.B, BA (Hons). RAMSBOTTOM & Co. Solicitors Internet Law & Global Cryptology Law Specialists From donald@ramsbottom.co.uk Wed, 09 Feb 2000 08:23:37 +0000 Date: Wed, 09 Feb 2000 08:23:37 +0000 From: Donald Ramsbottom donald@ramsbottom.co.uk Subject: JY and DeCSS and MPAA >A UK national did the original work in writing css-cat (the bit of the >Linux DVD suite that does the actual decoding). He published this code >on a UK web site. He, and his service provider, were then sent a cease >and desist order, claiming that the provision was in direct >contravention of UK copyright law (specifically sections 296(1) and >(2) of the Copyright Designs & Patents Act 1998), which contains a >similar restriction on products designed to contravene copyright >protection measures. He took down his copy of the css-cat code, and >renounced his ownership of it. S:296A (i) says: where a person has the use of a computer program under an agreement, any term or condition in the agreement is void so far as it purports to prohibit or restrict: (1) The making of any backup copy of the program which it is necesssary for him to have for the purpose of the agreed use. (ii) where the specified conditions are met (s:50 B(2) added later) the decompiling of the program; or (iii) the use of any device or means to observe, study or test the functioning of the program in order to understand the ideas and principles which underlie any element of the program. Other permitted acts or uses may be It is not an infringement of copyright for a lawful user of a copy of a computer program to copy or adapt it, provided that the copying or adapting: (i) is necessary for his lawful use (ii) is not prohibited under any term or condition of an agreement regulating the circumstances in which its use is lawful. The above is from Halsbury laws of England Vol 9(2) para 366 Note there has to a lawful use in the first place so aquiring a copy and decompiling is not covered. So far as Devices designed to circumvent copy-protection: the following applies where copies of a copyright work are issued to the public by or with the licence of the copyright owner in an electronic form which is copy protected, the person issuing the copies to the public has the same rights against a person, who knowing or having reason to believe that it will be used to make infringing copies: (i) makes, imports sells or lets for hire, offers or exposes for sale or hire, or advertises for sale or hire,or, in the case of a computer program only possesses in the course of business , any device or means specifically designed or adapted to circumvent the form of copy protection employed; or (ii) Publishes information intended to enable or assist persons to circumvent that form of copy protection As acopyright owner has in respect of an infringement of copyright. Halsburys Laws of England vol 9(2) para477 Additionally there are rights of search and seizure which I will not go into in detail. in short there are some holes in the above but it covers what has been done. On the bright side at least it's only a civil offence and not criminal. Jon in Norway has not been charged yet but could be. Donald Ramsbottom LL.B, BA (Hons). RAMSBOTTOM & Co. Solicitors Internet Law & Global Cryptology Law Specialists From bdm@fenrir.demon.co.uk Wed, 09 Feb 2000 07:32:14 +0000 (GMT) Date: Wed, 09 Feb 2000 07:32:14 +0000 (GMT) From: Brian Morrison bdm@fenrir.demon.co.uk Subject: JY and DeCSS and MAP -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On Tue, 8 Feb 2000 21:18:21 -0000, Brian Gladman wrote: >Why is it that we have a government that preaches so continuously about the >great benefits of cyberspace but consistently does so little to tackle the >really important issues that will determine whether the vision of the >information society turns out to be a pleasant dream or a very, very bad >nightmare? Well it's either that the policy makers don't understand what they are doing, or that they understand only too well. As the environment in which we perform our various transactions and interactions becomes more complex and technical, it seems that fewer and fewer of us fully understand all the relevant issues. I certainly support the idea of a UK EFF, but that sort of thing needs funding and permanent officers to drive policy and action. I only wish that I were suitably qualified....... - -- Brian Morrison bdm@fenrir.demon.co.uk "Almost noon, and she had yet to go the launderette in Concreton to thaw out chickens in the spin-drier..." PGP Public Key Fingerprint= C7 12 B9 54 00 0F 51 F6 37 9B 18 D1 E1 61 14 0B -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGPfreeware 5.0i OS/2 for non-commercial use Comment: This comment _is_ plain text Charset: cp850 iQA/AwUBOKEX/vQTY1HeMuXFEQLxYwCbByr2W1pqwkynMhyG96nb5oETvGYAoNnt ARUHbssjeRf/8NguYym3TTY3 =UygF -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From hoepman@cs.utwente.nl 08 Feb 2000 17:42:15 +0100 Date: 08 Feb 2000 17:42:15 +0100 From: Jaap-Henk Hoepman hoepman@cs.utwente.nl Subject: Food for Thawte On Mon, 07 Feb 2000 18:59:50 +0000 Ben Laurie writes: > Brian Gladman wrote: > > Hence it would be nice to have a way of trusting them from the outset and > > here I do see a possible value in certificates of a particular form. In > > this specific situation, if a third party company that I do know and trust > > provided a certificate which carried meaning: 'if you have any problems, > > financial or otherwise, in undertaking an electronic transaction with this > > company, we will fully compensate you' then I would derive some value from > > it. > > > I'd argue that linking a key with a company's identity is valuable in > itself: it provides you with a target for legal action. It is not > necessary for the CA to also engage in insurance, any more than > Companies House does! It wouldn't be necessary for the issuing CA to fully compensate you in case something went wrong. This would be equivalent to an insurance, something you may or may not be after. If you just want to build trust, a CA issuing certificates stating "this company is a respectable business" might be good enough provided that a) I believe this CA is capable of verifying this claim, and b) this CA will revoke the certificate as soon as the company starts `misbehaving' c) revocation of such a certificate would deprive a company of a serious part of its business Such schemes are already applied in the real world ("X approved", "by appointment of", etc.). Jaap-Henk -- Jaap-Henk Hoepman | Come sail your ships around me Dept. of Computer Science | And burn these bridges down University of Twente | Nick Cave - "Ship Song" Email: hoepman@cs.utwente.nl === WWW: www.cs.utwente.nl/~hoepman Phone: +31 53 4893795 === Secr: +31 53 4893770 === Fax: +31 53 4894590 PGP ID: 0xF52E26DD Fingerprint: 1AED DDEB C7F1 DBB3 0556 4732 4217 ABEF From Q.G.Campbell@newcastle.ac.uk Wed, 9 Feb 2000 08:28:47 +0000 (GMT) Date: Wed, 9 Feb 2000 08:28:47 +0000 (GMT) From: Quentin Campbell Q.G.Campbell@newcastle.ac.uk Subject: JY and DeCSS and MAP On Tue, 8 Feb 2000, Brian Gladman wrote: > [snip] > > I am quite happy to put 'two fingers' up to people who challenge the rights > of citizens but increasingly I find that when these 'evil empires' realise > that they are on a lost cause in trying to bully someone they will often go > for their ISP instead. Having just moved my ISP to take advantage of free > weekend access I am not sure that I want to move again since it was > traumatic getting everyone to notice that I had moved! > > If no-one has any answers to this maybe we should all contribute to the > formation of some form of virtual web site (is there such a thing?) where we > can all contribute this sort of stuff without fear of being got at by groups > like the MPAA. [snip] An interim solution in the UK might be for an academic lawyer who specialises in the areas of law and ethics and rights under discussion here, to front such a web site and discussion forum hosted at her university. The advantage I see in this is that a UK academic has the right of (almost) unfettered academic expression in pursuing her research. This protection is enshrined in the Statutes of her Univeristy. This makes it very difficult for her ISP (ie. the employing University) to try to close down her site should an organisation like MPAA try to bully the university. [I hope that a University would resist such pressure as a matter of principle but such concerns often take second place when external funding, etc, is involved.] It is frustrating that as an Academic-Related staff member I do not have the same protections under the Statutes as an Academic staff member has so I cannot act on my own initiative in this regard. However it is perfectly in order for me to provide professional assistance to an academic pursuing her research. Quentin -- PHONE: +44 191 222 8209 Computing Service, University of Newcastle FAX: +44 191 222 8765 Newcastle upon Tyne, United Kingdom, NE1 7RU. ------------------------------------------------------------------------- "Any opinions expressed above are mine. The University can get its own." From MBacon@snci.co.uk Wed, 9 Feb 2000 08:59:55 -0000 Date: Wed, 9 Feb 2000 08:59:55 -0000 From: Michael Bacon MBacon@snci.co.uk Subject: Deceptive demands by MPAA > -----Original Message----- > From: Peter D. Junger [mailto:junger@samsara.law.cwru.edu] > Sent: 08 February 2000 12:07 > Subject: Deceptive demands by MPAA > [snip] > I have just read the demand that was sent by the Motion Picture > Association of America to John Young, the maintainor of the > invaluable Cryptome site: . [snip] > To say directly that John is bound by either of the preliminary > injunctions would be to tell a lie. To suggest it is, if not a lie, > at least an effort to deceive. > > This seems to me to be a clear case of deliberately using misleading > language to deceive John Young and other non-parties who received > similar letters. > > I suppose that is why the demand comes from MPAA and not its > attorneys, > whom I hope would be, though I fear would not be, subject to > sanctions if > they had sent such a letter. > The letter concludes "The information in this notification is accurate, and we declare, under penalty of perjury, that the Motion Picture Association of America is authorized to act on behalf of the owner[s] of exclusive rights described above." -- which, taken together with the demand to cease "this illegal activity", suggets that 'sanctions' could apply to the MPAA. Michael (Streaky) Bacon ____ ~(____)> " " The views expressed herein are my own and do not necessarily reflect those of my employer From Pete.Chown@skygate.co.uk Wed, 9 Feb 2000 09:58:33 +0000 Date: Wed, 9 Feb 2000 09:58:33 +0000 From: Pete Chown Pete.Chown@skygate.co.uk Subject: JY and DeCSS and MPAA Donald Ramsbottom wrote: > (i) makes, imports sells or lets for hire, offers or exposes for sale or > hire, or advertises for sale or hire,or, in the case of a computer program > only possesses in the course of business , any device or means specifically > designed or adapted to circumvent the form of copy protection employed; or > > (ii) Publishes information intended to enable or assist persons to > circumvent that form of copy protection These two seem to be the biggest problem. Reverse engineering to allow interoperability with Linux seems to fall quite neatly into the right created by the Copyright Directive. (Also, given the absence of an agreement not to reverse engineer, it could fall within the Coca Cola case as well.) Presumably part (i) only covers the original authors and new importers, since no one is selling deCSS or anything like that. However part (ii) might well apply. However, my question is this. Can CSS be considered to be a copy protection scheme? I suggest not, since pirates could just copy the scrambled DVD. Any other thoughts? ---------------------------------------------------------------------- phone +44 (0) 20 8542 7856, fax +44 (0) 20 8543 0176, post: Skygate Technology Ltd, 8 Lombard Road, Wimbledon, London, SW19 3TZ From brian.gladman@btinternet.com Wed, 9 Feb 2000 10:23:51 -0000 Date: Wed, 9 Feb 2000 10:23:51 -0000 From: Brian Gladman brian.gladman@btinternet.com Subject: Food for Thawte From: "Jaap-Henk Hoepman" To: Sent: Tuesday, February 08, 2000 4:42 PM Subject: Re: Food for Thawte > On Mon, 07 Feb 2000 18:59:50 +0000 Ben Laurie writes: > > Brian Gladman wrote: > > > Hence it would be nice to have a way of trusting them from the outset and > > > here I do see a possible value in certificates of a particular form. In > > > this specific situation, if a third party company that I do know and trust > > > provided a certificate which carried meaning: 'if you have any problems, > > > financial or otherwise, in undertaking an electronic transaction with this > > > company, we will fully compensate you' then I would derive some value from > > > it. > > > > > I'd argue that linking a key with a company's identity is valuable in > > itself: it provides you with a target for legal action. It is not > > necessary for the CA to also engage in insurance, any more than > > Companies House does! > > It wouldn't be necessary for the issuing CA to fully compensate you in case > something went wrong. This would be equivalent to an insurance, something you > may or may not be after. If you just want to build trust, a CA issuing > certificates stating "this company is a respectable business" might be good > enough provided that > > a) I believe this CA is capable of verifying this claim, and > b) this CA will revoke the certificate as soon as the company starts > `misbehaving' > c) revocation of such a certificate would deprive a company of a serious part > of its business > > Such schemes are already applied in the real world ("X approved", "by > appointment of", etc.). There may be limited value here but I see several problems with this model which, when combined, lead me to want more than just a warm feeling. First unless the CA is a very well known I am not much more likely to have a trust relationship with it than I am with the company I am trying to deal with in the first place. I have nothing against Verisgn or Thwarte as a third party but they are just an IP address in the same way that the second party is and I see no obvious reason why I should take the risk of trusting them rather than the second party directly. In fact I can see reasons for not doing this since I am adding to the number of entities that I have to trust. But a more serious difficulty is that, if I am to trust a CA certificate saying that 'company X' is trustworthy, I am trusting the CA to know this to be so and this is asking a lot of a generic CA. To know that a company is trustworthy requires a lot of domain knowledge - knowledge about the business that the company is involved in - and it is not sensible to expect a generic CA to have this knowledge across all commercial domains. If a company is offering medical advice on the net, I want a certificate authority that I can trust to judge whether this organisation is can be trusted to give me medical advice and I would not go to Thwarte or Verisign for this. But if an insurance company is going to have to pay out large sums of money if 'QuackCo' gives out bad medical advice, they are going to be very reluctant to underwrite the company with a certificate without being very sure of their medical credentials. Inspecting a few documents is not enough here, nor is an identity certificate with a lot of small print. Money is the language that business understands and if, when a certificate fails to deliver, the issuing company has to fork out large sums of money then I will be more prepared to believe that it has been careful in issuing the certificate. In essence the money is my 'guarantee' that they have done the job properly. Richard Clayton has rightly said that his concern with the insurance model is that it will increase the cost of certificates. He is right. But if certificates are to have any real value then we will have to recognise that we will have to pay for them in one way or another. People can have low cost, high risk electronic commerce or they can have lower risks if they are prepared to pay more. And free but worthless certificates do not help since they just encourage people to think that they can have something for nothing. Brian From donald@ramsbottom.co.uk Wed, 09 Feb 2000 11:40:05 +0000 Date: Wed, 09 Feb 2000 11:40:05 +0000 From: Donald Ramsbottom donald@ramsbottom.co.uk Subject: Deceptive demands by MPAA SNIP >> >The letter concludes "The information in this notification is accurate, and >we declare, under penalty of perjury, that the Motion Picture Association of >America is authorized to act on behalf of the owner[s] of exclusive rights >described above." -- which, taken together with the demand to cease "this >illegal activity", suggets that 'sanctions' could apply to the MPAA. > The MPAA do seem to have left themselves somewhat open to attack by JY's Lawyers. They must know the contents of the various injunctions, after all they recite them. They must also know that the demands which they make are not part of the injunctions they recite and that the injunction does not apply to JY as, as far as I am aware he is neither a defendant, nor has he been personally served with the injunction. Such an abuse of the Court process and misleading demands would at least in the UK be looked at very dimly by the Courts if it were brought to their attention and could ,as I have mentioned elswhere be a potential contempt of Court. We will have to see whether they pursue matters further. Donald Ramsbottom LL.B, BA (Hons). RAMSBOTTOM & Co. Solicitors Internet Law & Global Cryptology Law Specialists From hoepman@cs.utwente.nl 09 Feb 2000 12:27:12 +0100 Date: 09 Feb 2000 12:27:12 +0100 From: Jaap-Henk Hoepman hoepman@cs.utwente.nl Subject: Food for Thawte On Wed, 9 Feb 2000 10:23:51 -0000 "Brian Gladman" writes: > From: "Jaap-Henk Hoepman" : > > It wouldn't be necessary for the issuing CA to fully compensate you in case > > something went wrong. This would be equivalent to an insurance, something you > > may or may not be after. If you just want to build trust, a CA issuing > > certificates stating "this company is a respectable business" might be good > > enough provided that > > > > a) I believe this CA is capable of verifying this claim, and > > b) this CA will revoke the certificate as soon as the company starts > > `misbehaving' > > c) revocation of such a certificate would deprive a company of a serious part > > of its business > > > > Such schemes are already applied in the real world ("X approved", "by > > appointment of", etc.). > > [snip] > > But a more serious difficulty is that, if I am to trust a CA certificate > saying that 'company X' is trustworthy, I am trusting the CA to know this to > be so and this is asking a lot of a generic CA. Exactly. So it's not a generic CA that is going to issue these certificates. It is going to be market/branche specific organisations that will do this. Lots of them exist today in the real, with a varying level of success. > [snip] > > But if an insurance company is going to have to pay out large sums of money > if 'QuackCo' gives out bad medical advice, they are going to be very > reluctant to underwrite the company with a certificate without being very > sure of their medical credentials. Inspecting a few documents is not enough > here, nor is an identity certificate with a lot of small print. Money is the > language that business understands and if, when a certificate fails to > deliver, the issuing company has to fork out large sums of money then I will > be more prepared to believe that it has been careful in issuing the > certificate. In essence the money is my 'guarantee' that they have done the > job properly. There are several ways to incorporate an economic/financial incentive into the CA model that will strengthen the position of the consumer. You propose to let the CA suffer in case it's claim turns out to be wrong. But: > > Richard Clayton has rightly said that his concern with the insurance model > is that it will increase the cost of certificates. He is right. But if > certificates are to have any real value then we will have to recognise that > we will have to pay for them in one way or another. I propose to let the business suffer in case something goes wrong, by letting the CA revoke the certificate. If the certificate is worth something (e.g. trusted by a lot of people) then losing this certificate will surely mean that the company loses business and therefore earns less (or looses) money. However, because the CA will not incur huge costs whenever something goes wrong, the certificates shouldn't be expensive, and therefore the consumer will pay little (if any) for this `intermediate' level of trust she gains. This is similar to the way ISO 900x works: the certificate itself does not tell you much, but if a company loses this certificate, you can be sure something's rotten. So companies will hang on to their ISO 900x certificate if ever they can. Jaap-Henk -- Jaap-Henk Hoepman | Come sail your ships around me Dept. of Computer Science | And burn these bridges down University of Twente | Nick Cave - "Ship Song" Email: hoepman@cs.utwente.nl === WWW: www.cs.utwente.nl/~hoepman Phone: +31 53 4893795 === Secr: +31 53 4893770 === Fax: +31 53 4894590 PGP ID: 0xF52E26DD Fingerprint: 1AED DDEB C7F1 DBB3 0556 4732 4217 ABEF From nbohm@ernest.net Wed, 09 Feb 2000 11:34:11 +0000 Date: Wed, 09 Feb 2000 11:34:11 +0000 From: Nicholas Bohm nbohm@ernest.net Subject: JY and DeCSS and MPAA At 09:58 AM 2/9/2000 +0000, Pete Chown wrote: >Donald Ramsbottom wrote: > >> (i) makes, imports sells or lets for hire, offers or exposes for sale or >> hire, or advertises for sale or hire,or, in the case of a computer program >> only possesses in the course of business , any device or means specifically >> designed or adapted to circumvent the form of copy protection employed; or >> >> (ii) Publishes information intended to enable or assist persons to >> circumvent that form of copy protection > >These two seem to be the biggest problem. Reverse engineering to >allow interoperability with Linux seems to fall quite neatly into the >right created by the Copyright Directive. (Also, given the absence of >an agreement not to reverse engineer, it could fall within the Coca >Cola case as well.) > >Presumably part (i) only covers the original authors and new >importers, since no one is selling deCSS or anything like that. >However part (ii) might well apply. > >However, my question is this. Can CSS be considered to be a copy >protection scheme? I suggest not, since pirates could just copy the >scrambled DVD. Any other thoughts? I do not think the 1988 Act anticipated the present case. "Copy-protected" means protected against copying, and includes any means intended to prevent or restrict copying of a work or to impair the quality of copies made - 296(4). Copy-protection is not the same as encryption, which is covered in section 298; but that applies only to broadcasting or cable programme services provided from a place in the UK, and to encrypted transmissions of any other description sent from a place in the UK. This does not cover scrambled DVDs, CDs, floppies etc, since their contents are not "transmissions" in this context. Regards, Nicholas Bohm Salkyns, Great Canfield, Takeley, Bishop's Stortford CM22 6SX, UK Phone 01279 871272 (+44 1279 871272) Fax 01279 870215 (+44 1279 870215) Mobile 07715 419728 (+44 7715 419728) PGP RSA 1024 bit public key ID: 0x08340015. Fingerprint: 9E 15 FB 2A 54 96 24 37 98 A2 E0 D1 34 13 48 07 PGP DSS/DH 1024/3072 public key ID: 0x899DD7FF. Fingerprint: 5248 1320 B42E 84FC 1E8B A9E6 0912 AE66 899D D7FF From brucew@thawte.com Wed, 09 Feb 2000 13:42:35 +0200 Date: Wed, 09 Feb 2000 13:42:35 +0200 From: Bruce Watermeyer brucew@thawte.com Subject: Food for Thawte This is a cryptographically signed message in MIME format. --------------msD6D46E862434D239938D8F17 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit What a commercial CA, such as Thawte or Verisign does is simply validate that the web site that you are looking at does belong to the company that it claims to. In other words if you go to gooddoctor.com and see that it has a certificate from either company, then you know that gooddoctor.com is in fact owned by a legitimate comapany registered as gooddoctor.com. And that the certificate request came from within that company from an individual authorised to do so. There is not attestation to value or worth of that comapnies medical experience, or their potential to deliver the goods to a consumer. Jaap-Henk Hoepman wrote: > On Wed, 9 Feb 2000 10:23:51 -0000 "Brian Gladman" writes: > > From: "Jaap-Henk Hoepman" : > > > It wouldn't be necessary for the issuing CA to fully compensate you in case > > > something went wrong. This would be equivalent to an insurance, something you > > > may or may not be after. If you just want to build trust, a CA issuing > > > certificates stating "this company is a respectable business" might be good > > > enough provided that > > > > > > a) I believe this CA is capable of verifying this claim, and > > > b) this CA will revoke the certificate as soon as the company starts > > > `misbehaving' > > > c) revocation of such a certificate would deprive a company of a serious part > > > of its business > > > > > > Such schemes are already applied in the real world ("X approved", "by > > > appointment of", etc.). > > > > [snip] > > > > But a more serious difficulty is that, if I am to trust a CA certificate > > saying that 'company X' is trustworthy, I am trusting the CA to know this to > > be so and this is asking a lot of a generic CA. > > Exactly. So it's not a generic CA that is going to issue these certificates. It > is going to be market/branche specific organisations that will do this. Lots of > them exist today in the real, with a varying level of success. > > > [snip] > > > > But if an insurance company is going to have to pay out large sums of money > > if 'QuackCo' gives out bad medical advice, they are going to be very > > reluctant to underwrite the company with a certificate without being very > > sure of their medical credentials. Inspecting a few documents is not enough > > here, nor is an identity certificate with a lot of small print. Money is the > > language that business understands and if, when a certificate fails to > > deliver, the issuing company has to fork out large sums of money then I will > > be more prepared to believe that it has been careful in issuing the > > certificate. In essence the money is my 'guarantee' that they have done the > > job properly. > > There are several ways to incorporate an economic/financial incentive into the > CA model that will strengthen the position of the consumer. You propose to let > the CA suffer in case it's claim turns out to be wrong. But: > > > > > Richard Clayton has rightly said that his concern with the insurance model > > is that it will increase the cost of certificates. He is right. But if > > certificates are to have any real value then we will have to recognise that > > we will have to pay for them in one way or another. > > I propose to let the business suffer in case something goes wrong, by letting > the CA revoke the certificate. If the certificate is worth something > (e.g. trusted by a lot of people) then losing this certificate will surely mean > that the company loses business and therefore earns less (or looses) money. > However, because the CA will not incur huge costs whenever something goes > wrong, the certificates shouldn't be expensive, and therefore the consumer will > pay little (if any) for this `intermediate' level of trust she gains. > > This is similar to the way ISO 900x works: the certificate itself does not tell > you much, but if a company loses this certificate, you can be sure something's > rotten. So companies will hang on to their ISO 900x certificate if ever they > can. > > Jaap-Henk > > -- > Jaap-Henk Hoepman | Come sail your ships around me > Dept. of Computer Science | And burn these bridges down > University of Twente | Nick Cave - "Ship Song" > Email: hoepman@cs.utwente.nl === WWW: www.cs.utwente.nl/~hoepman > Phone: +31 53 4893795 === Secr: +31 53 4893770 === Fax: +31 53 4894590 > PGP ID: 0xF52E26DD Fingerprint: 1AED DDEB C7F1 DBB3 0556 4732 4217 ABEF -- Bruce Watermeyer Thawte Certification Thawte now offers technical support 24 hours a day, 5 days a week: http://www.thawte.com/support/irc.html "It's better to regret something you did, Than something you didn't do!" --------------msD6D46E862434D239938D8F17 Content-Type: application/x-pkcs7-signature; name="smime.p7s" Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="smime.p7s" Content-Description: S/MIME Cryptographic Signature MIII0wYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIIIxDCCCMACAQExCzAJBgUrDgMCGgUAMAsGCSqGSIb3DQEHAaCC BqQwggOIMIIC8aADAgECAgMCB54wDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEEBQAwgZQxCzAJBgNVBAYTAlpBMRUw EwYDVQQIEwxXZXN0ZXJuIENhcGUxFDASBgNVBAcTC0R1cmJhbnZpbGxlMQ8wDQYDVQQKEwZU aGF3dGUxHTAbBgNVBAsTFENlcnRpZmljYXRlIFNlcnZpY2VzMSgwJgYDVQQDEx9QZXJzb25h bCBGcmVlbWFpbCBSU0EgMTk5OS45LjE2MB4XDTAwMDIwMTEwMDIwNFoXDTAxMDEzMTEwMDIw NFowge0xCzAJBgNVBAYTAlpBMRUwEwYDVQQIEwxXZXN0ZXJuIENhcGUxEjAQBgNVBAcTCUNh cGUgVG93bjEkMCIGA1UEChMbVGhhd3RlIENvbnN1bHRpbmcgKFB0eSkgTHRkMR0wGwYDVQQM ExRNYXJrZXRpbmcgRGVwYXJ0bWVudDETMBEGA1UEBBMKV2F0ZXJtZXllcjEVMBMGA1UEKhMM QnJ1Y2UgQWRyaWFuMSAwHgYDVQQDExdCcnVjZSBBZHJpYW4gV2F0ZXJtZXllcjEgMB4GCSqG SIb3DQEJARYRYnJ1Y2V3QHRoYXd0ZS5jb20wgZ8wDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADgY0AMIGJAoGB AOIUoPiQQ7CklpwdcORK/h8000YVcTaP69+X+dOkbsOK3TADEfDrFcziYtB7g1o4kXEw1qgZ yuxCrQM59u8XJdr50PXIywQKOUl88rAiaLPG17qa6rQJZhm3wl3PxpRNIRdxnyeZHxquge6y OvvAx3ZT0jss1IlFBPespvmNC60LAgMBAAGjgYwwgYkwOgYFK2UBBAEEMTAvAgEAMCowCwIB AQQGYnJ1Y2V3MBsCAQQEFms5VnhCZEg0R0t0Uk1iVGZrR25IM1EwHAYDVR0RBBUwE4ERYnJ1 Y2V3QHRoYXd0ZS5jb20wDAYDVR0TAQH/BAIwADAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBSIq/Fgg2ZV9ORYx0Yd wGG9I9fDjDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQQFAAOBgQAjt88+kOF7CBXKjK7E51Ls1P5V75zlohXw0Uwi I2BmN4pyQ8H6rdP2aTWmZVdk4KFnPOMFu+DXyP53x9eDzOIFPszzRxrjc+4NI7LUUHCAcgxp ngRFK/WkDRgYjPvWg5J7cErvdpuFoeOevqa7pGj3HlSZJNiTX0ha/7AsP4A04TCCAxQwggJ9 oAMCAQICAQswDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEEBQAwgdExCzAJBgNVBAYTAlpBMRUwEwYDVQQIEwxXZXN0 ZXJuIENhcGUxEjAQBgNVBAcTCUNhcGUgVG93bjEaMBgGA1UEChMRVGhhd3RlIENvbnN1bHRp bmcxKDAmBgNVBAsTH0NlcnRpZmljYXRpb24gU2VydmljZXMgRGl2aXNpb24xJDAiBgNVBAMT G1RoYXd0ZSBQZXJzb25hbCBGcmVlbWFpbCBDQTErMCkGCSqGSIb3DQEJARYccGVyc29uYWwt ZnJlZW1haWxAdGhhd3RlLmNvbTAeFw05OTA5MTYxNDAxNDBaFw0wMTA5MTUxNDAxNDBaMIGU MQswCQYDVQQGEwJaQTEVMBMGA1UECBMMV2VzdGVybiBDYXBlMRQwEgYDVQQHEwtEdXJiYW52 aWxsZTEPMA0GA1UEChMGVGhhd3RlMR0wGwYDVQQLExRDZXJ0aWZpY2F0ZSBTZXJ2aWNlczEo MCYGA1UEAxMfUGVyc29uYWwgRnJlZW1haWwgUlNBIDE5OTkuOS4xNjCBnzANBgkqhkiG9w0B AQEFAAOBjQAwgYkCgYEAs2lal9TQFgt6tcVd6SGcI3LNEkxL937Px/vKciT0QlKsV5Xje2F6 F4Tn/XI5OJS06u1lp5IGXr3gZfYZu5R5dkw+uWhwdYQc9BF0ALwFLE8JAxcxzPRB1HLGpl3i iESwiy7ETfHw1oU+bPOVlHiRfkDpnNGNFVeOwnPlMN5G9U8CAwEAAaM3MDUwEgYDVR0TAQH/ BAgwBgEB/wIBADAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBRyScJzNMZV9At2coF+d/SH58ayDjANBgkqhkiG9w0B AQQFAAOBgQBrxlnpMfrptuyxA9jfcnL+kWBI6sZV3XvwZ47GYXDnbcKlN9idtxcoVgWL3Vx1 b8aRkMZsZnET0BB8a5FvhuAhNi3B1+qyCa3PLW3Gg1Kb+7v+nIed/LfpdJLkXJeu/H6syg1v cnpnLGtz9Yb5nfUAbvQdB86dnoJjKe+TCX5V3jGCAfcwggHzAgEBMIGcMIGUMQswCQYDVQQG EwJaQTEVMBMGA1UECBMMV2VzdGVybiBDYXBlMRQwEgYDVQQHEwtEdXJiYW52aWxsZTEPMA0G A1UEChMGVGhhd3RlMR0wGwYDVQQLExRDZXJ0aWZpY2F0ZSBTZXJ2aWNlczEoMCYGA1UEAxMf UGVyc29uYWwgRnJlZW1haWwgUlNBIDE5OTkuOS4xNgIDAgeeMAkGBSsOAwIaBQCggbEwGAYJ KoZIhvcNAQkDMQsGCSqGSIb3DQEHATAcBgkqhkiG9w0BCQUxDxcNMDAwMjA5MTE0MjM1WjAj BgkqhkiG9w0BCQQxFgQUOjDP8fHamuS873LXqHYb8ogJxkwwUgYJKoZIhvcNAQkPMUUwQzAK BggqhkiG9w0DBzAOBggqhkiG9w0DAgICAIAwBwYFKw4DAgcwDQYIKoZIhvcNAwICAUAwDQYI KoZIhvcNAwICASgwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQAEgYAMjhl/3gKcASZP7ngxlZ6rg0rcFWVvFBab 3h/LWO3jcACjgTgC6OiPQEAxSsW/Dd1yhU5bHwqntJf32SBX/8slJcs6j/6KJLSYynn3/nuk YPPga6LjweDNJbilrJ3oxp6WGdG2R/5Rg+b1+0nD5pMBJydKRlPLUcbvpboWD5sf9A== --------------msD6D46E862434D239938D8F17-- From cb@fipr.org Wed, 9 Feb 2000 11:51:59 -0000 Date: Wed, 9 Feb 2000 11:51:59 -0000 From: Caspar Bowden cb@fipr.org Subject: RIP bill expected tomorrow We've had very strong indications that the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Bill (use of informers, tapping the Internet + access to traffic and account data, decryption powers) will get First Reading in parliament tomorrow. We will be preparing an analysis and Press Release ASAP. -- Caspar Bowden http://www.fipr.org Director, Foundation for Information Policy Research Tel: +44(0)171 354 2333 Fax: +44(0)171 827 6534 From hoepman@cs.utwente.nl 09 Feb 2000 12:57:21 +0100 Date: 09 Feb 2000 12:57:21 +0100 From: Jaap-Henk Hoepman hoepman@cs.utwente.nl Subject: Food for Thawte On Wed, 9 Feb 2000 12:42:35 +0100 Bruce Watermeyer writes: > What a commercial CA, such as Thawte or Verisign does is simply validate > that the web site > that you are looking at does belong to the company that it claims to. In > other words if you > go to gooddoctor.com and see that it has a certificate from either > company, then you know > that gooddoctor.com is in fact owned by a legitimate comapany registered > as gooddoctor.com. > And that the certificate request came from within that company from an > individual authorised > to do so. > > There is not attestation to value or worth of that comapnies medical > experience, or their > potential to deliver the goods to a consumer. I know. And it has been argued by several people on and off this list that this is in most cases not very useful. I was just arguing for a different kind of certificate I think might be much more useful in establishing trust relationships. Jaap-Henk -- Jaap-Henk Hoepman | Come sail your ships around me Dept. of Computer Science | And burn these bridges down University of Twente | Nick Cave - "Ship Song" Email: hoepman@cs.utwente.nl === WWW: www.cs.utwente.nl/~hoepman Phone: +31 53 4893795 === Secr: +31 53 4893770 === Fax: +31 53 4894590 PGP ID: 0xF52E26DD Fingerprint: 1AED DDEB C7F1 DBB3 0556 4732 4217 ABEF From donald@ramsbottom.co.uk Wed, 09 Feb 2000 12:50:41 +0000 Date: Wed, 09 Feb 2000 12:50:41 +0000 From: Donald Ramsbottom donald@ramsbottom.co.uk Subject: JY and DeCSS and MPAA SNIP > >I do not think the 1988 Act anticipated the present case. "Copy-protected" >means protected against copying, and includes any means intended to prevent >or restrict copying of a work or to impair the quality of copies made - >296(4). > >Copy-protection is not the same as encryption, which is covered in section >298; but that applies only to broadcasting or cable programme services >provided from a place in the UK, and to encrypted transmissions of any >other description sent from a place in the UK. This does not cover >scrambled DVDs, CDs, floppies etc, since their contents are not >"transmissions" in this context. > This is all true and combined with the Mars case and those exceptions referred to in SS 50(B) and 296(A) may mean that if you buy a DVD player and/or disks you can decrypt and/or reverse engineer them. What you do with that information is a different matter. but as Nick has pointed out s:296 (4) is to prevent copying and not decryption therefore it is arguable that the restriction on publishing (in s:296) the information you have obtained from the reverse engineering/decryption process may be published. Any other IP lawyers out there care to comment? Donald Ramsbottom LL.B, BA (Hons). RAMSBOTTOM & Co. Solicitors Internet Law & Global Cryptology Law Specialists From brucew@thawte.com Wed, 09 Feb 2000 14:00:18 +0200 Date: Wed, 09 Feb 2000 14:00:18 +0200 From: Bruce Watermeyer brucew@thawte.com Subject: Food for Thawte This is a cryptographically signed message in MIME format. --------------ms51CCF03F703F37BA92792C78 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Hi, My appologies for not having paid attention. I thought that there was a misinterpretation of the function of CA's Regards, Jaap-Henk Hoepman wrote: > On Wed, 9 Feb 2000 12:42:35 +0100 Bruce Watermeyer writes: > > What a commercial CA, such as Thawte or Verisign does is simply validate > > that the web site > > that you are looking at does belong to the company that it claims to. In > > other words if you > > go to gooddoctor.com and see that it has a certificate from either > > company, then you know > > that gooddoctor.com is in fact owned by a legitimate comapany registered > > as gooddoctor.com. > > And that the certificate request came from within that company from an > > individual authorised > > to do so. > > > > There is not attestation to value or worth of that comapnies medical > > experience, or their > > potential to deliver the goods to a consumer. > > I know. And it has been argued by several people on and off this list that this > is in most cases not very useful. I was just arguing for a different kind of > certificate I think might be much more useful in establishing trust > relationships. > > Jaap-Henk > > -- > Jaap-Henk Hoepman | Come sail your ships around me > Dept. of Computer Science | And burn these bridges down > University of Twente | Nick Cave - "Ship Song" > Email: hoepman@cs.utwente.nl === WWW: www.cs.utwente.nl/~hoepman > Phone: +31 53 4893795 === Secr: +31 53 4893770 === Fax: +31 53 4894590 > PGP ID: 0xF52E26DD Fingerprint: 1AED DDEB C7F1 DBB3 0556 4732 4217 ABEF -- Bruce Watermeyer Thawte Certification Thawte now offers technical support 24 hours a day, 5 days a week: http://www.thawte.com/support/irc.html "It's better to regret something you did, Than something you didn't do!" --------------ms51CCF03F703F37BA92792C78 Content-Type: application/x-pkcs7-signature; name="smime.p7s" Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="smime.p7s" Content-Description: S/MIME Cryptographic Signature MIII0wYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIIIxDCCCMACAQExCzAJBgUrDgMCGgUAMAsGCSqGSIb3DQEHAaCC BqQwggOIMIIC8aADAgECAgMCB54wDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEEBQAwgZQxCzAJBgNVBAYTAlpBMRUw EwYDVQQIEwxXZXN0ZXJuIENhcGUxFDASBgNVBAcTC0R1cmJhbnZpbGxlMQ8wDQYDVQQKEwZU aGF3dGUxHTAbBgNVBAsTFENlcnRpZmljYXRlIFNlcnZpY2VzMSgwJgYDVQQDEx9QZXJzb25h bCBGcmVlbWFpbCBSU0EgMTk5OS45LjE2MB4XDTAwMDIwMTEwMDIwNFoXDTAxMDEzMTEwMDIw NFowge0xCzAJBgNVBAYTAlpBMRUwEwYDVQQIEwxXZXN0ZXJuIENhcGUxEjAQBgNVBAcTCUNh cGUgVG93bjEkMCIGA1UEChMbVGhhd3RlIENvbnN1bHRpbmcgKFB0eSkgTHRkMR0wGwYDVQQM ExRNYXJrZXRpbmcgRGVwYXJ0bWVudDETMBEGA1UEBBMKV2F0ZXJtZXllcjEVMBMGA1UEKhMM QnJ1Y2UgQWRyaWFuMSAwHgYDVQQDExdCcnVjZSBBZHJpYW4gV2F0ZXJtZXllcjEgMB4GCSqG SIb3DQEJARYRYnJ1Y2V3QHRoYXd0ZS5jb20wgZ8wDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADgY0AMIGJAoGB AOIUoPiQQ7CklpwdcORK/h8000YVcTaP69+X+dOkbsOK3TADEfDrFcziYtB7g1o4kXEw1qgZ yuxCrQM59u8XJdr50PXIywQKOUl88rAiaLPG17qa6rQJZhm3wl3PxpRNIRdxnyeZHxquge6y OvvAx3ZT0jss1IlFBPespvmNC60LAgMBAAGjgYwwgYkwOgYFK2UBBAEEMTAvAgEAMCowCwIB AQQGYnJ1Y2V3MBsCAQQEFms5VnhCZEg0R0t0Uk1iVGZrR25IM1EwHAYDVR0RBBUwE4ERYnJ1 Y2V3QHRoYXd0ZS5jb20wDAYDVR0TAQH/BAIwADAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBSIq/Fgg2ZV9ORYx0Yd wGG9I9fDjDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQQFAAOBgQAjt88+kOF7CBXKjK7E51Ls1P5V75zlohXw0Uwi I2BmN4pyQ8H6rdP2aTWmZVdk4KFnPOMFu+DXyP53x9eDzOIFPszzRxrjc+4NI7LUUHCAcgxp ngRFK/WkDRgYjPvWg5J7cErvdpuFoeOevqa7pGj3HlSZJNiTX0ha/7AsP4A04TCCAxQwggJ9 oAMCAQICAQswDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEEBQAwgdExCzAJBgNVBAYTAlpBMRUwEwYDVQQIEwxXZXN0 ZXJuIENhcGUxEjAQBgNVBAcTCUNhcGUgVG93bjEaMBgGA1UEChMRVGhhd3RlIENvbnN1bHRp bmcxKDAmBgNVBAsTH0NlcnRpZmljYXRpb24gU2VydmljZXMgRGl2aXNpb24xJDAiBgNVBAMT G1RoYXd0ZSBQZXJzb25hbCBGcmVlbWFpbCBDQTErMCkGCSqGSIb3DQEJARYccGVyc29uYWwt ZnJlZW1haWxAdGhhd3RlLmNvbTAeFw05OTA5MTYxNDAxNDBaFw0wMTA5MTUxNDAxNDBaMIGU MQswCQYDVQQGEwJaQTEVMBMGA1UECBMMV2VzdGVybiBDYXBlMRQwEgYDVQQHEwtEdXJiYW52 aWxsZTEPMA0GA1UEChMGVGhhd3RlMR0wGwYDVQQLExRDZXJ0aWZpY2F0ZSBTZXJ2aWNlczEo MCYGA1UEAxMfUGVyc29uYWwgRnJlZW1haWwgUlNBIDE5OTkuOS4xNjCBnzANBgkqhkiG9w0B AQEFAAOBjQAwgYkCgYEAs2lal9TQFgt6tcVd6SGcI3LNEkxL937Px/vKciT0QlKsV5Xje2F6 F4Tn/XI5OJS06u1lp5IGXr3gZfYZu5R5dkw+uWhwdYQc9BF0ALwFLE8JAxcxzPRB1HLGpl3i iESwiy7ETfHw1oU+bPOVlHiRfkDpnNGNFVeOwnPlMN5G9U8CAwEAAaM3MDUwEgYDVR0TAQH/ BAgwBgEB/wIBADAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBRyScJzNMZV9At2coF+d/SH58ayDjANBgkqhkiG9w0B AQQFAAOBgQBrxlnpMfrptuyxA9jfcnL+kWBI6sZV3XvwZ47GYXDnbcKlN9idtxcoVgWL3Vx1 b8aRkMZsZnET0BB8a5FvhuAhNi3B1+qyCa3PLW3Gg1Kb+7v+nIed/LfpdJLkXJeu/H6syg1v cnpnLGtz9Yb5nfUAbvQdB86dnoJjKe+TCX5V3jGCAfcwggHzAgEBMIGcMIGUMQswCQYDVQQG EwJaQTEVMBMGA1UECBMMV2VzdGVybiBDYXBlMRQwEgYDVQQHEwtEdXJiYW52aWxsZTEPMA0G A1UEChMGVGhhd3RlMR0wGwYDVQQLExRDZXJ0aWZpY2F0ZSBTZXJ2aWNlczEoMCYGA1UEAxMf UGVyc29uYWwgRnJlZW1haWwgUlNBIDE5OTkuOS4xNgIDAgeeMAkGBSsOAwIaBQCggbEwGAYJ KoZIhvcNAQkDMQsGCSqGSIb3DQEHATAcBgkqhkiG9w0BCQUxDxcNMDAwMjA5MTIwMDE5WjAj BgkqhkiG9w0BCQQxFgQU32X5ai4+RZldOACWVNkGVEH8IsIwUgYJKoZIhvcNAQkPMUUwQzAK BggqhkiG9w0DBzAOBggqhkiG9w0DAgICAIAwBwYFKw4DAgcwDQYIKoZIhvcNAwICAUAwDQYI KoZIhvcNAwICASgwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQAEgYBgacUAGRBDwUlaGa9aozQLvfxm5o/r4Ypk SQsaTRGZKZvKBkUnoxxD7CE6cZj4+lA2ryPZcvzRbagNMgzbLbcstVuDT8I+1V19Kgf6prS8 eD0V+H5wGb3EHTzAOsAvUIJIHXdaOA37cJ7r5yu8DuRp281owtFd/meTLtmP0ni1Uw== --------------ms51CCF03F703F37BA92792C78-- From security@loncps.demon.co.uk Wed, 9 Feb 2000 12:00:04 +0000 Date: Wed, 9 Feb 2000 12:00:04 +0000 From: Chris Salter security@loncps.demon.co.uk Subject: Tutorials? -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Can anyone recommend any sites that contain Tutorials on, in effect, the reason why we need encryption. I have just been sitting on the sidelines of a uk newsgroup (unrelated to any crypto/privacy issues) watching a particular poster ridicule the very idea that Internet traffic is or even can be monitored by government agencies. I have looked back through my archives of ukcrypto and I certainly have plenty of material that could be compiled into some form of tutorial but I am hoping that this has already been done. Such a tutorial would contain references to background material from multiple and authoritative sources that would hopefully convince both the sceptic and ill-informed that reports of systems such as Echelon are much more than journalistic speculation. Best Regards to All, Chris - -- Christopher P Salter mailto:security@loncps.demon.co.uk -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGPsdk version 1.7.1 iQA/AwUBOKFWxOE2a193lQvaEQIaPgCg1S9/dDiRxpORd8jBjEBck5y/2rsAoKVZ FenLwtNlZ1U1aMJcOVkl9r0f =SzTA -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From Pete.Chown@skygate.co.uk Wed, 9 Feb 2000 12:24:26 +0000 Date: Wed, 9 Feb 2000 12:24:26 +0000 From: Pete Chown Pete.Chown@skygate.co.uk Subject: JY and DeCSS and MPAA I suppose the other argument the MPAA could use is that while the original reverse engineering was lawful, the subsequent publication of the *source code* to deCSS was not. If I remember correctly, the Copyright Directive does not allow information obtained by lawful reverse engineering to be published. You can use it for developing products of your own, but you can't publish it. Is the source code of deCSS a product, or is it information? If it is information, the defendants would have to fall back on the Mars case, which is a much weaker defence IMHO. Another problem with relying on the Mars case is that in the course of reverse engineering, they probably created derived works; for example a disassembly listing of the product. I don't remember that the Mars case is authority for this being lawful. All this aside, though, I think on balance the source code is most likely to be regarded as a product. I'm just throwing this one in so that those better qualified to comment can see what they think... ---------------------------------------------------------------------- phone +44 (0) 20 8542 7856, fax +44 (0) 20 8543 0176, post: Skygate Technology Ltd, 8 Lombard Road, Wimbledon, London, SW19 3TZ From paul@hedonism.demon.co.uk 09 Feb 2000 08:16:27 +0000 Date: 09 Feb 2000 08:16:27 +0000 From: Paul Crowley paul@hedonism.demon.co.uk Subject: Some fun viewing for tonight... Quentin Campbell writes: > What is interesting is that (so far) 76.4% of respondents to the "Virtual > Vote" have answered "NO" to the question: > > Do you think law enforcement agencies should be monitoring our emails, > faxes, and phone calls to help fight crime and terrorism? I think if you replaced "monitoring" with "permitted to monitor", and "our" with "some", you'd get a different response from the viewing public... -- __ \/ o\ paul@hedonism.demon.co.uk Got a Linux strategy? \ / /\__/ Paul Crowley http://www.hedonism.demon.co.uk/paul/ /~\ From octobersdad@reporters.net Wed, 9 Feb 2000 14:08:48 +0000 Date: Wed, 9 Feb 2000 14:08:48 +0000 From: T Bruce Tober octobersdad@reporters.net Subject: RIP bill expected tomorrow This is a PGP signed message sent according to RFC2015 [PGP/MIME] --=_Turnpike_W600WoIwTXo4Q5p6= Content-Type: text/plain;charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable In message <004101bf72f4$1380fb70$0100a8c0@DIRECTOR>, Caspar Bowden writes >We've had very strong indications that the Regulation of Investigatory >Powers Bill (use of informers, tapping the Internet + access to traffic and >account data, decryption powers) will get First Reading in parliament >tomorrow. > >We will be preparing an analysis and Press Release ASAP. >-- >Caspar Bowden http://www.fipr.org >Director, Foundation for Information Policy Research >Tel: +44(0)171 354 2333 Fax: +44(0)171 827 6534 I wondered if I was still subscribed to this list of not. It's been virtually dead, as far as my mailbox is concerned, for quite some time.=20 If I'm no longer on the list, I need to be, so could you be kind enuf to send me subscription details, unless you see this message also come up on the uk.crypto list. Thanks --=20 | Bruce Tober, , | *.* *.* *.* *.* | Birmingham, UK, EU (vox +44-1562-638-704) (mobile +44-780-374-8255= ) |=20 --=_Turnpike_W600WoIwTXo4Q5p6= Content-Type: application/pgp-signature Content-Disposition: attachment; filename=signature.asc -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGPsdk version 1.7.1 iQA/AwUBOKF08II/aBKYrVEjEQKLXwCg1H1ssCRkh95hUgI5gqKOFIxqiPIAniSk f3XUgkzGzDGpn++G+mJu3opU =vzsn -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- --=_Turnpike_W600WoIwTXo4Q5p6=-- From brian.gladman@btinternet.com Wed, 9 Feb 2000 13:29:00 -0000 Date: Wed, 9 Feb 2000 13:29:00 -0000 From: Brian Gladman brian.gladman@btinternet.com Subject: Food for Thawte From: "Bruce Watermeyer" To: Sent: Wednesday, February 09, 2000 12:00 PM Subject: Re: Food for Thawte > Hi, > > My appologies for not having paid attention. I thought that there was a > misinterpretation of the function of CA's No I am not misintepreting what a CA does since a CA is simply an authority that issues certificates. These certificates might attest to the ownership of the site, as you suggest, but they might equally attest to the medical expertise on offer from an individual. These are different sorts of CA's for sure but they are both CAs so this is not a misinterpreatation. What this shows is that the term CA, without qualification, is just too vague to be very useful in describing what is needed in this area. A CA attests to the trust that can be placed in some 'fact' - the value of doing this depends BOTH on how good the CA is AND how useful the 'fact' is. Brian From brian.gladman@btinternet.com Wed, 9 Feb 2000 14:19:23 -0000 Date: Wed, 9 Feb 2000 14:19:23 -0000 From: Brian Gladman brian.gladman@btinternet.com Subject: Food for Thawte From: "Jaap-Henk Hoepman" To: Sent: Wednesday, February 09, 2000 11:27 AM Subject: Re: Food for Thawte [snip] > > Richard Clayton has rightly said that his concern with the insurance model > > is that it will increase the cost of certificates. He is right. But if > > certificates are to have any real value then we will have to recognise that > > we will have to pay for them in one way or another. > > I propose to let the business suffer in case something goes wrong, by letting > the CA revoke the certificate. If the certificate is worth something > (e.g. trusted by a lot of people) then losing this certificate will surely mean > that the company loses business and therefore earns less (or looses) money. > However, because the CA will not incur huge costs whenever something goes > wrong, the certificates shouldn't be expensive, and therefore the consumer will > pay little (if any) for this `intermediate' level of trust she gains. > > This is similar to the way ISO 900x works: the certificate itself does not tell > you much, but if a company loses this certificate, you can be sure something's > rotten. So companies will hang on to their ISO 900x certificate if ever they > can. While I prefer the insurance model I am happy to see other models as well since we need enough variety in the market to ensure that market forces produce a sensible end result. Of course in the model you propose it is not just the business that suffers since customers may also suffer in the period before revocation occurs. Lower cost in exchange for higher risk as we might expect. Brian From phr@doc.ic.ac.uk Wed, 09 Feb 2000 14:31:47 +0000 Date: Wed, 09 Feb 2000 14:31:47 +0000 From: Philip Rowlands phr@doc.ic.ac.uk Subject: JY and DeCSS and MPAA Donald Ramsbottom wrote: > > So far as Devices designed to circumvent copy-protection: the following applies > > where copies of a copyright work are issued to the public by or with the > licence of the copyright owner in an electronic form which is copy > protected, the person issuing the copies to the public has the same rights > against a person, who knowing or having reason to believe that it will be > used to make infringing copies: > > (i) makes, imports sells or lets for hire, offers or exposes for sale or > hire, or advertises for sale or hire,or, in the case of a computer program > only possesses in the course of business , any device or means specifically > designed or adapted to circumvent the form of copy protection employed; or > > (ii) Publishes information intended to enable or assist persons to > circumvent that form of copy protection I have invented a new "copy protection" scheme for data distributed in an electronic form. All protected files have the secret string "phr" prepended to the actual data. I intend to licence this trade secret for vast fees. Unfortunately, I am not very good at designing encryption systems, and some young chap has reverse-engineered how my scheme works. Would he be in breach of part (ii) above if he made public his discovery? Does the law protect implementors of flawed encryption, as it seems to be in the DeCSS case? If so, what is the rationale for this? How far would I get if I tryed to sue the hypothetical programmer in the manner that the MPAA has been proceding? Phil From donald@ramsbottom.co.uk Wed, 09 Feb 2000 17:20:35 +0000 Date: Wed, 09 Feb 2000 17:20:35 +0000 From: Donald Ramsbottom donald@ramsbottom.co.uk Subject: JY and DeCSS and MPAA At 14:31 09/02/00 +0000, you wrote: SNIP > >I have invented a new "copy protection" scheme for data distributed in an >electronic form. All protected files have the secret string "phr" >prepended to the actual data. I intend to licence this trade secret for >vast fees. Unfortunately, I am not very good at designing encryption >systems, and some young chap has reverse-engineered how my scheme works. > >Would he be in breach of part (ii) above if he made public his discovery? > >Does the law protect implementors of flawed encryption, as it seems to be >in the DeCSS case? If so, what is the rationale for this? How far would I >get if I tryed to sue the hypothetical programmer in the manner that the >MPAA has been proceding? I think Nicholas covered this in his post. The rules quoted were for breach of copy protection not decryption, which Nicholas pointed out was not in the contemplation of the draftsmen of the 1988 Act. It has been pointed out that a DVD can be copied easily as there is no copy protection (within the meaning of the Act) only encrypted data which does not seem to be covered. I suspect there are IP lawyers sharpening their pencils and preparing for a big fat fight with someone over this, even as I type, as most will not have made the astute distinction which Nicholas has. Donald Ramsbottom LL.B, BA (Hons). RAMSBOTTOM & Co. Solicitors Internet Law & Global Cryptology Law Specialists From daw@cs.berkeley.edu 9 Feb 2000 10:39:08 -0800 Date: 9 Feb 2000 10:39:08 -0800 From: David Wagner daw@cs.berkeley.edu Subject: JY and DeCSS and MPAA In article <20000209095833.A826@hyena.skygate.co.uk>, Pete Chown wrote: > Can CSS be considered to be a copy protection scheme? Yes, of course. It seems that these days, anything can be considered a copy protection scheme. Wearing a pointy hat and waving a magic wand can be considered a copy protection scheme. (Hey, at least you know just what you're getting when you see the pointy hat!) The real question is, can CSS be considered an _effective_ copy protection scheme? And the answer, to my mind, is a resounding no. (CSS is roughly irrelevant to large-scale piracy -- bit-for-bit copying is far easier, and breaking CSS doesn't help you much anyway -- but if you wanted to break CSS for some reason, well, that's very easy, too.) The sad thing is that the DVD industry does not seem to have learned the copy-protection lesson of the 80's: software copy-protection schemes just don't work terribly well. What's the quote? "He who does not know history is condemned to repeat it", or somesuch? From pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz Thu, 10 Feb 2000 09:21:08 (NZDT) Date: Thu, 10 Feb 2000 09:21:08 (NZDT) From: Peter Gutmann pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz Subject: Tutorials? Chris Salter writes: >Can anyone recommend any sites that contain Tutorials on, in effect, the >reason why we need encryption. I have just been sitting on the sidelines >of a uk newsgroup (unrelated to any crypto/privacy issues) watching a >particular poster ridicule the very idea that Internet traffic is or even >can be monitored by government agencies. I have looked back through my >archives of ukcrypto and I certainly have plenty of material that could be >compiled into some form of tutorial but I am hoping that this has already >been done. Such a tutorial would contain references to background material >from multiple and authoritative sources that would hopefully convince both >the sceptic and ill-informed that reports of systems such as Echelon are >much more than journalistic speculation. I updated my godzilla crypto tutorial, http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~pgut001/tutorial/, a day or two back, part 8 covers crypto politics although this is the least-updated part of the whole thing. It gives a reasonable amount of information about why we need encryption. Peter. From ddt@cryptorights.org Wed, 9 Feb 2000 12:47:32 -0800 Date: Wed, 9 Feb 2000 12:47:32 -0800 From: Dave Del Torto ddt@cryptorights.org Subject: Tutorials? At 12:00 pm +0000 2000-02-09, Chris Salter wrote: >Can anyone recommend any sites that contain Tutorials on, in effect, the >reason why we need encryption. ... Peter Gutmann has recently updated his excellent tutorials: Tutorial #8 covers some of the "Why's" you're looking into, and you won't find much better than this anywhere online. dave From arj@burntwood.net Wed, 09 Feb 2000 22:14:36 +0000 Date: Wed, 09 Feb 2000 22:14:36 +0000 From: Adrian Ridley-Jones arj@burntwood.net Subject: How Old Is TEMPEST? Major General Nalder's "History of the Royal COrps of Signals" was indeed published in the late 50's.. 1958 to be exact. Two references predate the quoted examples, one from the British Army Expedition to the Nile and Suakin in 1884- 85 and a later one from the start of the First World War. The Nile / Suakin expedition identified the effects that TEMPEST was brought in to overcome. Induction interference meant the vibrators used to communicate with the front line troops had to be removed from the circuit. The Russians were regularly being intercepted by the Germans at the start of the Eastern Front campaign during the First World War. It directly contributed to the early defeat of the Russians, where two armies were defeated by a numberically smaller German force defending East Prussia. I accept the latter example is not pure Tempest, however it does lay the foundations for subsequent activities ...... indeed the Germans reacted to the easy interception of wireless by not using it as much as they would have wished. Surely this is indicative of the earliest forms of Tempest related activities (not using the medium !!). Communications interception occurred regularly throughout 1914 as the cavalry, equipped with wireless supplied signallers, were used in a dismounted role, releasing them to undertake communications interception duties. Also during October 1914 early direction finding experiments were carried out, using the first valve receiver, a Bellini Tosi. The next stage was during 1915 when it became necessary to take appropriate steps to prevent line communication interception by the Germans. During the early part of 1915, in a effort to rebuilt communications post bombardments, a large number of earth return circuit cables had been laid by non communications trained troops with chaotic results. At the same time, German attemtps to tap French lines was identified. This led to the first serious efforts to identify crosstalk and indeed if physical connection was required to intercept signals was conducted during June and July 1915 using a wireless receiver coupled to repeating coils in the ratio of 1 to 16. Telephone conversations could be heard at ranges of up to 100 yards and buzzer signals 300 yards. By August, the French were able to intercept German signals using a well earthed low-resistance telephone receiver. These developments led to the issuing of the first set of counter-measures and the creation of listening apparatus. Valve listening sets were tried out during 1916 and earth return circuits, abolished in the forward zones (3000 yards), being replaced with twisted cable metallic circuits. During Oct 1916 early attempts to jam listening devices using buzzers started. These were unsuccessful tending to drown out friendly conversations as well. German interception techniques were ahead of Allied ones and this had the consequence of ensuring their com-sec procedures were also ahead. However, British attempts to nullify interception resulted in the development of the small current DC signalling phone (nicknamed Fullerphone) at the end of 1915, invented by Captain A C Fuller. After field trials it was put into full scale production during 1916. Thus this would be the first recorded active Tempest activity as a result of orders from the Director of Army Signals to the Signal Service Training Centre issued in August 1915. It was here that Captain Fuller worked and invented the Fullerphone. However, I do believe due credit must be given to the Germans who had clearly led the developments up to this point. Maybe some more research will unearth information in this area, however after similar research regarding Second World War developments proved rather fruitless, I don't hold out much hope. It only remains to say that the experiences learnt during this period were then passed on to the US Army units being trained in England and France prior to being committed to the front line. It may well be here that the US Signal Corps carried on further work with (or via) Herbert Yardley and his American Black Chamber model !! Regards Adrian From jya@pipeline.com Wed, 09 Feb 2000 23:16:11 -0500 Date: Wed, 09 Feb 2000 23:16:11 -0500 From: John Young jya@pipeline.com Subject: DMCA Comments Due Forward. Non-US comments acceptable: Date: Wed, 9 Feb 2000 23:02:12 -0500 Sender: Law & Policy of Computer Communications From: Seth Finkelstein Subject: DMCA Anti-Circumvention comments - deadline Feb 17 To: CYBERIA-L@LISTSERV.AOL.COM Did you like Section 1201(a)(2) of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act? That provision under which we've seen programmers subjected to everything from injunctions to a raid by the police? Well then, you're going to LOVE Section 1201(a)(1) of the DMCA. 1201(a)(2) is the "offer to the public" prohibition. 1201(a)(1) applies to the very act of "circumvention" itself: "``(a) VIOLATIONS REGARDING CIRCUMVENTION OF TECHNOLOGICAL MEASURES.-- (1)(A) No person shall circumvent a technological measure that effectively controls access to a work protected" This is something like patent, copyright, and trade-secret all rolled into one. We've just seen the DMCA in practice, and it's going to get worse before it gets better. Now regarding this provision: "The Copyright Office is first seeking written and reply comments from interested parties in order to elicit information and views on whether noninfringing uses of certain classes of works are, or are likely to be, adversely affected by the prohibition against circumvention of access control technologies." http://www.loc.gov/copyright/1201/anticirc.html The implications should be obvious. The deadline for comments has been extended to February 17, 2000. Read the above for format information, there's some picky requirements on how to submit a comment. Send your contribution before it's too late. The court case you avoid may be your own! ----------------==----------------------------------------------------------- Seth Finkelstein Consulting Web Programmer, potential circumvention-criminal ----------------==----------------------------------------------------------- From shamrock@cypherpunks.to Wed, 09 Feb 2000 23:00:45 -0800 Date: Wed, 09 Feb 2000 23:00:45 -0800 From: Lucky Green shamrock@cypherpunks.to Subject: JY and DeCSS and MPAA Philip Rowlands wrote: > I have invented a new "copy protection" scheme for data distributed in an > electronic form. All protected files have the secret string "phr" > prepended to the actual data. I intend to licence this trade secret for > vast fees. Unfortunately, I am not very good at designing encryption > systems, and some young chap has reverse-engineered how my scheme works. > > Would he be in breach of part (ii) above if he made public his discovery? > > Does the law protect implementors of flawed encryption, as it seems to be > in the DeCSS case? If so, what is the rationale for this? How far would I > get if I tryed to sue the hypothetical programmer in the manner that the > MPAA has been proceding? I don't know what the law in the UK holds, but in the US, at least as far as the DMCA is concerned, the quality of the encryption scheme employed to protect copyrighted content is not a factor to be taken into consideration by the courts. If I were to select ROT-19 as the encryption scheme for my copyrighted works and you choose to distribute a ROT-19 decoder, your ass is grass. Assuming you are located within the jurisdiction of the US courts. Which tend to have a long-distance view on their jurisdiction, btw. Enjoy, --Lucky From nbohm@ernest.net Thu, 10 Feb 2000 09:13:46 +0000 Date: Thu, 10 Feb 2000 09:13:46 +0000 From: Nicholas Bohm nbohm@ernest.net Subject: JY and DeCSS and MPAA When I wrote yesterday... "I do not think the 1988 Act anticipated the present case. "Copy-protected" means protected against copying, and includes any means intended to prevent or restrict copying of a work or to impair the quality of copies made - 296(4). Copy-protection is not the same as encryption, which is covered in section 298; but that applies only to broadcasting or cable programme services provided from a place in the UK, and to encrypted transmissions of any other description sent from a place in the UK. This does not cover scrambled DVDs, CDs, floppies etc, since their contents are not "transmissions" in this context." ... I was assuming CSS was the system that prevented DVDs playing on players designed to play another region's DVDs. A correspondent in today's Connected (Telegraph) says otherwise, namely that CSS is to prevent copying and in particular ripping out of tracks, and is not for the purpose I assumed. This obviously affects what I wrote previously about the relevance of copy protection. No doubt someone will post some facts. Regards, Nicholas Salkyns, Great Canfield, Takeley, Bishop's Stortford CM22 6SX, UK Phone 01279 871272 (+44 1279 871272) Fax 01279 870215 (+44 1279 870215) Mobile 07715 419728 (+44 7715 419728) PGP RSA 1024 bit public key ID: 0x08340015. Fingerprint: 9E 15 FB 2A 54 96 24 37 98 A2 E0 D1 34 13 48 07 PGP DSS/DH 1024/3072 public key ID: 0x899DD7FF. Fingerprint: 5248 1320 B42E 84FC 1E8B A9E6 0912 AE66 899D D7FF From ben@algroup.co.uk Thu, 10 Feb 2000 10:48:29 +0000 Date: Thu, 10 Feb 2000 10:48:29 +0000 From: Ben Laurie ben@algroup.co.uk Subject: JY and DeCSS and MPAA Nicholas Bohm wrote: > ... I was assuming CSS was the system that prevented DVDs playing on > players designed to play another region's DVDs. A correspondent in today's > Connected (Telegraph) says otherwise, namely that CSS is to prevent copying > and in particular ripping out of tracks, and is not for the purpose I assumed. My understanding is that DVD region control operates simply by the disk saying "I am a region 23 disk" and the player refusing to play anything other than region 23 disks (i.e. it could, but it declines to). So, although CSS may not be directly used to enforce region protection, clearly having access to it allows one to build a player that ignores the region info. Cheers, Ben. -- SECURE HOSTING AT THE BUNKER! http://www.thebunker.net/hosting.htm http://www.apache-ssl.org/ben.html Y19100 no-prize winner! http://www.ntk.net/index.cgi?back=2000/now0121.txt From sxw@dcs.ed.ac.uk Thu, 10 Feb 2000 11:20:12 GMT Date: Thu, 10 Feb 2000 11:20:12 GMT From: Simon Wilkinson sxw@dcs.ed.ac.uk Subject: JY and DeCSS and MPAA > ... I was assuming CSS was the system that prevented DVDs playing on > players designed to play another region's DVDs. A correspondent in today's > Connected (Telegraph) says otherwise, namely that CSS is to prevent copying > and in particular ripping out of tracks, and is not for the purpose I assume. CSS does not implement region coding. Region coding is a property of the DVD file system, and is generally implemented by the drive hardware. CSS is used to implement encryption of the video streams on the disk, and to limit playback to licensed players. Without a CSS decoder, you can view the filesystem of a DVD, but the video streams will remain unplayable. The other thing to note is that CSS does not prevent direct, bit-to-bit, copying - if you can write DVDs, you can copy the entire disk, encrypted streams and all. The only thing that it prevents is re-encoding of the video streams in another format, such as Video CD, for re-distribution. Cheers, Simon. From midgley@mednetics.org Sun, 6 Feb 2000 00:52:52 -0000 Date: Sun, 6 Feb 2000 00:52:52 -0000 From: Adrian Midgley midgley@mednetics.org Subject: Re(2): How Old Is TEMPEST? Did I miss an expansion of the acronym TEMPEST? If so, apologies, and grateful if somebody would ... From Rodney.Tillotson@ukerna.ac.uk Mon, 07 Feb 2000 10:56:23 +0000 Date: Mon, 07 Feb 2000 10:56:23 +0000 From: Rodney Tillotson Rodney.Tillotson@ukerna.ac.uk Subject: How Old Is TEMPEST? At 12:52 06/02/2000, Mike Brown wrote: > ... Prior to WW1, field telephones ... > ... The British Army used horse-drawn cable wagons ... I am not unspeakably ancient but I did this -- in the early 1960s, in the school Cadet Force along the lanes of Sussex and with teams of highly-trained runners instead of a horse. The handsets were 1939-45 or later and I believed at the time that single-wire working had been current practice during that war. > It was very soon discovered that there was considerable crosstalk > on field telephone circuits ... That too. No hint to the enthusiastic youngsters that twin-wire was normal in the field. Rodney. From ijackson@chiark.greenend.org.uk Mon, 7 Feb 2000 14:02:26 +0000 (GMT) Date: Mon, 7 Feb 2000 14:02:26 +0000 (GMT) From: Ian Jackson ijackson@chiark.greenend.org.uk Subject: Lottery To Run On PC Technology Nigel Titley writes ("Re: Lottery To Run On PC Technology"): > Well, given that I've always regarded the lottery as a tax on > stupidity, I can't say I'm overly worried. This is getting rather off-topic, but actually the lottery is an overpriced source of hope for those who otherwise have little or none. Or, to put it another way, playing the lottery is only stupid if your utility function for money has certain shapes, which are not the only possible sensible ones. People who already have good prospects (like most of those here on this list) are much more likely to have utility functions where playing the lottery is not helpful, but that doesn't extrapolate to the rest of society. Ian. From marks@thawte.com Sat, 05 Feb 2000 00:47:08 GMT Date: Sat, 05 Feb 2000 00:47:08 GMT From: Mark Shuttleworth marks@thawte.com Subject: Thawte and Verisign - Important Announcement February 1, 2000 Dear Thawte Customers and Future Customers: In December, VeriSign and Thawte announced their intentions to join forces. We hope this letter addresses any questions you may have about what this will mean for you. Please be assured that none of the things you love most about Thawte will change after the acquisition. This includes: - Low prices for SSL Server and Personal Certificates - The people you have dealt with at Thawte - Our commitment to innovation VeriSign and Thawte are committed to providing a low entry price for sites that wish to conduct secure e-commerce using SSL. In fact, we guarantee that Thawte SSL Server Certificates will continue to be available to both existing and new customers for $125 (or less!) at least through February 1, 2001. This is a firm offer which you can take advantage of at any time during this period. You can print out this page and save it as proof of our guarantee. Furthermore, existing Thawte customers will be entitled to receive substantial discounts if they choose to take advantage of one of VeriSign's premium certificate offerings, such as the VeriSign Secure Site, Secure Site Plus, and Global Site solutions. In addition to providing SSL functionality, these offerings include popular additional features, such as up to $250,000 of NetSure warranty protection, the Secure Site Seal, automated performance monitoring through Keynote, free Web site security scanning through Netcraft, and free listing of your site in the Network Solutions dot.com directory. Look for complete information about this discount program soon on this site. For those of you who enjoy Thawte Personal Freemail certificates, please rest assured that you will still be able to obtain free personal certificates. VeriSign has offered free personal certificates for over 4 years, and we intend to continue that program, as well as Thawte's popular Web of Trust program. Thawte's vetting and support services will remain in place, so that you will still deal with the same people as before when you work with us to purchase and get help with certificates. Furthermore, Thawte and VeriSign have thoroughly reviewed both companies' certificate issuance and support processes. We have identified many areas in which the two companies can learn from each other. By adapting the best aspects of each other's operations and technology, we will be able to deliver even more cost-effective services on a global basis. Thawte and VeriSign have also spent the past few weeks exploring new product strategy for the coming years. Through our relationship, we will be able to offer you a much broader set of complementary products and services to help you enhance your e-commerce site. Working together, Thawte and VeriSign plan to introduce a number of exciting services, including PKI solutions for the Wireless Web and new low-cost payment processing services. VeriSign and Thawte recognize that there are many places where you can obtain a certificate that enables SSL. We hope that you will continue to do business with us now that we have joined forces, as we are convinced that we offer the best service, the best technology, the highest levels of trust, and the best prices across a broad range of solutions. You also have our commitment that we will continue to tell you about our plans for the future of online trust as they develop. If you have any questions or concerns, please feel free to write to either one of us. Sincerely: Mark Shuttleworth, President and CEO Thawte Consulting (Pty) Ltd. marks@thawte.com 12 Plein Street Durbanville 7550 South Africa Stratton Sclavos President and CEO VeriSign, Inc. stratton@verisign.com 1350 Charleston Rd. Mountain View, CA 94043 U.S.A. From daw@cs.berkeley.edu 9 Feb 2000 10:39:08 -0800 Date: 9 Feb 2000 10:39:08 -0800 From: David Wagner daw@cs.berkeley.edu Subject: JY and DeCSS and MPAA In article <20000209095833.A826@hyena.skygate.co.uk>, Pete Chown wrote: > Can CSS be considered to be a copy protection scheme? Yes, of course. It seems that these days, anything can be considered a copy protection scheme. Wearing a pointy hat and waving a magic wand can be considered a copy protection scheme. (Hey, at least you know just what you're getting when you see the pointy hat!) The real question is, can CSS be considered an _effective_ copy protection scheme? And the answer, to my mind, is a resounding no. (CSS is roughly irrelevant to large-scale piracy -- bit-for-bit copying is far easier, and breaking CSS doesn't help you much anyway -- but if you wanted to break CSS for some reason, well, that's very easy, too.) The sad thing is that the DVD industry does not seem to have learned the copy-protection lesson of the 80's: software copy-protection schemes just don't work terribly well. What's the quote? "He who does not know history is condemned to repeat it", or somesuch? From ddt@cryptorights.org Wed, 9 Feb 2000 12:47:32 -0800 Date: Wed, 9 Feb 2000 12:47:32 -0800 From: Dave Del Torto ddt@cryptorights.org Subject: Tutorials? At 12:00 pm +0000 2000-02-09, Chris Salter wrote: >Can anyone recommend any sites that contain Tutorials on, in effect, the >reason why we need encryption. ... Peter Gutmann has recently updated his excellent tutorials: Tutorial #8 covers some of the "Why's" you're looking into, and you won't find much better than this anywhere online. dave From arj@burntwood.net Wed, 09 Feb 2000 22:14:36 +0000 Date: Wed, 09 Feb 2000 22:14:36 +0000 From: Adrian Ridley-Jones arj@burntwood.net Subject: How Old Is TEMPEST? Major General Nalder's "History of the Royal COrps of Signals" was indeed published in the late 50's.. 1958 to be exact. Two references predate the quoted examples, one from the British Army Expedition to the Nile and Suakin in 1884- 85 and a later one from the start of the First World War. The Nile / Suakin expedition identified the effects that TEMPEST was brought in to overcome. Induction interference meant the vibrators used to communicate with the front line troops had to be removed from the circuit. The Russians were regularly being intercepted by the Germans at the start of the Eastern Front campaign during the First World War. It directly contributed to the early defeat of the Russians, where two armies were defeated by a numberically smaller German force defending East Prussia. I accept the latter example is not pure Tempest, however it does lay the foundations for subsequent activities ...... indeed the Germans reacted to the easy interception of wireless by not using it as much as they would have wished. Surely this is indicative of the earliest forms of Tempest related activities (not using the medium !!). Communications interception occurred regularly throughout 1914 as the cavalry, equipped with wireless supplied signallers, were used in a dismounted role, releasing them to undertake communications interception duties. Also during October 1914 early direction finding experiments were carried out, using the first valve receiver, a Bellini Tosi. The next stage was during 1915 when it became necessary to take appropriate steps to prevent line communication interception by the Germans. During the early part of 1915, in a effort to rebuilt communications post bombardments, a large number of earth return circuit cables had been laid by non communications trained troops with chaotic results. At the same time, German attemtps to tap French lines was identified. This led to the first serious efforts to identify crosstalk and indeed if physical connection was required to intercept signals was conducted during June and July 1915 using a wireless receiver coupled to repeating coils in the ratio of 1 to 16. Telephone conversations could be heard at ranges of up to 100 yards and buzzer signals 300 yards. By August, the French were able to intercept German signals using a well earthed low-resistance telephone receiver. These developments led to the issuing of the first set of counter-measures and the creation of listening apparatus. Valve listening sets were tried out during 1916 and earth return circuits, abolished in the forward zones (3000 yards), being replaced with twisted cable metallic circuits. During Oct 1916 early attempts to jam listening devices using buzzers started. These were unsuccessful tending to drown out friendly conversations as well. German interception techniques were ahead of Allied ones and this had the consequence of ensuring their com-sec procedures were also ahead. However, British attempts to nullify interception resulted in the development of the small current DC signalling phone (nicknamed Fullerphone) at the end of 1915, invented by Captain A C Fuller. After field trials it was put into full scale production during 1916. Thus this would be the first recorded active Tempest activity as a result of orders from the Director of Army Signals to the Signal Service Training Centre issued in August 1915. It was here that Captain Fuller worked and invented the Fullerphone. However, I do believe due credit must be given to the Germans who had clearly led the developments up to this point. Maybe some more research will unearth information in this area, however after similar research regarding Second World War developments proved rather fruitless, I don't hold out much hope. It only remains to say that the experiences learnt during this period were then passed on to the US Army units being trained in England and France prior to being committed to the front line. It may well be here that the US Signal Corps carried on further work with (or via) Herbert Yardley and his American Black Chamber model !! Regards Adrian From Pete.Chown@skygate.co.uk Thu, 10 Feb 2000 11:56:28 +0000 Date: Thu, 10 Feb 2000 11:56:28 +0000 From: Pete Chown Pete.Chown@skygate.co.uk Subject: Lottery To Run On PC Technology Ian Jackson wrote: > This is getting rather off-topic, but actually the lottery is an > overpriced source of hope for those who otherwise have little or none. Running it on Windows would make it a reasonably priced source of hope for unprofessional security professionals everywhere... :-) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- phone +44 (0) 20 8542 7856, fax +44 (0) 20 8543 0176, post: Skygate Technology Ltd, 8 Lombard Road, Wimbledon, London, SW19 3TZ From frank.stajano@cl.cam.ac.uk Thu, 10 Feb 2000 12:07:08 +0000 Date: Thu, 10 Feb 2000 12:07:08 +0000 From: Frank Stajano frank.stajano@cl.cam.ac.uk Subject: Lottery To Run On PC Technology At 2000-02-07 14:02 +0000, Ian Jackson wrote: >Or, to put it another way, playing the lottery is only stupid if your >utility function for money has certain shapes, which are not the only Good point, often overlooked (by me among others). Frank (http://i.am/filologo.disneyano/) http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~fms27/ From cb@fipr.org Thu, 10 Feb 2000 12:14:47 -0000 Date: Thu, 10 Feb 2000 12:14:47 -0000 From: Caspar Bowden cb@fipr.org Subject: Flash Release: UK PUBLISHES "IMPOSSIBLE" DECRYPTION LAW FLASH - FOR IMMEDIATE USE FOUNDATION FOR INFORMATION POLICY RESEARCH (www.fipr.org) ========================================================= News Release Thurs 10th Feb 2000 ========================================================= Contact: Caspar Bowden Director of FIPR +44 (0)171 354 2333 cb@fipr.org UK PUBLISHES "IMPOSSIBLE" DECRYPTION LAW ======================================== Today Britain became the only country in the world to publish a law which could imprison users of encryption technology for forgetting or losing their keys. The Home Office's "REGULATION OF INVESTIGATORY POWERS" (RIP) bill has been introduced in Parliament: it regulates the use of informers, requires Internet Service Providers to maintain "reasonable interception capabilities", and contains powers to compel decryption under complex interlocking schemes of authorisation. Caspar Bowden, director of Internet policy think-tank FIPR said, "this law could make a criminal out of anyone who uses encryption to protect their privacy on the Internet." "The DTI jettisoned decryption powers from its e-Communications Bill last year because it did not believe that a law which presumes someone guilty unless they can prove themselves innocent was compatible with the Human Rights Act. The corpse of a law laid to rest by Stephen Byers has been stitched back up and jolted into life by Jack Straw" Decryption Powers: Comparison with Part.III of Draft E-Comms Bill (July 99) ------------------------------------------------------------------------ The Home Office have made limited changes that amount to window-dressing, but the essential human rights issue remains: (Clause 46): authorities must have "reasonable grounds to believe" the key is in possession of a person (previously it had to "appear" to authorities that person had a key). This replaces an subjective test with one requiring objective evidence, but leaves unaffected the presumption of guilt if reasonable grounds exist. (Clause 49): to prove non-compliance with notice to decrypt, the prosecution must prove person "has or has had" possession of the key. This satisfies the objection to the case where a person may never have had possession of the key ("encrypted e-mail out of the blue"), but leaves unchanged the essential reverse-burden-of-proof for someone who has forgotten or irreplaceably lost a key. It is logically impossible for the defence to show this reliably. HUMAN RIGHT CHALLENGE "INEVITABLE" ================================== As part of the consultation on the draft proposals last year FIPR and JUSTICE jointly obtained a Legal Opinion from leading human rights experts (http://www.fipr.org/ecomm99/pr.html) which found that requiring the defence to prove that they do not posess a key was a likely breach of the European Convention of Human Rights. Mr.Bowden commented, "following the recent liberalisation of US export laws, as tens of thousands of ordinary computer users start to use encryption, a test-case looks inevitable after the Human Rights Act comes into force in October." R.I.P. RESURRECTS KEY ESCROW BY INTIMIDATION ? ============================================== Bowden said: "after trying and failing to push through mandatory key-escrow, then voluntary key-escrow, it now looks like the government is resorting to key-escrow through intimidation." Notes for editors ================= 1. Detailed analysis of the bill will be available on the FIPR website (www.fipr.org) later today. 2. FIPR is an independent non-profit organisation that studies the interaction between information technology and society, with special reference to the Internet; we do not (directly or indirectly) represent the interests of any trade-group. Our goal is to identify technical developments with significant social impact, commission research into public policy alternatives, and promote public understanding and dialogue between technologists and policy-makers in the UK and Europe. The Board of Trustees and Advisory Council (http://www.fipr.org/trac.html) comprise some of the leading experts in the UK. From cb@fipr.org Thu, 10 Feb 2000 12:41:46 -0000 Date: Thu, 10 Feb 2000 12:41:46 -0000 From: Caspar Bowden cb@fipr.org Subject: FIPR Release: UK PUBLISHES "IMPOSSIBLE" DECRYPTION LAW Sorry if duplicated - earlier posting did not appear -- Caspar Bowden http://www.fipr.org Director, Foundation for Information Policy Research Tel: +44(0)171 354 2333 Fax: +44(0)171 827 6534 FLASH - FOR IMMEDIATE USE FOUNDATION FOR INFORMATION POLICY RESEARCH (www.fipr.org) ========================================================= News Release Thurs 10th Feb 2000 ========================================================= Contact: Caspar Bowden Director of FIPR +44 (0)171 354 2333 cb@fipr.org UK PUBLISHES "IMPOSSIBLE" DECRYPTION LAW ======================================== Today Britain became the only country in the world to publish a law which could imprison users of encryption technology for forgetting or losing their keys. The Home Office's "REGULATION OF INVESTIGATORY POWERS" (RIP) bill has been introduced in Parliament: it regulates the use of informers, requires Internet Service Providers to maintain "reasonable interception capabilities", and contains powers to compel decryption under complex interlocking schemes of authorisation. Caspar Bowden, director of Internet policy think-tank FIPR said, "this law could make a criminal out of anyone who uses encryption to protect their privacy on the Internet." "The DTI jettisoned decryption powers from its e-Communications Bill last year because it did not believe that a law which presumes someone guilty unless they can prove themselves innocent was compatible with the Human Rights Act. The corpse of a law laid to rest by Stephen Byers has been stitched up and jolted back into life by Jack Straw" Decryption Powers: Comparison with Part.III of Draft E-Comms Bill (July 99) ------------------------------------------------------------------------ The Home Office have made limited changes that amount to window-dressing, but the essential human rights issue remains: (Clause 46): authorities must have "reasonable grounds to believe" the key is in possession of a person (previously it had to "appear" to authorities that person had a key). This replaces an subjective test with one requiring objective evidence, but leaves unaffected the presumption of guilt if reasonable grounds exist. (Clause 49): to prove non-compliance with notice to decrypt, the prosecution must prove person "has or has had" possession of the key. This satisfies the objection to the case where a person may never have had possession of the key ("encrypted e-mail out of the blue"), but leaves unchanged the essential reverse-burden-of-proof for someone who has forgotten or irreplaceably lost a key. It is logically impossible for the defence to show this reliably. HUMAN RIGHT CHALLENGE "INEVITABLE" ================================== As part of the consultation on the draft proposals last year FIPR and JUSTICE jointly obtained a Legal Opinion from leading human rights experts (http://www.fipr.org/ecomm99/pr.html) which found that requiring the defence to prove that they do not possess a key was a likely breach of the European Convention of Human Rights. Mr.Bowden commented, "following the recent liberalisation of US export laws, as tens of thousands of ordinary computer users start to use encryption, a test-case looks inevitable after the Human Rights Act comes into force in October." R.I.P. RESURRECTS KEY ESCROW BY INTIMIDATION ? ============================================== Bowden said: "after trying and failing to push through mandatory key-escrow, then voluntary key-escrow, it now looks like the government is resorting to key-escrow through intimidation." Notes for editors ================= 1. Detailed analysis of the bill will be available on the FIPR website (www.fipr.org) later today. 2. FIPR is an independent non-profit organisation that studies the interaction between information technology and society, with special reference to the Internet; we do not (directly or indirectly) represent the interests of any trade-group. Our goal is to identify technical developments with significant social impact, commission research into public policy alternatives, and promote public understanding and dialogue between technologists and policy-makers in the UK and Europe. The Board of Trustees and Advisory Council (http://www.fipr.org/trac.html) comprise some of the leading experts in the UK. From pleyland@microsoft.com Thu, 10 Feb 2000 05:12:41 -0800 Date: Thu, 10 Feb 2000 05:12:41 -0800 From: Paul Leyland pleyland@microsoft.com Subject: Re(2): How Old Is TEMPEST? > From: Adrian Midgley [mailto:midgley@mednetics.org] > Sent: 06 February 2000 00:53 > To: ukcrypto@maillist.ox.ac.uk > Subject: Re: Re(2): How Old Is TEMPEST? > > > Did I miss an expansion of the acronym TEMPEST? > If so, apologies, and grateful if somebody would ... No, you didn't miss an expansion, largely because there isn't one! TEMPEST is an arbitary code name. Paul From jya@pipeline.com Thu, 10 Feb 2000 08:43:16 -0500 Date: Thu, 10 Feb 2000 08:43:16 -0500 From: John Young jya@pipeline.com Subject: How Old Is TEMPEST? Paul Leyland wrote: >TEMPEST is an arbitary code name. Yes, that appears to be the authoritative answer, though one encounters expansions of the term with a variety of phrases to make it an acronym. The capitalization of TEMPEST seems derived from the practice of doing so with codewords, at least in the US. Is that the practice in the UK as well? Is it also a UK invention. And, when was the codeword TEMPEST first used? "Crosstalk" has been around a while, when did it appear? We ask because other phrases would be useful to trace the history of the technology (and its precursors) prior to use of TEMPEST. The 1884 citation is wondrous. And now another look at Marconi, Edison and especially Tesla are due, and, to be sure, 19th/20th century British researchers in electromagnetic fundamentals. Two other TEMPEST-related US codewords are NONSTOP and HIJACK. Their technology remains classified in the US and I do not know what it is. Are the terms used in the UK? Some standards and manuals once designated as TEMPEST are now referred to as "Technical," presumably to cover a wider range of technology such as "technical surveillance countermeasures" (TSCM) and others. Again, has the UK also switched to Technical or EMSEC -- or what? As ever, I owe great credit to Joel McNamara for his comprehensive "unofficial" TEMPEST Web site: http://www.eskimo.com/~joelm/tempest.html From cb@fipr.org Thu, 10 Feb 2000 14:13:19 -0000 Date: Thu, 10 Feb 2000 14:13:19 -0000 From: Caspar Bowden cb@fipr.org Subject: BBC Online 10/2/2000: "UK publishes 'impossible' decryption law" (13:29) http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/sci/tech/newsid_638000/638041.stm UK publishes 'impossible' decryption law At issue is the burden of proof The UK Government came under fire on Thursday from the internet community after it published a Bill to regulate covert surveillance. The critics say the legislation, if passed, could lead to innocent people being sent to jail simply because they have lost their data encryption codes. The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Bill covers the monitoring and the interception of communications by law enforcement and security agencies. It will, for example, lay down the legal rules that must be followed by the police and security services when they tap someone's phone. But it also regulates the authorities' access to the codes that encrypt data sent over the net. The Home Office is deeply concerned that criminals, such as paedophiles, will use encryption to hide their activities. And, as a result, the Bill proposes that the police or the security services should have the power to force someone to hand over decryption keys or the plain text of specified materials, such as e-mails, and jail those who refuse. The government believes it has built sufficient safeguards into the legislation. But Caspar Bowden, from the Foundation for Information Policy Research, said the law as drafted was "impossible" and accused the government of ignoring all the advice and lobbying it had received from the net community over the past year. Net privacy At issue is the burden of proof. Critics of the legislation say someone might go to jail unless they could prove they did not have a requested key - an impossible defence for someone who has lost the software code. "This law could make a criminal out of anyone who uses encryption to protect their privacy on the internet," Mr Bowden said. "The Department of Trade and Industry jettisoned decryption powers from its e-Communications Bill last year because it did not believe that a law which presumes someone guilty unless they can prove themselves innocent was compatible with the Human Rights Act. "But the corpse of a law laid to rest by Trade Secretary Stephen Byers has been stitched back up and jolted into life by Home Secretary Jack Straw." Under the new legislation, the police would have to have "reasonable grounds to believe" a key was in the possession of someone carrying out suspected illegal activity. Previous attempts to draft the legislation had only used the word "appear". Human rights Casper Bowden said the change merely replaced a subjective test with one requiring objective evidence. And it still left in place the presumption of guilt with only those who had innocently received a suspect e-mail able to mount a successful defence. "It's clear we are heading for the courts with a human rights test case," Mr Bowden told BBC News Online. "The legislation could be amended, but it's obvious the government is not going to take that course." However, the Home Secretary, Jack Straw, is clearly confident about the legal advice he has received. "The Human Rights Act and rapid change in technology are the twin drivers of the new Bill," he said on publication of the Bill. "None of the law enforcement activities specified in the Bill is new. Covert surveillance by police and other law enforcement officers is as old as policing itself; so too is the use of informants, agents, and undercover officers. "What is new is that for the first time the use of these techniques will be properly regulated by law, and externally supervised, not least to ensure that law enforcement operations are consistent with the duties imposed on public authorities by the European Convention on Human Rights and the Human Rights Act." From cb@fipr.org Thu, 10 Feb 2000 15:39:54 -0000 Date: Thu, 10 Feb 2000 15:39:54 -0000 From: Caspar Bowden cb@fipr.org Subject: RIP Bill is now up http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199900/cmbills/064/2000064.htm Explanatory notes http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199900/cmbills/064/en/00064x--.ht m -- Caspar Bowden http://www.fipr.org Director, Foundation for Information Policy Research Tel: +44(0)171 354 2333 Fax: +44(0)171 827 6534 From donald@ramsbottom.co.uk Thu, 10 Feb 2000 16:45:57 +0000 Date: Thu, 10 Feb 2000 16:45:57 +0000 From: Donald Ramsbottom donald@ramsbottom.co.uk Subject: JY and DeCSS and MPAA At 11:20 10/02/00 GMT, you wrote: >> ... I was assuming CSS was the system that prevented DVDs playing on >> players designed to play another region's DVDs. A correspondent in today's >> Connected (Telegraph) says otherwise, namely that CSS is to prevent copying >> and in particular ripping out of tracks, and is not for the purpose I assume. > >CSS does not implement region coding. Region coding is a property of the >DVD file system, and is generally implemented by the drive hardware. >CSS is used to implement encryption of the video streams on the disk, and >to limit playback to licensed players. Without a CSS decoder, you can view >the filesystem of a DVD, but the video streams will remain unplayable. > >The other thing to note is that CSS does not prevent direct, >bit-to-bit, copying - if you can write DVDs, you can copy the entire >disk, encrypted streams and all. The only thing that it prevents is >re-encoding of the video streams in another format, such as Video CD, >for re-distribution. > >Cheers, > >Simon. > The important bit here (legally) is that the CSS system does not prevent copying which the 1988 Act and quoted sections prevented. So it would seem to me that Nicholas original proposition still holds true. CSS does not stop bit by bit copying, and is part of the encryption system (flawed or otherwise) to prevent unlawful viewing not copying, as such: >"Copy-protected" means protected against copying, and includes any means >intended to prevent or restrict copying of a work or to impair the quality >of copies made - 296(4). So it would seem there is at least an arguement for DeCSS not violating the 1988 Act. If I have misunderstood the techie bits no doubt some kind techmarine will put it right. Donald Ramsbottom LL.B, BA (Hons). RAMSBOTTOM & Co. Solicitors Internet Law & Global Cryptology Law Specialists From Q.G.Campbell@newcastle.ac.uk Thu, 10 Feb 2000 16:21:48 +0000 (GMT) Date: Thu, 10 Feb 2000 16:21:48 +0000 (GMT) From: Quentin Campbell Q.G.Campbell@newcastle.ac.uk Subject: How Old Is TEMPEST? On Thu, 10 Feb 2000, John Young wrote: > >TEMPEST is an arbitary code name. > > Yes, that appears to be the authoritative answer, though > one encounters expansions of the term with a variety of > phrases to make it an acronym. [snip] The difference in effectivness of TEMPEST standards as against the FCC and EC standards that apply for consumer electricals must be so great one begins to wonder why the latter bother setting them. The various EC Directives limiting the level of interfering RF emissions from consumer electrical goods do not appear to be very effective. In the case of televisons in the UK the standards offer no protection against even hand-held detectors carried by TV Licencing inspectors. Of more practical concern to me was an experince some years ago when I ran a Special Event Amateur Radio Station at this university. We had a station optimised for 80m (3.5 -3.6MHz) operation. In the evenings we were putting out a very strong, clean, signal all over Europe. Hundred's of stations were trying to call us we were told. However the noise floor at our end was S9 to S9+ which meant we could only hear and work the very strongest of them. It was a great disappoinment. The RF interference was mainly generated by the thousand's of PCs and other computers around the campus. In such an environment I wonder just how effective any sensitive covert monitoring equipment can be? In one respect at least, GCHQ and Radio Amateurs share a common aim; this is to ensure that developing technology does not add to the already serious problems caused to listening equipment by high levels of RF pollution! It may appear selfish to others but many Radio Amateurs were quitely pleased when GCHQ, the CAA and others managed to block the introduction by the power generators of technology that would have enabled the carrying of digital transmissions over power cables that make up the Nationl Grid. Quentin -- PHONE: +44 191 222 8209 Computing Service, University of Newcastle FAX: +44 191 222 8765 Newcastle upon Tyne, United Kingdom, NE1 7RU. ------------------------------------------------------------------------- "Any opinions expressed above are mine. The University can get its own." From pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz Fri, 11 Feb 2000 05:39:44 (NZDT) Date: Fri, 11 Feb 2000 05:39:44 (NZDT) From: Peter Gutmann pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz Subject: How Old Is TEMPEST? Mike Brown writes: >It was very soon discovered that there was considerable crosstalk on >field telephone circuits ... "You'd like to book a table for three by the window for 9.30 PM, not too near the band, in the name of Oberleutenant von Gruber? I think you might have the wrong number". "Rather close line there, eh sir? That phone system is a shambles, no wonder we haven't had any orders!" Peter. From I.Brown@cs.ucl.ac.uk Thu, 10 Feb 2000 17:15:40 +0000 Date: Thu, 10 Feb 2000 17:15:40 +0000 From: Ian BROWN I.Brown@cs.ucl.ac.uk Subject: JY and DeCSS and MPAA >>"Copy-protected" means protected against copying, and includes any means >>intended to prevent or restrict copying of a work or to impair the quality >>of copies made - 296(4). > >So it would seem there is at least an arguement for DeCSS not violating the >1988 Act. If I have misunderstood the techie bits no doubt some kind >techmarine will put it right. You have the technical bits right, but just because CSS doesn't prevent one form of copying (bit by bit), I don't know if that means its function to prevent another kind of copying (ripping the contents of the disk and writing them elsewhere, as long as you have 5-9GB of storage free) is ignored for the purposes of the 1988 Act. Ian :) From donald@ramsbottom.co.uk Thu, 10 Feb 2000 18:10:34 +0000 Date: Thu, 10 Feb 2000 18:10:34 +0000 From: Donald Ramsbottom donald@ramsbottom.co.uk Subject: RIP Bill is now up At 15:39 10/02/00 -0000, you wrote: >http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199900/cmbills/064/2000064.htm > >Explanatory notes >http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199900/cmbills/064/en/00064x--.ht >m > >-- >Caspar Bowden http://www.fipr.org >Director, Foundation for Information Policy Research >Tel: +44(0)171 354 2333 Fax: +44(0)171 827 6534 > > > Would you look at the size of the thing!! I've been downloading and printing and I've reloaded the paper twice thus far. So this littlle ditty was knocked up in the period between the demise of the old section3 and now. Impressive, they can work fast when it suits them. Donald Ramsbottom LL.B, BA (Hons). RAMSBOTTOM & Co. Solicitors Internet Law & Global Cryptology Law Specialists From bdm@fenrir.demon.co.uk Thu, 10 Feb 2000 17:37:21 Date: Thu, 10 Feb 2000 17:37:21 From: Brian Morrison bdm@fenrir.demon.co.uk Subject: RIP Bill is now up On Thu, 10 Feb 2000 18:10:34 +0000, Donald Ramsbottom wrote: >So this littlle ditty was knocked up in the period between the demise >of the old section3 and now. If you ask me, Section 3 of the E-Commerce Bill was a blind to distract attention from what the HO were doing with this new Bill. -- Brian Morrison bdm@fenrir.demon.co.uk do you know how far this has gone? just how damaged have I become? 'Even Deeper' by Nine Inch Nails From Ian_Miller@scientia.com Thu, 10 Feb 2000 17:43:33 +0000 Date: Thu, 10 Feb 2000 17:43:33 +0000 From: Ian Miller Ian_Miller@scientia.com Subject: JY and DeCSS and MPAA On Thu, Feb 10, 2000 at 04:45:57PM +0000, Donald Ramsbottom wrote: > The important bit here (legally) is that the CSS system does not prevent > copying which the 1988 Act and quoted sections prevented. So it would seem > to me that Nicholas original proposition still holds true. CSS does not stop > bit by bit copying, and is part of the encryption system (flawed or > otherwise) to prevent unlawful viewing not copying, as such: > Whereas I think this is true in a technical sense, the DVD-CCA/MPAA are claiming in court that CSS is (or is part of) a copy-protection scheme. The fact that it does not work does not mean the courts will not rule that it is intended to be a copy-control system. I believe that the law is significantly different in the USA. From what I have read on the web, it seems that Digital Millenium Copyright Act (DMCA) forbids among other things any circumvention of access controls on a copyrighted work as well as copy controls. It seems to me that deCSS has to qualify as an access-control circumvention. This seems very different from our laws promoting inter-operability. Indeed it seems to be an encouragement use proprietrary formats, and claim their obscurity is enforcing an access control. This then makes reverse-engineering for interoperability into an illegal circumvention. Ian From donald@ramsbottom.co.uk Thu, 10 Feb 2000 18:39:28 +0000 Date: Thu, 10 Feb 2000 18:39:28 +0000 From: Donald Ramsbottom donald@ramsbottom.co.uk Subject: RIP Bill is now up At 17:37 10/02/00, you wrote: >On Thu, 10 Feb 2000 18:10:34 +0000, Donald Ramsbottom wrote: > >>So this littlle ditty was knocked up in the period between the demise >>of the old section3 and now. > >If you ask me, Section 3 of the E-Commerce Bill was a blind to distract >attention from what the HO were doing with this new Bill. > >-- >Brian Morrison bdm@fenrir.demon.co.uk > do you know how far this has gone? > just how damaged have I become? > 'Even Deeper' by Nine Inch Nails Yep, Looks like we've all been suckered here, played like trout etc etc. Well done HO you've had us all. real Politik no doubt:) Donald Ramsbottom LL.B, BA (Hons). RAMSBOTTOM & Co. Solicitors Internet Law & Global Cryptology Law Specialists From cb@fipr.org Thu, 10 Feb 2000 18:53:56 -0000 Date: Thu, 10 Feb 2000 18:53:56 -0000 From: Caspar Bowden cb@fipr.org Subject: ZDNet UK 10/2/2000: "New surveillance bill comes under fire" http://www.zdnet.co.uk/news/2000/5/ns-13280.html New surveillance bill comes under fire Thu, 10 Feb 2000 17:27:00 GMT Will Knight Regulation of Investigatory Powers bill violates human rights law, say civil liberties campaigners The government Thursday published the Regulation of Investigatory Powers (RIP) Bill, branded "impossible" by Internet campaigners for its potential human rights conflicts. The bill is designed to regulate the measures that police and security agencies in Britain are legally entitled to employ in order to eavesdrop on members of the public. The most controversial aspect of the bill is the recommendation that law enforcers be given legal power to confiscate keys required to decrypt encrypted computer communications, a provision that also existed in the DTI's E-Commerce Bill. Critics of the bill claim this measure could lead to the punishment of innocent individuals. They point out that under this ruling, anyone who is suspected of a misdemeanour and has received an unsolicited encrypted message could be subject to legal penalties for not handing it over. According to Casper Bowden of the Foundation for Information Policy Research (FIPR), RIP is totally unworkable and unjust: "The DTI jettisoned decryption powers from its e-Communications Bill last year because it did not believe that a law which presumes someone guilty unless they can prove themselves innocent was compatible with the Human Rights Act," he says. "This law could make a criminal out of anyone who uses encryption to protect their privacy on the Internet." The clauses relating to the confiscation of decryption keys are likely to land the government in all sorts of hot water, says Bowden. He predicts that this issue could lead to accusations of human rights abuse under forthcoming European law: "Following the recent liberalisation of US export laws, as tens of thousands of ordinary computer users start to use encryption, a test-case looks inevitable after the Human Rights Act comes into force in October." Other civil libertarians agree with Bowden that the bill appears to be little more than a renamed version of section 3 of the E-commerce Bill, rejected by the government last year because of possible human rights violations. Malcom Hutty, cofounder of Internet rights group Stand.org is appalled by the approval of this bill. "It's pretty horrifying," he says. "The DTI dropped this from the e-commerce bill because it was clearly in breach of the human rights bill. For the home office to take it up is shocking." Hutty foresees an Orwellian future in Britain if the bill is enforced: "For them to have the capability to monitor such a huge number of Internet users goes beyond normal police work and amounts to mass surveillance." Home Secretary Jack Straw has downplayed the potential for legal tangles. At the bill's publication he commented: "In my view the provisions of the regulation of investigatory powers bill are compatible with the convention rights." From cb@fipr.org Thu, 10 Feb 2000 18:56:09 -0000 Date: Thu, 10 Feb 2000 18:56:09 -0000 From: Caspar Bowden cb@fipr.org Subject: TechWeb 10/2/2000: "E-Spying Bill Called 'Escrow By Intimidation'" http://www.techweb.com/wire/story/TWB20000210S0005 E-Spying Bill Called 'Escrow By Intimidation' (02/10/00, 12:58 p.m. ET) By Madeleine Acey, TechWeb The British government published a bill Thursday to update law enforcement's interception powers to include communications made via company networks and ISPs. The legislation was immediately slammed as threatening human rights and labelled "key escrow through intimidation" by Internet think tank the Foundation For Information Policy Research (FIPR). Key escrow is a failed policy by which users of encryption software lodge copies of security keys with third parties approved by government. "This law could make a criminal out of anyone who uses encryption to protect their privacy on the Internet," said FIPR director Caspar Bowden. Following the recent liberalization of U.S. encryption software export laws, as tens of thousands of ordinary computer users start to use encryption, a test case looks inevitable. Requiring someone to prove they did not possess a key would likely be a breach of the European Convention of Human Rights, FIPR and civil rights group Justice concluded. "The DTI [Department of Trade and Industry] jettisoned decryption powers from its E-communications Bill last year because it did not believe that a law which presumes someone guilty unless they can prove themselves innocent was compatible with the Human Rights Act," Bowden said. "The corpse of a law laid to rest by [trade secretary] Stephen Byers has been stitched back up and jolted into life by [home secretary] Jack Straw." Straw insisted the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Bill ensure citizens' privacy and comply with the European Court on Human Rights. He said the interception methods of the past "sometimes led to serious miscarriages of justice" and that the bill would more closely regulate law enforcement and security agencies' activities. Straw added that interception of telecommunications was only legislated for in 1985. "There was only one completely dominant [telecom] provider and only landlines," he said. "No pagers, no mobiles, no e-mail, no Internet, no encryption. The change in the telecom landscape in less than a generation has been revolutionary. We have to ensure that the legislation keeps pace." Straw said interception played a vital role in the fight against terrorists and encryption "can be misused to devastating effect by criminals, not least in attempts by pedophiles to conceal their activities on the Internet." However, in submissions to the DTI last year, IT industry figures -- used as expert witnesses by law enforcement -- said encryption had never thwarted police attempts to crack encrypted files, and in some cases, the accused had handed keys over voluntarily. When asked at the time, security and police agencies, including the FBI, were unable to show any case where encryption had been a barrier to convicting a criminal. FIPR's Bowden said the Bill incorporated some changes to draft legislation to address previous criticisms. But, he said this was mere "window dressing". "To prove noncompliance with a notice to decrypt, the prosecution must prove a person 'has or has had' the key," Bowden said. "This satisfies the objection to the case where a person may never have had the key but leaves unchanged the essential reverse-burden of proof for someone who has forgotten or irreplaceably lost a key." From dacrick@cwcom.net Thu, 10 Feb 2000 18:55:28 +0000 Date: Thu, 10 Feb 2000 18:55:28 +0000 From: David Crick dacrick@cwcom.net Subject: More R.I.P. bill concerns -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Please feel free to quote me below or pass this on. Someone else may have come up with this point, but what the heck... A worry I have that you have not touched on is this: > to prove non-compliance with notice to decrypt, the prosecution > must prove person "has or has had" possession of the key. ^^^^^^^ "has had" will not only cause problems for those who have lost their key(s), but also for those who have *deliberately* "lost" their key. With the newer DH/DSS PGP public keys for instance, encryption sub-keys may be generated and revoked separately. A user may choose to do this every week, month, etc. [perhaps even deliberately to counteract the above legislation]. Now, if I not only generate new keys and revoke old ones, but also change my passphrase and overwrite/delete backed up keys, then it *will not be possible* for me to decrypt older messages, even though I *have had* the key. So what does the law say about that? Am I guilty for using good security practises? David. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 6.0.2ckt iQA/AwUBOKMJXFoyCjW+Y9fHEQIhbQCfR1yWmFL6VPRKNXRFd/lPzKfPseMAoKuk 4kMrvi6ipu8WykmZKpZ4URcQ =Edxi -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From brian.gladman@btinternet.com Mon, 21 Feb 2000 19:51:17 -0000 Date: Mon, 21 Feb 2000 19:51:17 -0000 From: Brian Gladman brian.gladman@btinternet.com Subject: More R.I.P. bill concerns From: "David Crick" To: "Caspar Bowden" Cc: Sent: Thursday, February 10, 2000 6:55 PM Subject: More R.I.P. bill concerns > Please feel free to quote me below or pass this on. Someone else > may have come up with this point, but what the heck... > > A worry I have that you have not touched on is this: > > > to prove non-compliance with notice to decrypt, the prosecution > > must prove person "has or has had" possession of the key. > ^^^^^^^ > > "has had" will not only cause problems for those who have lost > their key(s), but also for those who have *deliberately* "lost" > their key. I too have been pondering this clause and wondering in this context what actually constitutes 'possession'. If possession would cover the fact that I (my PC) may have had 'possession' of 1000's of SSL 'one-time' keys, the 'has had' looks pretty dire. > With the newer DH/DSS PGP public keys for instance, encryption > sub-keys may be generated and revoked separately. > > A user may choose to do this every week, month, etc. [perhaps > even deliberately to counteract the above legislation]. > > Now, if I not only generate new keys and revoke old ones, but > also change my passphrase and overwrite/delete backed up keys, > then it *will not be possible* for me to decrypt older messages, > even though I *have had* the key. Absolutely. I use this PGP mechanism with keys for each six month period and destroy the keys when they are six months out of date (i.e. 1 year after first use). The 'have had' is a horrendous provision (one among many). Brian From james@womble.org Thu, 10 Feb 2000 20:07:11 +0000 Date: Thu, 10 Feb 2000 20:07:11 +0000 From: James Gardiner james@womble.org Subject: RIP Bill is now up On Thu, Feb 10, 2000 at 03:39:54PM -0000, Caspar Bowden wrote: > http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199900/cmbills/064/2000064.htm I like the simplicity of the photostory on www.stand.org.uk - is there any value for us collectively to send similar letters to our local MPs and take the time to explain it to them? James (but please leave the swords at home!) From matthew.gream@pobox.com Thu, 10 Feb 2000 22:47:10 -0000 Date: Thu, 10 Feb 2000 22:47:10 -0000 From: Matthew Gream matthew.gream@pobox.com Subject: Cryptography: the relationship between the individual and society -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 I have been hiding around here for a while, so it's time get involved. By the way, whoever stole the garbage bin from my house, I don't throw personal items into it. Good try anyway. It's lucky I'm not paranoid. Allow me to present a solution to two recent problems: Problem 1: As presented at the Computer Lab security group meeting: the problems of data profiles in society and the loss of power to the individual. I propose a very short idealistic structure to counter this. Problem 2: As has recently occurred in legislation, it is now possible to force keys from users. I propose an abstract definition for a cipher to counter this. Please note: These ideas may not be novell, or may be very silly: but if they are amusing, I suppose they have served a purpose. And probably some big name philosopher will still my ideas and run with them, creating fame for him/herself. As usual, I'll end up relatively dead and unknown in a small bedsit in New York. Best regards, Matthew. - -- matthew.gream@pobox.com Cambridge_UK/2000 - -------------------------------------------- Conceptual principle at work: power between the individual and society .... - -------------------------------------------- A multi-dimensional cipher system ... 1. Introduction A cipher is presented. The cipher provides a method to encode and decode information to reduce the risk of disclosure by coercion [1] [2] [3]. When coerced to reveal the key to decode the ciphertext, the user can provide any of the possible keys to decode corresponding plaintexts. There are a number of plaintexts in the system, the user can choose to devulge 'non-important' plaintexts. The adversary does not know how many plaintexts are in the system, therefore is unable to know whether user has devulged all possible plaintexts. Therfore, the user can devulge two plaintexts and state that there are no more plaintexts to devulge. The user may be lying. 2. External Construction The cipher is designed to produce a single ciphertext and multiple keys from multiple plaintexts. The plaintext is a binary vector P of length q. There are n plaintexts in the system, each with subscript x. Therefore, the domain of plaintexts is P0q, P1q, ... Pnq. All plaintexts have equivalent lengths [4]. The ciphertext is a binary vector C of length r. There is one ciphertext in the system. Therefore, the domain of ciphertexts is Cr. The key is a binary vector K of length s. There are n keys in the system, each having subscript x. Therefore, the domain of keys is K0s, K1s, ... Kns. Each key has a correspondance with a particular plaintext. All keys have equivalent lengths [4]. The tranformation consists of encode and decode operations. The encode operation operates on the P domain to produce the C & K domains. This operation is referred to as the F operation. Therefore F[ {P}n ] = C, {K}n. The decode operation operates on the C and K domains to produce an element from the P domain. This operation is referred to as the G operation. Therefore Px = G[ C, Kx ] 3. Internal Construction The internal construction is yet to be determined. Please refer to the Discussion. 4. Discussion There are a number of points to consider: a. The problem will scale in time and space complexity with increasing values of n, q, r & s. A particular implementation may make tradeoffs. b. The process may be implemented using biological, quantum or alternative computing systems. The process may be mathematically specified, proved and formalised with various levels of logic and particular mathematical domains (number field domain, matrix domain, graph domain) as appropriate to the tradeoffs and implementation media. c. The system architecture can be described has having three layers. The first layer is the abstract theoretical construct, as specified above. The second layer is a particular mathematical domain representation to implement and prove the theoretical construct. The third layer is a physical implementation medium to execute the mathematical domain representation. Appropriate architectural choices and tradeoffs are made according to time, space and complexity issues, and the availability of operators, constructs and notations in each layer. d. The social architecture has not been considered here. A balance of power exists between individuals and society. Individuals necessarily give up some liberty to society in order for harmony and stability. Individuals do not give up all liberty, society does not give up all liberty. Society may be represented by government or by some other notion of collective organisation; whether a bound collective organisation, or a loose coupling of individualistic tendencies. The continuing evolution of cryptographic protocols is fundamentally about the oscillation of power between individuals and society. The protocols exist between individuals and society. As the protocols are broken, power swings either way. Each side then reasserts power to continually oscillate. This protocol reasserts individualistic power in light of recent legislative developments. e. There should be a most simple implementation proposed using a minimal construction of domains P, C & K. Perhaps, deductive or inductive proof could be used as a means of illustrating how the simple impelementation could scale towards increasing n, q, r & s. [1] Fundamentally, the encyption process is just a transformation process (cf. computing systems, turing machines, fourier transforms, z transforms, transmission systems, etc). [2] It is possible to transform the problem a relation between powers; i.e. there is information density and power evenly distributed throughout the system, however various implementations of a transform may move the balance of power around the system. [3] It is possible to construct a taxonomy and hierarchy of transformative systems and organise them according to quantitative differentials based upon the abstraction of power and density. [4] They may not, but this will make the problem harder: for further consideration. - -------------------------------------------- A multi-dimensional identity system ... A system is proposed to reassert the balance of power between the individual and society. The problem arises due to the continuing developments of data profiles [1]. Effectively, it is a method to create an additional layer between the individual and society [2]. Allow to try and describe the problem. Consider the case of a single individual. The individual interacts with many entities in society. These entities continue to gather and build information about the individual. Eventually, the individual is fully disclosed to society. Therefore, the individual loses personal privacy and therefore, power, as society completely knows the individual [3]. Realisation of this case is where the individual has a mobile phone [4]. The society knows where the individual is at all times. The society knows all of the transactions the individual has (audio calls, video calls, purchases, etc). Therefore, all information is learnt about the individual. Telephone companies have location data and phone conversations. Credit card companies have spending habits. Consider the solution of multiple identities. The individual adopts multiple identities for interaction with society. The society builds information about the multiple identifies, each in themselves. If the society does not know about the linkage between each of these identities [5], then it is not able to know everything about a particular individual. In this case, the individual regains a power distance from society. Realisation of this solution could occur by using a different credit card model [6]. Consider the case where the individual has multiple credit cards. The individual uses these cards in any manner what so ever: for instance, the individual may choose to use one credit card at each particular type of store. The stores may share information, but unless they can link credit cards to a particular individual, they can never build a complete profile on an individual. The individual preserves a degree of distance, and can do so in a completely legitimate manner. Allow me to propose a possible model. It may not be ideal or correct, but should suffice as an open gambit for thinking. Consider that there are credit card companies. There are also authentication entities. There is an individual. The individual may desire to have multiple credit cards. The individual may register address and personal details with an authentication entity. The request for a credit card may be made from the authentication entity to the credit card company. The credit card entity trusts the authentication entity on particular details (history, salary, etc). Now, the user has an additional credit card, and can use that card in any way whatsoever. The credit card company is not aware of which credit cards relate to which individuals. The integrity of the system is predicated on trust relationships between the credit card company and the authentication entity. There is trust that the authentication entity does not release individual identifying details ot the credit card company. [1] Hmm, I suggested this idea at the security group meeting and was immediately denounced because 'they can find your address', so much for open and creative intellectual thinking, supposely this is what Cambridge is all about -- well, myth and reality, design and implementation, theory and practice, doing and saying ... all those quips that surround the balance between the mind and body ;-). [2] Homer's shield, personal force fields, and all other other mythological constructions of armour that surround the individual and buffer it from everything that is "out there". Note that having increasing numbers of identities increases the strength of the shield, just like the density of the links in the armour, or just like nanontech construction, or just like other sorts of molecular and science things. heh heh. [3] Consider the relationship to losing one's Self into the ethereal medium, and spirituality, and connectedness, and understanding nature, etc. [4] The mobile phone is like a sword. [5] Or possibly of the linkage between particular identities and the individual, there is a sort of graph of reachability here. [6] This is generalisable to power distances and relationships and identities, there are more fundamental principles involved, but for purposes of illustration I use credit cards are they are a known notation. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP 6.5.1i for non-commercial use iQA/AwUBOKM/7K1VD3MTsHhAEQI8vQCgumwQYhzCNN+0NkN9UKU3w89m1mUAoM9i 1MphiofYW/eW+IatQM/u8LDg =Ji06 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From ghira@mistral.co.uk 10 Feb 2000 18:56:26 +0000 Date: 10 Feb 2000 18:56:26 +0000 From: Adam Atkinson ghira@mistral.co.uk Subject: Lottery To Run On PC Technology On 07-Feb-00 14:02:26, Ian Jackson said: >This is getting rather off-topic, but actually the lottery is an >overpriced source of hope for those who otherwise have little or none. Hmm. >People who already have good prospects (like >most of those here on this list) are much more likely to have utility >functions where playing the lottery is not helpful, but that doesn't >extrapolate to the rest of society. But there are people who are already poor who spend a disconcerting proportion of their money on lotteries. Premium bonds would be a better bet. As indeed would most other games of chance. The utility of almost certainly losing several pounds a week if you are very poor must be large and negative. If I were to spend several pounds a week on the lottery, the effect on my life would be close to nil. I'm not sure I agree with your reasoning. -- Adam Atkinson (ghira@mistral.co.uk) You mean, you'll put down your rock, I'll put down my sword, and we'll try to kill each other like civilized people? From padgett@gdi.net Thu, 10 Feb 2000 18:46:13 -0500 Date: Thu, 10 Feb 2000 18:46:13 -0500 From: Padgett 0sirius padgett@gdi.net Subject: RIP Bill is now up >>If you ask me, Section 3 of the E-Commerce Bill was a blind to distract >>attention from what the HO were doing with this new Bill. Just the old politco shell game. Thought I mentioned that possibility ? A. Padgett Peterson, P.E., CISSP: Cybernetic Psychophysicist Anti-Virus, Cryptographics, & Antique Radio Researcher http://www.freivald.org/~padgett/index.html mailto:padgett@gdi.net PGP 6.5 Key on request From matthew.gream@pobox.com Thu, 10 Feb 2000 22:47:10 -0000 Date: Thu, 10 Feb 2000 22:47:10 -0000 From: Matthew Gream matthew.gream@pobox.com Subject: Cryptography: the relationship between the individual and society -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 I have been hiding around here for a while, so it's time get involved. By the way, whoever stole the garbage bin from my house, I don't throw personal items into it. Good try anyway. It's lucky I'm not paranoid. Allow me to present a solution to two recent problems: Problem 1: As presented at the Computer Lab security group meeting: the problems of data profiles in society and the loss of power to the individual. I propose a very short idealistic structure to counter this. Problem 2: As has recently occurred in legislation, it is now possible to force keys from users. I propose an abstract definition for a cipher to counter this. Please note: These ideas may not be novell, or may be very silly: but if they are amusing, I suppose they have served a purpose. And probably some big name philosopher will still my ideas and run with them, creating fame for him/herself. As usual, I'll end up relatively dead and unknown in a small bedsit in New York. Best regards, Matthew. - -- matthew.gream@pobox.com Cambridge_UK/2000 - -------------------------------------------- Conceptual principle at work: power between the individual and society .... - -------------------------------------------- A multi-dimensional cipher system ... 1. Introduction A cipher is presented. The cipher provides a method to encode and decode information to reduce the risk of disclosure by coercion [1] [2] [3]. When coerced to reveal the key to decode the ciphertext, the user can provide any of the possible keys to decode corresponding plaintexts. There are a number of plaintexts in the system, the user can choose to devulge 'non-important' plaintexts. The adversary does not know how many plaintexts are in the system, therefore is unable to know whether user has devulged all possible plaintexts. Therfore, the user can devulge two plaintexts and state that there are no more plaintexts to devulge. The user may be lying. 2. External Construction The cipher is designed to produce a single ciphertext and multiple keys from multiple plaintexts. The plaintext is a binary vector P of length q. There are n plaintexts in the system, each with subscript x. Therefore, the domain of plaintexts is P0q, P1q, ... Pnq. All plaintexts have equivalent lengths [4]. The ciphertext is a binary vector C of length r. There is one ciphertext in the system. Therefore, the domain of ciphertexts is Cr. The key is a binary vector K of length s. There are n keys in the system, each having subscript x. Therefore, the domain of keys is K0s, K1s, ... Kns. Each key has a correspondance with a particular plaintext. All keys have equivalent lengths [4]. The tranformation consists of encode and decode operations. The encode operation operates on the P domain to produce the C & K domains. This operation is referred to as the F operation. Therefore F[ {P}n ] = C, {K}n. The decode operation operates on the C and K domains to produce an element from the P domain. This operation is referred to as the G operation. Therefore Px = G[ C, Kx ] 3. Internal Construction The internal construction is yet to be determined. Please refer to the Discussion. 4. Discussion There are a number of points to consider: a. The problem will scale in time and space complexity with increasing values of n, q, r & s. A particular implementation may make tradeoffs. b. The process may be implemented using biological, quantum or alternative computing systems. The process may be mathematically specified, proved and formalised with various levels of logic and particular mathematical domains (number field domain, matrix domain, graph domain) as appropriate to the tradeoffs and implementation media. c. The system architecture can be described has having three layers. The first layer is the abstract theoretical construct, as specified above. The second layer is a particular mathematical domain representation to implement and prove the theoretical construct. The third layer is a physical implementation medium to execute the mathematical domain representation. Appropriate architectural choices and tradeoffs are made according to time, space and complexity issues, and the availability of operators, constructs and notations in each layer. d. The social architecture has not been considered here. A balance of power exists between individuals and society. Individuals necessarily give up some liberty to society in order for harmony and stability. Individuals do not give up all liberty, society does not give up all liberty. Society may be represented by government or by some other notion of collective organisation; whether a bound collective organisation, or a loose coupling of individualistic tendencies. The continuing evolution of cryptographic protocols is fundamentally about the oscillation of power between individuals and society. The protocols exist between individuals and society. As the protocols are broken, power swings either way. Each side then reasserts power to continually oscillate. This protocol reasserts individualistic power in light of recent legislative developments. e. There should be a most simple implementation proposed using a minimal construction of domains P, C & K. Perhaps, deductive or inductive proof could be used as a means of illustrating how the simple impelementation could scale towards increasing n, q, r & s. [1] Fundamentally, the encyption process is just a transformation process (cf. computing systems, turing machines, fourier transforms, z transforms, transmission systems, etc). [2] It is possible to transform the problem a relation between powers; i.e. there is information density and power evenly distributed throughout the system, however various implementations of a transform may move the balance of power around the system. [3] It is possible to construct a taxonomy and hierarchy of transformative systems and organise them according to quantitative differentials based upon the abstraction of power and density. [4] They may not, but this will make the problem harder: for further consideration. - -------------------------------------------- A multi-dimensional identity system ... A system is proposed to reassert the balance of power between the individual and society. The problem arises due to the continuing developments of data profiles [1]. Effectively, it is a method to create an additional layer between the individual and society [2]. Allow to try and describe the problem. Consider the case of a single individual. The individual interacts with many entities in society. These entities continue to gather and build information about the individual. Eventually, the individual is fully disclosed to society. Therefore, the individual loses personal privacy and therefore, power, as society completely knows the individual [3]. Realisation of this case is where the individual has a mobile phone [4]. The society knows where the individual is at all times. The society knows all of the transactions the individual has (audio calls, video calls, purchases, etc). Therefore, all information is learnt about the individual. Telephone companies have location data and phone conversations. Credit card companies have spending habits. Consider the solution of multiple identities. The individual adopts multiple identities for interaction with society. The society builds information about the multiple identifies, each in themselves. If the society does not know about the linkage between each of these identities [5], then it is not able to know everything about a particular individual. In this case, the individual regains a power distance from society. Realisation of this solution could occur by using a different credit card model [6]. Consider the case where the individual has multiple credit cards. The individual uses these cards in any manner what so ever: for instance, the individual may choose to use one credit card at each particular type of store. The stores may share information, but unless they can link credit cards to a particular individual, they can never build a complete profile on an individual. The individual preserves a degree of distance, and can do so in a completely legitimate manner. Allow me to propose a possible model. It may not be ideal or correct, but should suffice as an open gambit for thinking. Consider that there are credit card companies. There are also authentication entities. There is an individual. The individual may desire to have multiple credit cards. The individual may register address and personal details with an authentication entity. The request for a credit card may be made from the authentication entity to the credit card company. The credit card entity trusts the authentication entity on particular details (history, salary, etc). Now, the user has an additional credit card, and can use that card in any way whatsoever. The credit card company is not aware of which credit cards relate to which individuals. The integrity of the system is predicated on trust relationships between the credit card company and the authentication entity. There is trust that the authentication entity does not release individual identifying details ot the credit card company. [1] Hmm, I suggested this idea at the security group meeting and was immediately denounced because 'they can find your address', so much for open and creative intellectual thinking, supposely this is what Cambridge is all about -- well, myth and reality, design and implementation, theory and practice, doing and saying ... all those quips that surround the balance between the mind and body ;-). [2] Homer's shield, personal force fields, and all other other mythological constructions of armour that surround the individual and buffer it from everything that is "out there". Note that having increasing numbers of identities increases the strength of the shield, just like the density of the links in the armour, or just like nanontech construction, or just like other sorts of molecular and science things. heh heh. [3] Consider the relationship to losing one's Self into the ethereal medium, and spirituality, and connectedness, and understanding nature, etc. [4] The mobile phone is like a sword. [5] Or possibly of the linkage between particular identities and the individual, there is a sort of graph of reachability here. [6] This is generalisable to power distances and relationships and identities, there are more fundamental principles involved, but for purposes of illustration I use credit cards are they are a known notation. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP 6.5.1i for non-commercial use iQA/AwUBOKM/7K1VD3MTsHhAEQI8vQCgumwQYhzCNN+0NkN9UKU3w89m1mUAoM9i 1MphiofYW/eW+IatQM/u8LDg =Ji06 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From cb@fipr.org Fri, 11 Feb 2000 00:59:31 -0000 Date: Fri, 11 Feb 2000 00:59:31 -0000 From: Caspar Bowden cb@fipr.org Subject: [Raven] BBC Online 10/2/2000: "Surveillance bill under fire" > From: raven-admin@ietf.org [mailto:raven-admin@ietf.org]On Behalf Of > Richard Payne ... > Presumably the right to silence, which still exists in the > U.K., overrides > the powers supposedly granted to the police by this bill? It's a nice point. See 49(1). http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199900/cmbills/064/00064--j.htm#4 9 The prosecution must show that the person "has or has had" possession of the key, but if you are claiming it has been lost or forgotten, naturally that is conceded. If you do claim it is lost or forgotten (or inaccessible), you can't just leave it at that, because the burden falls on you to PROVE that in order to establish your defence. If nothing at all is said (that can be used in evidence)...I guess they DO have to show that the person has or has had possession of they key (beyond reasonable doubt). Interesting - that was not so in the July 99 E-Comms Bill. Comments ? -- Caspar Bowden http://www.fipr.org Director, Foundation for Information Policy Research Tel: +44(0)171 354 2333 Fax: +44(0)171 827 6534 From rguerra@yahoo.com Thu, 10 Feb 2000 17:54:55 -0800 (PST) Date: Thu, 10 Feb 2000 17:54:55 -0800 (PST) From: Robert Guerra rguerra@yahoo.com Subject: is a digest version of this list available? Might someone be able to tell me if a daily digest version of this list is available ? if so, where should i go for details. regards robert ===== Robert Guerra - PGP public key available on PGP key servers Email-> mailto:rguerra@yahoo.com Home Page-> http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/3378 __________________________________________________ Do You Yahoo!? Talk to your friends online with Yahoo! Messenger. http://im.yahoo.com From donald@ramsbottom.co.uk Fri, 11 Feb 2000 08:37:33 +0000 Date: Fri, 11 Feb 2000 08:37:33 +0000 From: Donald Ramsbottom donald@ramsbottom.co.uk Subject: RIP bill= RIP ECHR Well where do we start on this ! The whole thing which is not an insignificant document; I have only looked at it briefly. There seems to be the use of a word which is much in favour at the Lord Chancellors department at the moment (it is used extensively in the new civil procedure rules) and that is "proportionate" but it is not defined. The alleged safeguards are a gift from der Fuhrer (oops sorry Tony Blair) to whomever he chooses to be a regulator. The opening statement refers to any public body so presumably Local authorities such as your local council will be able to serve new style notices on you. The security services and other LEAs are given wide powers of investigation and effective self certification, and there only check, ah yes the PMs appointee, how convenient. As for the replacement of the old Part III, the new one is longer and padded out with pious platitudes references to checks and accountability, but these essentially end up with, yep, you guessed it the PMs appointee, I think I will just call him Reynhard, that name has a security ring about it. There has been a new and insidious insertion which has been noticed by many, the "has or has had". I donot know if there is any way of telling whether an encrypted message has ever been read (a log of some sort perhaps?) but if you are being surveilled they will have the traffic logs and if there is a course of correspondence even if you choose to remain silent about the key, they will be able to show the chain of correspondence which together with the adverse inference they will comment on from your silence would I suggest be enough to prove beyond reasonable doubt that you either have or have had a key ( to a magistrate anyhow, assuming of course your right to trial by jury has also been curtailed by this time). The tipping off provisions are still there, and although longer and more convoluted amount to the same thing with appeal yes you guessed it Reynhard. The definitions of "protected material" is as wide as ever and still covers ALL encrypted data on a system, not just a specific set of emails or files. So once they have your key they can peruse your HDD at leisure as before and fish around for anything they like. You do of course have the right to appeal to Reynhard. Of course with your key they can do whatever they like in your name and as before you cannot tell anyone because of the tipping off provisions, (so conveniently neat). The old arguements will be trotted out about the need for all this the "Four Horsemen" et al, but as before the bill is a mechanism of observation on the "masses" rather than a tool for the prevention of crime and National security (in its broadest sense rather than just protecting whoever the current incumbent administration is). No doubt we will look at its provisions more closely as time progresses, but my first thoughts are not complimentary. Heinrich Straw has no problem with open dual standards it would seem. He has made adverse comments about Austria's government and the connections (quite rightly) with totalitarian regimes, while all the while he was putting in place the very tools of such a system.This is duplicitous and hypocritical. Enough of my early morning prattle. Donald Ramsbottom LL.B, BA (Hons). RAMSBOTTOM & Co. Solicitors Internet Law & Global Cryptology Law Specialists From cb@fipr.org Fri, 11 Feb 2000 08:04:59 -0000 Date: Fri, 11 Feb 2000 08:04:59 -0000 From: Caspar Bowden cb@fipr.org Subject: FT 11/2/2000: "BIG BROTHER: Government unveils e-mail surveillance law" http://www.ft.com/hippocampus/q34646a.htm Financial Times, Friday February 11 2000 BIG BROTHER: Government unveils e-mail surveillance law By Jean Eaglesham, Legal Correspondent The government will face an "inevitable" human rights challenge to a new law unveiled yesterday allowing officials to bug and tap e-mails and mobile phones, civil liberties campaigners said. Industry also expressed concern about the potential cost of the law, which will force internet service providers to have the technical capacity to intercept communications. Ministers insisted the regulation of investigatory powers bill was not a "snoopers charter", despite its extremely wide ambit. The law covers surveillance, bugging and tapping by all state bodies, including tax and social security inspectors, police and security services. Jack Straw, the home secretary, insisted none of the powers in the bill were new. "Covert surveillance by police and other law enforcement officers is as old as policing itself," Mr Straw said. "What is new is that for the first time the use of these techniques will be properly regulated by law". The bill is intended to update rules on surveillance to cope with modern technology including mobile phones, e-mail, pagers and the internet. It is also meant to provide a legal shield for existing techniques that have been ruled to breach the European Convention on Human Rights. The government aims to push the bill through Parliament before the Human Rights Act, incorporating the convention into UK law, takes effect in October. But controversial powers in the bill to decode encrypted e-mails will lay the government open to "inevitable" human rights challenges, according to the Foundation for Information Policy Research, an internet thinktank. The bill will allow people to be imprisoned for up to two years and fined for refusing to either provide a decryption key or a plain text version of the intercepted message. Caspar Bowden, director of the FIPR, said Britain had become "the only country in the world to publish a law which could imprison users of encryption technology for forgetting or losing their keys". Civil liberties campaigners also expressed concern that the new law will allow agencies such as the police to sign their own warrants for covert surveillance. Industry criticism centred on the cost of the new measures. The government said it has not yet decided whether the taxpayer should pick up the bill - it will consult on this issue later this year. Nick Landsman, secretary general of the Internet Service Providers Association, said he was pleased the government was open to consultation but companies did not see why they should pay for crime enforcement measures. From Q.G.Campbell@newcastle.ac.uk Fri, 11 Feb 2000 08:32:41 +0000 (GMT) Date: Fri, 11 Feb 2000 08:32:41 +0000 (GMT) From: Quentin Campbell Q.G.Campbell@newcastle.ac.uk Subject: RIP bill= RIP ECHR On Fri, 11 Feb 2000, Donald Ramsbottom wrote: [snip] > The definitions of "protected material" is as wide as ever and still covers > ALL encrypted data on a system, not just a specific set of emails or files. > So once they have your key they can peruse your HDD at leisure as before and > fish around for anything they like. You do of course have the right to > appeal to Reynhard. [snip] Donald Is this any different to what happens now where the Police believe that a computer was used in the commission of a crime or may hold evidence relating to that crime? The Police simply take away the system, copy the disk(s), then run their forensic software to try to recover as many file and file fragments as possible. It is in the nature of the thing that they cannot make an a priori conjecture about exactly what and where they will find it on the disks. It may be viewed as "trawling" but as they cannot know exactly how the computer functioned in the course of its crimminal use they clearly have to search everything in order to identify the bits that might be relevant evidence. Quentin -- PHONE: +44 191 222 8209 Computing Service, University of Newcastle FAX: +44 191 222 8765 Newcastle upon Tyne, United Kingdom, NE1 7RU. ------------------------------------------------------------------------- "Any opinions expressed above are mine. The University can get its own." From janne.haikonen@nokia.com Fri, 11 Feb 2000 10:46:03 +0200 Date: Fri, 11 Feb 2000 10:46:03 +0200 From: janne.haikonen@nokia.com janne.haikonen@nokia.com Subject: [Raven] BBC Online 10/2/2000: "Surveillance bill under fire" > The prosecution must show that the person "has or has had" > possession of the key, but if you are claiming it has been > lost or forgotten, naturally that is conceded. If you do > claim it is lost or forgotten (or inaccessible), you > can't just leave it at that, because the burden falls on you > to PROVE that in order to establish your defence. - Have they though about how exactly can one prove that he/she has forgotten/lost some security token (e.g. password/phrase/key)? "Give us your passphrase." "Sorry, but I don't remember it." "Prove that!" "Err... you see.. err... I've just forgotten it.." > If nothing at all is said (that can be used in evidence)...I > guess they DO have to show that the person has or has had > possession of they key (beyond reasonable doubt). Interesting - > that was not so in the July 99 E-Comms Bill. - That one is interesting too. If the LE can't decrypt your data (i.e. they have no access to the key/knowledge of it), how can they prove that the key ever existed in the first place. You can always claim that the file/communication was just garbage, and when they ask e.g. about some magic cookies or crypto signalling IEs that were present in your file/communication you can always act stupid and claim that you have no knowledge of what you computer/terminal does behind your back... Eh? Just my few cents, Janne Haikonen From Q.G.Campbell@newcastle.ac.uk Fri, 11 Feb 2000 08:55:19 +0000 (GMT) Date: Fri, 11 Feb 2000 08:55:19 +0000 (GMT) From: Quentin Campbell Q.G.Campbell@newcastle.ac.uk Subject: RIP Bill and mass surveillance Someone on this list today observed that in his view the Bill is really about facilitating "mass surveillance". This term has Orwellian undertones and for that reason is a more easily recognised notion than some of the others we might use when describing the really objectionable intents of this Bill. Would it be true *and* connect with the public at large so say that this Bill provides a: "legal framework that would facilitate the mass surveillance of our private conversations and correspondence in a way that has never been done before in the UK"? It seems to me vitally important that we counter the spin that the Government are putting on the Bill which seems to imply that it actually reigns in surveiilance and somehow stops the snooping that was going on before. It is a wondeful strategy to be able to argue a Human Rights case for the Bill's quick passage through Parliament when its intentions are nothing of the sort! Perhaps Jack Straw honestly believes it. Let us hope the term "mass surveillance" makes other Labour MPs scrutinise the Bill rather more sceptically. Quentin -- PHONE: +44 191 222 8209 Computing Service, University of Newcastle FAX: +44 191 222 8765 Newcastle upon Tyne, United Kingdom, NE1 7RU. ------------------------------------------------------------------------- "Any opinions expressed above are mine. The University can get its own." From janne.haikonen@nokia.com Fri, 11 Feb 2000 10:46:03 +0200 Date: Fri, 11 Feb 2000 10:46:03 +0200 From: janne.haikonen@nokia.com janne.haikonen@nokia.com Subject: [Raven] BBC Online 10/2/2000: "Surveillance bill under fire" > The prosecution must show that the person "has or has had" > possession of the key, but if you are claiming it has been > lost or forgotten, naturally that is conceded. If you do > claim it is lost or forgotten (or inaccessible), you > can't just leave it at that, because the burden falls on you > to PROVE that in order to establish your defence. - Have they though about how exactly can one prove that he/she has forgotten/lost some security token (e.g. password/phrase/key)? "Give us your passphrase." "Sorry, but I don't remember it." "Prove that!" "Err... you see.. err... I've just forgotten it.." > If nothing at all is said (that can be used in evidence)...I > guess they DO have to show that the person has or has had > possession of they key (beyond reasonable doubt). Interesting - > that was not so in the July 99 E-Comms Bill. - That one is interesting too. If the LE can't decrypt your data (i.e. they have no access to the key/knowledge of it), how can they prove that the key ever existed in the first place. You can always claim that the file/communication was just garbage, and when they ask e.g. about some magic cookies or crypto signalling IEs that were present in your file/communication you can always act stupid and claim that you have no knowledge of what you computer/terminal does behind your back... Eh? Just my few cents, Janne Haikonen From cpcoward@totalise.co.uk Fri, 11 Feb 2000 09:29:03 -0000 Date: Fri, 11 Feb 2000 09:29:03 -0000 From: Chris Coward cpcoward@totalise.co.uk Subject: is a digest version of this list available? --- Let me know too! If there is a digest could you let me know as well? Thanks Chris Coward cpcoward@totalise.co.uk > -----Original Message----- > From: owner-ukcrypto@maillist.ox.ac.uk > [mailto:owner-ukcrypto@maillist.ox.ac.uk]On Behalf Of Robert Guerra > Sent: 11 February 2000 01:55 > To: ukcrypto@maillist.ox.ac.uk > Subject: is a digest version of this list available? > > > Might someone be able to tell me if a daily digest version of this list > is available ? > if so, where should i go for details. > > regards > > robert > > ===== > Robert Guerra - PGP public key available on PGP key servers > Email-> mailto:rguerra@yahoo.com > Home Page-> http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/3378 > __________________________________________________ > Do You Yahoo!? > Talk to your friends online with Yahoo! Messenger. > http://im.yahoo.com > From David.Goodenough@dga.co.uk Fri, 11 Feb 2000 09:45:53 +0000 Date: Fri, 11 Feb 2000 09:45:53 +0000 From: David.Goodenough@dga.co.uk David.Goodenough@dga.co.uk Subject: [Raven] BBC Online 10/2/2000: "Surveillance bill under fire" This may be a daft question, but I will ask it anyway. Is there a difference in law between "having" and "having use of". I ask this because most users of such technology would not know what a key looked like, much less how to extract it from their system and give it to someone else. Additionally they would not know how to select the correct key, nor understand the difference between such things as asymetric keys which are generally not used to encrypt text and session keys that might have been used just for one message. Now of course PC plod will take this as an opportunity to take anything and everything they can get their hands on, but I seem to recall that recently there is a requirement that they only take what they are entitled to and not take everything and return extraneous bits later. Of course to your average PC plod the comments about users apply just as they do to users. An example. I am reasonably technical, but I have never quite worked out how to extract my private key in my Lotus Notes system. I could probably work it out, but it is not obvious and Notes provides no means to access it, it just uses it internally after I have unlocked it with a passphrase. I believe that it is in the ID file, but that might not be in a file on its own, it might be in the Name and Address database. If they are entitled to this key, and of course from a technical point of view it is not the key that was used to encrypt the data, it is the key used to decrypt the one time session key that was used to encrypt the data, and if they are entitled to the private key, are they entitled to whatever contains that private key if I am unable to disentangle the key for them, which might contain other (irrelevant) keys or are they merely entitled to the key? If the key is stored in the N&A DB, are they entitled to all the other private keys in that DB? If I am technically ignorant of the means if extracting this key am I automatically guilty? This looks to me like a lawyers license to print money and a complete nightmare for Joe Public (but we knew that bit didn't we). "Caspar Bowden" on 11-02-2000 12:59:31 AM Please respond to ukcrypto@maillist.ox.ac.uk To: raven@ietf.org, "Ukcrypto \(E-mail\)" cc: (bcc: David Goodenough/DGA/GB) Subject: RE: [Raven] BBC Online 10/2/2000: "Surveillance bill under fire" > From: raven-admin@ietf.org [mailto:raven-admin@ietf.org]On Behalf Of > Richard Payne ... > Presumably the right to silence, which still exists in the > U.K., overrides > the powers supposedly granted to the police by this bill? It's a nice point. See 49(1). http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199900/cmbills/064/00064--j.htm# 4 9 The prosecution must show that the person "has or has had" possession of the key, but if you are claiming it has been lost or forgotten, naturally that is conceded. If you do claim it is lost or forgotten (or inaccessible), you can't just leave it at that, because the burden falls on you to PROVE that in order to establish your defence. If nothing at all is said (that can be used in evidence)...I guess they DO have to show that the person has or has had possession of they key (beyond reasonable doubt). Interesting - that was not so in the July 99 E-Comms Bill. Comments ? -- Caspar Bowden http://www.fipr.org Director, Foundation for Information Policy Research Tel: +44(0)171 354 2333 Fax: +44(0)171 827 6534 From whgu0007@ermine.ox.ac.uk Fri, 11 Feb 2000 10:06:42 +0000 (GMT) Date: Fri, 11 Feb 2000 10:06:42 +0000 (GMT) From: Ian Goodyer whgu0007@ermine.ox.ac.uk Subject: is a digest version of this list available? --- Let me know too! On Fri, 11 Feb 2000, Chris Coward wrote: > If there is a digest could you let me know > as well? to stop this thread continuing with more 'me too' messages I thought I should mail the list. Unfortunately, Oxford Uni Computing Services, who host this list, do not provide a digest version option. You can either obtain a monthly archive using the standard majordomo commands or access the messages via the webpage. Apart from that, I can't help. Sorry. BTW, please mail admin type requests, like the above, to owner-ukcrypto@maillist.ox.ac.uk and not ukcrypto@maillist.ox.ac.uk to try and keep list traffic down. thanks, ian From mkirwan@baltimore.com Fri, 11 Feb 2000 10:36:58 -0000 Date: Fri, 11 Feb 2000 10:36:58 -0000 From: Mary Kirwan mkirwan@baltimore.com Subject: RIP Bill and mass surveillance At the risk of sounding like MoneyPenny, there is nonetheless a danger of overstating the risk to freedom and democracy from this type of Bill- it is always best to have a transparent system for wiretaps than have it done by slight of hand with no review, because no one even knows it happens. The difficulty I perceive is that constitutional protections which are well developed in Canada and the US may not exist at all or to the same extent in UK. In Canada, there are multiple challenges available to use of wiretaps at trial, and it can be a momentous hurdle to even get them admitted, there are challenges to the issuing of the warrant, the need to show that no other means could have been used to get the information, etc. That being said, the threshold level for granting of a warrant in this Bill as 'likely to be of value' is a bit dodgy - there should be a requirement also that the information sought should not be otherwise obtainable (Bill says, 'key' not otherwise obtainable). Mary Kirwan personal views only ginal Message----- From: Quentin Campbell [mailto:Q.G.Campbell@newcastle.ac.uk] Sent: Friday, February 11, 2000 8:55 AM To: ukcrypto@maillist.ox.ac.uk Subject: RIP Bill and mass surveillance Someone on this list today observed that in his view the Bill is really about facilitating "mass surveillance". This term has Orwellian undertones and for that reason is a more easily recognised notion than some of the others we might use when describing the really objectionable intents of this Bill. Would it be true *and* connect with the public at large so say that this Bill provides a: "legal framework that would facilitate the mass surveillance of our private conversations and correspondence in a way that has never been done before in the UK"? It seems to me vitally important that we counter the spin that the Government are putting on the Bill which seems to imply that it actually reigns in surveiilance and somehow stops the snooping that was going on before. It is a wondeful strategy to be able to argue a Human Rights case for the Bill's quick passage through Parliament when its intentions are nothing of the sort! Perhaps Jack Straw honestly believes it. Let us hope the term "mass surveillance" makes other Labour MPs scrutinise the Bill rather more sceptically. Quentin -- PHONE: +44 191 222 8209 Computing Service, University of Newcastle FAX: +44 191 222 8765 Newcastle upon Tyne, United Kingdom, NE1 7RU. ------------------------------------------------------------------------- "Any opinions expressed above are mine. The University can get its own." From cb@fipr.org Fri, 11 Feb 2000 10:56:48 -0000 Date: Fri, 11 Feb 2000 10:56:48 -0000 From: Caspar Bowden cb@fipr.org Subject: TechWeb 10/2/2000: "E-Spying Bill Called 'Escrow By Intimidation'" http://www.techweb.com/wire/story/TWB20000210S0005 E-Spying Bill Called 'Escrow By Intimidation' (02/10/00, 12:58 p.m. ET) By Madeleine Acey, TechWeb The British government published a bill Thursday to update law enforcement's interception powers to include communications made via company networks and ISPs. The legislation was immediately slammed as threatening human rights and labelled "key escrow through intimidation" by Internet think tank the Foundation For Information Policy Research (FIPR). Key escrow is a failed policy by which users of encryption software lodge copies of security keys with third parties approved by government. "This law could make a criminal out of anyone who uses encryption to protect their privacy on the Internet," said FIPR director Caspar Bowden. Following the recent liberalization of U.S. encryption software export laws, as tens of thousands of ordinary computer users start to use encryption, a test case looks inevitable. Requiring someone to prove they did not possess a key would likely be a breach of the European Convention of Human Rights, FIPR and civil rights group Justice concluded. "The DTI [Department of Trade and Industry] jettisoned decryption powers from its E-communications Bill last year because it did not believe that a law which presumes someone guilty unless they can prove themselves innocent was compatible with the Human Rights Act," Bowden said. "The corpse of a law laid to rest by [trade secretary] Stephen Byers has been stitched back up and jolted into life by [home secretary] Jack Straw." Straw insisted the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Bill ensure citizens' privacy and comply with the European Court on Human Rights. He said the interception methods of the past "sometimes led to serious miscarriages of justice" and that the bill would more closely regulate law enforcement and security agencies' activities. Straw added that interception of telecommunications was only legislated for in 1985. "There was only one completely dominant [telecom] provider and only landlines," he said. "No pagers, no mobiles, no e-mail, no Internet, no encryption. The change in the telecom landscape in less than a generation has been revolutionary. We have to ensure that the legislation keeps pace." Straw said interception played a vital role in the fight against terrorists and encryption "can be misused to devastating effect by criminals, not least in attempts by pedophiles to conceal their activities on the Internet." However, in submissions to the DTI last year, IT industry figures -- used as expert witnesses by law enforcement -- said encryption had never thwarted police attempts to crack encrypted files, and in some cases, the accused had handed keys over voluntarily. When asked at the time, security and police agencies, including the FBI, were unable to show any case where encryption had been a barrier to convicting a criminal. FIPR's Bowden said the Bill incorporated some changes to draft legislation to address previous criticisms. But, he said this was mere "window dressing". "To prove noncompliance with a notice to decrypt, the prosecution must prove a person 'has or has had' the key," Bowden said. "This satisfies the objection to the case where a person may never have had the key but leaves unchanged the essential reverse-burden of proof for someone who has forgotten or irreplaceably lost a key." From I.Brown@cs.ucl.ac.uk Fri, 11 Feb 2000 11:07:35 +0000 Date: Fri, 11 Feb 2000 11:07:35 +0000 From: Ian Brown I.Brown@cs.ucl.ac.uk Subject: Queen prepares royal e-signature Wouldn't it be nice if the government concentrated on fixing important things like the RIP mess, rather than on gimmicks like this... Queen prepares royal e-signature The Times, February 11 2000 BY ALAN HAMILTON THE Queen is being asked to abandon 600 years of tradition and sign the first major parliamentary Bill of the 21st century by computer. The Department of Trade and Industry has proposed that she should for once abandon her fountain pen and her distinctive, elegant Elizabeth R, and give her Royal Assent by electronic signature. Appropriately, the legislation in question is the Electronic Communications Bill, which if passed, probably in May, will give such signatures on legal documents the same standing as those on paper. Acts of Parliament have been signed by, or borne the wax seal of, the monarch at least since the 15th century, and their yellow vellum sheets line many shelves in the House of Lords record office. The Queen's private office already has its own e-mail address, and the Royal Household makes extensive use of the latest information technology. But Palace officials will have to be fully satisfied that the royal digital signature is fully secure and incapable of any illicit use. There are two ways in which the Queen could sign electronically: by running a stylus over a sensitive part of the computer screen, or having her signature stored in a smartcard within the machine, which at the press of a code would deliver it to the screen. Either way, both the Palace and the DTI are delving deeply into the possible legal implications of the royal hand being guided by digital technology. Stephen Byers, the Trade Secretary, has already signed official documents electronically on the Internet. "The Bill aims to allow electronic signatures to be given explicit legal status in the courts for the first time, giving people a secure electronic alternative to paper," a DTI spokesman said. But even if the Queen signs the Act on screen, she would almost certainly sign a paper version with her pen at the same time, if only to keep up the unbroken filing record in the Lords library. The Queen has two websites giving news of her family's engagements and a mass of history and constitutional background. "We left the age of the quill behind long ago," one Palace official said. But there are still times when the royal monicker can be applied only by hand. In 1998 the Queen met the Kuala Lumpur Manchester United supporters' club, and signed a football for them - with a pen. http://www.the-times.co.uk/news/pages/tim/2000/02/11/timnwsnws02006.html?1044816 From matthew.gream@camcon.co.uk Fri, 11 Feb 2000 11:49:02 +0000 Date: Fri, 11 Feb 2000 11:49:02 +0000 From: matthew.gream@camcon.co.uk matthew.gream@camcon.co.uk Subject: the power of cryptography Manifesto? The continuing struggle for individual liberties and freedoms is ever the struggle for the power of communication. The primal man and the wall, the sculptor and the veneration, the peacemaker and the prophecy, or the tyrant and the world. The individual seeths against society, a struggle to assert one's unique Self, to wield a battle for individual reality, for one's Self. To give one's Self, or to withhold one's Self, the liberty and sanctity of the seat of individual consciousness of each sentient being. To exist as a unique form free of prejudice and oppression. In the coming age, cryptography is the quintessential tool to negotiate the boundary between what is mine, and what is everyone elses, to protect the world from me, and to protect me from the world. If ever there was the ideal society, then such little call would there be for these devices of confusion. Until such a time, advance the march for the tools of self determination. And even in such a time, never relent upon the necessary measures of insurance that prevent the slide to a darker age. Cryptography is such a tool. Use it to continue to negotiate the balance of power, lest it ever concentrate in one form. Such as the day may come, ultimate abuses that may reign. Like the horrors before, never let the horrors occur again. On the epoch of a digital consciousness; cryptography is the crux of power. Matthew. Cambridge_UK/2000 - matthew.gream@pobox.com - not speaking on behalf of my employer From Pete.Chown@skygate.co.uk Fri, 11 Feb 2000 11:48:33 +0000 Date: Fri, 11 Feb 2000 11:48:33 +0000 From: Pete Chown Pete.Chown@skygate.co.uk Subject: [Raven] BBC Online 10/2/2000: "Surveillance bill under fire" janne.haikonen@nokia.com wrote: > - That one is interesting too. If the LE can't decrypt your data > (i.e. they have no access to the key/knowledge of it), how can they > prove that the key ever existed in the first place. One way would be if you had acted on the communication in some way. For example if there were a series of encrypted emails exchanged, always using the same key ID, it would be a reasonable deduction that the private keys were in the possession of the recipients. If you then forget your passphrase, you are about to be the victim of a miscarriage of justice. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- phone +44 (0) 20 8542 7856, fax +44 (0) 20 8543 0176, post: Skygate Technology Ltd, 8 Lombard Road, Wimbledon, London, SW19 3TZ From Q.G.Campbell@newcastle.ac.uk Fri, 11 Feb 2000 12:00:43 +0000 (GMT) Date: Fri, 11 Feb 2000 12:00:43 +0000 (GMT) From: Quentin Campbell Q.G.Campbell@newcastle.ac.uk Subject: Queen prepares royal e-signature On Fri, 11 Feb 2000, Ian Brown wrote: > Subject: Queen prepares royal e-signature > > Wouldn't it be nice if the government concentrated on fixing important > things like the RIP mess, rather than on gimmicks like this... > [snip] > > The Queen's private office already has its own e-mail address, and the > Royal Household makes extensive use of the latest information technology. > But Palace officials will have to be fully satisfied that the royal digital > signature is fully secure and incapable of any illicit use. [snip] On the face of it this is appropriate since the Government and the Royal Household should both demonstrate the courage of their convictions as represented in Bills that they jointly bring into law. However I hope HM's advisers tread warily. There is much scope for serious embarrassment here and it would be sad if the Royal Household became another victim of il-judged Government gimmickry and spin. Quentin -- PHONE: +44 191 222 8209 Computing Service, University of Newcastle FAX: +44 191 222 8765 Newcastle upon Tyne, United Kingdom, NE1 7RU. ------------------------------------------------------------------------- "Any opinions expressed above are mine. The University can get its own." From cddeal@lineone.net Fri, 11 Feb 2000 12:23:41 GMT Date: Fri, 11 Feb 2000 12:23:41 GMT From: cddeal cddeal@lineone.net Subject: CD Deal Welcome to CD Deal the 'new' software concept that gives you: * FREE Software selling in the UK retail for =A399.99!! In the first mont= h you will be able to have Plan it! Marketing Plan (=A349.99), Life Label= Maker (=A339.99) and Tertrimania lite (=A39.99) - all absollutely FREE * Other software and music titles which you can buy at fantastic prices!!= eg Shania Twain WGames Pack worth =A3120 in the shops which we sell =A32= 9.99, the complete Kids Pack selling in UK retail for =A3180 which we sel= l for =A329.99 The software we are selling is bought directly from the software and musi= c companies and is packaged in plastic crystal cases exactly the same as in the shops. To receive ONE email a month with great offers and details of FREE produc= ts which you can have with NO obligation, NO catch and No contract all you need to do is click = on the address below: Email: cddeal_yes@lineone.net If you don't want to receive the once a month e-mail with great offers th= en ignore this mail and never hear from us again. We look forward to hearing from you. Nick Hansen Customer Services Manager. From matthew.gream@camcon.co.uk Fri, 11 Feb 2000 11:49:02 +0000 Date: Fri, 11 Feb 2000 11:49:02 +0000 From: matthew.gream@camcon.co.uk matthew.gream@camcon.co.uk Subject: the power of cryptography Manifesto? The continuing struggle for individual liberties and freedoms is ever the struggle for the power of communication. The primal man and the wall, the sculptor and the veneration, the peacemaker and the prophecy, or the tyrant and the world. The individual seeths against society, a struggle to assert one's unique Self, to wield a battle for individual reality, for one's Self. To give one's Self, or to withhold one's Self, the liberty and sanctity of the seat of individual consciousness of each sentient being. To exist as a unique form free of prejudice and oppression. In the coming age, cryptography is the quintessential tool to negotiate the boundary between what is mine, and what is everyone elses, to protect the world from me, and to protect me from the world. If ever there was the ideal society, then such little call would there be for these devices of confusion. Until such a time, advance the march for the tools of self determination. And even in such a time, never relent upon the necessary measures of insurance that prevent the slide to a darker age. Cryptography is such a tool. Use it to continue to negotiate the balance of power, lest it ever concentrate in one form. Such as the day may come, ultimate abuses that may reign. Like the horrors before, never let the horrors occur again. On the epoch of a digital consciousness; cryptography is the crux of power. Matthew. Cambridge_UK/2000 - matthew.gream@pobox.com - not speaking on behalf of my employer From donald@ramsbottom.co.uk Fri, 11 Feb 2000 13:53:20 +0000 Date: Fri, 11 Feb 2000 13:53:20 +0000 From: Donald Ramsbottom donald@ramsbottom.co.uk Subject: RIP Bill and mass surveillance At 10:36 11/02/00 -0000, you wrote: >At the risk of sounding like MoneyPenny, there is nonetheless a danger of >overstating the risk to freedom and democracy from this type of Bill- it is >always best to have a transparent system for wiretaps than have it done by >slight of hand with no review, because no one even knows it happens. The >difficulty I perceive is that constitutional protections which are well >developed in Canada and the US may not exist at all or to the same extent in >UK. In Canada, there are multiple challenges available to use of wiretaps at >trial, and it can be a momentous hurdle to even get them admitted, there are >challenges to the issuing of the warrant, the need to show that no other >means could have been used to get the information, etc. That being said, the >threshold level for granting of a warrant in this Bill as 'likely to be of >value' is a bit dodgy - there should be a requirement also that the >information sought should not be otherwise obtainable (Bill says, 'key' not >otherwise obtainable). > Well lets tell a parable here. Once upon a time, there was a country known as Eutopia, it was ruled over by Caesar Augustus Antoninus and his consort Lavinia Cherii. Both were educated and Idealistic and had before their elevation to the purple been staltwart libertarians and lawyers to boot. They were now ensconsed as the rulers of the fair land, and they knew what was best for all their subjects. They had certain irritations which all rulers have to deal with, crime foreign intrigue , and of course internal dissent to their benificent rule. Antoninus did not object to the latter but was intent on dealing with the former that he forgot some of his earlier principals. All for the greater good of course. There was a system of senators and representatives from many differing aspects of Eutopian life, but ultimately Antoninus had for the duration of his reign the last word. His political relatives spread far and wide, among them was a young lad who Antoninus' Praetorians nicknamed "Little boots". Antoninus ruled for many years and even changed the political system which had been in place for 800 years, he changed the Courts and the way Justice was administered, he even removed an ancient right and safe guard of the people to be judged their peers as in his modern Eutopia that safe guard was not necessary and was too expensive ( or so his Caledonian righthand man Gordonius had told him). His other senior advisor sejackus also advised him (on receipt of proper advice from his officials and who in turn had received their advice from other less well known officials in the cabal of senior officialdom) that there was another problem in the land, that was the populous were talking to each other and SOME of them may be committing crimes and or other heinous offences while talking to each other, and because of the new fangled system of communication they (officialdom) were having trouble keeping things just the way they (sorry Antoninus) wanted it. With heavy heart Antoninus and Sejackus decided that they would enact laws which they never would have contemplated in their hedonistic youth, but they would build in safeguards for the people, they the ruling elite would decide what was necessary and what was not and they would make a special appointment for someone to oversee the correct workings of the new law, that way there would be no abuse of it. And it came to pass that the laws were passed and Antoninus and Sejackus looked on what they had done a proclaimed it was for the good of all. Many years passed and all seemed well, the populous was not overly concerned about the fact that many things which they had had in the past to prevent tyranny striking the heart of their realm were now just features of ancient history, and the word privacy was relegated to a game show in the Circus TVanus named "Call my Bluff". As with all things human the reign of Antoninus and his well meaning cohorts came to an end. New rulers came to pass, and the small boy called little boots (LB) was now a man and making himself popular with the people and he had ambition. Eventually LB by divers mesne actions on the part of officialdom and the populous became Caesar LB. LB was vein, he liked to party, to tell jokes and to indulge himself. He did not like criticism and especially anyone who commented on his jokes adveresely or about his close family ties. Soon he became paranoid and found to his delight that his predecessor had left the perfect tools with which to ensure that anyone who did not laugh at his jokes was known to him, and therafter rehabilitated to like the jokes or alternatively was left in a situation where any critiicsm was impossible due his complete lack of existance. Things went from bad to worse, and the people became discontented, they tried to help themselves but were unable to face the state and all its trappings. They looked to the laws that enabled LB to observe them so closely and were horrified by what they saw. "How could our beloved Antoninus and Sejackus have done this" they cried, but to no avail. No one in authority would listen. LB had made sure that any that would have were long gone, and those placed in their stead were all loyal to LB. And the moral, well no matter how well meaning something may be and the bona fides of those that do something for the "best", they cannot answer for the bona fides and probity of those to come. A bit off topic I know but worth saying (so I think) nonetheless. Donald Ramsbottom LL.B, BA (Hons). RAMSBOTTOM & Co. Solicitors Internet Law & Global Cryptology Law Specialists From editor@crecon.demon.co.uk Fri, 11 Feb 2000 12:34:53 +0000 Date: Fri, 11 Feb 2000 12:34:53 +0000 From: T Bruce Tober editor@crecon.demon.co.uk Subject: Queen prepares royal e-signature This is a PGP signed message sent according to RFC2015 [PGP/MIME] --=_Turnpike_$$iu3dDtHAp4o9gD= Content-Type: text/plain;charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable In message , Quentin Campbell writes >However I hope HM's advisers tread warily. There is much scope for serious >embarrassment here and it would be sad if the Royal Household became >another victim of il-judged Government gimmickry and spin. Also, one has to wonder just what strength of encryption she'll be allowed to use and whether she'll have to surrender her key if she comes under suspicion of a crime. tbt --=20 | Bruce Tober, , Freelance Journalist, | | My Website | | Birmingham, UK, EU +44-1562-638-704 (mobile - 0780-374-8255). = |=20 --=_Turnpike_$$iu3dDtHAp4o9gD= Content-Type: application/pgp-signature Content-Disposition: attachment; filename=signature.asc -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGPsdk version 1.7.1 iQA/AwUBOKQB7YI/aBKYrVEjEQJQ3gCgkZRD9uKTaitJFYPwNHgjhjTk5GwAoNCl O2O9IwPbaVBdO3pe9RbrBPAv =4lgK -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- --=_Turnpike_$$iu3dDtHAp4o9gD=-- From Ross.Anderson@cl.cam.ac.uk Fri, 11 Feb 2000 13:55:45 +0000 Date: Fri, 11 Feb 2000 13:55:45 +0000 From: Ross Anderson Ross.Anderson@cl.cam.ac.uk Subject: is a digest version of this list available? --- Let me know too! > If there is a digest could you let me know > as well? The list is mirrored to the following usenet newsgroup: chiark.mail/ukcrypto This might be easier for you to browse Ross From mkirwan@baltimore.com Fri, 11 Feb 2000 14:06:59 -0000 Date: Fri, 11 Feb 2000 14:06:59 -0000 From: Mary Kirwan mkirwan@baltimore.com Subject: RIP Bill and mass surveillance I just love a historian! -----Original Message----- From: Donald Ramsbottom [mailto:donald@ramsbottom.co.uk] Sent: Friday, February 11, 2000 1:53 PM To: ukcrypto@maillist.ox.ac.uk Subject: RE: RIP Bill and mass surveillance At 10:36 11/02/00 -0000, you wrote: >At the risk of sounding like MoneyPenny, there is nonetheless a danger of >overstating the risk to freedom and democracy from this type of Bill- it is >always best to have a transparent system for wiretaps than have it done by >slight of hand with no review, because no one even knows it happens. The >difficulty I perceive is that constitutional protections which are well >developed in Canada and the US may not exist at all or to the same extent in >UK. In Canada, there are multiple challenges available to use of wiretaps at >trial, and it can be a momentous hurdle to even get them admitted, there are >challenges to the issuing of the warrant, the need to show that no other >means could have been used to get the information, etc. That being said, the >threshold level for granting of a warrant in this Bill as 'likely to be of >value' is a bit dodgy - there should be a requirement also that the >information sought should not be otherwise obtainable (Bill says, 'key' not >otherwise obtainable). > Well lets tell a parable here. Once upon a time, there was a country known as Eutopia, it was ruled over by Caesar Augustus Antoninus and his consort Lavinia Cherii. Both were educated and Idealistic and had before their elevation to the purple been staltwart libertarians and lawyers to boot. They were now ensconsed as the rulers of the fair land, and they knew what was best for all their subjects. They had certain irritations which all rulers have to deal with, crime foreign intrigue , and of course internal dissent to their benificent rule. Antoninus did not object to the latter but was intent on dealing with the former that he forgot some of his earlier principals. All for the greater good of course. There was a system of senators and representatives from many differing aspects of Eutopian life, but ultimately Antoninus had for the duration of his reign the last word. His political relatives spread far and wide, among them was a young lad who Antoninus' Praetorians nicknamed "Little boots". Antoninus ruled for many years and even changed the political system which had been in place for 800 years, he changed the Courts and the way Justice was administered, he even removed an ancient right and safe guard of the people to be judged their peers as in his modern Eutopia that safe guard was not necessary and was too expensive ( or so his Caledonian righthand man Gordonius had told him). His other senior advisor sejackus also advised him (on receipt of proper advice from his officials and who in turn had received their advice from other less well known officials in the cabal of senior officialdom) that there was another problem in the land, that was the populous were talking to each other and SOME of them may be committing crimes and or other heinous offences while talking to each other, and because of the new fangled system of communication they (officialdom) were having trouble keeping things just the way they (sorry Antoninus) wanted it. With heavy heart Antoninus and Sejackus decided that they would enact laws which they never would have contemplated in their hedonistic youth, but they would build in safeguards for the people, they the ruling elite would decide what was necessary and what was not and they would make a special appointment for someone to oversee the correct workings of the new law, that way there would be no abuse of it. And it came to pass that the laws were passed and Antoninus and Sejackus looked on what they had done a proclaimed it was for the good of all. Many years passed and all seemed well, the populous was not overly concerned about the fact that many things which they had had in the past to prevent tyranny striking the heart of their realm were now just features of ancient history, and the word privacy was relegated to a game show in the Circus TVanus named "Call my Bluff". As with all things human the reign of Antoninus and his well meaning cohorts came to an end. New rulers came to pass, and the small boy called little boots (LB) was now a man and making himself popular with the people and he had ambition. Eventually LB by divers mesne actions on the part of officialdom and the populous became Caesar LB. LB was vein, he liked to party, to tell jokes and to indulge himself. He did not like criticism and especially anyone who commented on his jokes adveresely or about his close family ties. Soon he became paranoid and found to his delight that his predecessor had left the perfect tools with which to ensure that anyone who did not laugh at his jokes was known to him, and therafter rehabilitated to like the jokes or alternatively was left in a situation where any critiicsm was impossible due his complete lack of existance. Things went from bad to worse, and the people became discontented, they tried to help themselves but were unable to face the state and all its trappings. They looked to the laws that enabled LB to observe them so closely and were horrified by what they saw. "How could our beloved Antoninus and Sejackus have done this" they cried, but to no avail. No one in authority would listen. LB had made sure that any that would have were long gone, and those placed in their stead were all loyal to LB. And the moral, well no matter how well meaning something may be and the bona fides of those that do something for the "best", they cannot answer for the bona fides and probity of those to come. A bit off topic I know but worth saying (so I think) nonetheless. Donald Ramsbottom LL.B, BA (Hons). RAMSBOTTOM & Co. Solicitors Internet Law & Global Cryptology Law Specialists From editor@crecon.demon.co.uk Fri, 11 Feb 2000 12:34:53 +0000 Date: Fri, 11 Feb 2000 12:34:53 +0000 From: T Bruce Tober editor@crecon.demon.co.uk Subject: Queen prepares royal e-signature This is a PGP signed message sent according to RFC2015 [PGP/MIME] --=_Turnpike_$$iu3dDtHAp4o9gD= Content-Type: text/plain;charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable In message , Quentin Campbell writes >However I hope HM's advisers tread warily. There is much scope for serious >embarrassment here and it would be sad if the Royal Household became >another victim of il-judged Government gimmickry and spin. Also, one has to wonder just what strength of encryption she'll be allowed to use and whether she'll have to surrender her key if she comes under suspicion of a crime. tbt --=20 | Bruce Tober, , Freelance Journalist, | | My Website | | Birmingham, UK, EU +44-1562-638-704 (mobile - 0780-374-8255). = |=20 --=_Turnpike_$$iu3dDtHAp4o9gD= Content-Type: application/pgp-signature Content-Disposition: attachment; filename=signature.asc -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGPsdk version 1.7.1 iQA/AwUBOKQB7YI/aBKYrVEjEQJQ3gCgkZRD9uKTaitJFYPwNHgjhjTk5GwAoNCl O2O9IwPbaVBdO3pe9RbrBPAv =4lgK -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- --=_Turnpike_$$iu3dDtHAp4o9gD=-- From David.Goodenough@dga.co.uk Fri, 11 Feb 2000 15:33:56 +0000 Date: Fri, 11 Feb 2000 15:33:56 +0000 From: David.Goodenough@dga.co.uk David.Goodenough@dga.co.uk Subject: Queen prepares royal e-signature --0__=S05E9Ack7N3RGqXQnyPXqCrNWsWgkevUXBqFoK89CS7zBLIqiP6c1mhJ Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline I would sincerely hope that she will not be using a key that could be used for encryption, and therefore that the question should not arise (does the statement that signature only keys are safe still exist in this bill as it did in the eComerce bill). I would hope at the very least she will be using a key that is designated signature only, and preferably one using an algorithm which is signature only. T Bruce Tober on 11-02-2000 12:34:53 PM Please respond to ukcrypto@maillist.ox.ac.uk To: ukcrypto@maillist.ox.ac.uk cc: (bcc: David Goodenough/DGA/GB) Subject: Re: Queen prepares royal e-signature In message , Quentin Campbell writes >However I hope HM's advisers tread warily. There is much scope for serious >embarrassment here and it would be sad if the Royal Household became >another victim of il-judged Government gimmickry and spin. Also, one has to wonder just what strength of encryption she'll be allowed to use and whether she'll have to surrender her key if she comes under suspicion of a crime. tbt -- | Bruce Tober, , Freelance Journalist, | | My Website | | Birmingham, UK, EU +44-1562-638-704 (mobile - 0780-374-8255). | --0__=S05E9Ack7N3RGqXQnyPXqCrNWsWgkevUXBqFoK89CS7zBLIqiP6c1mhJ Content-type: application/octet-stream; name="signature.asc" Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="signature.asc" Content-transfer-encoding: base64 LS0tLS1CRUdJTiBQR1AgU0lHTkFUVVJFLS0tLS0NClZlcnNpb246IFBHUHNkayB2ZXJzaW9uIDEu Ny4xDQoNCmlRQS9Bd1VCT0tRQjdZSS9hQktZclZFakVRSlEzZ0Nna1pSRDl1S1RhaXRKRllQd05I Z2poalRrNUd3QW9OQ2wNCk8yTzlJd1BiYVZCZE8zcGU5UmJyQlBBdg0KPTRsZ0sNCi0tLS0tRU5E IFBHUCBTSUdOQVRVUkUtLS0tLQ0KDQo= --0__=S05E9Ack7N3RGqXQnyPXqCrNWsWgkevUXBqFoK89CS7zBLIqiP6c1mhJ-- From ijackson@chiark.greenend.org.uk Fri, 11 Feb 2000 17:12:15 +0000 (GMT) Date: Fri, 11 Feb 2000 17:12:15 +0000 (GMT) From: Ian Jackson ijackson@chiark.greenend.org.uk Subject: is a digest version of this list available? --- Let me know too! Ross Anderson writes ("Re: is a digest version of this list available? --- Let me know too! "): > The list is mirrored to the following usenet newsgroup: > > chiark.mail/ukcrypto That would be chiark.mail.ukcrypto. That newsgroup is only available on chiark itself and at the University of Cambridge. For technical reasons mail-to-news gateway output is often restricted like this. I suggest that people elsewhere who want to read mailing lists as news (which is a very good idea) get their local administrators to organise a gateway. There's a reasonable amount of plausible software around for this (and I can supply a the one which feeds chiark.mail.*). Ian. (chiark's administrator) From tcmay@got.net Fri, 11 Feb 2000 08:55:15 -0800 Date: Fri, 11 Feb 2000 08:55:15 -0800 From: Tim May tcmay@got.net Subject: the power of cryptography At 3:49 AM -0800 2/11/00, matthew.gream@camcon.co.uk wrote: >Manifesto? > >The continuing struggle for individual liberties and freedoms is ever the >struggle for the power of communication. The primal man and the wall, the >sculptor and the veneration, the peacemaker and the prophecy, or the >tyrant and >the world. > >The individual seeths against society, a struggle to assert one's unique Self, >to wield a battle for individual reality, for one's Self. To give one's >Self, or >to withhold one's Self, the liberty and sanctity of the seat of individual >consciousness of each sentient being. To exist as a unique form free of >prejudice and oppression. > >In the coming age, cryptography is the quintessential tool to negotiate the >boundary between what is mine, and what is everyone elses, to protect the >world >from me, and to protect me from the world. If ever there was the ideal >society, >then such little call would there be for these devices of confusion. Until >such >a time This whole "until we reach perfection" line of reasoning is pernicious. As David Honig noted in his response, even in "ideal" societies people want privacy. In particular, an ideal society will still involve competition, both personal and commercial. I don't want my rivals reading my plans, no matter how ideal the society is. You seem to be thinking of the Eloi as being the ideal society. Feh. --Tim May print pack"C*",split/\D+/,`echo "16iII*o\U@{$/=$z;[(pop,pop,unpack"H*",<> )]}\EsMsKsN0[lN*1lK[d2%Sa2/d0 Date: Tue, 20 Jul 1999 15:07:15 +0000 From: "Markku J. Saarelainen" X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.61 [en] (Win95; I) X-Accept-Language: en MIME-Version: 1.0 Newsgroups: soc.culture.russian Subject: Re: A player does exist ... Russia shall have a new LEADER ... References: <379367FD.FB7C90C3@earthlink.net> <37937051.A2D5237F@earthlink.net> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit ok .. B'eltsin ... you know what to do ... resign, resign and then resign .... all your secrets are out ... " .. in the name of her ... a new flame shall be lightened to show the way for the children of the future .. who share their dreams ... shall play our guitar to sing the song what your balalaika likes to sing ... I follow the Moskva ... the wise man said .. please wlk in this way ... it is the call of your heart ... " ... Red Hot in Moscow .... "Markku J. Saarelainen" wrote: > " ... the leader shall show the light ... show the way for our visions of > the future .. this burning desire .. flames of our hearts shall lead us to > our common destination .. providing new strength and energy for us and our > children ....your .. (her/she) sincerity, beauty, honesty and intelligence > .. distant memories from the man ...who opened doors for others to achieve > their missions .... who by himself was ignored and neglected ... but > distant memories ... my dear ...shall remain constant .. to show the way to > our common destination ...." Red Hot in Moscow ... > > "Markku J. Saarelainen" wrote: > > > "And you ask me why I love her .. her beauty .. her sincerity ..she is > > the constant .. my land's only border lie around my heart ...my dear ... > > you know, you feel and you hear ... once I had dreams .. now they are > > obsessions .. I opened doors .. they walked right through them ... my > > love ... the player exists .. those who know him... the time shall show > > .. my dear ... the wind of change shall blow straight through ... the > > children of the future share their dreams .... not for us, but for them > > ....." ---------------- MY MESSAGE IN July, 1999 ------------- ---------------------------------------------------- Markku "Mark" J. Saarelainen P.O. Box 2314 Duluth, GA 30096 Tel: USA-678-377-6346 Email: mjsion@earthlink.net URL: http://homestead.virtualjerusalem.com/waeg/ DISCLAIMER: No thought written in this message is a statement of any organization by which I am employed or for which I work. ----------------------------------------------------- From phantomink@powersurfr.com Fri, 11 Feb 2000 13:04:59 -0700 Date: Fri, 11 Feb 2000 13:04:59 -0700 From: phantomink phantomink@powersurfr.com Subject: Queen prepares royal e-signature This is a multi-part message in MIME format. --------------DD408BF3D06BEBDF38218FD2 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Greg wrote: THis is something that I thought would get a laugh, as the brits sink intoa crisis at home regarding security and e commerce,. Greg > > Subject: Queen prepares royal e-signature > > > > Wouldn't it be nice if the government concentrated on fixing important > > things like the RIP mess, rather than on gimmicks like this... > > > [snip] > > > > The Queen's private office already has its own e-mail address, and the > > Royal Household makes extensive use of the latest information technology. > > But Palace officials will have to be fully satisfied that the royal digital > > signature is fully secure and incapable of any illicit use. > [snip] > > On the face of it this is appropriate since the Government and the Royal > Household should both demonstrate the courage of their convictions as > represented in Bills that they jointly bring into law. > > However I hope HM's advisers tread warily. There is much scope for serious > embarrassment here and it would be sad if the Royal Household became > another victim of il-judged Government gimmickry and spin. > > Quentin > -- > PHONE: +44 191 222 8209 Computing Service, University of Newcastle > FAX: +44 191 222 8765 Newcastle upon Tyne, United Kingdom, NE1 7RU. > ------------------------------------------------------------------------- > "Any opinions expressed above are mine. The University can get its own." --------------DD408BF3D06BEBDF38218FD2 Content-Type: text/x-vcard; charset=us-ascii; name="vcard.vcf" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Content-Description: Card for phantom ink Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="vcard.vcf" begin: vcard fn: phantom ink n: ;phantom ink email;internet: phantomink@powersurfr.com x-mozilla-cpt: ;0 x-mozilla-html: FALSE version: 2.1 end: vcard --------------DD408BF3D06BEBDF38218FD2-- From dave@xemu.demon.co.uk Fri, 11 Feb 2000 02:23:27 +0000 Date: Fri, 11 Feb 2000 02:23:27 +0000 From: Dave Bird dave@xemu.demon.co.uk Subject: More R.I.P. bill concerns In article <004601bf7ca5$1fef0770$2d8401d5@fortytwo>, Brian Gladman writes >From: "David Crick" >To: "Caspar Bowden" >Cc: >Sent: Thursday, February 10, 2000 6:55 PM >Subject: More R.I.P. bill concerns > > >> Please feel free to quote me below or pass this on. Someone else >> may have come up with this point, but what the heck... >> >> A worry I have that you have not touched on is this: >> >> > to prove non-compliance with notice to decrypt, the prosecution >> > must prove person "has or has had" possession of the key. >> ^^^^^^^ >> >> "has had" will not only cause problems for those who have lost >> their key(s), but also for those who have *deliberately* "lost" >> their key. > >I too have been pondering this clause and wondering in this context what >actually constitutes 'possession'. If possession would cover the fact that >I (my PC) may have had 'possession' of 1000's of SSL 'one-time' keys, the >'has had' looks pretty dire. > >> With the newer DH/DSS PGP public keys for instance, encryption >> sub-keys may be generated and revoked separately. >> >> A user may choose to do this every week, month, etc. [perhaps >> even deliberately to counteract the above legislation]. >> >> Now, if I not only generate new keys and revoke old ones, but >> also change my passphrase and overwrite/delete backed up keys, >> then it *will not be possible* for me to decrypt older messages, >> even though I *have had* the key. > >Absolutely. I use this PGP mechanism with keys for each six month period >and destroy the keys when they are six months out of date (i.e. 1 year after >first use). > >The 'have had' is a horrendous provision (one among many). > > Brian > > > > -- ^-^-^-@@-^-;-^ http://www.xemu.demon.co.uk/ (..)__u news:alt.smoking.mooses happy as a clam at high tide -. <_" .-._.-. From ijackson@chiark.greenend.org.uk Fri, 11 Feb 2000 17:12:15 +0000 (GMT) Date: Fri, 11 Feb 2000 17:12:15 +0000 (GMT) From: Ian Jackson ijackson@chiark.greenend.org.uk Subject: is a digest version of this list available? --- Let me know too! Ross Anderson writes ("Re: is a digest version of this list available? --- Let me know too! "): > The list is mirrored to the following usenet newsgroup: > > chiark.mail/ukcrypto That would be chiark.mail.ukcrypto. That newsgroup is only available on chiark itself and at the University of Cambridge. For technical reasons mail-to-news gateway output is often restricted like this. I suggest that people elsewhere who want to read mailing lists as news (which is a very good idea) get their local administrators to organise a gateway. There's a reasonable amount of plausible software around for this (and I can supply a the one which feeds chiark.mail.*). Ian. (chiark's administrator) From david@swarb.freeuk.com Fri, 11 Feb 2000 08:10:57 +0000 Date: Fri, 11 Feb 2000 08:10:57 +0000 From: David Swarbrick david@swarb.freeuk.com Subject: Flash Release: UK PUBLISHES "IMPOSSIBLE" DECRYPTION LAW In message <001201bf73c0$6d204650$0100a8c0@DIRECTOR>, Caspar Bowden wrote: >FLASH - FOR IMMEDIATE USE > >FOUNDATION FOR INFORMATION POLICY RESEARCH (www.fipr.org) Given how much was learned about the previous incarnation of these powers, would it be possible to have a concerted approach to a campaign? Criticism concentrated on one or two points previously, but there were several other real and significant weaknesses which were not brought out - for example in the Justice report. If we fixate on one or two points only - however important, we lose the opportunity to point out that the law may breach Human Rights Law in a dozen different ways. -- David Swarbrick, Solicitor 01484 722531 - david@swarb.freeuk.com http://www.swarb.co.uk law-index of 10,500+ uk case summaries & uk.legalFQA The Law Society regulates our investment business. IP/IT Law and Contracts. From hopwood@zetnet.co.uk Fri, 11 Feb 2000 23:42:29 +0000 Date: Fri, 11 Feb 2000 23:42:29 +0000 From: David Hopwood hopwood@zetnet.co.uk Subject: RIP bill as .zip archive -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I have put a .zip archive of the RIP bill and the explanatory notes, with internal links fixed to be relative, at http://www.users.zetnet.co.uk/hopwood/crypto/politics/ripbill.zip (108K zipped, 485K unzipped). - -- David Hopwood PGP public key: http://www.users.zetnet.co.uk/hopwood/public.asc RSA 2048-bit; fingerprint 71 8E A6 23 0E D3 4C E5 0F 69 8C D4 FA 66 15 01 "Attempts to control the use of encryption technology are wrong in principle, unworkable in practice, and damaging to the long-term economic value of the information networks." -- UK Labour Party pre-election policy document -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3i Charset: noconv iQEVAwUBOKSeLTkCAxeYt5gVAQGc1QgAmLtptHAmqSHM5fgVw9Z3o2xFkZYRNGOS K9O7KDPdoye+L+KnB+HfOlcS9M+27ZVUGDQESbC1q5xBXn6eFA7rKHv1a71X9P7D Jg07gWpozDSV/ALTV9b9ulzAecKfx3eJ8NEZxPF6WIC5CLQgo+Bb1pZJ2zGNVRbo wQSyJBl1OB0XYaPVY6o9cLwVx/ktcYprKVsau+LOwp5ffcJgwcjzQ9N58NZ0BTaG 7UXdpxvyccUJ8dpbCsJKIhaVYoMuR0FaRqlS5k0Uai+pU2Tj47VuzqimH2qm0MKH ECT7TAzUyWAY7TqYnABztDGvYU26djjqTs9LqLM4OKhNOGquHebTvg== =P6Od -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From dave@xemu.demon.co.uk Fri, 11 Feb 2000 20:44:32 +0000 Date: Fri, 11 Feb 2000 20:44:32 +0000 From: Dave Bird dave@xemu.demon.co.uk Subject: RIP Bill and mass surveillance In article <1.5.4.32.20000211135320.00712e68@192.168.0.65>, Donald Ramsbottom writes >Eventually LB by divers mesne actions on the part of officialdom and the >populous became Caesar LB. LB was vein, he was a jugular fellow, was he? -- ^-^-^-@@-^-;-^ http://www.xemu.demon.co.uk/ (..)__u news:alt.smoking.mooses From dave@xemu.demon.co.uk Fri, 11 Feb 2000 20:40:30 +0000 Date: Fri, 11 Feb 2000 20:40:30 +0000 From: Dave Bird dave@xemu.demon.co.uk Subject: is a digest version of this list available? --- Let me know too! In article , Ross Anderson writes >> If there is a digest could you let me know >> as well? > >The list is mirrored to the following usenet newsgroup: >chiark.mail/ukcrypto >This might be easier for you to browse If you just want the articles filtered out of your mailbox and presented as a threaded newsgroup instead, why don't you buy the "Turnpike" newreader I use from Demon internet which does precisely that? I think it's about fifty quid. -- ^-^-^-@@-^-;-^ http://www.xemu.demon.co.uk/ (..)__u news:alt.smoking.mooses From matthew.gream@pobox.com Sat, 12 Feb 2000 00:30:21 -0000 Date: Sat, 12 Feb 2000 00:30:21 -0000 From: Matthew Gream matthew.gream@pobox.com Subject: the power of cryptography -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 > This whole "until we reach perfection" line of reasoning is pernicious. > > As David Honig noted in his response, even in "ideal" societies > people want > privacy. > > In particular, an ideal society will still involve competition, both > personal and commercial. I don't want my rivals reading my plans, > no matter > how ideal the society is. > > You seem to be thinking of the Eloi as being the ideal society. Feh. Tim, If you were to read the sentence that follows the one you quoted, you would find that I say "however, until such time" to acknowledge two things. Firstly, that an ideal society takes time to reach (if at all reachable), and secondly, that when an ideal society is reached, it needs to prevent itself from slipping back to a non-ideal society. These principles apply regardless of whether cryptography is available. So Tim, in fact, I agree with you in principle. However, I am not sure about your assertion that an ideal society will involve competition. In any case, the two important things are: a) there is still a need for cryptography in either case, and b) cryptography can be considered a pivot for the power relationship between individuals and society. Which, really, comes back to cryptography as an "armament" (cf. continual scaling of constructive [cryptographic] and destructive [cryptobreaking] technologies, which itself is a generalisable aspect of not only society, but the aspect of escalating power irrespective of the media in which it is manifested). The more generalisable conclusion is that in a purely digital environment, cryptographic mechanisms are the codification of rules and ethics. A most interesting study would be to codify well established ideas of ethics and morality (as they have evolved over history), and try to make a direct comparison with theoretical and realisable cryptographic constructs (as they are a recent construction!). Then, there'd be an interesting side by side comparison between "real" and "digital" worlds, and some general understandings about the translations between the two. (the next cool study is to construct an analysis of "systems of negotiation" -- i.e. speech, humans, transport protocols, cryptographic protocols, military strategy, dialetic, etc -- as a means of understanding parallels between the generalisable aspects of negotiation and cryptography -- which is really just a negotiation, but in another mathematical domain, etc: the cool thing then of course to unify some of the work in provable transformations between theory and implementation in cyptography, and work in other domains) Good to know that I provoked a reaction in any case ;-). That is my creative madness over for the week. Best regards, Matthew. - -- matthew.gream@pobox.com Cambridge_UK/2000 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP 6.5.1i for non-commercial use iQA/AwUBOKSpma1VD3MTsHhAEQLzQwCgtDJPTVNSOEOnxfowNJ3dFuGCrRAAn3Ob 6T24uhkeMqFPG7GTO0GLzRwB =abLB -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From owenfb@easynet.co.uk Sat, 12 Feb 2000 01:08:00 +0000 Date: Sat, 12 Feb 2000 01:08:00 +0000 From: Owen Blacker owenfb@easynet.co.uk Subject: RIP Bill and mass surveillance Quoting Donald Ramsbottom : > Well lets tell a parable here. > > Once upon a time, there was a country known as Eutopia, it was > ruled over by > Caesar Augustus Antoninus and his consort Lavinia Cherii. [deletia] > > A bit off topic I know but worth saying (so I think) nonetheless. But wonderfully well written (and makes the essential point rather well, I feel!) :o) ----- Owen Blacker Senior Internet Developer and Internet Security Consultant DSS: 0x7e3c8eab | 2f45 c60d 6a0a 0007 193d d994 cd36 e021 7e3c 8eab RSA: 0x38fee6c3 | 7c41 e69c 5b8a 484d 22af 1859 f4c9 307b This message was sent by Easymail - http://www.easynet.co.uk/ From fred@cisco.com Fri, 11 Feb 2000 17:40:22 -0800 Date: Fri, 11 Feb 2000 17:40:22 -0800 From: Fred Baker fred@cisco.com Subject: [Raven] BBC Online 10/2/2000: "Surveillance bill under fire" At 10:46 AM 2/11/00 +0200, janne.haikonen@nokia.com wrote: >You can always >claim that the file/communication was just garbage, and when they >ask e.g. about some magic cookies or crypto signalling IEs that were >present in your file/communication you can always act stupid and >claim that you have no knowledge of what you computer/terminal >does behind your back... I think that would last about 9 milliseconds in the presence of a competent lawyer. Let's see, you're paying how much every month for the privilege of sending someone else something neither you nor they know or can use the contens of? Why are you doing that? Doesn't doing so constitute some form of denial of service attack which may itself be punishable? From tcmay@got.net Fri, 11 Feb 2000 22:13:16 -0800 Date: Fri, 11 Feb 2000 22:13:16 -0800 From: Tim May tcmay@got.net Subject: the power of cryptography At 4:30 PM -0800 2/11/00, Matthew Gream wrote: >If you were to read the sentence that follows the one you quoted, you would >find that I say "however, until such time" to acknowledge two things. >Firstly, that an ideal society takes time to reach (if at all reachable), >and secondly, that when an ideal society is reached, it needs to prevent >itself from slipping back to a non-ideal society. I understood your point. And I still think your point is pernicious. The very notion of "perfection means rights won't be needed" is what is pernicious. Seen frequently in the gun debate. ("If we lived in a perfect society, guns would not be needed and there would be no need for the Second Amendment.") Whether or not we can ever achieve "perfection" is not the issue. What is wrong-headed is the very line of reasoning you have used. I am not interested in trying to persuade you otherwise, so I won't comment any further in this thread. I just had to point out how deeply flawed your whole manifesto is to some of us (hopefully _most_ of us). --Tim May print pack"C*",split/\D+/,`echo "16iII*o\U@{$/=$z;[(pop,pop,unpack"H*",<> )]}\EsMsKsN0[lN*1lK[d2%Sa2/d0, Mary Kirwan wrote: >At the risk of sounding like MoneyPenny, there is nonetheless a danger of >overstating the risk to freedom and democracy from this type of Bill- it is >always best to have a transparent system for wiretaps than have it done by >slight of hand with no review, because no one even knows it happens. The >difficulty I perceive is that constitutional protections which are well >developed in Canada and the US may not exist at all or to the same extent in >UK. In Canada, there are multiple challenges available to use of wiretaps at >trial, and it can be a momentous hurdle to even get them admitted, there are >challenges to the issuing of the warrant, the need to show that no other >means could have been used to get the information, etc. That being said, the >threshold level for granting of a warrant in this Bill as 'likely to be of >value' is a bit dodgy - there should be a requirement also that the >information sought should not be otherwise obtainable (Bill says, 'key' not >otherwise obtainable). > What you omit to consider is that this type of notice will inevitably be directed at, and make criminal, the innocent half of any conversation. To read the criminal's, post, say from a pedophile to a young girl he is trying to corrupt, the police must use these extraordinary and terrifying powers, and terrify into submission, not the criminal, but the victim. It is the victim who gets threatened with five years imprisonment for revealing that her private key has been obtained, and who may not tell this terrible secret, for example, to her parents. -- David Swarbrick, Solicitor 01484 722531 - david@swarb.freeuk.com http://www.swarb.co.uk law-index of 10,500+ uk case summaries & uk.legalFQA The Law Society regulates our investment business. IP/IT Law and Contracts. From robin@robinsg.demon.co.uk Sat, 12 Feb 2000 09:20:34 +0000 Date: Sat, 12 Feb 2000 09:20:34 +0000 From: Robin Galbraith robin@robinsg.demon.co.uk Subject: is a digest version of this list available? --- Let me know too! -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 In article , Dave Bird writes > If you just want the articles filtered out of your mailbox > and presented as a threaded newsgroup instead, why don't > you buy the "Turnpike" newreader I use from Demon internet > which does precisely that? I think it's about fifty quid. ^^^^^ UKP15 plus VAT see:http://www.turnpike.com/order.html Robin - -- Robin Galbraith -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGPsdk version 1.7.1 iQA/AwUBOKUl4h3K4XhQGpowEQLzuQCfVlrMGbnLZCiw38izVWkViOCiyrAAn3+4 ndgVh2fCXsxRrIlei8dem4oR =aaaI -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From ghira@mistral.co.uk 12 Feb 2000 9:39:6 +0000 Date: 12 Feb 2000 9:39:6 +0000 From: Adam Atkinson ghira@mistral.co.uk Subject: is a digest version of this list available? --- Let me know too! On 12-Feb-00 09:20:34, Robin Galbraith said: >> If you just want the articles filtered out of your mailbox >> and presented as a threaded newsgroup instead, why don't >> you buy the "Turnpike" newreader I use from Demon internet >> which does precisely that? Isn't this a fairly common feature in email programs? Certainly all the email programs I've used in the last few years have had it. My mail gets put in about 40 different folders. -- Adam Atkinson (ghira@mistral.co.uk) Never attribute to malice that which is adequately explained by incompetence. From prunesquallor@proproco.co.uk Sat, 12 Feb 2000 10:16:31 -0000 Date: Sat, 12 Feb 2000 10:16:31 -0000 From: John R T Brazier prunesquallor@proproco.co.uk Subject: More R.I.P. bill concerns Seems to me a call for lawyers. The phrase in 49.1.b is 'he is a person who has or has had possession of the key', so: 1) Can you possess something if you are unaware of it? So if my computer processes temporary information (like an SSL session key) and I don't know do I possess the keys? 2) If I know something, do I 'possess' the knowledge? How is 'possession' defined in law? So if I remember my key (and never write it down) do I possess it (I seem to remember argy-bargy in the drug cases as to if something circulating in your bloodstream was 'possession' - and I believe that the conclusion was negative)? 3) If I can 'possess' knowledge, can I lose possession of it (in the same way that I can lose possession of my watch)? If I can, then there may be a defence under 49.3.a under the 'reasonably practical' defence. As an aside, I would suspect that no court would say it was 'reasonably practical' for an individual to keep track of thousands of session and temporary keys - a few hundred pages of hex dumps should convince any jury! All the best, John B -----Original Message (from Brian) ----- I too have been pondering this clause and wondering in this context what actually constitutes 'possession'. If possession would cover the fact that I (my PC) may have had 'possession' of 1000's of SSL 'one-time' keys, the 'has had' looks pretty dire. > With the newer DH/DSS PGP public keys for instance, encryption > sub-keys may be generated and revoked separately. > > A user may choose to do this every week, month, etc. [perhaps > even deliberately to counteract the above legislation]. > > Now, if I not only generate new keys and revoke old ones, but > also change my passphrase and overwrite/delete backed up keys, > then it *will not be possible* for me to decrypt older messages, > even though I *have had* the key. Absolutely. I use this PGP mechanism with keys for each six month period and destroy the keys when they are six months out of date (i.e. 1 year after first use). The 'have had' is a horrendous provision (one among many). Brian From fred@cisco.com Fri, 11 Feb 2000 17:40:22 -0800 Date: Fri, 11 Feb 2000 17:40:22 -0800 From: Fred Baker fred@cisco.com Subject: [Raven] BBC Online 10/2/2000: "Surveillance bill under fire" At 10:46 AM 2/11/00 +0200, janne.haikonen@nokia.com wrote: >You can always >claim that the file/communication was just garbage, and when they >ask e.g. about some magic cookies or crypto signalling IEs that were >present in your file/communication you can always act stupid and >claim that you have no knowledge of what you computer/terminal >does behind your back... I think that would last about 9 milliseconds in the presence of a competent lawyer. Let's see, you're paying how much every month for the privilege of sending someone else something neither you nor they know or can use the contens of? Why are you doing that? Doesn't doing so constitute some form of denial of service attack which may itself be punishable? From prunesquallor@proproco.co.uk Sat, 12 Feb 2000 10:16:31 -0000 Date: Sat, 12 Feb 2000 10:16:31 -0000 From: John R T Brazier prunesquallor@proproco.co.uk Subject: More R.I.P. bill concerns Seems to me a call for lawyers. The phrase in 49.1.b is 'he is a person who has or has had possession of the key', so: 1) Can you possess something if you are unaware of it? So if my computer processes temporary information (like an SSL session key) and I don't know do I possess the keys? 2) If I know something, do I 'possess' the knowledge? How is 'possession' defined in law? So if I remember my key (and never write it down) do I possess it (I seem to remember argy-bargy in the drug cases as to if something circulating in your bloodstream was 'possession' - and I believe that the conclusion was negative)? 3) If I can 'possess' knowledge, can I lose possession of it (in the same way that I can lose possession of my watch)? If I can, then there may be a defence under 49.3.a under the 'reasonably practical' defence. As an aside, I would suspect that no court would say it was 'reasonably practical' for an individual to keep track of thousands of session and temporary keys - a few hundred pages of hex dumps should convince any jury! All the best, John B -----Original Message (from Brian) ----- I too have been pondering this clause and wondering in this context what actually constitutes 'possession'. If possession would cover the fact that I (my PC) may have had 'possession' of 1000's of SSL 'one-time' keys, the 'has had' looks pretty dire. > With the newer DH/DSS PGP public keys for instance, encryption > sub-keys may be generated and revoked separately. > > A user may choose to do this every week, month, etc. [perhaps > even deliberately to counteract the above legislation]. > > Now, if I not only generate new keys and revoke old ones, but > also change my passphrase and overwrite/delete backed up keys, > then it *will not be possible* for me to decrypt older messages, > even though I *have had* the key. Absolutely. I use this PGP mechanism with keys for each six month period and destroy the keys when they are six months out of date (i.e. 1 year after first use). The 'have had' is a horrendous provision (one among many). Brian From Casper.Dik@holland.sun.com Sat, 12 Feb 2000 12:38:43 +0100 Date: Sat, 12 Feb 2000 12:38:43 +0100 From: Casper Dik Casper.Dik@holland.sun.com Subject: More R.I.P. bill concerns >Absolutely. I use this PGP mechanism with keys for each six month period >and destroy the keys when they are six months out of date (i.e. 1 year after >first use). > >The 'have had' is a horrendous provision (one among many). The SSH protocol has perfect forward secrecy; it generates temporary Public/private keys to do key exchange with. Given the transscript of an SSH session, it is impossible to recover the session even though you "have had" the key. Casper From brian.gladman@btinternet.com Sat, 12 Feb 2000 13:23:05 -0000 Date: Sat, 12 Feb 2000 13:23:05 -0000 From: Brian Gladman brian.gladman@btinternet.com Subject: More R.I.P. bill concerns ----- Original Message ----- From: "Casper Dik" To: Sent: Saturday, February 12, 2000 11:38 AM Subject: Re: More R.I.P. bill concerns > >Absolutely. I use this PGP mechanism with keys for each six month period > >and destroy the keys when they are six months out of date (i.e. 1 year after > >first use). > > > >The 'have had' is a horrendous provision (one among many). > > > The SSH protocol has perfect forward secrecy; it generates temporary > Public/private keys to do key exchange with. > > Given the transscript of an SSH session, it is impossible to recover > the session even though you "have had" the key. Yes, one of the things that RIP will promote is exactly the applications that offer perfect forward secrecy. As the Bill recognises, a user cannot be expected to circumvent features in software so the obvious way round RIP are to use tions that employ this technique. And Ross's work on the Steganographic File System (SFS) will help greatly since the authorities will not be able to tell whether there are protected files on a system anyway. And if they want a key, give them the top level one without revealing that there are many other levels. Sadly, the danger of this Bill is that it will promote the existence of just what the authorities should not want if they had a real interest in the safey of UK citizens. As far as I can see it will undermine the safety of the honest majority without doing anything significant to impede the guilty. We have some vague statistics to justify what is proposed but the problems with these were pointed out on this list some time ago. Brian From richard@turnpike.com Sat, 12 Feb 2000 14:05:27 +0000 Date: Sat, 12 Feb 2000 14:05:27 +0000 From: Richard Clayton richard@turnpike.com Subject: US export laws - a side effect (was about digests of this list) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 In article <622.77T314T5792787ghira@mistral.co.uk>, Adam Atkinson writes >On 12-Feb-00 09:20:34, Robin Galbraith said: > >>> If you just want the articles filtered out of your mailbox >>> and presented as a threaded newsgroup instead, why don't >>> you buy the "Turnpike" newreader I use from Demon internet >>> which does precisely that? > >Isn't this a fairly common feature in email programs? Certainly all >the email programs I've used in the last few years have had it. My >mail gets put in about 40 different folders. This is extremely off-topic, but the point about Turnpike is that it literally treats the mailing list as news and puts it in with the Usenet newsgroups... this means that it will expire in the fullness of time rather than growing and growing in a folder as something you ought to get around to reading... I find that (even on lists as interesting as uk-crypto) to be extremely useful To go back on-topic for a moment... there seems to be an interesting effect of the new US export laws. I could not possibly name the company involved for commercial reasons, but for some years they have made an international version of their software available which is, provided that you can obtain it, free of any restrictions upon further export save for those countries that the UN has embargoed on a worldwide basis for pretty much all goods, not just crypto. Now that the US regime has been liberalised they are considering exporting their product direct from the US, and, by implication, the international version will be discontinued. However, if you use the US product in your product then you must yourself conform to the US laws. These ban export to the UN-sanctioned places but also to some other places as well, of which Cuba is the most obvious example. The practical effect is that the change of US approach has been to make the export of crypto software harder on a planet-wide scale, albeit simpler between the western democracies. I wonder if the US administration foresaw this ? - -- richard writing to inform and not as company policy fewer than 20 MPs still need adopting: http://www.stand.org.uk/ "Assembly of Japanese bicycle require great peace of mind" quoted in ZAMM -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGPsdk version 1.7.1 iQA/AwUBOKVopzH5BMWRRATGEQJsFgCg8KWJchadwZ1OKEdppaLtjBGHtTMAoLwG gUQS7209C/Ts9uBxcNAfs6yS =xSCM -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From lists@notatla.demon.co.uk Sat, 12 Feb 2000 14:11:18 GMT Date: Sat, 12 Feb 2000 14:11:18 GMT From: lists@notatla.demon.co.uk lists@notatla.demon.co.uk Subject: More R.I.P. bill concerns "Brian Gladman" > Yes, one of the things that RIP will promote is exactly the applications > that offer perfect forward secrecy. As the Bill recognises, a user cannot > be expected to circumvent features in software so the obvious way round RIP > are to use tions that employ this technique. The constrained-by-software argument appears to relate to tipping-off rather than a failure to disclose. Or did you have a different section in mind ? (4) In proceedings against any person for an offence under this section in respect of any disclosure, it shall be a defence for that person to show that- (a) the disclosure was effected entirely by the operation of software designed to indicate when a key to protected information has ceased to be secure; and If possession includes electronic possession without the user's knowledge of the key or means to extract it (and if they don't mean this it will all be meaningless in presence of PFS) then the aim is clearly to discourage any use of crypto at all in case a lost key brings a legal penalty. > As far as I can see it will undermine the safety of > the honest majority without doing anything significant to impede the guilty. Maybe MI5 has persuaded them that the honest are not in the majority. P.S. Can people discussing newsgroups and mail software please keep their traffic off-list ? From lists@notatla.demon.co.uk Sat, 12 Feb 2000 15:00:38 GMT Date: Sat, 12 Feb 2000 15:00:38 GMT From: lists@notatla.demon.co.uk lists@notatla.demon.co.uk Subject: RIP Bill and mass surveillance David Swarbrick > What you omit to consider is that this type of notice will inevitably be > directed at, and make criminal, the innocent half of any conversation. > > To read the criminal's, post, say from a pedophile to a young girl he is > trying to corrupt, the police must use these extraordinary and > terrifying powers, and terrify into submission, not the criminal, but > the victim. It is the victim who gets threatened with five years Don't be so gloomy. It's only 2 years if the criminal sent her a trojan that wiped her disk. From cs97ktb@brunel.ac.uk Sat, 12 Feb 2000 16:49:08 +0000 (GMT) Date: Sat, 12 Feb 2000 16:49:08 +0000 (GMT) From: Kieran Barry cs97ktb@brunel.ac.uk Subject: More R.I.P. bill concerns On Thu, 10 Feb 2000, David Crick wrote: > Please feel free to quote me below or pass this on. Someone else > may have come up with this point, but what the heck... > > A worry I have that you have not touched on is this: > > > to prove non-compliance with notice to decrypt, the prosecution > > must prove person "has or has had" possession of the key. > ^^^^^^^ > > "has had" will not only cause problems for those who have lost > their key(s), but also for those who have *deliberately* "lost" > their key. Let me suggest another interpretation: They want to be able to prosecute someone who deletes their key between being served a notice and the case reaching court. "Has had" certainly covers this situation. Also, if this situation is covered, then the non-compliance offence can probably only ever catch the terminally stupid, or those caught in the act. I expect to hear this defence from ministers should our discussion reach that level. If this is what they want to cover, then they have certainly succeeded. It would fulfill the tradition of Home Office bills being "badly drafted" (read: giving extra rights to the authorities.) With the civil service and civil liberties, I do not subscribe to the malice/ incompetence doctrine. Regards Kieran From donald@ramsbottom.co.uk Sat, 12 Feb 2000 18:00:33 +0000 Date: Sat, 12 Feb 2000 18:00:33 +0000 From: Donald Ramsbottom donald@ramsbottom.co.uk Subject: Is resistance Futile? > >Given how much was learned about the previous incarnation of these >powers, would it be possible to have a concerted approach to a campaign? > >Criticism concentrated on one or two points previously, but there were >several other real and significant weaknesses which were not brought out >- for example in the Justice report. > >If we fixate on one or two points only - however important, we lose the >opportunity to point out that the law may breach Human Rights Law in a >dozen different ways. > >-- >David Swarbrick, Solicitor 01484 722531 - david@swarb.freeuk.com >http://www.swarb.co.uk law-index of 10,500+ uk case summaries & uk.legalFQA >The Law Society regulates our investment business. IP/IT Law and Contracts. David, This sounds sensible to me, what do you suggest by way of coordination. Organised "resistance" is always so much more effective than sproadic sallys by disparate un coordinated groups. Perhaps Caspar or some other cogniscentii of such matters could suggest something. Firstly we need to know what our strength is so don't be shy all you Cryptolanders (and that includes lurkers), speak up (post up as the case may be), time to be counted. It occurs that the list may not approve of this so if someone has the necessary experience to coordinate, we would probably have to continue off list, but I suspect that no one would object to "straw Poll" of interested parties. Cry God for Harry, England and.............. oops got a little carried away......very embarassing and all that.............Just shut up and go away quietly! Donald Ramsbottom LL.B, BA (Hons). RAMSBOTTOM & Co. Solicitors Internet Law & Global Cryptology Law Specialists From david@swarb.freeuk.com Sat, 12 Feb 2000 17:20:12 +0000 Date: Sat, 12 Feb 2000 17:20:12 +0000 From: David Swarbrick david@swarb.freeuk.com Subject: RIP Bill and mass surveillance In message <200002121500.PAA03659@notatla.demon.co.uk>, lists@notatla.demon.co.uk wrote: >David Swarbrick > >> What you omit to consider is that this type of notice will inevitably be >> directed at, and make criminal, the innocent half of any conversation. >> >> To read the criminal's, post, say from a pedophile to a young girl he is >> trying to corrupt, the police must use these extraordinary and >> terrifying powers, and terrify into submission, not the criminal, but >> the victim. It is the victim who gets threatened with five years > >Don't be so gloomy. It's only 2 years if the criminal sent her a trojan >that wiped her disk. > No its five years if she tells her parents -- David Swarbrick, Solicitor 01484 722531 - david@swarb.freeuk.com http://www.swarb.co.uk law-index of 10,500+ uk case summaries & uk.legalFQA The Law Society regulates our investment business. IP/IT Law and Contracts. From brian.gladman@btinternet.com Sat, 12 Feb 2000 17:31:56 -0000 Date: Sat, 12 Feb 2000 17:31:56 -0000 From: Brian Gladman brian.gladman@btinternet.com Subject: More R.I.P. bill concerns From: To: Sent: Saturday, February 12, 2000 2:11 PM Subject: Re: More R.I.P. bill concerns > "Brian Gladman" > > > Yes, one of the things that RIP will promote is exactly the applications > > that offer perfect forward secrecy. As the Bill recognises, a user cannot > > be expected to circumvent features in software so the obvious way round RIP > > are to use tions that employ this technique. > > The constrained-by-software argument appears to relate to tipping-off > rather than a failure to disclose. Or did you have a different section > in mind ? > > (4) In proceedings against any person for an offence under this > section in respect of any disclosure, it shall be a defence for that > person to show that- > > (a) the disclosure was effected entirely by the operation of software > designed to indicate when a key to protected information has > ceased to be secure; and This was the clause I recalled but I obviously got it in the wrong place. Having said this the point still applies - if an application offers perfect forward secrecy a user simply won't have a key to hand over and he or she can call in the company who provided the application in their defence (not that they should have to). Brian From dave@xemu.demon.co.uk Sat, 12 Feb 2000 17:12:45 +0000 Date: Sat, 12 Feb 2000 17:12:45 +0000 From: Dave Bird dave@xemu.demon.co.uk Subject: [Raven] BBC Online 10/2/2000: "Surveillance bill under fire" In article <4.1.20000211173802.04868c20@flipper.cisco.com>, Fred Baker writes >Let's see, you're paying how much every month for the privilege of >sending someone else something neither you nor they know or can use the >contens of? Why are you doing that? Because it is a well-known cryptographic technique to include some dummy messages with garbage plaintext, to present an added obstacle for eavesdroppers. >Doesn't doing so constitute some form >of denial of service attack which may itself be punishable? Not if he consents to it, no. -- ^-^-^-@@-^-;-^ http://www.xemu.demon.co.uk/ (..)__u news:alt.smoking.mooses From matthew.gream@pobox.com Sat, 12 Feb 2000 19:39:46 -0000 Date: Sat, 12 Feb 2000 19:39:46 -0000 From: Matthew Gream matthew.gream@pobox.com Subject: the power of cryptography -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Tim, > I understood your point. And I still think your point is pernicious. I am not sure that you understand my point. > The very notion of "perfection means rights won't be needed" is what is > pernicious. Seen frequently in the gun debate. ("If we lived in a perfect > society, guns would not be needed and there would be no need for > the Second Amendment.") I do not intend to suggest that rights won't be needed when there is perfection. I would suggest that the path towards perfection involves the continuing development of rights; I would then suggest that issue is perhaps the mechanisms used to maintain the stability of those rights. Spears, Slingshots, Catapults, Tanks, Guns, Genetic Agents, Computing Agents, Secret Services, Cryptographic Agents are all tools that are plausable mechanisms to maintain and develop rights, but each are of certain levels of effectiveness at certain times in history, and each are desirable or undesirable (e.g. non-violent action is preferred, but unfortunately violent action may be needed if the situation demands it). Catapults are of limited effectiveness in a modern society. Guns may eventually lose effectivness due to genetic, physical and computing advances (or may exist "in principle": molecular disruptors). The same may occur with cryptography, it may exist "in principle", but in a further advanced form: quantum systems. That is the big picture. Most people are concerned about the short to medium term picture, to ensure that in 30-40 years time they will still live a "good life". Even that, becomes an issue, because with life extension technologies, I may eventually be able to live a somewhat immortal life. Which means, then, perhaps I should be concerned with the big picture ? The points from this are: - - perfection inherently includes the notion of satisfiable rights, because it can be seen as the development of rights towards a suitably satisfactory state. - - satisfiable rights inherently include mechanisms to maintain such rights, because without structual integrity, such rights may regress or erode. - - the mechanisms to maintain these rights develop and change as society changes; obsoleting the usefulness of certain technologies at certain times, and all it takes is one other party to advance to new technologies, and everyone else is forced to advance (in some form, e.g. arms race or bilateral agreements) as well, lest anyone be left in a vulnerable/weak position. Fundamentally: - - the digital world is entirely digital, and in the digital world, some form of cryptography is the basis for all manner of rights (transport protocols are basic "rights" between communication systems, QoS parameters can be seen as more advanced forms of rights, cryptographic parameters and systems are even more advancesd forms of rights, and then smart contracts, nym systems and everything else are continually evolution of rights towards digital entities, where digital entities are autonomous sentient entities that can operate and mediate and wield "power" through their use of cryptographic mechanisms). [does anyone want to fund me full time to study this, it's killing my social life as a hobby :-)] > Whether or not we can ever achieve "perfection" is not the issue. What is > wrong-headed is the very line of reasoning you have used. I think perfection is an ideal model, important to use as a reasoning tool to frame reality, or to trade off and look at versions of reality, and therefore make decisions about the best sorts of reality. There is an analogy here with models of computability. The models are ideal and not necessarily correct or reachable, but they provide a good way to develop metrics and make tradeoffs for the realistic results. I do not think that you understand the line of reasoning that I am using. I do think that perhaps I have not expressed my reasoning very well. > I am not interested in trying to persuade you otherwise, so I > won't comment > any further in this thread. I just had to point out how deeply flawed your > whole manifesto is to some of us (hopefully _most_ of us). It is not a manifesto I subscribe to, but it is a point of discussion to understand the problem further, that is all. A philosophical question often resolves around the nature of how people interpret what other people say. Some people assume that what people say is an absolute statement of that persons beliefs, when sometimes people say things to provoke reaction and discussion. This is why extremists, whether you like them or not, or agree with them, are often useful -- and actually desirable -- as a catalyst for action. The nature of the way in which the extremists go about there activities is an issue, though. Draw a similarity to revolutionaries, who are extremists. I hope that my use of analogies helps refine my reasoning. I agree, no further comment from myself. Interested parties can take the discussion up with me in personal email. I have more thinking to do. Perhaps it was good to shout to see what response I received. Best regards, Matthew. > > > --Tim May > > print pack"C*",split/\D+/,`echo "16iII*o\U@{$/=$z;[(pop,pop,unpack"H*",<> > )]}\EsMsKsN0[lN*1lK[d2%Sa2/d0 ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- > Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, > ComSec 3DES: 831-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero > W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, > "Cyphernomicon" | black markets, collapse of governments. > > - -- matthew.gream@pobox.com Cambridge_UK/2000 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP 6.5.1i for non-commercial use iQA/AwUBOKW2/61VD3MTsHhAEQIaQQCfR7zelAzdT57wwSjY1LbiokrGIxYAoObE D07JmNI5X5txQyzqhOHwTf7n =e7U1 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From padgett@gdi.net Sat, 12 Feb 2000 14:47:33 -0500 Date: Sat, 12 Feb 2000 14:47:33 -0500 From: Padgett 0sirius padgett@gdi.net Subject: [Raven] BBC Online 10/2/2000: "Surveillance bill under fire" >I think that would last about 9 milliseconds in the presence of a competent >lawyer. Let's see, you're paying how much every month for the privilege of >sending someone else something neither you nor they know or can use the >contens of? Why are you doing that? Doesn't doing so constitute some form >of denial of service attack which may itself be punishable? With PGP (and most PK mechanisms) when you send someone else an encrypted message, unless you use an ADK or copy yourself, you CAN'T recover the contents - only the recipient can. AT least what is in my Eudora "Out" box is the encrypted message, not the plaintext. Is true - if the target has a public key and the miscreant uses it, then the target's key is necessary to decrypt even if stored on the bad guy's machine. That could get really nasty: 1) bad guy retrieves target's public key 2) sends something really nasty including encrypted part using target's key & id to LEA 3) target will be forced to divulge private portion 3a) and will not be allowed to revoke ? (or is that permissable as long as it is not stated why ?) 3b) target now needs new key If done in mass mailing, could this be a DoS attack ? Certainly would be inconvenient. A. Padgett Peterson, P.E., CISSP: Cybernetic Psychophysicist Anti-Virus, Cryptographics, & Antique Radio Researcher http://www.freivald.org/~padgett/index.html mailto:padgett@gdi.net PGP 6.5 Key on request From tcmay@got.net Sat, 12 Feb 2000 11:53:05 -0800 Date: Sat, 12 Feb 2000 11:53:05 -0800 From: Tim May tcmay@got.net Subject: the power of cryptography At 11:39 AM -0800 2/12/00, Matthew Gream wrote: >Fundamentally: >- - the digital world is entirely digital, and in the digital world, some >form of cryptography is the basis for all manner of rights (transport >protocols are basic "rights" between communication systems, QoS parameters >can be seen as more advanced forms of rights, cryptographic parameters and >systems are even more advancesd forms of rights, and then smart contracts, >nym systems and everything else are continually evolution of rights towards >digital entities, where digital entities are autonomous sentient entities >that can operate and mediate and wield "power" through their use of >cryptographic mechanisms). > >[does anyone want to fund me full time to study this, it's killing my social >life as a hobby :-)] Where have you been for the past decade? It's been done. Your observations are not new, and are actually fairly naive in many ways. You need to read some Nozick, for example. And Friedman, my own writings, those of other Cypherpunks, and so on. For example, Nozick addresses the issue of a "equitable society." He points out that even in a hypothetical society of initially "equal" people that disparities in wealth will rapidly arise. This is because independent agents will choose to use their capabilities in different ways, will bet on outcomes and win or lose, will choose to work harder, etc. This will result in unequal distributions. Information will not be uniformly distributed (anyone who cites the mantra "information wants to be free" without understanding the nuances and realities is deluding himself). Your "in a perfect society locks and ciphers would not be needed" philosophy is...uninteresting. I suggest that instead of trying to get someone to fund your stupid idea that you instead do some basic reading and then move on to more interesting issues. --Tim May print pack"C*",split/\D+/,`echo "16iII*o\U@{$/=$z;[(pop,pop,unpack"H*",<> )]}\EsMsKsN0[lN*1lK[d2%Sa2/d0 Where have you been for the past decade? It's been done. Your observations > are not new, and are actually fairly naive in many ways. You need to read > some Nozick, for example. And Friedman, my own writings, those of other > Cypherpunks, and so on. I have been active in cryptographic activities some time ago, including the creation of a national radio show to protest against what happened to Zimmerman and Clipper! Does that give me some starting credo ? I agree that my observations are perhaps not new and are perhaps niave. Therefore I do have further reading to do. > Your "in a perfect society locks and ciphers would not be needed" > philosophy is...uninteresting. Tim, please do not misquote me. Perhaps from your perspective, it is uninteresting. I make the assertion that 10000 years ago, locks and ciphers were not needed because at that time, society was not sufficiently constructed to need them. However, at that time, rights were needed, as society has always needed rights. At that time, society used physical implements and other constructions to maintain rights. I make the assertion that 0 years ago, locks and ciphers are needed, because at this time, society is sufficiently constructed to need them. At this time, rights are needed, as society has always needed rights. At this time, society uses cryptography and other mechanisms to maintain rights, and sees physical implements as an irrelevant historical artificat. I make the assertion that 1000 years henceforth, locks and ciphers _may not_ be needed, because in such a time, society may be sufficiently advanced beyond these notions. In that time, rights will still be needed, as society has always needed rights. At this time, society uses some other mechanism to maintain rights, and sees both physical implements and cryptography as a historical artifact. Therefore, I agree that at the present time, and for the forseeable future, based upon our realistic extrapolations of the developments of technology and society, that cryptography is needed. I agree with you Tim. Cryptography is not just needed, it is fundamental. Anyway, this seems pointless, what am I arguing about ? I am trying to argue about a bigger picture. What is the point of arguing about a bigger picture ? A bigger picture helps frame what is happening now. What is the point of this ? It helps convince people that cryptography is the appropriate technology; people who may otherwise still perceive it as an esoteric technology but are convinced by reasoning that illustrates its place in the bigger picture. > I suggest that instead of trying to get someone to fund your stupid idea > that you instead do some basic reading and then move on to more > interesting > issues. Firstly, Tim, please do not say that my ideas are "stupid"; - - perhaps I have not fully explained my self ? perhaps you have not comprehended me properly ? - - perhaps my totality of experiences puts me at a different perspective than does the totality of yours ? - - perhaps my ideas may be "stupid", but perhaps that is not something that can be determined for a very long time ? - - perhaps the outcome of the pursuit of my "stupid" ideas is some "non-stupid" results ? (If I could remember a quote that suggest that philosophers think that their ideas are the absolute, but they should realise that the importance of their ideas are the way in which they can be broken down and used and developed by further philosophers). In any case, perhaps also my comment about funding was a general comment that I realise I need to do further reading and investigation in order to determine something particularly worthwhile to spend time on. In fact, that was the intention of my comment. Perhaps I did not express it properly or perhaps you misinterpreted it. Perhaps I have got my knickers into a knot again ? Best regards, Matthew. - -- matthew.gream@pobox.com Cambridge_UK/2000 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP 6.5.1i for non-commercial use iQA/AwUBOKXFca1VD3MTsHhAEQKC6QCePzufwhinn4S7gAC8g7Lf4C/RWSUAoM/k VzOvwiaZPysUCDifBSj1r5wM =72zp -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From lists@notatla.demon.co.uk Sat, 12 Feb 2000 20:58:37 GMT Date: Sat, 12 Feb 2000 20:58:37 GMT From: lists@notatla.demon.co.uk lists@notatla.demon.co.uk Subject: Is resistance Futile? Donald Ramsbottom : > It occurs that the list may not approve of this so if someone has the > necessary experience to coordinate, we would probably have to continue off > list, but I suspect that no one would object to "straw Poll" of interested > parties. rip-protest(-request)@notatla.demon.co.uk has been set up for coordination of protest against the errors of the bill. Subscription requests should go to rip-protest-request@notatla.demon.co.uk with "subscribe" in the subject. Only subscribers may post, except by arrangement with me. I suggest that, despite the common ground of influencing policy, no posts be sent to both rip-request and ukcrypto. The list will be available as digests and as archives. It will be unmoderated unless/until I decide intervention is needed. -- ############################################################## # Antonomasia ant@notatla.demon.co.uk # # See http://www.notatla.demon.co.uk/ # ############################################################## From tcmay@got.net Sat, 12 Feb 2000 13:11:02 -0800 Date: Sat, 12 Feb 2000 13:11:02 -0800 From: Tim May tcmay@got.net Subject: the power of cryptography At 12:41 PM -0800 2/12/00, Matthew Gream wrote: >> Your "in a perfect society locks and ciphers would not be needed" >> philosophy is...uninteresting. > >Tim, please do not misquote me. Perhaps from your perspective, it is >uninteresting. You need to work on your understanding of English. I didn't attribute that as a direct quote, with either quote marks or "Gream said:" I characterized that phrase as your point of view, which nothing in your comments earlier or even here, below, disputes. > >I make the assertion that 10000 years ago, locks and ciphers were not needed >because at that time, society was not sufficiently constructed to need them. Nonsense. Various methods of denying access, hiding information, etc. have existed for a lot longer than 10,000 years. Whether they metal locks or numerical ciphers is not the point. They had gates and doors which could be barred from the inside, they had secret information (initiation rights would otherwise be meaningless). You mistake the modern instantiations of privacy tools for the whole. >I make the assertion that 1000 years henceforth, locks and ciphers _may not_ >be needed, because in such a time, society may be sufficiently advanced >beyond these notions. What a nitwit. --Tim May print pack"C*",split/\D+/,`echo "16iII*o\U@{$/=$z;[(pop,pop,unpack"H*",<> )]}\EsMsKsN0[lN*1lK[d2%Sa2/d0On 12-Feb-00 09:20:34, Robin Galbraith said: > >>> If you just want the articles filtered out of your mailbox >>> and presented as a threaded newsgroup instead, why don't >>> you buy the "Turnpike" newreader I use from Demon internet >>> which does precisely that? > >Isn't this a fairly common feature in email programs? Certainly all >the email programs I've used in the last few years have had it. My >mail gets put in about 40 different folders. That sort of filtering is normal, but few do what Turnpike does, which is to use the message ID and the In-Reply-To: header to pseudo-thread the messages. Very nice, I wish more mail program authors would add this feature. - -- Brian Morrison bdm@fenrir.demon.co.uk "Almost noon, and she had yet to go the launderette in Concreton to thaw out chickens in the spin-drier..." PGP Public Key Fingerprint= C7 12 B9 54 00 0F 51 F6 37 9B 18 D1 E1 61 14 0B -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGPfreeware 5.0i OS/2 for non-commercial use Comment: This comment _is_ plain text Charset: cp850 iQA/AwUBOKXHQ/QTY1HeMuXFEQKakQCg7b6PRMKuLhp/zhXFkhznrA6XQGAAn2PR Og9EG90wjuCXcy389yjaUU9W =eP2E -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From ghira@mistral.co.uk 13 Feb 2000 6:34:43 +0000 Date: 13 Feb 2000 6:34:43 +0000 From: Adam Atkinson ghira@mistral.co.uk Subject: is a digest version of this list available? --- Let me know too! On 12-Feb-00 20:49:07, Brian Morrison said: >That sort of filtering is normal, but few do what Turnpike does, which >is to use the message ID and the In-Reply-To: header to pseudo-thread >the messages. Very nice I've not used Turnpike, but Thor seems to do this as well. Well, it tries to. It tells me how many replies there have been to each mail in this thread, and displays them to me in some kind of order. However, threads sometimes get split in two, and I'm not sure if this is Thor's fault, or some messages lacking particular headers. -- Adam Atkinson (ghira@mistral.co.uk) "That's the biggest shark I've ever seen" he said, superficially. From bdm@fenrir.demon.co.uk Sun, 13 Feb 2000 08:10:08 +0000 (GMT) Date: Sun, 13 Feb 2000 08:10:08 +0000 (GMT) From: Brian Morrison bdm@fenrir.demon.co.uk Subject: Differences betwwen the EC Bill and the RIP Bill -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On Sat, 12 Feb 2000 17:42:18 +0000 (GMT), Charles Lindsey wrote: >Section 51 (2)(a) > Plod may not use the key to decode amything he would not have known > about if he had not got the key. That clause appears nonsensical. If the information held is encrypted, then Plod will not have known about any of it. This would appear to mean that having obtained the key, Plod cannot use it! Surely shome mishtake! - -- Brian Morrison bdm@fenrir.demon.co.uk "Almost noon, and she had yet to go the launderette in Concreton to thaw out chickens in the spin-drier..." PGP Public Key Fingerprint= C7 12 B9 54 00 0F 51 F6 37 9B 18 D1 E1 61 14 0B -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGPfreeware 5.0i OS/2 for non-commercial use Comment: This comment _is_ plain text Charset: cp850 iQA/AwUBOKZm3/QTY1HeMuXFEQJfEQCg++SV48dTknP+idDr2as/YjHIOA4AoKqV dG7r0SiGHXUnCnROwezHxKY0 =ASBU -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From donald@ramsbottom.co.uk Sun, 13 Feb 2000 10:45:09 +0000 Date: Sun, 13 Feb 2000 10:45:09 +0000 From: Donald Ramsbottom donald@ramsbottom.co.uk Subject: RIP Bill and mass surveillance > he was a jugular fellow, was he? Definite Freudian thinghy there! Too much dictation and and not enough typing in the past is my only defence for my admitted appalling spelling and grammar. After 20 years of a dictaphone it's amazing what you have to look up when you actually write, because you have forgotten how to and have an auxulliary processing system to do it all called a secretary! You also get to know how limited "concise" dictionaries are. Well that's my defence and I will stick to it. :) Donald Ramsbottom LL.B, BA (Hons). RAMSBOTTOM & Co. Solicitors Internet Law & Global Cryptology Law Specialists From matthew.gream@camcon.co.uk Sun, 13 Feb 2000 12:13:08 +0000 Date: Sun, 13 Feb 2000 12:13:08 +0000 From: matthew.gream@camcon.co.uk matthew.gream@camcon.co.uk Subject: the power of cryptography Tim May wrote: >>Tim, please do not misquote me. Perhaps from your perspective, it is >>uninteresting. > >You need to work on your understanding of English. I didn't attribute that >as a direct quote, with either quote marks or "Gream said:" I characterized >that phrase as your point of view, which nothing in your comments earlier >or even here, below, disputes. I understood your intent, and I think that you were wrong in your characterisation. Perhaps you misunderstand that I am trying to be pedantic about terminology, i.e. issues that are broader than "locks and ciphers". >>I make the assertion that 10000 years ago, locks and ciphers were not needed >>because at that time, society was not sufficiently constructed to need them. > >Nonsense. Various methods of denying access, hiding information, etc. have >existed for a lot longer than 10,000 years. Whether they metal locks or >numerical ciphers is not the point. They had gates and doors which could be >barred from the inside, they had secret information (initiation rights >would otherwise be meaningless). You mistake the modern instantiations of >privacy tools for the whole. I agree, cf. the Maori culture which used rituals, beliefs, customs, morals and other constructs to retain social integrity and delineate rights/wrongs, etc. This would hardly be considered "locks and ciphers", but it would be considered "rights, ethics and morals": which illustrates the sensitivity of terminology. Sure now when you use the term "privacy tools", you are generalising beyond "locks and ciphers". >>I make the assertion that 1000 years henceforth, locks and ciphers _may not_ >>be needed, because in such a time, society may be sufficiently advanced >>beyond these notions. > >What a nitwit. I don't have a problem with being called a nitwit when I'm arguing about the finer points of terminology. Perhaps you should also call the people that argue about the finer points of export law nitwits as well ? Best regards, Matthew. From dave@xemu.demon.co.uk Sun, 13 Feb 2000 16:54:53 +0000 Date: Sun, 13 Feb 2000 16:54:53 +0000 From: Dave Bird dave@xemu.demon.co.uk Subject: RIP Bill and mass surveillance In article <1.5.4.32.20000213104509.0071fcc4@192.168.0.65>, Donald Ramsbottom writes >> he was a jugular fellow, was he? > >Definite Freudian thinghy there! > >Too much dictation and and not enough typing in the past is my only defence >for my admitted appalling spelling and grammar. Mine's not wonderful, either; and of course a spellchecker would let it through as a valid word(if the wrong sense between "vain" and "vein") -- ^-^-^-@@-^-;-^ http://www.xemu.demon.co.uk/ (..)__u news:alt.smoking.mooses From richard@turnpike.com Mon, 14 Feb 2000 00:30:07 +0000 Date: Mon, 14 Feb 2000 00:30:07 +0000 From: Richard Clayton richard@turnpike.com Subject: Differences betwwen the EC Bill and the RIP Bill -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 In article <200002121742.RAA23678@clw.cs.man.ac.uk>, Charles Lindsey writes >I have now compared the old and the new documents. > >The Bad news is that not much has changed. > >The Good news is that most of the comments I made in response to the EC >Bill have been totally ignored, and hence I can reuse all those comments >without having to rewrite them :-) . another useful analytic technique is to compare the wording in Part III with that in the other sections of the Bill. [it's not a trivial technique, since you have to read the whole thing, and that took me most of the afternoon] Interception (Part I) requires that warrants can be issued if they are necessary for a) National Security b) Serious Crime c) Economic well-being of the UK (foreigners only) d) International Mutual Assistance (which doesn't exist yet) Warrants for the disclosure of communications data relate to a) National Security b) Crime or for preventing disorder (disorder is not defined anywhere) c) Economic well-being of the UK (this time including people within the UK) d) Public safety e) Public health f) Tax etc g) to prevent death or injury in an emergency h) anything else the Secretary of State may add Covert human intelligence is allowed for a) National Security b) Crime or preventing disorder c) Economic well-being of the UK d) Public Safety e) Public Health f) Tax etc g) anything else the Secretary of State may add Intrusive surveillance is allowed for a) National Security b) Serious Crime c) Economic well-being of the UK Part III (the forced disclosure of encryption keys) warrants are required to be necessary for a) National Security b) Crime c) Economic well-being of the UK So Part III looks rather anomalous ... why not disorder (whatever that might be if it is not a crime) or indeed - since it allows a significant intrusion, not serious crime ? Indeed Part I also looks anomalous - and the notes comment on this. You cannot tap a trade-unionist's phone just because they are organising a strike... but you can bug their headquarters, pay informers and then turn up with a PACE warrant, seize their laptops and then demand that they decrypt their files... It seems to me that the Part I protection is of limited practical use. - -- richard writing to inform and not as company policy fewer than 20 MPs still need adopting: http://www.stand.org.uk/ "Assembly of Japanese bicycle require great peace of mind" quoted in ZAMM -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGPsdk version 1.7.1 iQA/AwUBOKdMjzH5BMWRRATGEQJBjACg7YsY1Ccw5EOyDxBRB7qzPgQiLVwAn3LN R1J6IYtkrg+2kXv+Cz9gc3W3 =l82o -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From richard@turnpike.com Mon, 14 Feb 2000 00:38:30 +0000 Date: Mon, 14 Feb 2000 00:38:30 +0000 From: Richard Clayton richard@turnpike.com Subject: RIP Bill and mass surveillance -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 In article <2lh4uYAMZZp4Ewlw@swarb.freeuk.com>, David Swarbrick writes >In message <200002121500.PAA03659@notatla.demon.co.uk>, >lists@notatla.demon.co.uk wrote: >>David Swarbrick >> >>> What you omit to consider is that this type of notice will inevitably be >>> directed at, and make criminal, the innocent half of any conversation. >>> >>> To read the criminal's, post, say from a pedophile to a young girl he is >>> trying to corrupt, the police must use these extraordinary and >>> terrifying powers, and terrify into submission, not the criminal, but >>> the victim. It is the victim who gets threatened with five years >> >>Don't be so gloomy. It's only 2 years if the criminal sent her a trojan >>that wiped her disk. >> >No its five years if she tells her parents however she does have a defence if she asks the nice policeman first and they say that the parents can be told... ... this is interestingly different from Part I (18(9)(b) where you can disclose if you need to actually get something done). ie: the model is that interception needs several people at the CSP to do the work, so they can chat to each other on a need-to-know basis -- whereas the model for keys is that individuals can release them. Besides being technical nonsense (you'd be looking for an escrow provider having a few more safeguards!) it does assume that the warrant gets served on the right person in the first place. The silly thing is that this is really minutiae ... there are far worse things in this Bill, but they cannot even make the basic mechanisms make consistent sense :( - -- richard writing to inform and not as company policy fewer than 20 MPs still need adopting: http://www.stand.org.uk/ "Assembly of Japanese bicycle require great peace of mind" quoted in ZAMM -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGPsdk version 1.7.1 iQA/AwUBOKdOhjH5BMWRRATGEQJgdgCgj+vjpWppkwH1d89GtQtPcBQRwD4An1+8 3Z9FfLu4vKwL6HX/9TnMRlar =xFGs -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From donald@ramsbottom.co.uk Mon, 14 Feb 2000 07:55:08 +0000 Date: Mon, 14 Feb 2000 07:55:08 +0000 From: Donald Ramsbottom donald@ramsbottom.co.uk Subject: Brown v Procurator fiscal Below is the text of Brown v Procurator Fiscal. This is the Road Traffic case, and considers the right to silence and self incrimination. It is a Scots case and is not binding in England & wales, and is being appealed to the House of Lords. If HMG is having this difficulty with the ECHR on a well established traffic law, it should consider the difficulty it will have with the contents of the new RIP bill. The Law report is from todays Times. >Brown v Procurator Fiscal, Dunfermline=20 > > Before the Lord Justice-General (Lord Rodger of > Earlsferry), Lord Marnoch and Lord Allanbridge=20 > > Judgment February 4, 2000=20 > > If a constable suspected someone of driving while drunk, > required him to say whether he had been driving his car, > and was told "It was me", and evidence of that reply was > given to the court by the prosecution on a charge of drink > driving, the driver=B9s human rights would be infringed.=20 > > The High Court of Justiciary, sitting as the Court of > Criminal Appeal of Scotland, so held, allowing an appeal > by Mrs Margaret Brown in a prosecution of her for > driving while drunk, and declaring that the Crown could > not lead evidence of an admission by her under section > 172(2)(a) of the Road Traffic Act 1988, that she had > been the driver of the motor vehicle in question.=20 > > Section 172 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 provides:=20 > > "(2) Where the driver of a vehicle is alleged to be guilty of > an offence to which this section applies - (a) the person > keeping the vehicle shall give such information as to the > identity of the driver as he may be required to give by or > on behalf of a chief officer of police...=20 > > "(3) ... a person who fails to comply with a requirement > under subsection (2) above shall be guilty of an offence."=20 > > Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights > (1953, Cmd 8969) provides:=20 > > "1 In the determination of ... any criminal charge against > him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing..."=20 > > Mr Lorenzo Alonzi for the appellant; Mr Colin Boyd, > QC, Solicitor-General for Scotland, for the Crown; Mr > Colin Sutherland, QC, for HM Advocate-General for > Scotland.=20 > > THE LORD JUSTICE-GENERAL said that the > appellant=B9s breath had smelt of alcohol when had been > charged with theft of a bottle of gin at a supermarket, to > which she had said she had travelled by car. She had > indicated to the constables that a parked car was hers, > was found to have its keys and was suspected of driving > while drunk. She had been required to say who had been > driving it and had replied: "It was me".=20 > > It had long been understood that under section 172, no > caution was necessary, and the keeper had no right to > remain silent and his reply could be used in evidence > against him if it turned out that he was the driver.=20 > > However, anyone charged with an offence had a right > under article 6(1) of the Convention to remain silent and > not to contribute to incriminating himself: Funke v France > (Series A No 256-A (1993), paragraph 44); Murray v. > United Kingdom (Reports of Judgments and Decisions > 1996-I, p30, paragraphs 45-47); Saunders v United > Kingdom (Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-VI > p2044, paragraphs 68-9).=20 > > The right of silence and the right against self-incrimination > were not lately minted: the latter had been recognised in > "capitall crymes" in the Claim of Right 1689; see also > Hume, Commentaries (volume II, pp336-7); Alison, > Criminal Law (volume II, pp586-7); and compare R v > Director of Serious Fraud Office, Ex parte Smith > ([1993] AC 1, 30-32E); R v White ([1999] 2 SCR 417, > 438); Wigmore on Evidence (McNaughton, rev 1961) > (volume 8, p318); Lamb v. Munster ((1882) 10 QBD > 110, 113).=20 > > The right not to incriminate oneself presupposed that the > prosecution sought to prove their case without resort to > evidence obtained through coercion in defiance of the > accused=B9s will: see Saunders (paragraph 68); R v Hebert > ([1990] 2 SCR 151, 164e-175g).=20 > > The Crown accepted that a provision which required an > accused to go into the witness box and admit that he had > been driving a car would infringe article 6(1). That that > was so at trial, when the accused had full notice of the > charge and the right to legal representation, was most > striking.=20 > > The right played a central r=F4le in the procedures required > for a fair trial. Without a right of silence during the > investigation, the prosecution could conscript the accused > to defeat himself, and circumvent his right not to > incriminate himself at trial.=20 > > The common law was guided by that very consideration: > see Chalmers v HM Advocate (1954 JC 66, 79); and > compare Hebert (at pp174e-f, 177i-178b); Ferreira v > Levin N.O. (1996 (1) SA 984, 1071, note 265).=20 > > According to recognised international standards the right > of silence and not to incriminate oneself at trial implied the > recognition of similar rights at the stage when one was a > suspect being questioned in a criminal investigation.=20 > > When questioned, the appellant had been a suspect and > article 6.1 had applied: see Deweer v Belgium (Series A > No 35 (1980) paragraph 46); Eckle v Germany (Series > A No 51 (1982) paragraph 73).=20 > > Even had it not, it would none the less apply to the use of > her reply at trial: compare Saunders (paragraph 74); > contrast the Commission decisions in Tora Tolmos v > Spain (No 23816/94, May 17, 1995); D.N. v The > Netherlands (No 6170/73, May 26, 1975) and J.P. v > Austria (Nos 15135/89, 15136/89 and 15137/89, > September 5, 1989); albeit not all of the reasoning in the > Commission cases was easy to follow.=20 > > Saunders bore comparison with Thomson Newspapers > Ltd v Canada ([1990] 1 SCR 425, 540h-542f) which > distinguished an inquisitorial investigation, seeking to > discover whether any offence had been committed and, if > so, by whom, from an adversarial criminal investigation to > discover whether a particular individual had committed a > particular crime.=20 > > In the former, but not the latter, a right not to answer > questions was unnecessary where the answers could not > be used against the accused at a subsequent trial.=20 > > In the present case, where the accused was compelled to > reply in an adversarial investigation, that strengthened the > argument that rights of silence and against > self-incrimination should prevent the use of her reply to > incriminate her at trial.=20 > > The Crown argued that her reply was not a confession of > an offence, merely a link in the chain of testimony: see > California v Byers ((1971) 402 US 424, 432); In re > Willie ((1807) CC Va 25 F 38, 40).=20 > > But it would contribute to proof that she had driven her > car, and even adopting the American test would be > self-incriminating: see Hoffman v United States (1950) > 341 US 479, 486).=20 > > It was not illogical that the right did not extend to the use > of documents and bodily samples which might be obtained > from the accused by compulsory powers but which had > an existence independent of his will (see Byers (at > pp431-432); Thomson Newspapers Ltd (at > pp548j-549c); Ferreira v Levin N.O. (at pp1050-2)) > unlike the appellant=B9s reply.=20 > > In the majority had held that a statement made under a > system of compulsion for a non-criminal purpose was > different from one compelled for a criminal investigation.=20 > > Here the reply had not been obtained for "non-criminal > governmental purposes". The precondition for a request > under section 172 was the investigation of an offence by > the driver.=20 > > Canadian case law was relevant. It distinguished > road-traffic law from a man's voluntary participation in a > particular trade for which a licence was required and was > granted on condition that, inter alia, he furnish certain > reports about his activities from time to time; where, if he > considered he was compelled against his will to produce > them, lest they one day be used against him in a > prosecution for breaching the terms of his licence, he was > free to resign from that trade: R v Fitzpatrick ([1995] 4 > SCR 154, 172-8, paragraphs 33-42).=20 > > Driving, it had been said, was often a necessity of life. > When a person needed to drive in order to function > meaningfully in society, the choice of whether to do so > was not truly as free as the choice of whether to enter into > a given industry: see R v White (at pp438-50).=20 > > Section 172 could be given effect in a manner compatible > with the applicant=B9s Convention rights, if it was read as > meaning that the Crown had no power to lead evidence of > her reply at her trial.=20 > > LORD MARNOCH, having read and re-read Saunders, > confessed that he could find nothing in it which added > significantly to what had long been the common law of > Scotland.=20 > > Scots Law required that suspected persons should > normally be cautioned that they were not obliged to say > anything. Even with a caution, anything in the nature of > cross-examination would render the answers inadmissible: > Chalmers; HM Advocate v Friel (1978 SLT (Notes) > 21).=20 > > But for the Companies Act, Scottish common law would > have reached exactly the same result in relation to the Mr > Saunders' answers to the Department of Trade and > Industry inspectors.=20 > > Section 172 had now to be construed as not permitting > the Crown to lead evidence of any reply given by a > suspect.=20 > > However, his Lordship was not persuaded that principle > or precedent required any broader approach to be taken.=20 > > The mere fact of a person being the registered keeper of a > vehicle was not, of itself, sufficient to make him a > "suspect" in respect of an offence committed by a driver > of that vehicle. Very often, vehicles were driven by > persons other than their registered keepers.=20 > > Lord Allanbridge delivered a concurring opinion.=20 > > Law agents: Balfour & Manson; Crown Agent; Solicitor > for the Scottish Executive.=20 > Donald Ramsbottom LL.B, BA (Hons). RAMSBOTTOM & Co. Solicitors Internet Law & Global Cryptology Law Specialists From Q.G.Campbell@newcastle.ac.uk Mon, 14 Feb 2000 08:31:47 +0000 (GMT) Date: Mon, 14 Feb 2000 08:31:47 +0000 (GMT) From: Quentin Campbell Q.G.Campbell@newcastle.ac.uk Subject: More R.I.P. bill concerns On Fri, 11 Feb 2000, Dave Bird wrote: > In article <004601bf7ca5$1fef0770$2d8401d5@fortytwo>, Brian Gladman > writes > >From: "David Crick" > >To: "Caspar Bowden" > >Cc: > >Sent: Thursday, February 10, 2000 6:55 PM > >Subject: More R.I.P. bill concerns > > > > > >> Please feel free to quote me below or pass this on. Someone else > >> may have come up with this point, but what the heck... > >> > >> A worry I have that you have not touched on is this: > >> > >> > to prove non-compliance with notice to decrypt, the prosecution > >> > must prove person "has or has had" possession of the key. > >> ^^^^^^^ > >> > >> "has had" will not only cause problems for those who have lost > >> their key(s), but also for those who have *deliberately* "lost" > >> their key. > > > >I too have been pondering this clause and wondering in this context what > >actually constitutes 'possession'. If possession would cover the fact that > >I (my PC) may have had 'possession' of 1000's of SSL 'one-time' keys, the > >'has had' looks pretty dire. > > > >> With the newer DH/DSS PGP public keys for instance, encryption > >> sub-keys may be generated and revoked separately. > >> > >> A user may choose to do this every week, month, etc. [perhaps > >> even deliberately to counteract the above legislation]. > >> > >> Now, if I not only generate new keys and revoke old ones, but > >> also change my passphrase and overwrite/delete backed up keys, > >> then it *will not be possible* for me to decrypt older messages, > >> even though I *have had* the key. > > > >Absolutely. I use this PGP mechanism with keys for each six month period > >and destroy the keys when they are six months out of date (i.e. 1 year after > >first use). > > > >The 'have had' is a horrendous provision (one among many). > > > > Brian The FIPR has implied that this objectionable wording and related provisions of the Bill are in some way "key escrow through intimidation". I would be interested to see some discussion on the forms that people think this "intimidation" might take. Are the FIPR just suggesting crude and indirect coercion of the form "well if you are of a forgetful or careless nature then we suggest escrowing your private key(s) if you are worried about going to goal". Even if it is desirbale, is it practical to escrow all keys that might fall within the ambit of the provisions of the Bill? If this is so, will it be possible to shift liability for key loss to a third-party? For example, a thriving industry of fly-by-night businesses might develop setting up to escrow keys then going into liquidation simply so that their customers can hand-over liability/responsibility for key loss to what will soon be defunct businesses. Quentin -- PHONE: +44 191 222 8209 Computing Service, University of Newcastle FAX: +44 191 222 8765 Newcastle upon Tyne, United Kingdom, NE1 7RU. ------------------------------------------------------------------------- "Any opinions expressed above are mine. The University can get its own." From donald@ramsbottom.co.uk Mon, 14 Feb 2000 09:45:28 +0000 Date: Mon, 14 Feb 2000 09:45:28 +0000 From: Donald Ramsbottom donald@ramsbottom.co.uk Subject: SIF and encryption Apologies to list, but my server keeps telling me Nicholas does not exist!!! It's not that far off topic any how. Below is text of letter I have been trying to get through to Nicholas regarding professional standards and encryption. Translations- SIF = Solicitors indemnity fund, Law Soc = Law society >Nicholas, > >Sorry to bother you, but I have just read "SIF in Focus" which came with the >Gazette. Page 7 contains some standard email advice. It also says: > >" Security is vital in the age of the Hacker. Sensistive information should >be encrypted if it is to be sent ccross the internet." > >Now we both know this is true, but I am unaware of any guidance from the Law >Soc on the subject. For instance is there any recommended system, alogorithm, strength >or program? is there any other guidance? As it would now appear to be >negligent not to encrypt, and as I believe you are still on the relevant >committee can you help? > >If this is a unilateral statement bythe SIF ( I suspect it is) is the >Society aware of this edict? > >Sorry to be a pain on a Monday morning, but I have quite a lot of email >traffic and do not want to be caught out. > >What happens if the client or other solicitor does not use email, but that is >the only practical medium? Sorry the question keep bubbling up! > >I have looked on the Law Soc website which is singularly unhelpful, as far >as I could see. > >Donald Ramsbottom LL.B, BA (Hons). > >RAMSBOTTOM & Co. Solicitors > >Internet Law & Global Cryptology Law Specialists Donald Ramsbottom LL.B, BA (Hons). RAMSBOTTOM & Co. Solicitors Internet Law & Global Cryptology Law Specialists From s.simpson@mia.co.uk Mon, 14 Feb 2000 09:08:54 +0000 Date: Mon, 14 Feb 2000 09:08:54 +0000 From: Simpson, Sam s.simpson@mia.co.uk Subject: RSA.COM site hacked :) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 You may care to look at www.rsa.com. The current front screen (at 09:00am GMT 14/2/00) is the HTML file below: "Wat up whats up to all my nigs ya know who ya are n #2600 and whats up all my #sesame nigs and call rigger if ya come here bc he is the gayest fuck ;) 718-815-4674 all chans are on a irc server lol - -tek pBK > * also irc.segments.org ;)" I wonder how long it'll take them to notice...Hhhm, would you trust RSA with your data security now? ;) Cheers, Sam Simpson Communications Analyst - -- http://www.scramdisk.clara.net/ for ScramDisk hard-drive encryption & Delphi Crypto Components. PGP Keys available at the same site. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 6.0.2ckt http://members.tripod.com/IRFaiad/ iQA/AwUBOKfGEe0ty8FDP9tPEQLCfwCeJqdmB4SHoiOfAkJPAZZgBUi607oAn1gq dClIr8r2gIYflVDnnyb4hfqY =KLet -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From mkirwan@baltimore.com Mon, 14 Feb 2000 09:41:33 -0000 Date: Mon, 14 Feb 2000 09:41:33 -0000 From: Mary Kirwan mkirwan@baltimore.com Subject: RIP Bill and mass surveillance Actually, having had years of experience, both on the defence and prosecution side, albeit in a different jurisdiction (under a written constitution), of defending/prosecuting very significant wiretap cases, I did not find that the wiretap powers results even remotely in the reign of terror this list envisages will result from the implementation of such a regime in the UK. However, I bow to the superior insights offered by those long practicing in the UK. Mary Kirwan -----Original Message----- From: David Swarbrick [mailto:david@swarb.freeuk.com] Sent: Friday, February 11, 2000 10:19 PM To: ukcrypto@maillist.ox.ac.uk Subject: Re: RIP Bill and mass surveillance In message <0949AF853902D311AF530008C7C9AE22463B56@irlbdc.cdsemea.baltim ore.com>, Mary Kirwan wrote: >At the risk of sounding like MoneyPenny, there is nonetheless a danger of >overstating the risk to freedom and democracy from this type of Bill- it is >always best to have a transparent system for wiretaps than have it done by >slight of hand with no review, because no one even knows it happens. The >difficulty I perceive is that constitutional protections which are well >developed in Canada and the US may not exist at all or to the same extent in >UK. In Canada, there are multiple challenges available to use of wiretaps at >trial, and it can be a momentous hurdle to even get them admitted, there are >challenges to the issuing of the warrant, the need to show that no other >means could have been used to get the information, etc. That being said, the >threshold level for granting of a warrant in this Bill as 'likely to be of >value' is a bit dodgy - there should be a requirement also that the >information sought should not be otherwise obtainable (Bill says, 'key' not >otherwise obtainable). > What you omit to consider is that this type of notice will inevitably be directed at, and make criminal, the innocent half of any conversation. To read the criminal's, post, say from a pedophile to a young girl he is trying to corrupt, the police must use these extraordinary and terrifying powers, and terrify into submission, not the criminal, but the victim. It is the victim who gets threatened with five years imprisonment for revealing that her private key has been obtained, and who may not tell this terrible secret, for example, to her parents. -- David Swarbrick, Solicitor 01484 722531 - david@swarb.freeuk.com http://www.swarb.co.uk law-index of 10,500+ uk case summaries & uk.legalFQA The Law Society regulates our investment business. IP/IT Law and Contracts. From Nigel.Metheringham@VData.co.uk Mon, 14 Feb 2000 09:49:53 +0000 Date: Mon, 14 Feb 2000 09:49:53 +0000 From: Nigel Metheringham Nigel.Metheringham@VData.co.uk Subject: RSA.COM site hacked :) [Cc list snipped] s.simpson@mia.co.uk said: > You may care to look at www.rsa.com. The current front screen (at > 09:00am GMT 14/2/00) is the HTML file below: [snipped] > I wonder how long it'll take them to notice...Hhhm, would you trust > RSA with your data security now? ;) Looks like its some form of DNS poisoning attack - ie the box you are talking to is not an RSA one at all, but is instead at 200.24.19.252 which reverse maps to bachue.udea.edu.co Nigel. -- [ - Opinions expressed are personal and may not be shared by VData - ] [ Nigel Metheringham Nigel.Metheringham@VData.co.uk ] [ Phone: +44 1423 850000 Fax +44 1423 858866 ] From owenfb@easynet.co.uk Mon, 14 Feb 2000 10:00:56 +0000 Date: Mon, 14 Feb 2000 10:00:56 +0000 From: Owen Blacker owenfb@easynet.co.uk Subject: RSA.COM site hacked :) Quoting "Simpson, Sam" : > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > Hash: SHA1 > > You may care to look at www.rsa.com. The current front screen > (at 09:00am GMT 14/2/00) is the HTML file below: > > "Wat up whats up to all my nigs ya know who ya are n #2600 and > whats up all my #sesame nigs and > call rigger if ya come here bc he is the gayest fuck ;) > 718-815-4674 all chans are on a irc server lol > > > - -tek > pBK > * also irc.segments.org ;)" > > > I wonder how long it'll take them to notice...Hhhm, would you > trust RSA with your data security now? ;) [deletia] I make it a little after 1000 Z now and it looks like it used to... I always miss these fab hacks. :o/ *G* ----- Owen Blacker Senior Internet Developer and Internet Security Consultant DSS: 0x7e3c8eab | 2f45 c60d 6a0a 0007 193d d994 cd36 e021 7e3c 8eab RSA: 0x38fee6c3 | 7c41 e69c 5b8a 484d 22af 1859 f4c9 307b This message was sent by Easymail - http://www.easynet.co.uk/ From s.simpson@mia.co.uk Mon, 14 Feb 2000 10:13:20 +0000 Date: Mon, 14 Feb 2000 10:13:20 +0000 From: Simpson, Sam s.simpson@mia.co.uk Subject: RSA.COM site hacked :) Still broken from here - but (if it's a DNS hack...) that's probably because we have cached DNS entries. What an entertaining morning :) Cheers, Sam Simpson Communications Analyst -- http://www.scramdisk.clara.net/ for ScramDisk hard-drive encryption & Delphi Crypto Components. PGP Keys available at the same site. > -----Original Message----- > From: Owen Blacker [mailto:owenfb@easynet.co.uk] > Sent: 14 February 2000 10:06 > To: ukcrypto@maillist.ox.ac.uk > Subject: Re: RSA.COM site hacked :) > > > Quoting "Simpson, Sam" : > > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > > Hash: SHA1 > > > > You may care to look at www.rsa.com. The current front screen > > (at 09:00am GMT 14/2/00) is the HTML file below: > > > > "Wat up whats up to all my nigs ya know who ya are n #2600 and > > whats up all my #sesame nigs and > > call rigger if ya come here bc he is the gayest fuck ;) > > 718-815-4674 all chans are on a irc server lol > > > > > > - -tek > > pBK > * also irc.segments.org ;)" > > > > > > I wonder how long it'll take them to notice...Hhhm, would you > > trust RSA with your data security now? ;) > > [deletia] > > I make it a little after 1000 Z now and it looks like it used > to... I > always miss these fab hacks. :o/ > > *G* > > ----- > Owen Blacker > Senior Internet Developer and Internet Security Consultant > DSS: 0x7e3c8eab | 2f45 c60d 6a0a 0007 193d d994 cd36 e021 7e3c 8eab > RSA: 0x38fee6c3 | 7c41 e69c 5b8a 484d 22af 1859 f4c9 307b > > > This message was sent by Easymail - http://www.easynet.co.uk/ > From Q.G.Campbell@newcastle.ac.uk Mon, 14 Feb 2000 10:13:49 +0000 (GMT) Date: Mon, 14 Feb 2000 10:13:49 +0000 (GMT) From: Quentin Campbell Q.G.Campbell@newcastle.ac.uk Subject: RSA.COM site hacked :) On Mon, 14 Feb 2000, Nigel Metheringham wrote: > Subject: Re: RSA.COM site hacked :) > > [Cc list snipped] > > s.simpson@mia.co.uk said: > > You may care to look at www.rsa.com. The current front screen (at > > 09:00am GMT 14/2/00) is the HTML file below: > [snipped] > > > I wonder how long it'll take them to notice...Hhhm, would you trust > > RSA with your data security now? ;) > > Looks like its some form of DNS poisoning attack - ie the box you are > talking to is not an RSA one at all, but is instead at 200.24.19.252 > which reverse maps to bachue.udea.edu.co > > Nigel. The irony of this episode is sweet indeed! The first News headline at the real RSA web site is: RSA Laboratories Unveils Innovative Countermeasure To Recent "Denial of Service" Hacker Attacks This is dated 11 February. Perhaps RSA ought to deploy some of their "Innovative Countermeasures" to avoid future denial of service attacks to their own site. Quentin -- PHONE: +44 191 222 8209 Computing Service, University of Newcastle FAX: +44 191 222 8765 Newcastle upon Tyne, United Kingdom, NE1 7RU. ------------------------------------------------------------------------- "Any opinions expressed above are mine. The University can get its own." From MBacon@snci.co.uk Mon, 14 Feb 2000 10:36:10 -0000 Date: Mon, 14 Feb 2000 10:36:10 -0000 From: Michael Bacon MBacon@snci.co.uk Subject: RSA.COM site hacked :) Actually this is the second defacement (on 13 Feb). The first (on 12 Feb, by Coolio) is mirrored at: http://www.attrition.org/mirror/attrition/2000/02/12/www.rsa.com/ Reuters Swedish website was also defaced over the weekend, together with some 27 Israeli sites. Michael (Streaky) Bacon ____ ~(____)> " " The views expressed herein are my own and do not necessarily reflect those of my employer > -----Original Message----- > From: Quentin Campbell [mailto:Q.G.Campbell@newcastle.ac.uk] > Sent: 14 February 2000 10:14 > To: ukcrypto@maillist.ox.ac.uk > Subject: Re: RSA.COM site hacked :) > > > On Mon, 14 Feb 2000, Nigel Metheringham wrote: > > > Subject: Re: RSA.COM site hacked :) > > > > [Cc list snipped] > > > > s.simpson@mia.co.uk said: > > > You may care to look at www.rsa.com. The current front screen (at > > > 09:00am GMT 14/2/00) is the HTML file below: > > [snipped] > > > > > I wonder how long it'll take them to notice...Hhhm, would > you trust > > > RSA with your data security now? ;) > > > > Looks like its some form of DNS poisoning attack - ie the > box you are > > talking to is not an RSA one at all, but is instead at > 200.24.19.252 > > which reverse maps to bachue.udea.edu.co > > > > Nigel. > > The irony of this episode is sweet indeed! The first News > headline at the > real RSA web site is: > > RSA Laboratories Unveils Innovative Countermeasure To Recent > "Denial of Service" Hacker Attacks > > This is dated 11 February. > > Perhaps RSA ought to deploy some of their "Innovative > Countermeasures" to > avoid future denial of service attacks to their own site. > > Quentin > -- > PHONE: +44 191 222 8209 Computing Service, University of Newcastle > FAX: +44 191 222 8765 Newcastle upon Tyne, United > Kingdom, NE1 7RU. > -------------------------------------------------------------- > ----------- > "Any opinions expressed above are mine. The University can > get its own." > > From cb@fipr.org Mon, 14 Feb 2000 10:52:24 -0000 Date: Mon, 14 Feb 2000 10:52:24 -0000 From: Caspar Bowden cb@fipr.org Subject: More R.I.P. bill concerns > -----Original Message----- > From: owner-ukcrypto@maillist.ox.ac.uk > [mailto:owner-ukcrypto@maillist.ox.ac.uk]On Behalf Of Quentin Campbell ... > Are the FIPR just suggesting crude and indirect coercion of > the form "well > if you are of a forgetful or careless nature then we suggest escrowing > your private key(s) if you are worried about going to goal". Yes. > Even if it is desirbale, is it practical to escrow all keys that might > fall within the ambit of the provisions of the Bill? I don't think it is desirable or practicable, but I can imagine some weasel words welling up in Parliament to the effect that ..."if members of the public are concerned...they can always use the services of a reputable key-recovery agent, so they they should always be in a position to gain posession of the key". I'm not saying we approve of this - to the contracy, it would be despicable. > If this is so, will it be possible to shift liability for key > loss to a third-party? I haven't seen anything in the bill which wouls absolve responsibility -- Caspar Bowden http://www.fipr.org Director, Foundation for Information Policy Research Tel: +44(0)171 354 2333 Fax: +44(0)171 827 6534 From wendyg@cix.compulink.co.uk Mon, 14 Feb 2000 11:31 +0000 (GMT) Date: Mon, 14 Feb 2000 11:31 +0000 (GMT) From: Wendy Grossman wendyg@cix.compulink.co.uk Subject: RSA.COM site hacked :) In-Reply-To: <04DD95EB6E9FD31199D400A0C9A6CFFF54D36E@mail.mia.co.uk> There seems to be some confusion here. www.rsa.com takes me to Humboldt Netlink Internet services.. www.rsasecurity.com is the RSA crypto people's site. The latter looks normal atm. wg > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > Hash: SHA1 > > You may care to look at www.rsa.com. The current front screen > (at 09:00am GMT 14/2/00) is the HTML file below: > > "Wat up whats up to all my nigs ya know who ya are n #2600 and > whats up all my #sesame nigs and > call rigger if ya come here bc he is the gayest fuck ;) > 718-815-4674 all chans are on a irc server lol > > > - -tek > pBK > * also irc.segments.org ;)" > > > I wonder how long it'll take them to notice...Hhhm, would you > trust RSA with your data security now? ;) > > > Cheers, > > Sam Simpson > Communications Analyst > - -- http://www.scramdisk.clara.net/ for ScramDisk hard-drive > encryption & Delphi Crypto Components. PGP Keys available at the > same site. > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- > Version: 6.0.2ckt http://members.tripod.com/IRFaiad/ > > iQA/AwUBOKfGEe0ty8FDP9tPEQLCfwCeJqdmB4SHoiOfAkJPAZZgBUi607oAn1gq > dClIr8r2gIYflVDnnyb4hfqY > =KLet > -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- > From donald@ramsbottom.co.uk Mon, 14 Feb 2000 12:43:51 +0000 Date: Mon, 14 Feb 2000 12:43:51 +0000 From: Donald Ramsbottom donald@ramsbottom.co.uk Subject: RSA.COM site hacked :) At 11:31 14/02/00 +0000, you wrote: >In-Reply-To: <04DD95EB6E9FD31199D400A0C9A6CFFF54D36E@mail.mia.co.uk> >There seems to be some confusion here. > >www.rsa.com takes me to Humboldt Netlink Internet services.. > >www.rsasecurity.com is the RSA crypto people's site. The latter looks >normal atm. > snip I just went in at 11.45 am and got: >Wat up whats up to all my nigs ya know who ya are n #2600 and whats up all my #sesame nigs and call rigger if ya come here >bc he is the gayest fuck ;) 718-815-4674 all chans are on a irc server lol -tek pBK > * also irc.segments.org ;) So it looks as if they have not got up at RSA yet! Donald Ramsbottom LL.B, BA (Hons). RAMSBOTTOM & Co. Solicitors Internet Law & Global Cryptology Law Specialists From brian.gladman@btinternet.com Mon, 14 Feb 2000 12:00:22 -0000 Date: Mon, 14 Feb 2000 12:00:22 -0000 From: Brian Gladman brian.gladman@btinternet.com Subject: RSA.COM site hacked :) From: "Nigel Metheringham" To: Sent: Monday, February 14, 2000 9:49 AM Subject: Re: RSA.COM site hacked :) > s.simpson@mia.co.uk said: > > You may care to look at www.rsa.com. The current front screen (at > > 09:00am GMT 14/2/00) is the HTML file below: > [snipped] > > > I wonder how long it'll take them to notice...Hhhm, would you trust > > RSA with your data security now? ;) > > Looks like its some form of DNS poisoning attack - ie the box you are > talking to is not an RSA one at all, but is instead at 200.24.19.252 > which reverse maps to bachue.udea.edu.co > > Nigel. That is what it looks like to me as well since using a numeric address for RSA gets to the right page. I think there has been something going on over the last few weeks. I have seen a massive increase in the number of probing attacks on my system since the middle of January. Even the US government seems to have noticed. Someone maybe trying to show them using more than just words the folly of their encryption policies over the last 20 years. Brian From s.simpson@mia.co.uk Mon, 14 Feb 2000 11:59:56 +0000 Date: Mon, 14 Feb 2000 11:59:56 +0000 From: Simpson, Sam s.simpson@mia.co.uk Subject: RSA.COM site hacked :) Donald, Your DNS server has probably cached the IP address of the edu site - so you'll have to wait until it expires until the "proper" address is returned. Regards, Sam Simpson Communications Analyst -- http://www.scramdisk.clara.net/ for ScramDisk hard-drive encryption & Delphi Crypto Components. PGP Keys available at the same site. > -----Original Message----- > From: Donald Ramsbottom [mailto:donald@ramsbottom.co.uk] > Sent: 14 February 2000 11:58 > To: ukcrypto@maillist.ox.ac.uk > Subject: Re: RSA.COM site hacked :) > > > At 11:31 14/02/00 +0000, you wrote: > >In-Reply-To: <04DD95EB6E9FD31199D400A0C9A6CFFF54D36E@mail.mia.co.uk> > >There seems to be some confusion here. > > > >www.rsa.com takes me to Humboldt Netlink Internet services.. > > > >www.rsasecurity.com is the RSA crypto people's site. The > latter looks > >normal atm. > > > snip > > I just went in at 11.45 am and got: > > >Wat up whats up to all my nigs ya know who ya are n #2600 > and whats up all > my #sesame nigs and call rigger if ya come here > >bc he is the gayest fuck ;) 718-815-4674 all chans are on a > irc server lol > -tek pBK > * also irc.segments.org ;) > > So it looks as if they have not got up at RSA yet! > > Donald Ramsbottom LL.B, BA (Hons). > > RAMSBOTTOM & Co. Solicitors > > Internet Law & Global Cryptology Law Specialists > > From brian.gladman@btinternet.com Mon, 14 Feb 2000 12:05:12 -0000 Date: Mon, 14 Feb 2000 12:05:12 -0000 From: Brian Gladman brian.gladman@btinternet.com Subject: RSA.COM site hacked :) ----- Original Message ----- From: "Donald Ramsbottom" To: Sent: Monday, February 14, 2000 12:43 PM Subject: Re: RSA.COM site hacked :) > At 11:31 14/02/00 +0000, you wrote: > >In-Reply-To: <04DD95EB6E9FD31199D400A0C9A6CFFF54D36E@mail.mia.co.uk> > >There seems to be some confusion here. > > > >www.rsa.com takes me to Humboldt Netlink Internet services.. > > > >www.rsasecurity.com is the RSA crypto people's site. The latter looks > >normal atm. > > > snip > > I just went in at 11.45 am and got: > > >Wat up whats up to all my nigs ya know who ya are n #2600 and whats up all > my #sesame nigs and call rigger if ya come here > >bc he is the gayest fuck ;) 718-815-4674 all chans are on a irc server lol > -tek pBK > * also irc.segments.org ;) > > So it looks as if they have not got up at RSA yet! As others have pointed out, this attack may not be their direct problem and it may take some time to fix. This seems to be the result of a pretty insecure DNS system on which we have all become dependent without fully realising all the consequences. This is the downside of evolutionary systems design - evolution sometimes goes in the wrong path until something in the environment forces a correction. Brian From jya@pipeline.com Mon, 14 Feb 2000 07:01:44 -0500 Date: Mon, 14 Feb 2000 07:01:44 -0500 From: John Young jya@pipeline.com Subject: RSA.COM site hacked :) Curious. From NYC at 7:00 AM EST both rsa.com and rsasecurity.com produce the same page. Is it possible the hacked page is in a net cache that serves the UK? Or are all requests doing right into Sam's omni-Turing cache? Double-click's opt-out is allegedly doing something weird like that -- covert links being set even as you try to get out of the tentacles. From rupesh.jain@cdac.ernet.in Mon, 14 Feb 2000 17:47:59 +0530 Date: Mon, 14 Feb 2000 17:47:59 +0530 From: rupesh rupesh.jain@cdac.ernet.in Subject: RSA.COM site hacked :) This is a nonsense thread you have started. Even if RSA site is hacked how is it anyway related to strength of their Crypto Solutions.? -----Original Message----- From: Simpson, Sam To: Date: Monday, February 14, 2000 3:47 PM Subject: RE: RSA.COM site hacked :) >Still broken from here - but (if it's a DNS hack...) that's probably because >we have cached DNS entries. > >What an entertaining morning :) > > >Cheers, > >Sam Simpson >Communications Analyst >-- http://www.scramdisk.clara.net/ for ScramDisk hard-drive encryption & >Delphi Crypto Components. PGP Keys available at the same site. > >> -----Original Message----- >> From: Owen Blacker [mailto:owenfb@easynet.co.uk] >> Sent: 14 February 2000 10:06 >> To: ukcrypto@maillist.ox.ac.uk >> Subject: Re: RSA.COM site hacked :) >> >> >> Quoting "Simpson, Sam" : >> >> > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- >> > Hash: SHA1 >> > >> > You may care to look at www.rsa.com. The current front screen >> > (at 09:00am GMT 14/2/00) is the HTML file below: >> > >> > "Wat up whats up to all my nigs ya know who ya are n #2600 and >> > whats up all my #sesame nigs and >> > call rigger if ya come here bc he is the gayest fuck ;) >> > 718-815-4674 all chans are on a irc server lol >> > >> > >> > - -tek >> > pBK > * also irc.segments.org ;)" >> > >> > >> > I wonder how long it'll take them to notice...Hhhm, would you >> > trust RSA with your data security now? ;) >> >> [deletia] >> >> I make it a little after 1000 Z now and it looks like it used >> to... I >> always miss these fab hacks. :o/ >> >> *G* >> >> ----- >> Owen Blacker >> Senior Internet Developer and Internet Security Consultant >> DSS: 0x7e3c8eab | 2f45 c60d 6a0a 0007 193d d994 cd36 e021 7e3c 8eab >> RSA: 0x38fee6c3 | 7c41 e69c 5b8a 484d 22af 1859 f4c9 307b >> >> >> This message was sent by Easymail - http://www.easynet.co.uk/ >> From Nigel.Metheringham@VData.co.uk Mon, 14 Feb 2000 12:14:18 +0000 Date: Mon, 14 Feb 2000 12:14:18 +0000 From: Nigel Metheringham Nigel.Metheringham@VData.co.uk Subject: RSA.COM site hacked :) I don't want to keep this topic going as its unrelated to ukcrypto (other than you can postulate solutions for this problem that use crypto - but thats a technical rather than a policy discussion), however I'll post this in the hope of laying this one to rest today. The attack on www.rsa.com performed today (or possibly latish yesterday assuming normal DNS timeouts) *looks* like a DNS cache poisoning attach where a number of name servers have been persauded that the IP address of www.rsa.com is other than its real IP address (which should be known and passed out by RSA's own DNS servers). This means you get a different web server and different web pages when you go to http://www.rsa.com/ - however RSA's own web server has *not* been hacked. This is analogous to you following a sign saying "bank this way" and finding yourself in a dark alleyway in a potential mugging situation. There are various ways this incorrect signposting could have been done. Maybe (1 or more of) the RSA DNS servers were hacked (as in broken in to) and incorrect information loaded into them. Unlikely but possible - and if it happens then many other DNS servers round the world that had looked up this data before the hacked server(s) were taken down would cache it leading to some people seeing the replacement web site for many hours afterwards. Alternatively it may be that the DNS server on the RSA boxes was corrupted from outside. Or someone has managed to push additional DNS data into the root name servers, which passes it on to other DNS servers doing top level lookups. Or someone has managed to put additional DNS data into many main ISP name servers. In all these cases there is no question of the RSA web site itself having been broken. In many the RSA servers in general have not been touched. This does show that there are still problems in the DNS infrastructure which was really designed (like SMTP) for a more friendly world. I *think* that use of a https type page would have prevented this by forcing the client to do an additional check that the reverse DNS for the server you are talking to is also consistant (and you would need a signed cert for www.rsa.com on the replacement website). [actually that additional lookup cannot be in place in all cases since many people proxy SSL which would break under these conditions] Hopefully there will be a decent description of the exact attack used in this case, but it looks most likely as though RSA were only a target, not actually compromised as such. Nigel. -- [ - Opinions expressed are personal and may not be shared by VData - ] [ Nigel Metheringham Nigel.Metheringham@VData.co.uk ] [ Phone: +44 1423 850000 Fax +44 1423 858866 ] From MBacon@snci.co.uk Mon, 14 Feb 2000 12:24:11 -0000 Date: Mon, 14 Feb 2000 12:24:11 -0000 From: Michael Bacon MBacon@snci.co.uk Subject: RSA.COM site hacked :) Without wishing to prolong this thread, but in the interests of accuracy, the registration details for RSA.COM are: Registrant: RSA Data Security, Inc. (RSA-DOM) 100 Marine Parkway, Suite 500 Redwood City, CA 94065 Domain Name: rsa.com Michael (Streaky) Bacon ____ ~(____)> " " The views expressed herein are my own and do not necessarily reflect those of my employer > -----Original Message----- > From: wendyg@cix.compulink.co.uk [mailto:wendyg@cix.compulink.co.uk] > Sent: 14 February 2000 11:31 > To: ukcrypto@maillist.ox.ac.uk > Subject: Re: RSA.COM site hacked :) > > > In-Reply-To: <04DD95EB6E9FD31199D400A0C9A6CFFF54D36E@mail.mia.co.uk> > There seems to be some confusion here. > > www.rsa.com takes me to Humboldt Netlink Internet services.. > > www.rsasecurity.com is the RSA crypto people's site. The > latter looks > normal atm. > > wg > > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > > Hash: SHA1 > > > > You may care to look at www.rsa.com. The current front screen > > (at 09:00am GMT 14/2/00) is the HTML file below: > > > > "Wat up whats up to all my nigs ya know who ya are n #2600 and > > whats up all my #sesame nigs and > > call rigger if ya come here bc he is the gayest fuck ;) > > 718-815-4674 all chans are on a irc server lol > > > > > > - -tek > > pBK > * also irc.segments.org ;)" > > > > > > I wonder how long it'll take them to notice...Hhhm, would you > > trust RSA with your data security now? ;) > > > > > > Cheers, > > > > Sam Simpson > > Communications Analyst > > - -- http://www.scramdisk.clara.net/ for ScramDisk hard-drive > > encryption & Delphi Crypto Components. PGP Keys available at the > > same site. > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- > > Version: 6.0.2ckt http://members.tripod.com/IRFaiad/ > > > > iQA/AwUBOKfGEe0ty8FDP9tPEQLCfwCeJqdmB4SHoiOfAkJPAZZgBUi607oAn1gq > > dClIr8r2gIYflVDnnyb4hfqY > > =KLet > > -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- > > > > From s.simpson@mia.co.uk Mon, 14 Feb 2000 12:24:58 +0000 Date: Mon, 14 Feb 2000 12:24:58 +0000 From: Simpson, Sam s.simpson@mia.co.uk Subject: RSA.COM site hacked :) Thanks for your considered and reasonable comments on the matter. Applied logic lives, eh? If it was a hack then it is worrying that they can't even protect their own server - why should you trust them to protect yours? It appears that the actual attack cannot be reasonably prevented though, so I'd suggest this doesn't reflect poorly on the integrity of RSA's servers. ... Sam Simpson Communications Analyst -- http://www.scramdisk.clara.net/ for ScramDisk hard-drive encryption & Delphi Crypto Components. PGP Keys available at the same site. > -----Original Message----- > From: rupesh [mailto:rupesh.jain@cdac.ernet.in] > Sent: 14 February 2000 12:21 > To: ukcrypto@maillist.ox.ac.uk > Subject: Re: RSA.COM site hacked :) > > > This is a nonsense thread you have started. > Even if RSA site is hacked how is it anyway related to > strength of their > Crypto Solutions.? > > -----Original Message----- > From: Simpson, Sam > To: > Date: Monday, February 14, 2000 3:47 PM > Subject: RE: RSA.COM site hacked :) > > > >Still broken from here - but (if it's a DNS hack...) that's probably > because > >we have cached DNS entries. > > > >What an entertaining morning :) > > > > > >Cheers, > > > >Sam Simpson > >Communications Analyst > >-- http://www.scramdisk.clara.net/ for ScramDisk hard-drive > encryption & > >Delphi Crypto Components. PGP Keys available at the same site. > > > >> -----Original Message----- > >> From: Owen Blacker [mailto:owenfb@easynet.co.uk] > >> Sent: 14 February 2000 10:06 > >> To: ukcrypto@maillist.ox.ac.uk > >> Subject: Re: RSA.COM site hacked :) > >> > >> > >> Quoting "Simpson, Sam" : > >> > >> > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > >> > Hash: SHA1 > >> > > >> > You may care to look at www.rsa.com. The current front screen > >> > (at 09:00am GMT 14/2/00) is the HTML file below: > >> > > >> > "Wat up whats up to all my nigs ya know who ya are n #2600 and > >> > whats up all my #sesame nigs and > >> > call rigger if ya come here bc he is the gayest fuck ;) > >> > 718-815-4674 all chans are on a irc server lol > >> > > >> > > >> > - -tek > >> > pBK > * also irc.segments.org ;)" > >> > > >> > > >> > I wonder how long it'll take them to notice...Hhhm, would you > >> > trust RSA with your data security now? ;) > >> > >> [deletia] > >> > >> I make it a little after 1000 Z now and it looks like it used > >> to... I > >> always miss these fab hacks. :o/ > >> > >> *G* > >> > >> ----- > >> Owen Blacker > >> Senior Internet Developer and Internet Security Consultant > >> DSS: 0x7e3c8eab | 2f45 c60d 6a0a 0007 193d d994 cd36 e021 > 7e3c 8eab > >> RSA: 0x38fee6c3 | 7c41 e69c 5b8a 484d 22af 1859 f4c9 307b > >> > >> > >> This message was sent by Easymail - http://www.easynet.co.uk/ > >> > > From S.Baker@ukerna.ac.uk Mon, 14 Feb 2000 12:41:03 +0000 Date: Mon, 14 Feb 2000 12:41:03 +0000 From: Simon Baker S.Baker@ukerna.ac.uk Subject: RSA.COM site hacked :) Evidently it's the Cali Cartel.... simonb[avernus]$ arin NETBLK-UDEA Universidad de Antioquia (NETBLK-UDEA) Universidad de Antioquia Oficina 16-323 Calle 67 # 53-108 A.A. 1226 Medellin, Medellin CO simonb[avernus]$ nc -vv -w 3 www.rsa.com 80 DNS fwd/rev mismatch: www.rsa.com != bachue.udea.edu.co GET www.rsa.com [200.24.19.252] 80 (?) open / HTTP/1.0 HTTP/1.1 200 OK Date: Mon, 14 Feb 2000 13:38:29 GMT Server: Apache/1.3.6 (Unix) (Red Hat/Linux) Last-Modified: Sun, 13 Feb 2000 23:26:17 GMT ETag: "4002-ee-38a73d99" Accept-Ranges: bytes Content-Length: 238 Connection: close Content-Type: text/html Wat up whats up to all my nigs ya know who ya are n #2600 and whats up all my #s esame nigs and call rigger if ya come here bc he is the gayest fuck ;) 718-815-4674 all chans a re on a irc server lol -tek pBK > * also irc.segments.org ;) sent 17, rcvd 499 At 12:05 14/02/00 +0000, you wrote: >----- Original Message ----- >From: "Donald Ramsbottom" >To: >Sent: Monday, February 14, 2000 12:43 PM >Subject: Re: RSA.COM site hacked :) > > > > At 11:31 14/02/00 +0000, you wrote: > > >In-Reply-To: <04DD95EB6E9FD31199D400A0C9A6CFFF54D36E@mail.mia.co.uk> > > >There seems to be some confusion here. > > > > > >www.rsa.com takes me to Humboldt Netlink Internet services.. > > > > > >www.rsasecurity.com is the RSA crypto people's site. The latter looks > > >normal atm. > > > > > snip > > > > I just went in at 11.45 am and got: > > > > >Wat up whats up to all my nigs ya know who ya are n #2600 and whats up >all > > my #sesame nigs and call rigger if ya come here > > >bc he is the gayest fuck ;) 718-815-4674 all chans are on a irc server >lol > > -tek pBK > * also irc.segments.org ;) > > > > So it looks as if they have not got up at RSA yet! > >As others have pointed out, this attack may not be their direct problem and >it may take some time to fix. > >This seems to be the result of a pretty insecure DNS system on which we have >all become dependent without fully realising all the consequences. > >This is the downside of evolutionary systems design - evolution sometimes >goes in the wrong path until something in the environment forces a >correction. > > Brian > > From wendyg@cix.compulink.co.uk Mon, 14 Feb 2000 12:47 +0000 (GMT) Date: Mon, 14 Feb 2000 12:47 +0000 (GMT) From: Wendy Grossman wendyg@cix.compulink.co.uk Subject: RSA.COM site hacked :) In-Reply-To: <008801bf76e3$bf283400$20a9ac3e@fortytwo> > > ----- Original Message ----- > From: "Donald Ramsbottom" > To: > Sent: Monday, February 14, 2000 12:43 PM > Subject: Re: RSA.COM site hacked :) > > > This seems to be the result of a pretty insecure DNS system on which > we have > all become dependent without fully realising all the consequences. > The depressing thing is that as long as two years ago, Matt Blaze pointed out at CFP that the technology to do secure DNS had been available for probably a couple of years even then, but the will to deploy it was lacking. And ICANN seems to be too busy worrying about cybersquatters... wg From J.Goldberg@Cranfield.ac.uk Mon, 14 Feb 2000 13:01:47 +0000 (GMT) Date: Mon, 14 Feb 2000 13:01:47 +0000 (GMT) From: Jeffrey Goldberg J.Goldberg@Cranfield.ac.uk Subject: RSA.COM site hacked :) On Mon, 14 Feb 2000, Nigel Metheringham wrote: > I *think* that use of a https type page would have prevented this > [...] (and you would need a signed cert for www.rsa.com on the > replacement website). Indeed. This could almost be a advert *for* using RSA's products and services. -j -- Jeffrey Goldberg +44 (0)1234 750 111 x 2826 Cranfield Computer Centre FAX 751 814 J.Goldberg@Cranfield.ac.uk http://WWW.Cranfield.ac.uk/public/cc/cc047/ Relativism is the triumph of authority over truth, convention over justice. From octobersdad@reporters.net Mon, 14 Feb 2000 13:01:46 +0000 Date: Mon, 14 Feb 2000 13:01:46 +0000 From: T Bruce Tober octobersdad@reporters.net Subject: RSA.COM site hacked :) This is a PGP signed message sent according to RFC2015 [PGP/MIME] --=_Turnpike_+B3OoME5y$p4Q7FR= Content-Type: text/plain;charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable In message <1.5.4.32.20000214124351.00713990@192.168.0.65>, Donald Ramsbottom writes >At 11:31 14/02/00 +0000, you wrote: >>In-Reply-To: <04DD95EB6E9FD31199D400A0C9A6CFFF54D36E@mail.mia.co.uk> >>There seems to be some confusion here. >> >>www.rsa.com takes me to Humboldt Netlink Internet services.. >> >>www.rsasecurity.com is the RSA crypto people's site. The latter looks=20 >>normal atm. >> >snip > >I just went in at 11.45 am and got: > >>Wat up whats up to all my nigs ya know who ya are n #2600 and whats up all >my #sesame nigs and call rigger if ya come here >>bc he is the gayest fuck ;) 718-815-4674 all chans are on a irc server lol >-tek pBK > * also irc.segments.org ;)=20 > >So it looks as if they have not got up at RSA yet! Likewise at 13:01. However rsasecurity.com is normal. --=20 | Bruce Tober, , | *.* *.* *.* *.* | Birmingham, UK, EU (vox +44-1562-638-704) (mobile +44-780-374-8255= ) |=20 --=_Turnpike_+B3OoME5y$p4Q7FR= Content-Type: application/pgp-signature Content-Disposition: attachment; filename=signature.asc -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGPsdk version 1.7.1 iQA/AwUBOKf8uoI/aBKYrVEjEQJcTQCePruKvuFlLBV4rfGA/OSxmoK/Tm0AoJjK LaZRyPD0PR1jPPqhmZTH4quT =6Uzd -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- --=_Turnpike_+B3OoME5y$p4Q7FR=-- From octobersdad@reporters.net Mon, 14 Feb 2000 13:01:46 +0000 Date: Mon, 14 Feb 2000 13:01:46 +0000 From: T Bruce Tober octobersdad@reporters.net Subject: RSA.COM site hacked :) This is a PGP signed message sent according to RFC2015 [PGP/MIME] --=_Turnpike_+B3OoME5y$p4Q7FR= Content-Type: text/plain;charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable In message <1.5.4.32.20000214124351.00713990@192.168.0.65>, Donald Ramsbottom writes >At 11:31 14/02/00 +0000, you wrote: >>In-Reply-To: <04DD95EB6E9FD31199D400A0C9A6CFFF54D36E@mail.mia.co.uk> >>There seems to be some confusion here. >> >>www.rsa.com takes me to Humboldt Netlink Internet services.. >> >>www.rsasecurity.com is the RSA crypto people's site. The latter looks=20 >>normal atm. >> >snip > >I just went in at 11.45 am and got: > >>Wat up whats up to all my nigs ya know who ya are n #2600 and whats up all >my #sesame nigs and call rigger if ya come here >>bc he is the gayest fuck ;) 718-815-4674 all chans are on a irc server lol >-tek pBK > * also irc.segments.org ;)=20 > >So it looks as if they have not got up at RSA yet! Likewise at 13:01. However rsasecurity.com is normal. --=20 | Bruce Tober, , | *.* *.* *.* *.* | Birmingham, UK, EU (vox +44-1562-638-704) (mobile +44-780-374-8255= ) |=20 --=_Turnpike_+B3OoME5y$p4Q7FR= Content-Type: application/pgp-signature Content-Disposition: attachment; filename=signature.asc -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGPsdk version 1.7.1 iQA/AwUBOKf8uoI/aBKYrVEjEQJcTQCePruKvuFlLBV4rfGA/OSxmoK/Tm0AoJjK LaZRyPD0PR1jPPqhmZTH4quT =6Uzd -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- --=_Turnpike_+B3OoME5y$p4Q7FR=-- From S.Baker@ukerna.ac.uk Mon, 14 Feb 2000 12:41:03 +0000 Date: Mon, 14 Feb 2000 12:41:03 +0000 From: Simon Baker S.Baker@ukerna.ac.uk Subject: RSA.COM site hacked :) Evidently it's the Cali Cartel.... simonb[avernus]$ arin NETBLK-UDEA Universidad de Antioquia (NETBLK-UDEA) Universidad de Antioquia Oficina 16-323 Calle 67 # 53-108 A.A. 1226 Medellin, Medellin CO simonb[avernus]$ nc -vv -w 3 www.rsa.com 80 DNS fwd/rev mismatch: www.rsa.com != bachue.udea.edu.co GET www.rsa.com [200.24.19.252] 80 (?) open / HTTP/1.0 HTTP/1.1 200 OK Date: Mon, 14 Feb 2000 13:38:29 GMT Server: Apache/1.3.6 (Unix) (Red Hat/Linux) Last-Modified: Sun, 13 Feb 2000 23:26:17 GMT ETag: "4002-ee-38a73d99" Accept-Ranges: bytes Content-Length: 238 Connection: close Content-Type: text/html Wat up whats up to all my nigs ya know who ya are n #2600 and whats up all my #s esame nigs and call rigger if ya come here bc he is the gayest fuck ;) 718-815-4674 all chans a re on a irc server lol -tek pBK > * also irc.segments.org ;) sent 17, rcvd 499 At 12:05 14/02/00 +0000, you wrote: >----- Original Message ----- >From: "Donald Ramsbottom" >To: >Sent: Monday, February 14, 2000 12:43 PM >Subject: Re: RSA.COM site hacked :) > > > > At 11:31 14/02/00 +0000, you wrote: > > >In-Reply-To: <04DD95EB6E9FD31199D400A0C9A6CFFF54D36E@mail.mia.co.uk> > > >There seems to be some confusion here. > > > > > >www.rsa.com takes me to Humboldt Netlink Internet services.. > > > > > >www.rsasecurity.com is the RSA crypto people's site. The latter looks > > >normal atm. > > > > > snip > > > > I just went in at 11.45 am and got: > > > > >Wat up whats up to all my nigs ya know who ya are n #2600 and whats up >all > > my #sesame nigs and call rigger if ya come here > > >bc he is the gayest fuck ;) 718-815-4674 all chans are on a irc server >lol > > -tek pBK > * also irc.segments.org ;) > > > > So it looks as if they have not got up at RSA yet! > >As others have pointed out, this attack may not be their direct problem and >it may take some time to fix. > >This seems to be the result of a pretty insecure DNS system on which we have >all become dependent without fully realising all the consequences. > >This is the downside of evolutionary systems design - evolution sometimes >goes in the wrong path until something in the environment forces a >correction. > > Brian > > From Denis.Russell@ncl.ac.uk Mon, 14 Feb 2000 13:45:23 +0000 Date: Mon, 14 Feb 2000 13:45:23 +0000 From: Denis.Russell@ncl.ac.uk Denis.Russell@ncl.ac.uk Subject: SIF and encryption At 9:45 am +0000 14/2/00, Donald Ramsbottom wrote: >... >>Now we both know this is true, but I am unaware of any guidance from the Law >>Soc on the subject. For instance is there any recommended system, >alogorithm, strength >>or program?... That prompts me to ask a question that has been nagging me for some time. It seems, at least in some circumstances, that if you attempt to do a job or perform a function, than anything less than a perfect job apparently leaves one open to liability. It seems that it is better to make no attempt at all. This advice surfaced first in the context of accessing certain content on the web. There were suggestions some while ago that organizations such as Universities might properly perform some kind of content filtering of "undesirable" sites, and perhaps block access at the institutional proxy or firewall. The advice received was that if this were attempted then it would in some way imply that the filtering was complete in some way, and that any deviation from perfection would lay the filtering organization open to some kind of legal liability. The advice was to establish a policy of acceptable use and then not to attempt to police it, but to respond to violations that were brought to our notice. If this is true (and I really don't know), it would be interesting to know what the boundaries of such an implication are. For example, if our institution institutes a policy or a practice (does that make a difference?) of scanning machines with intrusion vulnerability detection tools (like Satan) and telling users about them does that mean that any vulnerability that we fail to detect is our responsibility? Does this also apply to virus scanning? What if we establish (here's the connection with UKCRYPTO at last) cryptographic services, like PGP, and Kerborised access, etc, etc) and these services are found imperfect? Have we implicitly offered perfection? What if the services themselves are technically OK, but that our operation of important parts of them is faulty? Here I am thinking perhaps of mistakenly authenticating the PGP key of someone, or authenticating the key of someone who turns out to be a pedofile (yes, I realize that this confuses key authentication with character reference), or perhaps running a Kerberos server that gets hacked. Is there any way in which we can successfully and safely operate these kinds of service on a "best efforts" basis, but limit our liability (and instill healthy scepticism into users) - if we have a liability? It does seem that taking the line that since we can't achieve perfection then we should protect our posteriors by doing nothing is a council of despair. Confused Denis. From ptrei@rsasecurity.com Mon, 14 Feb 2000 09:32:56 -0500 Date: Mon, 14 Feb 2000 09:32:56 -0500 From: Trei, Peter ptrei@rsasecurity.com Subject: RSA.COM site hacked :) Yep, it looks like someone poisoned the DNS records for one of our obsolete domains. We noticed over a day ago, and corrected updates have been wending their way through the Internet since. Our main domain, www.rsasecurity.com, was never touched. It was amusing to see traceroutes terminating in Colombia. Peter Trei (NOT an RSA spokesman) > ---------- > From: Simpson, Sam[SMTP:s.simpson@mia.co.uk] > Sent: Monday, February 14, 2000 4:08 AM > To: John Young; ukcrypto@maillist.ox.ac.uk; cryptography@c2.net; PGP > Users; Bruce Schneier; Coderpunks; gnupg-users@gnupg.org > Cc: Rolfe, Adam > Subject: RSA.COM site hacked :) > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > Hash: SHA1 > > You may care to look at www.rsa.com. The current front screen > (at 09:00am GMT 14/2/00) is the HTML file below: > > "Wat up whats up to all my nigs ya know who ya are n #2600 and > whats up all my #sesame nigs and > call rigger if ya come here bc he is the gayest fuck ;) > 718-815-4674 all chans are on a irc server lol > > > - -tek > pBK > * also irc.segments.org ;)" > > > I wonder how long it'll take them to notice...Hhhm, would you > trust RSA with your data security now? ;) > > > Cheers, > > Sam Simpson > Communications Analyst > From donald@ramsbottom.co.uk Mon, 14 Feb 2000 15:25:59 +0000 Date: Mon, 14 Feb 2000 15:25:59 +0000 From: Donald Ramsbottom donald@ramsbottom.co.uk Subject: SIF and encryption Dennis, SNIP >That prompts me to ask a question that has been nagging me for some time. >It seems, at least in some circumstances, that if you attempt to do a job >or perform a function, t The general legal consensus seems to be, do not try and do anything to monitor the content if you are an ISP or the like. The arguement being you are acting just like a Telco and cannot monitor all that goes on on your network. If you do attempt to moderate, then you are attempting to bring in some standards, but whether those standards are adequate, or if the sytem breaks down is another matter. If something is brought to your attention then you must react to it within a reasonable time, but there is no complusion to be proactive (ughh I hate that word). so in short what you have written is correct, it is better to do nothing rather than try and fail to come up to everyones expectations, which will all differ as to what can reasonably be expected. Even the "reasonably" is open to interpretation! > >If this is true (and I really don't know), it would be interesting to know >what the boundaries of such an implication are. For example, if our >institution institutes a policy or a practice (does that make a > Here if you are a UNI or the like you need to have very clear user policies including idiot proofing what the users can do etc. It also depends for whose benfit the scanning is done the users per se or the UNI. It all gets a bit confused from there on in. So have clear policies which all users must sign (in the UNI) before they are allowed access and also make sure any surfers come through an affirmitive virtual version which should be logged. > >It does seem that taking the line that since we can't achieve perfection >then we should protect our posteriors by doing nothing is a council of >despair. I agree but unfortunately there are both those who will try and exploit any scheme no matter how well intentioned if they think they can make a buck out of it, let's face it no one goes to Law for fun (OK there maybe exceptions, but the general rule etc). Donald Ramsbottom LL.B, BA (Hons). RAMSBOTTOM & Co. Solicitors Internet Law & Global Cryptology Law Specialists From ptrei@rsasecurity.com Mon, 14 Feb 2000 09:32:56 -0500 Date: Mon, 14 Feb 2000 09:32:56 -0500 From: Trei, Peter ptrei@rsasecurity.com Subject: RSA.COM site hacked :) Yep, it looks like someone poisoned the DNS records for one of our obsolete domains. We noticed over a day ago, and corrected updates have been wending their way through the Internet since. Our main domain, www.rsasecurity.com, was never touched. It was amusing to see traceroutes terminating in Colombia. Peter Trei (NOT an RSA spokesman) > ---------- > From: Simpson, Sam[SMTP:s.simpson@mia.co.uk] > Sent: Monday, February 14, 2000 4:08 AM > To: John Young; ukcrypto@maillist.ox.ac.uk; cryptography@c2.net; PGP > Users; Bruce Schneier; Coderpunks; gnupg-users@gnupg.org > Cc: Rolfe, Adam > Subject: RSA.COM site hacked :) > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > Hash: SHA1 > > You may care to look at www.rsa.com. The current front screen > (at 09:00am GMT 14/2/00) is the HTML file below: > > "Wat up whats up to all my nigs ya know who ya are n #2600 and > whats up all my #sesame nigs and > call rigger if ya come here bc he is the gayest fuck ;) > 718-815-4674 all