PIU report on Encryption and Law enforcement RELEASED (fwd)

Jukka E Isosaari jei@zor.hut.fi
Wed, 2 Jun 1999 03:52:52 +0300 (EEST)


On Tue, 1 Jun 1999, Michael Thick wrote:

> Dear All,  could I tap the collective wisdom?  I am a member of the
> "Caldicott and Babies validation group"  (the only connection appears to be
> the title!) which is charged with producing and signing off the business
> case for issuing and recording NHS numbers to babies at birth. They are
> proposing a number of worrying things:
> 1) NHSnet will be used to communicate between the issuing authority and
> maternity without any form of additional security.
> 2) They are planning to hold a "linkage" between mother and baby at NSTS
> level to "facilitate" epidemiology of paediatric and neonatal morbidity,
> again with no plans for additional controls for confidentiality.
> Medical members of the panel registered disquiet, but I feel that some
> additional pressure will be useful. Any thoughts?
> Michael Thick

Speaking of babies, how about this for a death-toll 
in the US vs Iraq war:

1,500,000 people dead, including 750,000 children under five.
=============================================================

From: New Worker Online <ncp@geocities.com>
Subject: Sanctions -- war by other means!

Sanctions -- war by other means!

Book review by Karen Dabrowska

Imposing economic sanctions -- Legal remedy or genocidal tool? by Geoff
Simons, published by Pluto Press, 1999, pp256, =A312.99 (pbk).

DO sanctions work? This is the question asked by Geoff Simons in the
preface to his latest book.

 He concludes that sanctions are so diverse -- in their type, ambition and
manner of applicalion -- that no general answer is possible.

 Sanctions are variously porous, ineffectual, counterproductive,
misdirected, persuasive, effectual and devastating.

 They invariably have some impact, and they may achieve covert objectives
different to those that are publicly proclaimed: the deliverers of
sanctions often have hidden agendas. For example, United States efforts to
keep Iraqi oil off world markets may have more to do with regulating energy
prices than with any worry about weapons of mass destruction.

 The book has three main aims:

  *To illustrate the historical continuity of the economic sanctions option
as a powerful means of coercion. The emphasis is primarily on sanctions as
a means of economic warfare, a concomitant to naked violence, though it
should be equally obvious that economic measures call be used to drastic
effect also within a purely domestic context;

   *To illustrate the character and impact of particular sanctions regimes.
It is one thing to block the shipment of arms (and not much else) to an
apartheid South Africa, quite another to subject a mediaeval city or a
modern Arab country to a total years-long economic blockade.

 Any attempt to judge the morality or efficacy of the sanctions option must
consider the range of possible measures set against the goals to be achieve=
d;

  *To indicate that the use of the sanctions option has many implications
in ethics and law.

 Sanctions have a long history dating back to the Megarian Decree in Greece
enacted by Pericles in 432BC. The specific reasons for the decree are
debated but some commentators have noted that it followed the kidnapping of
three Aspasian women.

 In the 19th century sieges generally involved land-based targets, though
action was often taken against coastal fortifications and garrisons
receiving supplies by river.

 The 20th century witnessed the imposition of sanctions by both the League
of Nations and the United Nations which proved largely ineffectual as no
attempt was made to impose comprehensive economic sanctions on plainly
recalcitrant states.

 During the colonial era the most powerful members of the Security Council
were directly supporting Portugal in its struggle to maintain colonial
control.

 The United Slates has played a major role in the imposition of sanctions.
The cases of Cuba, Vietnam, Libya, Iran and Iraq are discussed, suggesting
that the United Nations is like a little dog on the American lead.

 America's influence in the Security Council is plain: resolutions are
blocked or adopted largely according to how Washington judges their likely
impact on US foreign policy.

 The United states, like the other permanent members of the Council, has
the power of veto which means that American approval is essential for any
resolution to stand.

 However, there are important limits to US sway in the Security Council:
resolutions that Washington would welcome are not always adopted.

 The United States would have a UN-mandated embargo against Libyan oil, but
was blocked by the energy appetites of the European powers; Washington
would have liked tough UN sanctions against north Korea in the early 1990s
but was blocked by the threat of a Chinese veto in the Security Council.

 In such circumstances the US resorts to the option of imposing unilateral
sanctions, following Ihe exercise of defined presidential powers or,
according to new domestic legislation. In short, Washington will exploit
its unrivalled influence in international bodies where it can; when blocked
it will take independent action -- which in turn may irritate other
influential states and groups in the international community.

 The book ends with a case study of Iraq where sanctions imposed following
the invasion of Kuwait in 1990 have caused the deaths of more than
1,500,000 people including 750,000 children under five.

 Simons concludes that the use of virtual economic siege has reduced the
Iraqis to penury, disease and starvation.

 The United States was able to contrive international measures of a
geoocidal nature for the gradual exterminatian of a national people in
violation of UN conventions, other elements of international law and all
human decency.


(Please mention the New Worker Online when ordering the book)