From E.J.Koops@kub.nl Mon, 1 Feb 1999 12:41:37 MET Date: Mon, 1 Feb 1999 12:41:37 MET From: Bert-Jaap Koops E.J.Koops@kub.nl Subject: disclosure of crypto keys Ian Miller : > >In summary, my conclusion is that in > >principle, a command to hand over the crypto key or passphrase is > >compatible with the privilege against self-incrimination, provided > >there is sufficient evidence that the suspect is able to decrypt. > Did you consider the case where the individual subject to such a command > refuses to hand-over the long-term key, but agrees to hand-over the session > keys for the revelant messages? I considered the question whether legislation can be enacted to give a decryption command as such. Whether it's a command to hand over a private key or session keys is not really relevant to the issue of compatibility with the privilege against self-incrimination. It is, of course, quite relevant once you decide to enact legislation. The choice for handing over session keys, then, should be obvious. (Alternatively, the suspect could decrypt himself and give plaintext, provided the police can somehow monitor that this is done correctly. You might even use a public notary (or TTP ;-) to do the decrypting.) Adam Back wrote: > > In summary, my conclusion is that in > > principle, a command to hand over the crypto key or passphrase is > > compatible with the privilege against self-incrimination, provided > ^^ > Did you miss out an *in* there? (in-compatible?) > A right to not self-incriminate surely covers not giving out > information stored purely in ones mind, which could be argued might > incriminate the oneself. Not "surely". A passphrase (or memorized key) resembles "material which exists outside of the will of the suspect". Giving blood for a blood sample is compatible with the privilege against self-incrimination, because you cannot alter the blood (or the alcohol percentage in it). You can't alter the passphrase in your mind, because then it wouldn't work on the private key, and you can't alter the private key, because then it wouldn't work on the ciphertext. In that respect, it differs from statements like "I did it", which is an expression of the (changeable) contents of one's mind. The tricky thing remains the retort: "but I don't have the key" or "I've forgotten my passphrase". That is why there must be evidence that someone is able to decrypt (e.g., because the message was encrypted this morning). > Also there is the right to remain silent. (Modulo the change of > late to allow the judge to inform the jury to take into account that > the person has chosen to remain silent). Exactly. See also the Murray case of the European Court. His silence on the question what he did in the house where an IRA hostage was held, could be used as evidence because in this case, there were sufficient and stringent safeguards. > Technical solutions time (write code not laws): Indeed, there are many ways to anticipate a decryption command and make sure you will get away with not decrypting. Another reason why this approach is not fruitful, as I stated. Kind regards, Bert-Jaap --------------------------------------------------------------------- Bert-Jaap Koops tel +31 13 466 8101 Tilburg University facs +31 13 466 8149 P.O. Box 90153 e-mail E.J.Koops@kub.nl 5000 LE Tilburg http://cwis.kub.nl/~frw/people/koops/bertjaap.htm the Netherlands --------------------------------------------------------------------- This world's just mad enough to have been made by the Being his beings into being prayed. (Howard Nemerov) --------------------------------------------------------------------- From lawya@lucs-01.novell.leeds.ac.uk Mon, 1 Feb 1999 12:43:49 GMT0BST Date: Mon, 1 Feb 1999 12:43:49 GMT0BST From: Yaman Akdeniz lawya@lucs-01.novell.leeds.ac.uk Subject: UK ISPA Give Police Secret Briefing and new CR&CL(UK) report lau For Immediate Release, 01 February, 1999 UK ISPA Give Police Secret Briefing and new CR&CL(UK) report launched Cyber-Rights & Cyber-Liberties (UK) has discovered that the Internet Service Providers Association ("ISPA") last year gave a secret briefing to the Association of Chief Police Officers ("ACPO") about the ISP industry capabilities for the provision of information to the police about their customers. This new "Who Watches the Watchmen" report therefore brings into the open what your ISP can do for the police with your Internet account. The publication of this new report entitled "Who Watches the Watchmen: Part III - ISP Capabilities for the Provision of Personal Information to the Police," () follows the development of a "privacy letter" from the consumer's perspective by the Leeds based organisation, and an exchange of letters between Cyber-Rights & Cyber-Liberties (UK) and the ACPO/ISPs and the Government Forum in December 1998. Mr Yaman Akdeniz (lawya@cyber-rights.org), director of Cyber-Rights & Cyber-Liberties (UK) stated that: "With all these possibilities and capabilities for the provisions of information through the ISPs to the police, the ISPA runs the risk of becoming the Big Brother Providers Association. The leaked report shows that our concerns were fully justified, and that secrecy, rather than `media disinformation' was at work with the activities of the ACPO/ISPs Forum." Mr Nicholas Bohm (nbohm@cyber-rights.org), E-Commerce Policy Adviser for Cyber-Rights & Cyber-Liberties (UK) added: "The police need help to understand how to deal with Internet crime, and ISPA is of course free to give them that help. But ISPs also have responsibilities to their customers, and for ISPA to produce a report in secret for the benefit of the police is bound to send out completely the wrong message. ISPA should have been open about it, so that there can be proper debate and public understanding of the difficult issues involved. Getting the best out of the Internet depends on public confidence in it and its operators, and secret reports are no way to build confidence." The new Watchmen report concludes that "transparency, openness and accountability are important features of a healthy society. We believe it is now time for the Government through the Parliament to intervene in the activities of the ACPO/ISPs, Government Forum and clarify these matters including the laws in relation to interception of communications and the relevant procedures." Notes for the Media: This press release will be available at http://www.cyber-rights.org/press Cyber-Rights & Cyber-Liberties (UK), "Who Watches the Watchmen: Part III - ISP Capabilities for the Provision of Personal Information to the Police," February 1999, at http://www.cyber-rights.org/privacy/watchmen-iii.htm UK Internet Users Privacy Letter is at Contact Information: Mr Yaman Akdeniz, director Address: Centre For Criminal Justice Studies, University of Leeds, LS2 9JT. Direct Telephone: +44 498 865116 Fax: 0113- 2335056 E-mail: lawya@cyber-rights.org Mr Nicholas Bohm, E-Commerce Policy Adviser, Phone: 01279 871272 (+44 1279 871272) Fax: 01279 870215 (+44 1279 870215) E-mail: nbohm@cyber-rights.org ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Yaman Akdeniz Cyber-Rights & Cyber-Liberties (UK) at: http://www.cyber-rights.org Read the new CR&CL (UK) Report, Who Watches the Watchmen, Part:II Accountability & Effective Self-Regulation in the Information Age, August 1998 at http://www.cyber-rights.org/watchmen-ii.htm ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ From E.J.Koops@kub.nl Mon, 1 Feb 1999 15:42:42 MET Date: Mon, 1 Feb 1999 15:42:42 MET From: Bert-Jaap Koops E.J.Koops@kub.nl Subject: did I miss the consultation document? Dear list members, I am (finally) updating the entry on the UK in my Crypto Law Survey. With an enormous backlog of ukcrypto to read, I fear I am not quite up to date. Has the consultation document announced by Barbara Roche on 19 October has been published yet, and if so, where? Did the consultation end on 14 December as planned? (I noticed Nigel stating on 2 November "We are yet to launch consultation document".) And has the Electronic Commerce Bill been published yet? If so, what is its status? Thanks, Bert-Jaap --------------------------------------------------------------------- Bert-Jaap Koops tel +31 13 466 8101 Tilburg University facs +31 13 466 8149 P.O. Box 90153 e-mail E.J.Koops@kub.nl 5000 LE Tilburg http://cwis.kub.nl/~frw/people/koops/bertjaap.htm the Netherlands --------------------------------------------------------------------- This world's just mad enough to have been made by the Being his beings into being prayed. (Howard Nemerov) --------------------------------------------------------------------- From david@swarb.demon.co.uk Mon, 1 Feb 1999 19:34:08 +0000 Date: Mon, 1 Feb 1999 19:34:08 +0000 From: David Swarbrick david@swarb.demon.co.uk Subject: disclosure of crypto keys In message , Bert-Jaap Koops writes >Ian Miller : >> >In summary, my conclusion is that in >> >principle, a command to hand over the crypto key or passphrase is >> >compatible with the privilege against self-incrimination, provided >> >there is sufficient evidence that the suspect is able to decrypt. >> Did you consider the case where the individual subject to such a command >> refuses to hand-over the long-term key, but agrees to hand-over the session >> keys for the revelant messages? >I considered the question whether legislation can be enacted to give >a decryption command as such. Whether it's a command to hand over a >private key or session keys is not really relevant to the issue of >compatibility with the privilege against self-incrimination. We already have the answer. The Police and Criminal Evidence Act allows a constable to require the handing over of files in 'legible' form. Is it still self incrimination to hand over existing evidence? I think there is a clear argument to say that the privilege against self incrimination prevents only a requirement to provide a new statement. >It is, >of course, quite relevant once you decide to enact legislation. The >choice for handing over session keys, then, should be obvious. >(Alternatively, the suspect could decrypt himself and give plaintext, >provided the police can somehow monitor that this is done correctly. >You might even use a public notary (or TTP ;-) to do the decrypting.) > >Adam Back wrote: >> > In summary, my conclusion is that in >> > principle, a command to hand over the crypto key or passphrase is >> > compatible with the privilege against self-incrimination, provided >> ^^ >> Did you miss out an *in* there? (in-compatible?) >> A right to not self-incriminate surely covers not giving out >> information stored purely in ones mind, which could be argued might >> incriminate the oneself. >Not "surely". A passphrase (or memorized key) resembles >"material which exists outside of the will of the suspect". Giving >blood for a blood sample is compatible with the privilege against >self-incrimination, because you cannot alter the blood (or the >alcohol percentage in it). You can't alter the passphrase in your >mind, because then it wouldn't work on the private key, and you >can't alter the private key, because then it wouldn't work on the >ciphertext. In that respect, it differs from statements like "I did >it", which is an expression of the (changeable) contents of >one's mind. The tricky thing remains the retort: "but I don't have >the key" or "I've forgotten my passphrase". That is why there must be >evidence that someone is able to decrypt (e.g., because the message >was encrypted this morning). I do not think anyone now argues for more than access to plain text. The context might require holding of private keys, but the concern is not to get your key, but the text. I suspect that the argument about the right against self-incrimination is a false trail. -- David Swarbrick, Solicitor. Brighouse, West Yorkshire. Tel: +44(0)1484 722531 Fax: +44(0)1484 716617 e-mail david@swarb.demon.co.uk http://www.swarb.co.uk/ (Office) http://www.swarb.demon.co.uk/ (Home) Home of the law-index to 8800+ cases - 'damn fine webbery" From nbohm@ernest.net Mon, 01 Feb 1999 20:01:09 +0000 Date: Mon, 01 Feb 1999 20:01:09 +0000 From: Nicholas Bohm nbohm@ernest.net Subject: disclosure of crypto keys At 07:34 PM 2/1/1999 +0000, David Swarbrick wrote: >In message , Bert-Jaap Koops >writes >>Ian Miller : >>> >In summary, my conclusion is that in >>> >principle, a command to hand over the crypto key or passphrase is >>> >compatible with the privilege against self-incrimination, provided >>> >there is sufficient evidence that the suspect is able to decrypt. >>> Did you consider the case where the individual subject to such a command >>> refuses to hand-over the long-term key, but agrees to hand-over the session >>> keys for the revelant messages? >>I considered the question whether legislation can be enacted to give >>a decryption command as such. Whether it's a command to hand over a >>private key or session keys is not really relevant to the issue of >>compatibility with the privilege against self-incrimination. > >We already have the answer. The Police and Criminal Evidence Act allows >a constable to require the handing over of files in 'legible' form. It allows a constable to require, but provides no penalty for failure to comply. It's really only useful in the case of a warrant executed against a compliant third party who needs to be sure he is within the proper scope of the warrant in order to be relieved of third party liability for complying. It's not much good against the suspect. >Is it still self incrimination to hand over existing evidence? I think >there is a clear argument to say that the privilege against self >incrimination prevents only a requirement to provide a new statement. > > > >>It is, >>of course, quite relevant once you decide to enact legislation. The >>choice for handing over session keys, then, should be obvious. >>(Alternatively, the suspect could decrypt himself and give plaintext, >>provided the police can somehow monitor that this is done correctly. >>You might even use a public notary (or TTP ;-) to do the decrypting.) >> >>Adam Back wrote: >>> > In summary, my conclusion is that in >>> > principle, a command to hand over the crypto key or passphrase is >>> > compatible with the privilege against self-incrimination, provided >>> ^^ >>> Did you miss out an *in* there? (in-compatible?) >>> A right to not self-incriminate surely covers not giving out >>> information stored purely in ones mind, which could be argued might >>> incriminate the oneself. >>Not "surely". A passphrase (or memorized key) resembles >>"material which exists outside of the will of the suspect". Giving >>blood for a blood sample is compatible with the privilege against >>self-incrimination, because you cannot alter the blood (or the >>alcohol percentage in it). You can't alter the passphrase in your >>mind, because then it wouldn't work on the private key, and you >>can't alter the private key, because then it wouldn't work on the >>ciphertext. In that respect, it differs from statements like "I did >>it", which is an expression of the (changeable) contents of >>one's mind. The tricky thing remains the retort: "but I don't have >>the key" or "I've forgotten my passphrase". That is why there must be >>evidence that someone is able to decrypt (e.g., because the message >>was encrypted this morning). > >I do not think anyone now argues for more than access to plain text. The >context might require holding of private keys, but the concern is not to >get your key, but the text. I think it's too soon to say: without a key (even if only a session key) it is difficult for the recipient to know whether the plaintext is derived from the ciphertext. >I suspect that the argument about the right against self-incrimination >is a false trail. Or will be by the time legislation is in place. Regards, Nicholas Bohm Salkyns, Great Canfield, Takeley, Bishop's Stortford CM22 6SX, UK Phone 01279 871272 (+44 1279 871272) Fax 01279 870215 (+44 1279 870215) Mobile 0860 636749 (+44 860 636749) PGP RSA 1024 bit public key ID: 0x08340015. Fingerprint: 9E 15 FB 2A 54 96 24 37 98 A2 E0 D1 34 13 48 07 PGP DSS/DH 1024/3072 public key ID: 0x899DD7FF. Fingerprint: 5248 1320 B42E 84FC 1E8B A9E6 0912 AE66 899D D7FF From chl@clw.cs.man.ac.uk Mon, 1 Feb 1999 17:28:07 GMT Date: Mon, 1 Feb 1999 17:28:07 GMT From: Charles Lindsey chl@clw.cs.man.ac.uk Subject: UK ISPA Give Police Secret Briefing and new CR&CL(UK) report lau On Mon, 1 Feb 1999 12:43:49 GMT0BST "Yaman Akdeniz" said... > Cyber-Rights & Cyber-Liberties (UK) has discovered that the Internet > Service Providers Association ("ISPA") last year gave a secret > briefing to the Association of Chief Police Officers ("ACPO") about > the ISP industry capabilities for the provision of information to the > police about their customers. This new "Who Watches the Watchmen" > report therefore brings into the open what your ISP can do for the > police with your Internet account. I don't think there was anything particularly secret about it. The fact that the meeting was to be held was discussed on the newsgroups before it happened. There are circumstances where ISPs should disclose evidence related to a crime in just the same way as any citizen could reasonably be expected to respond when a policeman knocks on the door and asks "Did you see ...?". The meeting was merely to discuss some uniform procedures to be used when such information was requested, and Clive Feather (who attended the meeting) gave clear assurances as to the sort of information Demon might or might not be prepared to divulge. Charles H. Lindsey ---------At Home, doing my own thing------------------------ Email: chl@clw.cs.man.ac.uk Web: http://www.cs.man.ac.uk/~chl Voice/Fax: +44 161 437 4506 Snail: 5 Clerewood Ave, CHEADLE, SK8 3JU, U.K. PGP: 2C15F1A9 Fingerprint: 73 6D C2 51 93 A0 01 E7 65 E8 64 7E 14 A4 AB A5 From Chris.Sundt@tscexch.x400.icl.co.uk Mon, 1 Feb 1999 23:04:31 -0000 Date: Mon, 1 Feb 1999 23:04:31 -0000 From: Sundt Chris CE Chris.Sundt@tscexch.x400.icl.co.uk Subject: did I miss the consultation document? Bert-Jaap, I am very much involved in discussions on the Ecommerce Bill. The Consultation document has been delayed by a number of factors - but mainly two things. First is the need for political agreement on the balance between law enforcement requirements and the creation of a commercial/legal environment that encourages ecommerce. Second is the rapid turnover in Ministers at the DTI (we are now on our third in about 6 months!). This requires they be briefed and agree what is contained in the consultation paper. I don't expect to see it until later this month at the earliest. Hope this helps. Regards. Chris Sundt (email c.sundt@iclnet.co.uk tel +44-1344-473692) -----Original Message----- From: Bert-Jaap Koops [mailto:E.J.Koops@kub.nl] Sent: 01 February 1999 15:43 To: ukcrypto@maillist.ox.ac.uk Subject: did I miss the consultation document? From joswald@rpkusa.com Mon, 1 Feb 1999 15:40:24 -0800 Date: Mon, 1 Feb 1999 15:40:24 -0800 From: Jack Oswald joswald@rpkusa.com Subject: RPK? QSBsaXR0bGUgd2hpbGUgYWdvIEkgc2VudCBhIG1lc3NhZ2UgaW4gcmVzcG9uc2UgdG8gYSByZXF1 ZXN0IHRvIGhhdmUgUlBLIGdldCBpbnZvbHZlZCBpbiBhIHNwZWNpZmljIGRpc2N1c3Npb24uICBT aW5jZSBzZW5kaW5nIHRoYXQgbWVzc2FnZSBJIHNhdyBubyBmb2xsb3d1cCBhbmQgc28gSSBqdXN0 IHdhbnQgdG8gbWFrZSBzdXJlIHRoYXQgdGhlIG9yaWdpbmFsIG1lc3NhZ2UgY2FtZSB0aHJvdWdo Lg0KDQpKYWNrDQo= From aba@dcs.ex.ac.uk Tue, 2 Feb 1999 00:05:14 GMT Date: Tue, 2 Feb 1999 00:05:14 GMT From: Adam Back aba@dcs.ex.ac.uk Subject: disclosure of crypto keys Nicholas Bohm writes: > At 07:34 PM 2/1/1999 +0000, David Swarbrick wrote: > >We already have the answer. The Police and Criminal Evidence Act allows > >a constable to require the handing over of files in 'legible' form. > > It allows a constable to require, but provides no penalty for failure to > comply. Ah that's good news indeed. So we can hand over a PGP dump. It's not legible to them but that's their problem. If one handed over a note book written in or hand written notes in code, similarly it would be their problem. I think this sounds very reasonable. Absent certain obligations (eg. financial accounting requirments to keep records for x years, etc) I see no special reason why one should be required to keep ones correspondence in a form which is useful to the police -- I keep information for my own use, not for the use of hostile third parties. If I am presumed innocent, why would I be required to keep information in a form useful to law enforcement agents. The `law', and especially some over-zealous law enforcement type's view of it, includes all manner of things which I personally might not think morally right or even sane! I think it unreasonable that one should be deputised to keep a wire tap log on oneself. > >I do not think anyone now argues for more than access to plain text. The > >context might require holding of private keys, but the concern is not to > >get your key, but the text. I think if it's in ciphertext you shouldn't have any obligation to hand over the key. A better metaphor for discussing ciphertext would be to consider it a note to oneself which happens to lack context making it readily understandable to a third party. You are not obliged to explain what it means. Therefore I would argue you are not obliged to provide the key. Adam From joswald@rpkusa.com Mon, 01 Feb 1999 17:40:25 -0800 Date: Mon, 01 Feb 1999 17:40:25 -0800 From: Jack Oswald joswald@rpkusa.com Subject: ANNOUNCEMENT: RPK ENCRYPTONITE ENGINE CHOSEN All - We have been requested to join the discussion. First of all, there has never been, and never will be any intention to hide any of the methods, techniques or any other element of how RPK is used and implemented. Therefore, I am as concerned as you are that you were not able to find all of the answers to your questions at our web site. If you have not yet found it, on the web site www.rpk.com is a Downloads page where you will find two 25-page(+/-) papers that describe the algorithm in detail. If that has not been sufficient, we may be able to make available directly to individuals who request one of our toolkits with source code purely for the purposes of evaluation and analysis. The source code is the definitive implementation. Also, other analyses have been done which have yet to be made public. We will do so as soon as we can obtain all of the necessary releases. Also, in the future, please fell free to contact us directly. We have nothing to hide. Our business is based on the fact that RPK works as marketed. If anyone can prove otherwise, we sincerely need to know. Jack Oswald President and CEO RPK Security Inc. "Securing the Internet" joswald@rpkusa.com +1 415-563-1800 +1 415-440-0950 fax www.rpkusa.com www.InvisiMail.com 1755 Filbert Street, Suite 1U San Francisco, CA 94123 -----Original Message----- From: owner-ukcrypto@maillist.ox.ac.uk [mailto:owner-ukcrypto@maillist.ox.ac.uk] On Behalf Of William Whyte Sent: Sunday, January 17, 1999 7:10 AM To: 'ukcrypto@maillist.ox.ac.uk' Subject: RE: ANNOUNCEMENT: RPK ENCRYPTONITE ENGINE CHOSEN [I said...] > > It's annoying that people don't realise that RPK is actually only > > about as fast as Diffie-Hellman; it's a public-key operation with a > > bolted-on stream cipher. [Jim said...] > Perhaps annoying, but not surprising: I browsed their website and can't > find a description of what they're really doing. I'm left with the > impression that the stream cipher part is a home-brew invention that's > been looked at by a grand total of two outside cryptographers -- one each > stream cipher specialist and public key specialist. Do I have that right? > Could a serious company rely on security through obscurity in this day and > age? I haven't looked at the site in any detail for a year or so, but as I remember they use the first 256 bytes of output from the LFSR to create a permutation box, and the remainder forms an XOR stream. They then have a kind-of block cipher, where each block is 256 bytes and is permuted according to the permutation box and then XORed with the current output from the LFSR. There's things like "stutter" put into the LFSRs to make them slightly trickier to follow, and the basic set-up is to have two main shift registers and a third one to select whether the next byte of output is from the first or second of the main registers. So that much was clear, at least a year ago. But it's still not _quite_ enough detail to be sure. It's a bit unfair having this discussion behind their backs. Does anyone fancy getting someone from RPK to subscribe to UK Crypto? William From cryptlist@ubik.demon.co.uk Tue, 2 Feb 1999 03:05:00 +0000 Date: Tue, 2 Feb 1999 03:05:00 +0000 From: Anthony Naggs cryptlist@ubik.demon.co.uk Subject: RPK? In message <003101be4e3c$3d6b5080$7700a8c0@Server.rpkusa.com>, Jack Oswald wrote >A little while ago I sent a message in response to a request to have RPK get >involved in a specific discussion. Since sending that message I saw no followup >and so I just want to make sure that the original message came through. I certainly saw your message here. Given the absence of response I guess you must have answered all the questions of those who were previously discussing the subject. Cheers, -- Anthony Naggs From joswald@rpkusa.com Mon, 1 Feb 1999 19:44:07 -0800 Date: Mon, 1 Feb 1999 19:44:07 -0800 From: Jack Oswald joswald@rpkusa.com Subject: ANNOUNCEMENT: RPK ENCRYPTONITE ENGINE CHOSEN All - We have been requested to join the discussion. First of all, there has never been, and never will be any intention to hide any of the methods, techniques or any other element of how RPK is used and implemented. Therefore, I am as concerned as you are that you were not able to find all of the answers to your questions at our web site. If you have not yet found it, on the web site www.rpk.com is a Downloads page where you will find two 25-page(+/-) papers that describe the algorithm in detail. If that has not been sufficient, we may be able to make available directly to individuals who request one of our toolkits with source code purely for the purposes of evaluation and analysis. The source code is the definitive implementation. Also, other analyses have been done which have yet to be made public. We will do so as soon as we can obtain all of the necessary releases. Also, in the future, please fell free to contact us directly. We have nothing to hide. Our business is based on the fact that RPK works as marketed. If anyone can prove otherwise, we sincerely need to know. Jack Oswald President and CEO RPK Security Inc. "Securing the Internet" joswald@rpkusa.com +1 415-563-1800 +1 415-440-0950 fax www.rpkusa.com www.InvisiMail.com 1755 Filbert Street, Suite 1U San Francisco, CA 94123 -----Original Message----- From: owner-ukcrypto@maillist.ox.ac.uk [mailto:owner-ukcrypto@maillist.ox.ac.uk] On Behalf Of William Whyte Sent: Sunday, January 17, 1999 7:10 AM To: 'ukcrypto@maillist.ox.ac.uk' Subject: RE: ANNOUNCEMENT: RPK ENCRYPTONITE ENGINE CHOSEN [I said...] > > It's annoying that people don't realise that RPK is actually only > > about as fast as Diffie-Hellman; it's a public-key operation with a > > bolted-on stream cipher. [Jim said...] > Perhaps annoying, but not surprising: I browsed their website and can't > find a description of what they're really doing. I'm left with the > impression that the stream cipher part is a home-brew invention that's > been looked at by a grand total of two outside cryptographers -- one each > stream cipher specialist and public key specialist. Do I have that right? > Could a serious company rely on security through obscurity in this day and > age? I haven't looked at the site in any detail for a year or so, but as I remember they use the first 256 bytes of output from the LFSR to create a permutation box, and the remainder forms an XOR stream. They then have a kind-of block cipher, where each block is 256 bytes and is permuted according to the permutation box and then XORed with the current output from the LFSR. There's things like "stutter" put into the LFSRs to make them slightly trickier to follow, and the basic set-up is to have two main shift registers and a third one to select whether the next byte of output is from the first or second of the main registers. So that much was clear, at least a year ago. But it's still not _quite_ enough detail to be sure. It's a bit unfair having this discussion behind their backs. Does anyone fancy getting someone from RPK to subscribe to UK Crypto? William From Chris.Sundt@tscexch.x400.icl.co.uk Mon, 1 Feb 1999 23:04:31 -0000 Date: Mon, 1 Feb 1999 23:04:31 -0000 From: Sundt Chris CE Chris.Sundt@tscexch.x400.icl.co.uk Subject: did I miss the consultation document? Bert-Jaap, I am very much involved in discussions on the Ecommerce Bill. The Consultation document has been delayed by a number of factors - but mainly two things. First is the need for political agreement on the balance between law enforcement requirements and the creation of a commercial/legal environment that encourages ecommerce. Second is the rapid turnover in Ministers at the DTI (we are now on our third in about 6 months!). This requires they be briefed and agree what is contained in the consultation paper. I don't expect to see it until later this month at the earliest. Hope this helps. Regards. Chris Sundt (email c.sundt@iclnet.co.uk tel +44-1344-473692) -----Original Message----- From: Bert-Jaap Koops [mailto:E.J.Koops@kub.nl] Sent: 01 February 1999 15:43 To: ukcrypto@maillist.ox.ac.uk Subject: did I miss the consultation document? From aidan@baltimore.ie Tue, 2 Feb 1999 09:20:56 -0000 Date: Tue, 2 Feb 1999 09:20:56 -0000 From: Aidan Gallagher aidan@baltimore.ie Subject: Trusting Internet Banking ------ =_NextPart_000_01BE4E94.F050B520 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable I am receiving messages daily from your maillist. I have tried to = unsubscribe from the service unsuccessfully. Can somebody advise me how = I can be taken off this list. Many Thanks Aidan Gallagher _________________________ Aidan Gallagher Head of Sales Baltimore Technologies IFSC House Irish Financial Services Centre Custom House Quay Dublin 1 Ireland Tel +353-1-6054399 Fax +353-1-6054388 E-Mail aidan@baltimore.ie ________________________ -----Original Message----- From: Grupo de seguridad [SMTP:gseguridad@msc.es] Sent: 29 January 1999 12:30 To: 'ukcrypto@maillist.ox.ac.uk' Subject: RE: Trusting Internet Banking > Yes - they are, presumably using SGC (Server-Gated Cryptography). > Basically, this is a cert that switches on full-strength crypto. It is > this mechanism that Fortify exploits (just switches it on for all > certs). It is also possible to mark arbitrary certs in the cert DB as > SGC certs. >=20 Global Server ID from Verisign allows 128 bits for bank institutions, what about other sensitive information institutions as Public Health Systems? It is possible now or in a near future? Best regards, Luis Saiz P.S. 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This new "Who Watches the Watchmen" >> report therefore brings into the open what your ISP can do for the >> police with your Internet account. > >I don't think there was anything particularly secret about it. The >fact that the meeting was to be held was discussed on the newsgroups >before it happened. There are circumstances where ISPs should disclose >evidence related to a crime in just the same way as any citizen could >reasonably be expected to respond when a policeman knocks on the door >and asks "Did you see ...?". The meeting was merely to discuss some >uniform procedures to be used when such information was requested, and >Clive Feather (who attended the meeting) gave clear assurances as to the >sort of information Demon might or might not be prepared to divulge. The briefing is a document, and its existence has not previously been disclosed outside the Forum (as far as I can tell). ISPs are not in the position of a fortuitous witness of what their customers transmit through their services, they are handling their customers' correspondence. Their customers are entitled to have this treated as private under the European Convention on Human Rights, Article 8, which now forms part of UK domestic law. ISPs should be no more free than banks, solicitors, doctors, accountants etc to provide information about their customers as they think fit, except when obliged by law by a judicially-issued warrant or a court order. Regards, Nicholas Bohm Salkyns, Great Canfield, Takeley, Bishop's Stortford CM22 6SX, UK Phone 01279 871272 (+44 1279 871272) Fax 01279 870215 (+44 1279 870215) Mobile 0860 636749 (+44 860 636749) PGP RSA 1024 bit public key ID: 0x08340015. Fingerprint: 9E 15 FB 2A 54 96 24 37 98 A2 E0 D1 34 13 48 07 PGP DSS/DH 1024/3072 public key ID: 0x899DD7FF. Fingerprint: 5248 1320 B42E 84FC 1E8B A9E6 0912 AE66 899D D7FF From gladman@seven77.demon.co.uk Tue, 2 Feb 1999 10:52:45 -0000 Date: Tue, 2 Feb 1999 10:52:45 -0000 From: Brian Gladman gladman@seven77.demon.co.uk Subject: Export Controls on Intangible Goods Some time ago I published an open letter to the DTI concerning the possible impact of the proposed legislation on the control of intangibles on the publication of crypto source code and R&D results on the Web. I used my site at: http://www.seven77.demon.co.uk/aes.htm as an example. I now have a response from Bridget Butt at the DTI (my thanks to Nigel and to Bridget for providing this) and a copy of this is included below. I have also had a conversation with Bridget about these issues and it seems that the DTI is determined to continue with these proposlas (for which the EC is being 'blamed'). My impression is that the DTI is somewhat blindly following the the principle that if something is controlled in physical form then the same control should be exerted over any intangible equivalent. There does not seem to be any concern about the practical difficulties of implementing such controls or about the impact that they will have on many important and beneficial activities. As far as I can ascertain there has been no attempt to assess such issues proir to any legislation. The strong impression I have is that this is seen as a 'loophole' that has to be closed simply as an 'an act of faith' without regard for practicality or any detrimental consequences that this might have. So we have a situation in which this 'loophole' is to be closed without any knowledge of the real benefits this will provide, without any knowledge of the practicality or the costs involved, and without any understanding of the impact that this will have on desirable activities! All in all, a pretty sound basis for legislation. It hence seems that we now need to lobby our MPs and MEPs to ensure that the they understand what is being proposed. With this and the Electronic Compromise (oops Commerce) Bill, it would seem that government policy in these areas is completely at the mercy of the hawks in the Civil Service. If ever our civil liberties and our hard won personal and academic freedoms needed protection they most certainly need it now. And this from a Labour government that promised us a Freedom of Information Bill and the removal of all controls on cryptography! Brian ----------------------------------------------------------- Dr B. R. Gladman (by email) Dear Dr Gladman In your open letter to the DTI which was sent to Nigel Hickson, and which he has passed on to me for reply, you ask whether the Web Page described in your letter would become illegal under any future government legislation on, or related to, the control of cryptography or intangible exports. The first point to make with regard to proposed legislation on the introduction of export controls on the electronic transfer of technology or software (as set out in the White Paper on Strategic Export Controls and in the European Commission’s proposal for a revised Dual-use Goods Regulation), is that the same general principles determining whether or not a licence is required will apply to electronic transfers, as apply to exports in physical form. As your query relates to cryptography which is of course a dual-use technology, it is the European Commission’s proposal for a revised Dual-use Goods Regulation (COM 1998 257 final) which needs to be considered. The first point I must make is that the Commission’s proposal is, of course, only draft legislation and could well be subject to changes before being adopted. In particular, the issue of how the legislation would apply to technology or software placed on Internet websites is a matter currently under discussion within the Community and so I cannot give you a categorical answer to your question. What I can say, however, is that under the Commission’s proposal, the same conditions would apply to transfers of technology or software made by electronic means as would apply to transfers in tangible form. As I am sure you are aware, technology or software in the public domain is not normally subject to export control (transfers of public domain technology or software may be caught by the end-use control related to weapons of mass destruction). Under the Commission’s proposal, “in the public domain” would continue to be defined as meaning “technology” or “software” which had been made available without restrictions upon its further dissemination (copyright restrictions do not remove “technology” or “software” from being “in the public domain”)”. To the extent that the AES scheme fulfilled these conditions, then it would be regarded as “in the public domain” and not therefore subject to export control. You will also probably be aware of the proposed Wassenaar Cryptography Note. This is likely to have been introduced into EC legislation before the proposal on intangible transfers. This will mean that, to the extent that cryptographic software placed on a website was not regarded as being in the public domain, (e.g. because of restrictions placed on its dissemination) it could still be released from export control if it met the conditions of the Cryptography Note. Yours sincerely Bridget Butt BRIDGET BUTT Scott Inquiry Follow-up Unit From E.J.Koops@kub.nl Tue, 2 Feb 1999 12:38:14 MET Date: Tue, 2 Feb 1999 12:38:14 MET From: Bert-Jaap Koops E.J.Koops@kub.nl Subject: disclosure of crypto keys David Swarbrick wrote: > Is it still self incrimination to hand over existing evidence? I think > there is a clear argument to say that the privilege against self > incrimination prevents only a requirement to provide a new statement. [snip] > I suspect that the argument about the right against self-incrimination > is a false trail. Not quite. It is true that the privilege against self-incrimination prevents only the mandatory producing of "testimonial statements". US case law provides good guidance on this. Tax returns are not testimonial evidence (Fisher), nor are business documents (Doe) or an authorization (for a bank to disclose information) which the suspect was compelled to write (Doe II). However, the _act of producing_ may be testimonial and incriminating, if in handing something over the holder admits to possession of the document. Only if it is a foregone conclusion that the holder possess a document, is handing it over not testimonial. (Doe) (By and large the same holds for European case law, as I read it.) That is why I conclude that handing over a crypto key is compatible with the privilege only if there is sufficient evidence ("a foregone conclusion") that the suspect has got the key and knows the passphrase. Otherwise, the _act of producing_ the key would testify to his knowledge of it. Bert-Jaap From Clare.Wardle@postoffice.co.uk 02 Feb 1999 16:29:55 Z Date: 02 Feb 1999 16:29:55 Z From: Clare Wardle Clare.Wardle@postoffice.co.uk Subject: UK ISPA Give Police Secret Briefing and new CR&CL(UK) report lau Nicholas Bohm wrote >ISPs should be no more free than banks, solicitors, doctors, accountants >etc to provide information about their customers as they think fit, except >when obliged by law by a judicially-issued warrant or a court order. Moreover if in the course of disclosing the messages to a third party such as the police,they disclose personal data, which almost inevitably they will, they need to check that the request to disclose meets the specific criteria of a statutory ability to request information appropriate to the requesting party, and that this statutory power is allowable under the Data Protection Directive, or the ISP will be able to be sued by the people whose personal data it is. It is not open to ISPs or anyone else to decide to give personal data relating to other people willy nilly without authorisation. Fishing expeditions are definitely out. Clare Wardle My views are my own and not necessarily those of my employer or colleagues From david@swarb.demon.co.uk Tue, 2 Feb 1999 07:28:47 +0000 Date: Tue, 2 Feb 1999 07:28:47 +0000 From: David Swarbrick david@swarb.demon.co.uk Subject: disclosure of crypto keys In message <199902020005.AAA21179@server.eternity.org>, Adam Back writes > >Nicholas Bohm writes: >> At 07:34 PM 2/1/1999 +0000, David Swarbrick wrote: >> >We already have the answer. The Police and Criminal Evidence Act allows >> >a constable to require the handing over of files in 'legible' form. >> >> It allows a constable to require, but provides no penalty for failure to >> comply. > >Ah that's good news indeed. So we can hand over a PGP dump. It's not >legible to them but that's their problem. If one handed over a note >book written in or hand written notes in code, similarly it would be >their problem. > >I think this sounds very reasonable. Absent certain obligations >(eg. financial accounting requirments to keep records for x years, >etc) I see no special reason why one should be required to keep ones >correspondence in a form which is useful to the police -- I keep >information for my own use, not for the use of hostile third parties. > >If I am presumed innocent, why would I be required to keep information >in a form useful to law enforcement agents. The `law', and especially >some over-zealous law enforcement type's view of it, includes all >manner of things which I personally might not think morally right or >even sane! I think it unreasonable that one should be deputised to >keep a wire tap log on oneself. > >> >I do not think anyone now argues for more than access to plain text. The >> >context might require holding of private keys, but the concern is not to >> >get your key, but the text. > >I think if it's in ciphertext you shouldn't have any obligation to >hand over the key. A better metaphor for discussing ciphertext would >be to consider it a note to oneself which happens to lack context >making it readily understandable to a third party. You are not >obliged to explain what it means. Therefore I would argue you are not >obliged to provide the key. > I think you cannot have read the paragraph you quoted. I doubt they will want your key (well ok they might _want_ it). I anticipate that we will get a beefed up version (with penalty) of the old PACE provision. They will say "We have reason to believe that this file represents information we have a right to see. Dec-crypt it or face a penalty. If you want to argue, do it in court' There will be difficulties, contradictions, and conundrums, but none enough to stop it being imposed, and, I think, effective. -- David Swarbrick, Solicitor. Brighouse, West Yorkshire. Tel: +44(0)1484 722531 Fax: +44(0)1484 716617 e-mail david@swarb.demon.co.uk http://www.swarb.co.uk/ (Office) http://www.swarb.demon.co.uk/ (Home) Home of the law-index to 8800+ cases - 'damn fine webbery" From Pete@dmed.demon.co.uk Tue, 2 Feb 1999 16:57:06 +0000 Date: Tue, 2 Feb 1999 16:57:06 +0000 From: Pete Mitchell Pete@dmed.demon.co.uk Subject: UK ISPA Give Police Secret Briefing and new CR&CL(UK) report lau Clare Wardle wrote: >Nicholas Bohm wrote >>ISPs should be no more free than banks, solicitors, doctors, accountants >>etc to provide information about their customers as they think fit, except >>when obliged by law by a judicially-issued warrant or a court order. > >Moreover if in the course of disclosing the messages to a third party such as >the police,they disclose personal data, which almost inevitably they will, they >need to check that the request to disclose meets the specific criteria of a >statutory ability to request information appropriate to the requesting party, >and that this statutory power is allowable under the Data Protection Directive, >or the ISP will be able to be sued by the people whose personal data it is. It >is not open to ISPs or anyone else to decide to give personal data relating to >other people willy nilly without authorisation. Fishing expeditions are >definitely out. > In principle yes; but in practice? I take the DPA to be next to useless as a means of discouraging official intrusion into private data. Has anyone ever been prosecuted, or sued, under the Act in such circumstances? Has such a complaint ever even been logged by the Registrar? I actually asked this question of the DPR's office a few months ago, but never got a reply. -- Pete Mitchell From lawya@lucs-01.novell.leeds.ac.uk Tue, 2 Feb 1999 20:17:05 GMT0BST Date: Tue, 2 Feb 1999 20:17:05 GMT0BST From: Yaman Akdeniz lawya@lucs-01.novell.leeds.ac.uk Subject: UK ISPA Give Police Secret Briefing and new CR&CL(UK) report Pete- > In principle yes; but in practice? I take the DPA to be next to > useless as a means of discouraging official intrusion into private > data. Has anyone ever been prosecuted, or sued, under the Act in > such circumstances? Has such a complaint ever even been logged by > the Registrar? I actually asked this question of the DPR's office a > few months ago, but never got a reply. There are a few cases resulting from the data protection act and normally the Registrar's annual reports do refer to these cases. One well known case reached the House of Lords. - R. v Brown (Gregory Michael) Court: (HL) House of Lords, Reported: [1996] 1 A.C. 543 The Crown appealed against the quashing of B's conviction for improper use of personal data under the Data Protection Act 1984 s.5. B, a former police officer, was alleged to have misused data contained in the police national computer, whilst collaborating with a debt collection agency. B had retrieved the data and observed its contents, but had taken no other steps in relation to it. The Crown argued that, as information constituted data only when it appeared on the screen, B's actions were the only way that the information could be used. Held, dismissing the appeal, that (1) use of the information did not have to occur while the information was in a computer readable form and (2) "use" had to be given its natural and ordinary meaning as the 1984 Act contained no definition. To display and read data on screen could not, without any further act, constitute "use" contrary to s.5(2)(b). Another police related case is DPP v Bignall Court: (QBD) Queens Bench Division Reported: [1998] 1 Cr. App. R. 1 Police officers with authorised access to computer information were not convicted under the Computer Misuse Act 1990 for unauthorised use of that information as the Act was concerned only with preventing unauthorised access. Unauthorised use should be dealt with under the Data Protection Act 1984. The DPP appealed by way of case stated against the overturning of the respondent police officers' convictions of offences under the Computer Misuse Act 1990 s.1. The respondents had, for private purposes, obtained details relating to two motor cars from the Police National Computer. The DPP maintained that the Commissioner of Police, who controlled access to the computer, gave authority to police officers to access information only for police purposes and the respondents' use of the computer to gain material for non-police purposes was therefore unauthorised. The respondents distinguished between the gaining of access, which was said to be authorised, and the admittedly unauthorised purpose of their excursion. Held, dismissing the appeal, that the Act was concerned with the protection of computer systems and criminalised the "hacking" or unauthorised access to computer material. It was not designed to protect the integrity of information stored on computers, which was the purpose behind the Data Protection Act 1984. Whether or not the Commissioner alone was entitled to control access to the computer, the respondents' access was not unauthorised in terms of s.17(5) or s.17(2) and they were not therefore in breach of s.1. There was not a gap in the law since police officers were open to prosecution for use of the computer for improper purposes under s.5(2)(b) of the 1984 Act. There is one case involving the Data Protection Registrar v Amnesty International (British Section) but I do not have the details for that case and again I believe the information should be obtained from the DPR's annual reports. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Yaman Akdeniz Cyber-Rights & Cyber-Liberties (UK) at: http://www.cyber-rights.org Read the new CR&CL (UK) Report, Who Watches the Watchmen, Part:II Accountability & Effective Self-Regulation in the Information Age, August 1998 at http://www.cyber-rights.org/watchmen-ii.htm ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ From david@swarb.demon.co.uk Tue, 2 Feb 1999 19:55:53 +0000 Date: Tue, 2 Feb 1999 19:55:53 +0000 From: David Swarbrick david@swarb.demon.co.uk Subject: disclosure of crypto keys In message , Bert-Jaap Koops writes > David Swarbrick wrote: >> Is it still self incrimination to hand over existing evidence? I think >> there is a clear argument to say that the privilege against self >> incrimination prevents only a requirement to provide a new statement. >[snip] >> I suspect that the argument about the right against self-incrimination >> is a false trail. >Not quite. It is true that the privilege against self-incrimination >prevents only the mandatory producing of "testimonial statements". US >case law provides good guidance on this. Tax returns are not >testimonial evidence (Fisher), nor are business documents (Doe) or an >authorization (for a bank to disclose information) which the >suspect was compelled to write (Doe II). However, the _act of >producing_ may be testimonial and incriminating, if in handing >something over the holder admits to possession of the document. Only >if it is a foregone conclusion that the holder possess a document, >is handing it over not testimonial. (Doe) >(By and large the same holds for European case law, as I read it.) > >That is why I conclude that handing over a crypto key is compatible >with the privilege only if there is sufficient evidence ("a foregone >conclusion") that the suspect has got the key and knows the >passphrase. Otherwise, the _act of producing_ the key would testify >to his knowledge of it. > Bert-Jaap Your erudition about US law is awesome, and I take the logic of what you say. I have to say, though, that it is likely to be of very little persuasive value in the UK, and even less so in Europe. We do not have anything like the same well developed and defined law protecting against self incrimination. My experience and understanding of English law and of English judges suggests that they would not listen too keenly to such refinements, and would probably go out of their way to prevent them getting between the police and a needed conviction. Whether and how much it will change with the incorporation of the Euro Convention on Human Rights remains to be seen. -- David Swarbrick, Solicitor. Brighouse, West Yorkshire. Tel: +44(0)1484 722531 Fax: +44(0)1484 716617 e-mail david@swarb.demon.co.uk http://www.swarb.co.uk/ (Office) http://www.swarb.demon.co.uk/ (Home) Home of the law-index to 8800+ cases - 'damn fine webbery" From david@swarb.demon.co.uk Tue, 2 Feb 1999 20:42:32 +0000 Date: Tue, 2 Feb 1999 20:42:32 +0000 From: David Swarbrick david@swarb.demon.co.uk Subject: UK ISPA Give Police Secret Briefing and new CR&CL(UK) report lau In message <0192D36B72803001*/c=gb/admd=bt/prmd=ukpo/o=royalmail/ou=lnmr m1/s=Wardle/g=Clare/@MHS>, Clare Wardle writes >Nicholas Bohm wrote >>ISPs should be no more free than banks, solicitors, doctors, accountants >>etc to provide information about their customers as they think fit, except >>when obliged by law by a judicially-issued warrant or a court order. > >Moreover if in the course of disclosing the messages to a third party such as >the police,they disclose personal data, which almost inevitably they will, they >need to check that the request to disclose meets the specific criteria of a >statutory ability to request information appropriate to the requesting party, >and that this statutory power is allowable under the Data Protection Directive, >or the ISP will be able to be sued by the people whose personal data it is. I think in this case Data Protection is an undeveloped and ineffective protection. I think the general law of confidence, and the new Human Rights Law properly used is likely to be more effective. > It >is not open to ISPs or anyone else to decide to give personal data relating to >other people willy nilly without authorisation. Fishing expeditions are >definitely out. >From memory, they would say that the form provides a warranty (from a police constable!!) that it is not a fishing expedition, and that they would rely upon the specific exemptions in the Data Protection Act for police investigations. -- David Swarbrick, Solicitor. Brighouse, West Yorkshire. Tel: +44(0)1484 722531 Fax: +44(0)1484 716617 e-mail david@swarb.demon.co.uk http://www.swarb.co.uk/ (Office) http://www.swarb.demon.co.uk/ (Home) Home of the law-index to 8800+ cases - 'damn fine webbery" From joswald@rpkusa.com Tue, 2 Feb 1999 21:46:57 -0800 Date: Tue, 2 Feb 1999 21:46:57 -0800 From: Jack Oswald joswald@rpkusa.com Subject: ANNOUNCEMENT: RPK SECURITY ANNOUNCES RPK ENCRYPTONITE GLOBAL REPRESENTATIVE PROGRAM FOR ENCRYPTION TECHNOLOGY To the moderator: Please forward this (or let pass through your filter) if you believe this announcement would be of interest for your membership. ------------------------------------------------------------------- CONTACT: Paula Miller Lyn Oswald Nadel Phelan, Inc. RPK Security, Inc. (831) 439-5570 x277 (212) 488-9891 paulam@nadelphelan.com lynoswald@rpkusa.com RPK SECURITY ANNOUNCES RPK ENCRYPTONITE GLOBAL REPRESENTATIVE PROGRAM FOR ENCRYPTION TECHNOLOGY SAN FRANCISCO, CA. January 25, 1998 - RPK Security, Inc. (www.rpk.com), a technology leader in strong and fast public key encryption, announced today the launch of its RPK Encryptonite Global Representative Program for its encryption technology, expanding its global reach through a worldwide sales channel. The three charter companies that have joined the program include ITCG, a leading provider of business and information technology consultancy services for electronic commerce, !Effective, an innovative information consulting company focused on delivering IT based business solutions to stock exchange companies, and M & A Group, a leader in management consulting with offices worldwide. The companies will promote and sell RPK Encryptonite Engine licenses and may also offer custom engineering assistance, local implementation and technical support. "We joined the RPK Encryptonite Program based on our customers' increasing demand for high performance security solutions. RPK Security offers a fast, flexible and globally strong encryption solution," said David Maxwell, managing director of ITCG. "Our participation in RPK's program will allow us to offer our customers a superior product." "Our aim is to excite our clientele by delivering innovative technology solutions and RPK allows us to do that," said Ronald Nanninga, marketing executive of !Effective. "We intend to leverage our knowledge and experience of encryption in marketing the RPK technology to our customers." "All M&A Group corporate prospects and customers need RPK security products and we look forward to signing significant deals for RPK in 1999," said Jean-Paul Pinzuti, founder/partner of M&A Group. The RPK Encryptonite Engine, a strong, fast and scalable cryptosystem, uniquely combines all the benefits of public key systems (authentication, digital signatures and digital certificates) with the speed of a secret key system into one algorithm. With the Encryptonite Engine's superior performance, applications requiring streaming data, sound, video or numerous transactions, such as credit card payments, receive instantaneous responses and secure communication links. The RPK Encryptonite Toolkit, a software implementation of the RPK Encryptonite Engine, gives developers everything they need to quickly and easily incorporate strong, fast and scalable public key encryption into all their applications - without an extensive knowledge of cryptography. Its speed and compact size make it suitable for even the most demanding embedded systems. "The first three charter partners of our global representative program will provide world class local sales and engineering support," said Jack Oswald, president and CEO of RPK Security. "Since our encryption technology was developed outside the U.S., it is well suited to be used worldwide and these partners will make a huge difference in RPK's ability to service and support customers on a global basis." ABOUT RPK SECURITY Founded in 1995, RPK Security, Inc. is a technology leader in fast public key encryption. RPK's cryptographic research and product development is based in New Zealand, Switzerland and the U.K, with worldwide sales and marketing in San Francisco, CA. Contact RPK at www.rpk.com or (212) 488-9891. ABOUT ITCG Founded in 1998, Information Technology Consulting Group Limited (ITCG) offers IT Consulting and software development services to global corporations. ITCG consultants are experts in E-Commerce, Business Systems Analysis, Web Technologies, Microsoft Technologies, multi-tiered architectures and Corporate Information Systems Integration. Based in the UK, ITCG can be reached at Enquiries@itcguk.com or call +44 1494 523 996. more ABOUT !EFFECTIVE !Effective, based in the Netherlands, is an innovative information consulting company focused on delivering IT solutions to stock exchange companies. An extensive knowledge of the securities business combined with an expertise in e-commerce solutions make !Effective a valuable partner in providing custom solutions. !Effective can be reached at info@effective-it.com or call +31 (0)10 4253555 ABOUT M&A GROUP M&A Group offers management consulting services in strategic planning, mergers & acquisition, transition management, alliances & partnerships and private placements. With offices worldwide, M&A provides effective support to global corporations. M&A can be reached at 100140.3275@compuserve.com or call +33-(0)1 44 01 51 00. From ben@algroup.co.uk Wed, 03 Feb 1999 10:42:16 +0000 Date: Wed, 03 Feb 1999 10:42:16 +0000 From: Ben Laurie ben@algroup.co.uk Subject: ANNOUNCEMENT: RPK SECURITY ANNOUNCES RPK ENCRYPTONITE GLOBAL REPRESENTATIVE PROGRAM FOR ENCRYPTION TECHNOLOGY Jack Oswald wrote: > The three charter companies that have joined the program include ITCG, a > leading provider of business and information technology consultancy services > for electronic commerce, !Effective, an innovative information consulting Hehe, whoever thought of that name clearly wasn't a C or Perl programmer! :-) Cheers, Ben. -- http://www.apache-ssl.org/ben.html "My grandfather once told me that there are two kinds of people: those who work and those who take the credit. He told me to try to be in the first group; there was less competition there." - Indira Gandhi From Clare.Wardle@postoffice.co.uk 03 Feb 1999 12:19:04 Z Date: 03 Feb 1999 12:19:04 Z From: Clare Wardle Clare.Wardle@postoffice.co.uk Subject: UK ISPA Give Police Secret Briefing and new CR&CL(UK) report lau Pete Mitchell wrote: >I take the DPA to be next to useless >as a means of discouraging official intrusion into private data. Has >anyone ever been prosecuted, or sued, under the Act in such >circumstances? Has such a complaint ever even been logged by the >Registrar? Complaints have certainly been dealt with. And while I agree that with more staff and resources the Data Protection Registrar could be more effective, she and her team do do quite a lot of good work. They have been very effective in getting sensible codes of practice for use of personal data by government agencies e.g. recently under the Social Security Fraud Act. Moreover, when a company is asked for data, eg on its employees by the police or local authority, the DPA makes it clear that such data can only be provided in specific cases, and for specific purposes, which gives an incentive to the company to get it right - certainly don't agree that you can't go behind the bald confirmation by a constable that the data request is not a fishing expedition as suggested by Dave Swarbrick. However, if the general public were more aware of their rights, and enforced them in this kind of case, the legislation would have more teeth. Simple way forward - everyone who thinks that their ISP is providing their information to the police too readily, or their medical records are being accessed by inappropriate people, complain to the Registrar, e-mail data@wycliffe.demon.co.uk. Under the new Act (which is supposed to be in force already, but is in fact probably going to come into force later this year) it will be possible for individuals to sue for damages, which will make it more likely that individuals will sue. Clare Wardle My views are my own and not necessarily those of my employer or colleagues. From ben@algroup.co.uk Thu, 04 Feb 1999 09:39:40 +0000 Date: Thu, 04 Feb 1999 09:39:40 +0000 From: Ben Laurie ben@algroup.co.uk Subject: Network Week demonstrate complete lack of clue In an article entitled "56-bit cipher defeated in just 22 hours", Network Week (3 Feb 1999) say "Eric Young and Tim Hudson used 'brute force' - trying every possible combination - on a $250,000 custom-built super PC". Yeah, right! Cheers, Ben. -- http://www.apache-ssl.org/ben.html "My grandfather once told me that there are two kinds of people: those who work and those who take the credit. He told me to try to be in the first group; there was less competition there." - Indira Gandhi From gladman@seven77.demon.co.uk Thu, 4 Feb 1999 10:04:59 -0000 Date: Thu, 4 Feb 1999 10:04:59 -0000 From: Brian Gladman gladman@seven77.demon.co.uk Subject: ANNOUNCEMENT: RPK SECURITY ANNOUNCES RPK ENCRYPTONITE GLOBAL REPRESENTATIVE PROGRAM FOR ENCRYPTION TECHNOLOGY -----Original Message----- From: Ben Laurie To: ukcrypto@maillist.ox.ac.uk Date: 03 February 1999 10:48 Subject: Re: ANNOUNCEMENT: RPK SECURITY ANNOUNCES RPK ENCRYPTONITE GLOBAL REPRESENTATIVE PROGRAM FOR ENCRYPTION TECHNOLOGY >Jack Oswald wrote: >> The three charter companies that have joined the program include ITCG, a >> leading provider of business and information technology consultancy services >> for electronic commerce, !Effective, an innovative information consulting > >Hehe, whoever thought of that name clearly wasn't a C or Perl >programmer! :-) > >Cheers, > >Ben. > Yes you are right there - puts me off immediately! Brian From nbohm@ernest.net Thu, 04 Feb 1999 10:39:03 +0000 Date: Thu, 04 Feb 1999 10:39:03 +0000 From: Nicholas Bohm nbohm@ernest.net Subject: ANNOUNCEMENT: RPK SECURITY ANNOUNCES RPK ENCRYPTONITE GLOBAL REPRESENTATIVE PROGRAM FOR ENCRYPTION TECHNOLOGY At 10:04 AM 2/4/1999 -0000, Brian Gladman wrote: > >-----Original Message----- >From: Ben Laurie >To: ukcrypto@maillist.ox.ac.uk >Date: 03 February 1999 10:48 >Subject: Re: ANNOUNCEMENT: RPK SECURITY ANNOUNCES RPK ENCRYPTONITE GLOBAL >REPRESENTATIVE PROGRAM FOR ENCRYPTION TECHNOLOGY > > >>Jack Oswald wrote: >>> The three charter companies that have joined the program include ITCG, a >>> leading provider of business and information technology consultancy >services >>> for electronic commerce, !Effective, an innovative information consulting >> >>Hehe, whoever thought of that name clearly wasn't a C or Perl >>programmer! :-) >> >>Cheers, >> >>Ben. >> > > >Yes you are right there - puts me off immediately! I know this is a boring request, but will someone spill the beans and explain the joke for C and Perl ignorami like me? Plaintive regards, Nicholas Bohm Salkyns, Great Canfield, Takeley, Bishop's Stortford CM22 6SX, UK Phone 01279 871272 (+44 1279 871272) Fax 01279 870215 (+44 1279 870215) Mobile 0860 636749 (+44 860 636749) PGP RSA 1024 bit public key ID: 0x08340015. Fingerprint: 9E 15 FB 2A 54 96 24 37 98 A2 E0 D1 34 13 48 07 PGP DSS/DH 1024/3072 public key ID: 0x899DD7FF. Fingerprint: 5248 1320 B42E 84FC 1E8B A9E6 0912 AE66 899D D7FF From pleyland@microsoft.com Thu, 4 Feb 1999 03:25:50 -0800 Date: Thu, 4 Feb 1999 03:25:50 -0800 From: Paul Leyland pleyland@microsoft.com Subject: ANNOUNCEMENT: RPK SECURITY ANNOUNCES RPK ENCRYPTONITE GLOBAL REPRESENTATIVE PROGRAM FOR ENCRYPTION TECHNOLOGY > >>> for electronic commerce, !Effective, an innovative > information consulting > >> > >>Hehe, whoever thought of that name clearly wasn't a C or Perl > >>programmer! :-) ... > I know this is a boring request, but will someone spill the beans and > explain the joke for C and Perl ignorami like me? The '!' character is used for the logical negation operator, so the name reads as "NOT Effective". Someone, somewhere, screwed up. Paul From bdm@fenrir.demon.co.uk Thu, 04 Feb 1999 11:28:41 +0000 (GMT) Date: Thu, 04 Feb 1999 11:28:41 +0000 (GMT) From: Brian Morrison bdm@fenrir.demon.co.uk Subject: ANNOUNCEMENT: RPK SECURITY ANNOUNCES RPK ENCRYPTONITE GLOBAL REPRESENTATIVE PROGRAM FOR ENCRYPTION TECHNOLOGY -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On Thu, 04 Feb 1999 10:39:03 +0000, Nicholas Bohm wrote: >I know this is a boring request, but will someone spill the beans and >explain the joke for C and Perl ignorami like me? > ! is C (and PERL) speak for logical not, so !Effective means not effective, a bad name for a security product eh? - -- Brian Morrison bdm@fenrir.demon.co.uk "Almost noon, and she had yet to go the launderette in Concreton to thaw out chickens in the spin-drier..." PGP Public Key Fingerprint= C7 12 B9 54 00 0F 51 F6 37 9B 18 D1 E1 61 14 0B -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGPfreeware 5.0i OS/2 for non-commercial use Comment: This comment _is_ plain text Charset: cp850 iQA/AwUBNrl2WfQTY1HeMuXFEQIaNgCeLCD9ZvWvkouscOE4WsF7GboiSmIAnR/L 2Te1cy+XfIGZiOFdYIhQz9b5 =y0e9 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From gladman@seven77.demon.co.uk Thu, 4 Feb 1999 11:30:36 -0000 Date: Thu, 4 Feb 1999 11:30:36 -0000 From: Brian Gladman gladman@seven77.demon.co.uk Subject: ANNOUNCEMENT: RPK SECURITY ANNOUNCES RPK ENCRYPTONITE GLOBAL REPRESENTATIVE PROGRAM FOR ENCRYPTION TECHNOLOGY From: Nicholas Bohm To: ukcrypto@maillist.ox.ac.uk Date: 04 February 1999 10:49 Subject: Re: ANNOUNCEMENT: RPK SECURITY ANNOUNCES RPK ENCRYPTONITE GLOBAL REPRESENTATIVE PROGRAM FOR ENCRYPTION TECHNOLOGY In a number of popular computer languages including C, C++ and Perl, placing an exclamation mark (!) in front of an object negates its value. Hence the use of the expression '!Effective' is immediately read by any computer programmer as 'Not Effective' - not quite the intended message. Brian - From markc@chiark.greenend.org.uk Thu, 4 Feb 1999 12:00:02 +0000 (GMT) Date: Thu, 4 Feb 1999 12:00:02 +0000 (GMT) From: Mark Carroll markc@chiark.greenend.org.uk Subject: ANNOUNCEMENT: RPK SECURITY ANNOUNCES RPK ENCRYPTONITE GLOBAL REPRESENTATIVE PROGRAM FOR ENCRYPTION TECHNOLOGY On Thu, 4 Feb 1999, Nicholas Bohm wrote: (snip) > >>Jack Oswald wrote: (snip) > >>> for electronic commerce, !Effective, an innovative information consulting (snip) > I know this is a boring request, but will someone spill the beans and > explain the joke for C and Perl ignorami like me? ! is normally read as 'not' (the logical operator). -- Mark From phillip.temple@onlinemagic.com Thu, 04 Feb 1999 12:04:30 +0000 Date: Thu, 04 Feb 1999 12:04:30 +0000 From: Phillip Temple phillip.temple@onlinemagic.com Subject: ANNOUNCEMENT: RPK SECURITY ANNOUNCES RPK ENCRYPTONITE GLOBAL REPRESENTATIVE PROGRAM FOR ENCRYPTION TECHNOLOGY At 10:39 AM 2/4/99 +0000, Nicholas wrote: > >I know this is a boring request, but will someone spill the beans and >explain the joke for C and Perl ignorami like me? ! is the NOT operator. Thus !Effective translates to "NOT effective". Phillip. From lclarke@mpc-data.co.uk 04 Feb 1999 11:41:03 +0000 Date: 04 Feb 1999 11:41:03 +0000 From: Leon Clarke lclarke@mpc-data.co.uk Subject: ANNOUNCEMENT: RPK SECURITY ANNOUNCES RPK ENCRYPTONITE GLOBAL REPRESENTATIVE PROGRAM FOR ENCRYPTION TECHNOLOGY Nicholas Bohm writes: > >>Jack Oswald wrote: > >>> for electronic commerce, !Effective, an innovative information consulting > I know this is a boring request, but will someone spill the beans and > explain the joke for C and Perl ignorami like me? '!' means 'not' From jei@zor.hut.fi Thu, 4 Feb 1999 15:55:47 +0200 (EET) Date: Thu, 4 Feb 1999 15:55:47 +0200 (EET) From: jei@zor.hut.fi jei@zor.hut.fi Subject: ANNOUNCEMENT: RPK SECURITY ANNOUNCES RPK ENCRYPTONITE GLOBAL REPRESENTATIVE PROGRAM FOR ENCRYPTION TECHNOLOGY On Thu, 4 Feb 1999, Brian Morrison wrote: > > > On Thu, 04 Feb 1999 10:39:03 +0000, Nicholas Bohm wrote: > > >I know this is a boring request, but will someone spill the beans and > >explain the joke for C and Perl ignorami like me? > > > > ! is C (and PERL) speak for logical not, so !Effective means not > effective, a bad name for a security product eh? Maybe it's one of those NSA trojan companies, like Crypto AG. ;-) ++ J From jei@zor.hut.fi Thu, 4 Feb 1999 15:55:47 +0200 (EET) Date: Thu, 4 Feb 1999 15:55:47 +0200 (EET) From: jei@zor.hut.fi jei@zor.hut.fi Subject: ANNOUNCEMENT: RPK SECURITY ANNOUNCES RPK ENCRYPTONITE GLOBAL REPRESENTATIVE PROGRAM FOR ENCRYPTION TECHNOLOGY On Thu, 4 Feb 1999, Brian Morrison wrote: > > > On Thu, 04 Feb 1999 10:39:03 +0000, Nicholas Bohm wrote: > > >I know this is a boring request, but will someone spill the beans and > >explain the joke for C and Perl ignorami like me? > > > > ! is C (and PERL) speak for logical not, so !Effective means not > effective, a bad name for a security product eh? Maybe it's one of those NSA trojan companies, like Crypto AG. ;-) ++ J From joswald@rpkusa.com Thu, 4 Feb 1999 08:58:23 -0800 Date: Thu, 4 Feb 1999 08:58:23 -0800 From: Jack Oswald joswald@rpkusa.com Subject: ANNOUNCEMENT: RPK SECURITY ANNOUNCES RPK ENCRYPTONITE GLOBAL REPRESENTATIVE PROGRAM FOR ENCRYPTION TECHNOLOGY Just to be clear (and I am just helping !Effective clarify) is that the firm is a consulting firm with the goal of helping companies go from !(not) Effective to Effective. It is not the name of a security product. I agree that it is a bit too esoteric but except for geeks like us who "speak" in programming languages, most of their target audience only sees it as a variant of Spanish punctuation ;) Jack -----Original Message----- From: owner-ukcrypto@maillist.ox.ac.uk [mailto:owner-ukcrypto@maillist.ox.ac.uk] On Behalf Of Brian Morrison Sent: Thursday, February 04, 1999 3:29 AM To: ukcrypto@maillist.ox.ac.uk Subject: Re: ANNOUNCEMENT: RPK SECURITY ANNOUNCES RPK ENCRYPTONITE GLOBAL REPRESENTATIVE PROGRAM FOR ENCRYPTION TECHNOLOGY -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On Thu, 04 Feb 1999 10:39:03 +0000, Nicholas Bohm wrote: >I know this is a boring request, but will someone spill the beans and >explain the joke for C and Perl ignorami like me? > ! is C (and PERL) speak for logical not, so !Effective means not effective, a bad name for a security product eh? - -- Brian Morrison bdm@fenrir.demon.co.uk "Almost noon, and she had yet to go the launderette in Concreton to thaw out chickens in the spin-drier..." PGP Public Key Fingerprint= C7 12 B9 54 00 0F 51 F6 37 9B 18 D1 E1 61 14 0B -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGPfreeware 5.0i OS/2 for non-commercial use Comment: This comment _is_ plain text Charset: cp850 iQA/AwUBNrl2WfQTY1HeMuXFEQIaNgCeLCD9ZvWvkouscOE4WsF7GboiSmIAnR/L 2Te1cy+XfIGZiOFdYIhQz9b5 =y0e9 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From E.J.Koops@kub.nl Fri, 5 Feb 1999 13:19:18 MET Date: Fri, 5 Feb 1999 13:19:18 MET From: Bert-Jaap Koops E.J.Koops@kub.nl Subject: disclosure of crypto keys David Swarbrick : > I have to say, though, that it is likely to be of very little > persuasive value in the UK, and even less so in Europe. > We do not have anything like the same well developed and defined law > protecting against self incrimination. Not the same well developed case-law, but we do have two judgements of the European Court of Human Rights: Funke and Saunders. My reading of those judgements is that the protection in Europe is quite similar to that in the US. You should read Funke to gain some confidence that the privilege against self-incrimination is really substantial in Europe. (Funke was threatened with a conviction for not giving foreign bank account papers which he'd said earlier he had. The European Court concluded a breach of article 6 of the European Convention because there was improper compulsion to hand over potentially incriminating material.) > Whether and how much it will change with the incorporation of the Euro > Convention on Human Rights remains to be seen. Pardon my ignorance, but is not the UK already bound to the European Convention of Human Rights? Bert-Jaap --------------------------------------------------------------------- Bert-Jaap Koops tel +31 13 466 8101 Tilburg University facs +31 13 466 8149 P.O. Box 90153 e-mail E.J.Koops@kub.nl 5000 LE Tilburg http://cwis.kub.nl/~frw/people/koops/bertjaap.htm the Netherlands --------------------------------------------------------------------- This world's just mad enough to have been made by the Being his beings into being prayed. (Howard Nemerov) --------------------------------------------------------------------- From E.J.Koops@kub.nl Fri, 5 Feb 1999 13:41:31 MET Date: Fri, 5 Feb 1999 13:41:31 MET From: Bert-Jaap Koops E.J.Koops@kub.nl Subject: Self Incrimination and Crypto FAQ "Arnold G. Reinhold" wrote (some time ago) > Subject: Re: Self Incrimination and Cryptographic Keys in US > This discussion deserves an FAQ of its own I haven't participated in the discussion on cryptography@c2.net, but there is a similar thread on ukcrypto in which I mentioned briefly the results of my research into this issue [*]. Moreover, the discussion pops up every year or so on these or other lists, and the same arguments are repeated many times. So, it seems sensible to make a FAQ. I would volunteer for this, but that I probably won't have time until July. What do people think? Should I give it a try? If so, can it wait until July? Kind regards, Bert-Jaap [*] See Chapter 8 of my Ph.D. thesis The Crypto Controversy, not online, but summary available at http://cwis.kub.nl/~frw/people/koops/thesis/thesis.htm --------------------------------------------------------------------- Bert-Jaap Koops tel +31 13 466 8101 Tilburg University facs +31 13 466 8149 P.O. Box 90153 e-mail E.J.Koops@kub.nl 5000 LE Tilburg http://cwis.kub.nl/~frw/people/koops/bertjaap.htm the Netherlands --------------------------------------------------------------------- This world's just mad enough to have been made by the Being his beings into being prayed. (Howard Nemerov) --------------------------------------------------------------------- From Clare.Wardle@postoffice.co.uk 05 Feb 1999 14:02:04 Z Date: 05 Feb 1999 14:02:04 Z From: Clare Wardle Clare.Wardle@postoffice.co.uk Subject: disclosure of crypto keys Yes, the UK is a signatory to the European Convention on Human Rights, but it is about to incorporate it into UK law in a statute (which will mean that it will hopefully be easier for those who think that their rights have been breached to get a remedy since they will be able to cite the statute in the courts in the UK, rather than having to go through those courts under national law and then go to Europe to check whether that answer was in accordance with their rights under the Convention. From Clare.Wardle@postoffice.co.uk 05 Feb 1999 14:02:03 Z Date: 05 Feb 1999 14:02:03 Z From: Clare Wardle Clare.Wardle@postoffice.co.uk Subject: disclosure of crypto keys Yes, the UK is a signatory to the European Convention on Human Rights, but it is about to incorporate it into UK law in a statute (which will mean that it will hopefully be easier for those who think that their rights have been breached to get a remedy since they will be able to cite the statute in the UK courts, rather than having to go through the UK courts under national law and then go to Europe to check whether that answer was in accordance with their rights under the Convention. From proff@iq.org Sat, 6 Feb 1999 01:27:07 +1100 (EST) Date: Sat, 6 Feb 1999 01:27:07 +1100 (EST) From: Julian Assange proff@iq.org Subject: Danger: spooks at work Danger: spooks at work by STEWART FIST The Australian 2feb99 ONE standby of investigative journalism is the Freedom of Information Act (the FOI) which sometimes allows reporters to access documents that politicians or bureaucrats would prefer remain hidden. Australia wasn't the first to introduce such an act. We copied the idea fairly recently and quite reluctantly from the US, where, for 30 years the right of journalists to access government information has been a mainstay of democracy. The FOI movement came from the government's denial in 1954 that nuclear bomb tests in the Pacific had resulted in lethal radiation. Everyone knew they had, but the news media ran into a wall of government silence. As US President James Madison once said: "A popular government, without popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a prologue to a farce or a tragedy - or perhaps both. Knowledge will forever govern ignorance, and a people who mean to be their own Governors must arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives." The American Civil Liberties Union took up the matter, and in 1966 the US Congress passed the Freedom of Information Act which "requires Federal agencies to make records available to the public through public inspection and upon the request of any person for any public or private use". Two years ago, the US amended its act to allow for electronic access (E-FOIA) which "includes improving public access to government information and records . . . [and] reducing the delays in agencies' responses to request for records". It also redefined records as including electronically stored information. Some US states also have their own FOI Acts, and some have quasi-judicial commissions that impose substantial penalties on departments and individuals failing to produce documents. Other states have what they cutely call Project Sunshines, which work in association with local bar associations to ensure government agencies respond to legitimate requests. Connecticut's FOI Commission recently imposed fines of $1800 for non-compliance on an agency, and warned the Oxford Board of Education that failure to act would "result in the referral of this matter to the appropriate state's attorney for criminal prosecution". This is technically a class-B misdemeanour. In Australia, we are light years behind, although we've come a long way since I was actively involved in television current affairs in the late 1960s. But politicians such as Jeff Kennett aren't particularly enamoured of the idea of having journalists probe into their dealings. Apart from banning his ministers and staff from talking to any pinko ABC types, Kennett has now found an excuse to attack the whole concept of FOI, and is threatening to legislate to block all access. This is casino capitalism with a totalitarian slant. Attacks of this kind on investigative journalism surface every year or two, yet many Australians don't appear to interpret them as personal attacks on their right to know. In the US, the FOI Act is used more by grassroots activists and organisations than by journalists; but here it is too complex, expensive and time-consuming for most non-journalists to bother. It is instructive to lift the curtain of bureaucratic secrecy in Australia to see what government agencies release and what they censor. This month we've been given an opportunity to do that, through the online release of an uncensored copy of the Walsh Report by Internet privacy campaign group Electronic Frontiers Australia (EFA). Gerard Walsh, a former deputy director of ASIO, and one of Australia's spy-masters, names his report: Review of Policy Relating to Encryption Technologies. It was commissioned by the Federal Attorney-General's Department in late 1996 as a background paper for an open public debate on cryptography. However, distribution was blocked at the last minute by unknown bureaucrats in some unknown government agency - but only after the report was in the hands of the government printer. The EFA, which takes a serious interest in cryptographic matters, applied for a copy under FOI, but the request was refused for "law enforcement, public safety and national security" reasons. EFA tried again in 1997, and finally scored a heavily censored copy. Cuts in FOI documents are accompanied by explanations of why the material is said to be sensitive. Unfortunately for the censors, a few original copies of the report were sent to libraries, and a university student recently stumbled across an unexpurgated version gathering dust in the State Library in Hobart. So it is now possible to make a comparison between the censored and virgin copies, and evaluate the FOI process itself. Walsh was proposing to open discussion on some legitimate questions about the way criminals were able to use encryption to avoid detection. As befitting a spy master, he was willing to accept that Trojan Horses and secret back doors into computer systems should be used to keep the police informed of possible criminal activities. Trojan Horses are virus-like utilities that can be planted in software to transmit passwords and other information back to the police or security services. I have no desire to see criminals gain ascendancy over the police by using new electronic technologies, but I do have reservations about the casual way the police claim the right to use such invasive technologies, and the way they ignore basic rights of privacy. But whether you agree with Walsh or not is beside the point. You didn't ever get to see the background document, so these discussion items were never seriously considered by the community. They disappeared from public view courtesy of some bureaucratic censor's scissors. So it's fascinating now to compare the cut made with the claims as to why they were made. For example, a suggestion of design flaws in American and British key-recovery proposals was cut out, despite the fact that the flaws were well-known worldwide. Also cut was a comment that export controls were of dubious value, along with one that American agencies sought to dominate discussion on encryption policy. Since the US Government has banned the export of serious cryptography under its Munitions Act and lined up police and security services around the world to support it, this seems hard to deny. These cuts were ostensibly made for reasons of "national security, defence or international relations", when obviously they were casually censored so as not to hurt the delicate feelings of some American or Pommy mates in brother security establishments. Two other cuts purported to refer to internal working documents. The first recommended that law enforcement agencies should be allowed to hack into private computers without being charged under anti-hacking laws (they do this all the time), and the second suggested the authorities be given the legal right to demand encryption keys (the secret key that permits decoding) from suspects. The first recommendation tries to legalise a common-but-illegal police/security practice, and the second infringes the right of citizens not to incriminate themselves. With the above, you can credit the authorities with self-serving rationality and a minuscule of efficiency, but the following are almost beyond belief. These cuts were made supposedly because they were capable of "affecting enforcement of law and protection of public safety": A statement that encryption is a looming problem. A statement that strong encryption is widely available and can't be broken. Acknowledgment that more overt forms of surveillance carry political risk. A statement that communications interception is valuable. A statement that criminals are using prepaid cards in mobile phones. These are so trivial they almost deserve cutting because they patronise the intelligence of the reader. But the idea that they could affect law enforcement or public safety is beyond comprehension. The bureaucrats also cut a bit of scuttlebutt that Australia might need another crypto-analytical agency (probably protecting their own department's pre-eminence in this area), and some motherhood statements about the need for secret agencies to have special privileges: protection from disclosure; the rights of covert entry to premises; and exemption from the normal legal discovery process. As Mandy Rice-Davies once said about some other figures of authority caught in similarly compromising circumstances: "They would say that, wouldn't they!" This censoring of the Walsh Report makes a mockery of the Freedom of Information Act. The agency concerned has misused both the Act and the regulations concerning national security classifications. This is clearly a bureaucracy more anxious to avoid embarrassment than to encourage genuine policy debate. The EFA report is at: www.efa.org.au/Issues/Crypto/Walsh/index.htm -- Julian Assange Patriots always talk of dying for their country, and never of killing for their country. - Bertrand Russel From I.Brown@cs.ucl.ac.uk Fri, 05 Feb 1999 16:18:29 +0100 Date: Fri, 05 Feb 1999 16:18:29 +0100 From: Ian BROWN I.Brown@cs.ucl.ac.uk Subject: Danger: spooks at work > ONE standby of investigative journalism is the Freedom of > Information Act (the FOI) which sometimes allows reporters to > access documents that politicians or bureaucrats would prefer > remain hidden... And on a UK FOIA, ta-da, here comes Jack Straw to the rescue of the spooks and police (as usual). Unbelievable for someone who was spied upon by MI5 because he was president of the National Union of Students in a previous life. Access to secrets will be diluted By Andrew Grice, Political Editor The Independent, 5 February 1999 THE GOVERNMENT has watered down its long-awaited plans for a Freedom of Information Act, which will be published next month. Although ministers will hail their proposals as an historic and radical change, they are facing a backlash from Labour MPs furious that the legislation will be weaker than outlined in a 1997 White Paper... Labour MPs who want "an act with teeth" believe it has been watered down by Jack Straw, the Home Secretary, who took over responsibility for freedom of information after David Clark, the Cabinet Office minister, was sacked by Tony Blair last July. Mr Clark drew up the White Paper and wanted a radical bill. Andrew Mackinlay, the Labour MP for Thurrock, said yesterday: "The White Paper was a ground-breaking document and should be enacted in full. It would give us one of the most radical Freedom of Information Acts in the world..." http://www.independent.co.uk/stories/A0502918.html From gladman@seven77.demon.co.uk Mon, 8 Feb 1999 17:07:32 -0000 Date: Mon, 8 Feb 1999 17:07:32 -0000 From: Brian Gladman gladman@seven77.demon.co.uk Subject: PGP 6.0 Source Code The source code for PGP 6.0 is now available in Europe at: www.pgpi.com I have downloaded it but I have not compiled all of it yet as it uses a few tools that I don't have. Brian From ben@algroup.co.uk Mon, 08 Feb 1999 19:14:37 +0000 Date: Mon, 08 Feb 1999 19:14:37 +0000 From: Ben Laurie ben@algroup.co.uk Subject: Possible Security Problem: Fake PGP Key It has come to my attention that there is a faked key out there, purporting to be mine: Key ID: 0x6B722A59 Fingerprint: 428C 1E68 35E1 E96C 177A F49C A906 3F1F 6B72 2A59 Name: Ben Laurie Created: 09/10/98 Type: 2048/1024 DH/DSS It isn't clear to me what the point of this key is, but since I use PGP to sign both Apache and Apache-SSL, and given recent Trojans, it isn't hard to guess. I didn't create this key. I don't know who did. I have no report of it being used (yet), but if anyone has seen it used, I'd like to know about it. BTW, I observe that it is hard to know that my key is really mine, since it isn't signed by well-known people. If there's anyone out there who wants to sign it on the basis that they've seen it sign Apache or Apache-SSL distributions for several years, that would seem to be at least as worthwhile as having met me at a key-signing party.... Cheers, Ben. -- http://www.apache-ssl.org/ben.html "My grandfather once told me that there are two kinds of people: those who work and those who take the credit. He told me to try to be in the first group; there was less competition there." - Indira Gandhi From 101544.3054@compuserve.com Tue, 9 Feb 1999 14:32:45 -0500 Date: Tue, 9 Feb 1999 14:32:45 -0500 From: Rainer Fahs 101544.3054@compuserve.com Subject: PGP 6.0 Source Code Good news, Brian, should we now ask SECAN to start evaluation? :-) Rainer From gladman@seven77.demon.co.uk Wed, 10 Feb 1999 09:01:50 -0000 Date: Wed, 10 Feb 1999 09:01:50 -0000 From: Brian Gladman gladman@seven77.demon.co.uk Subject: PGP 6.0 Source Code -----Original Message----- From: Rainer Fahs <101544.3054@compuserve.com> To: INTERNET:ukcrypto@maillist.ox.ac.uk Date: 09 February 1999 19:38 Subject: PGP 6.0 Source Code Good news, Brian, should we now ask SECAN to start evaluation? :-) Rainer Hi Rainer, Certainly be interesting to hear their response - are you volunteering? Brian PS. For the uninitiated SECAN is NATO's crypto and infosec evaluation agency (and this is effectively NSA under another name). From gfu93@dial.pipex.com Wed, 10 Feb 1999 09:17:00 -0000 Date: Wed, 10 Feb 1999 09:17:00 -0000 From: Tony Seymour gfu93@dial.pipex.com Subject: New Stateman on crypto Casper, I am unable to read the New Statesman article, would there be any possibility of you sending me the article, thanks tony seymour -----Original Message----- From: Caspar Bowden To: ukcrypto@maillist.ox.ac.uk Date: 15 January 1999 17:59 Subject: New Stateman on crypto >http://rots.ivision.co.uk/~stefan/php/library.php3?Action=Record&searchStar t >=1&searchRange=10&searchWriter=&searchContent=encryption&searchSection=&sea r >chDayFrom=&searchMonthFrom=&searchYearFrom=&searchDayTo=&searchMonthTo=&sea r >chYearTo=&URN=199901080043 > >-- >Caspar Bowden http://www.fipr.org >Director, Foundation for Information Policy Research >Tel: +44(0)171 354 2333 Fax: +44(0)171 827 6534 > > > From jya@pipeline.com Wed, 10 Feb 1999 08:36:04 -0500 Date: Wed, 10 Feb 1999 08:36:04 -0500 From: John Young jya@pipeline.com Subject: RSA v. C2 Dan Tebbutt wrote an excellent piece yesterday in The Australian on RSA's fight with C2 for the IP of Eric Young and Tim Hudson, the covert process of getting AU approval for export of crypto and what it may mean for sweetheart arrangements to bypass global controls (no, there's no hint of GAK, yet): http://technology.news.com.au/indextech.asp?URL=/techno/features/f90210a.htm Mirrored at: http://jya.com/rsa-c2.dt.htm What's also of interest is how it demonstrates what appears to be happening with out-of-sight deal making among crypto manufacturers and government, as indicated by Freeh's remarks posted here by Declan. Sue Parker at Americans for Computer Privacy says that it too is busily working behind the scene to devise crypto legislation "acceptable to all parties." She wouldn't say when drafts of deals would be publically available. She did say that the recent Reno and Freeh encryption remarks "are nothing new." These offstage deals may account for why the crypto topic has been relatively quiet, and not merely because of the impeachment circus, maybe, indeed, the circus has served as a useful diversion. The rising hurrahs for counterterrorism funding, both in the US and overseas, portends a push for maintaining crypto controls worldwide -- as BXA's Reinsch stated in a speech yesterday: with a 64-bit worldwide limit "a loophole in Wassenaar has been closed." And BXA opened its regulation-rich, backroom deal-richer, Wassenaar site on Monday: http://www.bxa.doc.gov/Wassenaar/ Compare that smoke-filled Davos-forum with Dan's article on ever far-reaching, ever-richer RSA. Dream turbo-capitalism. From Tom.A.Parker@icl.com Wed, 10 Feb 1999 15:02:15 -0000 Date: Wed, 10 Feb 1999 15:02:15 -0000 From: Parker Tom TA Tom.A.Parker@icl.com Subject: Asymmetric Key sizes Although a lot is being said about the shrinking level of security offered by various symmetric key sizes, with 56 bits coming in for a lot of stick, haven't seen anything lately on asymmetric attacks. Has anyone any information on the latest successful attack position on asymmetric keys, RSA in particular? How secure is 512 bits considered now, and why? What's the current recommended key size? Has anything been published that is later than the now rather old (January 1996) "Report by the Ad Hoc Group of Cryptographers and Computer Scientists"? Thanks in advance, Tom Parker tom.a.parker@icl.com From Tom.A.Parker@icl.com Wed, 10 Feb 1999 15:02:15 -0000 Date: Wed, 10 Feb 1999 15:02:15 -0000 From: Parker Tom TA Tom.A.Parker@icl.com Subject: Asymmetric Key sizes Although a lot is being said about the shrinking level of security offered by various symmetric key sizes, with 56 bits coming in for a lot of stick, haven't seen anything lately on asymmetric attacks. Has anyone any information on the latest successful attack position on asymmetric keys, RSA in particular? How secure is 512 bits considered now, and why? What's the current recommended key size? Has anything been published that is later than the now rather old (January 1996) "Report by the Ad Hoc Group of Cryptographers and Computer Scientists"? Thanks in advance, Tom Parker tom.a.parker@icl.com From bdm@fenrir.demon.co.uk Wed, 10 Feb 1999 16:55:37 Date: Wed, 10 Feb 1999 16:55:37 From: Brian Morrison bdm@fenrir.demon.co.uk Subject: Asymmetric Key sizes On Wed, 10 Feb 1999 15:02:15 -0000, Parker Tom TA wrote: >Although a lot is being said about the shrinking level of security offered >by various symmetric key sizes, with 56 bits coming in for a lot of stick, >haven't seen anything lately on asymmetric attacks. Has anyone any >information on the latest successful attack position on asymmetric keys, RSA >in particular? How secure is 512 bits considered now, and why? What's the >current recommended key size? Has anything been published that is later than >the now rather old (January 1996) "Report by the Ad Hoc Group of >Cryptographers and Computer Scientists"? > There was a posting to sci.crypt (might have been sci.crypt.research) a few days ago stating that the RSA-140 factoring challenge had been completed, this involves factoring a 140 digit number, a similar process to that required to break an RSA key. I think that this development means that it is now possible to break 512 bit RSA keys, and reduces the security of 768 bit RSA keys. I certainly can't claim to be able to rigorously state this, but that was the tone of the post. A search of Dejanews would probably locate the post in question. HTH -- Brian Morrison bdm@fenrir.demon.co.uk 'The village populace is jumpin' on faces, catchin' the javelin, Headin' the shot.' [FX: wet thud - "Oooo.."] From jya@pipeline.com Wed, 10 Feb 1999 12:16:49 -0500 Date: Wed, 10 Feb 1999 12:16:49 -0500 From: John Young jya@pipeline.com Subject: Asymmetric Key sizes The factoring of RSA140 is described at: http://jya.com/rsa140.htm From s.simpson@mia.co.uk Wed, 10 Feb 1999 17:20:00 +0000 Date: Wed, 10 Feb 1999 17:20:00 +0000 From: Simpson, Sam s.simpson@mia.co.uk Subject: Asymmetric Key sizes -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 We know that 512-bit keys have been insecure for some time now [Sch96a], [Odl95], [Rob95]; a well-funded adversary could certainly break these size keys (even if it does take a month or two). In reality, an adversary wouldn't even need to be well funded - they would just need access to a large network of computers. The adversary could thus be a computer manufacturer, a large corporation (using idle time on computers) or a co-ordinated effort. If doubt exists about the ability to factor a 512-bit key one only has to see that a 465-bit key was broken with just 2000 MIPS-years of effort [Paa99]. [Odl95] A.M.Odlyzko, "The Future of Integer Factorization", RSA CryptoBytes, Volume 1, Number 2, Summer 1995. [Paa99] C.Paar, message beginning "The next RSA challenge, RSA140...", as distributed on cryptography@c2.net mailing list, 4th Feb 1999. [Rob95] M.J.B.Robshaw, "Security Estimates for 512-bit RSA", RSA Labs, June 29. [Sch96a] B.Schneier, "Applied Cryptography, Second Edition", Wiley, 1996. Using any less than an absolute minimum of 768-bits for data which needs even medium term protection seems imprudent. Hope this helps, Sam Simpson Comms Analyst - -- http://www.hertreg.ac.uk/ss/ for ScramDisk hard-drive encryption & Delphi Crypto Components. PGP Keys available at the same site. > -----Original Message----- > From: Parker Tom TA [mailto:Tom.A.Parker@icl.com] > Sent: Wednesday, February 10, 1999 3:02 PM > To: 'ukcrypto@maillist.ox.ac.uk' > Subject: Asymmetric Key sizes > > > Although a lot is being said about the shrinking level of > security offered > by various symmetric key sizes, with 56 bits coming in for a > lot of stick, > haven't seen anything lately on asymmetric attacks. Has anyone any > information on the latest successful attack position on > asymmetric keys, RSA > in particular? How secure is 512 bits considered now, and > why? What's the > current recommended key size? Has anything been published > that is later than > the now rather old (January 1996) "Report by the Ad Hoc Group of > Cryptographers and Computer Scientists"? > > Thanks in advance, > > Tom Parker > tom.a.parker@icl.com > > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP 6.0.2 iQA/AwUBNsG/z+0ty8FDP9tPEQJQgQCg6sgjXUI9FRsp8Z+2CldsRv1gJRIAoNg+ mf3aq0BXhGthwuQ9FXlFEMTH =zQIA -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From R.ASKWITH@livjm.ac.uk Wed, 10 Feb 1999 17:38:16 +0000 Date: Wed, 10 Feb 1999 17:38:16 +0000 From: Bob Askwith R.ASKWITH@livjm.ac.uk Subject: Asymmetric Key sizes happened to see this just today... RSA 140 factored (465 bits) http://jya.com/rsa140.htm At 15:02 10/02/99 -0000, you wrote: >Although a lot is being said about the shrinking level of security offered >by various symmetric key sizes, with 56 bits coming in for a lot of stick, >haven't seen anything lately on asymmetric attacks. Has anyone any >information on the latest successful attack position on asymmetric keys, RSA >in particular? How secure is 512 bits considered now, and why? What's the >current recommended key size? Has anything been published that is later than >the now rather old (January 1996) "Report by the Ad Hoc Group of >Cryptographers and Computer Scientists"? --------------- Cheers, Bob. From pleyland@microsoft.com Wed, 10 Feb 1999 09:40:43 -0800 Date: Wed, 10 Feb 1999 09:40:43 -0800 From: Paul Leyland pleyland@microsoft.com Subject: Asymmetric Key sizes > Although a lot is being said about the shrinking level of > security offered > by various symmetric key sizes, with 56 bits coming in for a > lot of stick, > haven't seen anything lately on asymmetric attacks. Has anyone any > information on the latest successful attack position on > asymmetric keys, RSA > in particular? How secure is 512 bits considered now, and > why? What's the > current recommended key size? Has anything been published > that is later than > the now rather old (January 1996) "Report by the Ad Hoc Group of > Cryptographers and Computer Scientists"? The world record factorization is now 463 bits. See, for example, http://listserv.nodak.edu/scripts/wa.exe?A2=ind9902&L=nmbrthry&F=&S=&P=302 512 bits is looking decidedly shaky IMAO. Paul From LKhan@zergo.com Wed, 10 Feb 1999 17:52:42 -0000 Date: Wed, 10 Feb 1999 17:52:42 -0000 From: Liaquat Khan LKhan@zergo.com Subject: Asymmetric Key sizes The RSA challenge RSA-140, a 140-digit modulus (about 465-bits long) was factored into two 70-digit prime numbers, using the Number Field Sieve(NFS), recently, see http://jya.com/rsa140.htm. 512-bit keys were considered on the small size for a quite while now, but they are definitely too close for comfort after this (although key length is really dependent on the application, I feel, the (absolute) minimum key length (for RSA) one should really use is 640-bits). regards, Liaquat Khan -----Original Message----- From: Parker Tom TA [mailto:Tom.A.Parker@icl.com] Sent: 10 February 1999 15:02 To: 'ukcrypto@maillist.ox.ac.uk' Subject: Asymmetric Key sizes Although a lot is being said about the shrinking level of security offered by various symmetric key sizes, with 56 bits coming in for a lot of stick, haven't seen anything lately on asymmetric attacks. Has anyone any information on the latest successful attack position on asymmetric keys, RSA in particular? How secure is 512 bits considered now, and why? What's the current recommended key size? Has anything been published that is later than the now rather old (January 1996) "Report by the Ad Hoc Group of Cryptographers and Computer Scientists"? Thanks in advance, Tom Parker tom.a.parker@icl.com From pleyland@microsoft.com Wed, 10 Feb 1999 10:01:00 -0800 Date: Wed, 10 Feb 1999 10:01:00 -0800 From: Paul Leyland pleyland@microsoft.com Subject: Asymmetric Key sizes > From: Brian Morrison [mailto:bdm@fenrir.demon.co.uk] > There was a posting to sci.crypt (might have been > sci.crypt.research) a > few days ago stating that the RSA-140 factoring challenge had been > completed, this involves factoring a 140 digit number, a similar > process to that required to break an RSA key. > > I think that this development means that it is now possible to break > 512 bit RSA keys, and reduces the security of 768 bit RSA keys. I > certainly can't claim to be able to rigorously state this, > but that was the tone of the post. It has been possible to break 512 bit keys for several years. Back in 1994 we estimated that the same approach we used for RSA-129 (429 bits) would work for a 512-bit key, albeit with about 90 times as much sieving and several weeks on big iron for the linear algebra. We also recognized back then that GNFS would do the job with less effort. Advances in algorithms and technology have made a 512-bit key now about as hard as 429-bit key then --- at least as far as the sieving goes. The linear algebra is still much harder. As for 768-bit keys, they would appear to be resistant to any reasonable attack with any reasonable amount of hardware. > A search of Dejanews would probably locate the post in question. I refer the honorable member to my previous reply. 8-) Paul From duggie_stenhouse@hotmail.com Thu, 11 Feb 1999 07:14:12 PST Date: Thu, 11 Feb 1999 07:14:12 PST From: Duggie Stenhouse duggie_stenhouse@hotmail.com Subject: BT's Trustwire 40 bit secure communications claim Just been harangued by a BT salesman trying to sell the services of the BT spinoff http://www.trustwise.com Basically it's a "bona fide" certificate issuer - however, they are also selling "secure e-commerce solution" based on 40 bit keys which "guarantee security" ho hum ______________________________________________________ Get Your Private, Free Email at http://www.hotmail.com From duggie_stenhouse@hotmail.com Thu, 11 Feb 1999 07:14:12 PST Date: Thu, 11 Feb 1999 07:14:12 PST From: Duggie Stenhouse duggie_stenhouse@hotmail.com Subject: BT's Trustwire 40 bit secure communications claim Just been harangued by a BT salesman trying to sell the services of the BT spinoff http://www.trustwise.com Basically it's a "bona fide" certificate issuer - however, they are also selling "secure e-commerce solution" based on 40 bit keys which "guarantee security" ho hum ______________________________________________________ Get Your Private, Free Email at http://www.hotmail.com From owenc@panix.com Thu, 11 Feb 1999 18:57:14 -0500 (EST) Date: Thu, 11 Feb 1999 18:57:14 -0500 (EST) From: Owen O'Connor owenc@panix.com Subject: BT's Trustwire 40 bit secure communications claim THIS IS NOT FOR FORWARDING OR PUBLIC ATTRIBUTION. The product is re-badged Verisign. Officially and effectively, it's verisign with a locacl reseller. Notice the huge similarity between it and digitalid.verisign.com. It's also oddly more expensive than VS - and they also admit that. On Thu, 11 Feb 1999, Duggie Stenhouse wrote: > Just been harangued by a BT salesman trying to sell the services > of the BT spinoff http://www.trustwise.com > > Basically it's a "bona fide" certificate issuer - however, they are also > selling "secure e-commerce solution" based on 40 bit keys which > "guarantee security" > > ho hum > > ______________________________________________________ > Get Your Private, Free Email at http://www.hotmail.com > From steve@tightrope.demon.co.uk Fri, 12 Feb 1999 09:16:31 +0000 Date: Fri, 12 Feb 1999 09:16:31 +0000 From: Steve Mynott steve@tightrope.demon.co.uk Subject: BT's Trustwire 40 bit secure communications claim strangly enough BT micropayment https://transend.labs.bt.com/ uses a RSA 128-bit cert. How have they managed that? On Thu, Feb 11, 1999 at 07:14:12AM -0800, Duggie Stenhouse wrote: > Just been harangued by a BT salesman trying to sell the services > of the BT spinoff http://www.trustwise.com > > Basically it's a "bona fide" certificate issuer - however, they are also > selling "secure e-commerce solution" based on 40 bit keys which > "guarantee security" -- 1024/D9C69DF9 steve mynott steve@tightrope.demon.co.uk http://www.pineal.com/ just about every computer on the market today runs unix, except the mac (and nobody cares about it). -- bill joy 6/21/85 From dparkins@alien.bt.co.uk Fri, 12 Feb 1999 10:57:37 +0000 Date: Fri, 12 Feb 1999 10:57:37 +0000 From: David Parkinson dparkins@alien.bt.co.uk Subject: BT's Trustwire 40 bit secure communications claim At 09:16 12/02/99 +0000, Steve Mynott wrote: >strangly enough BT micropayment > >https://transend.labs.bt.com/ > >uses a RSA 128-bit cert. How have they managed that? > According to my browser: The RC4 encryption is 128-bit (40 secret) The RSA element is 512-bit. David From ben@algroup.co.uk Fri, 12 Feb 1999 11:38:19 +0000 Date: Fri, 12 Feb 1999 11:38:19 +0000 From: Ben Laurie ben@algroup.co.uk Subject: BT's Trustwire 40 bit secure communications claim Steve Mynott wrote: > > strangly enough BT micropayment > > https://transend.labs.bt.com/ > > uses a RSA 128-bit cert. How have they managed that? Server-Gated Cryptography. Cheers, Ben. -- http://www.apache-ssl.org/ben.html "My grandfather once told me that there are two kinds of people: those who work and those who take the credit. He told me to try to be in the first group; there was less competition there." - Indira Gandhi From PHalliden@zergo.com Fri, 12 Feb 1999 12:03:13 -0000 Date: Fri, 12 Feb 1999 12:03:13 -0000 From: Paul Halliden PHalliden@zergo.com Subject: BT's Trustwire 40 bit secure communications claim According to my browser (IE4.01) the site uses a 128-bit *hash* (MD5) with 512-bit RSA keys used to establish a 40-bit RC4 encryption key. It also uses the older SSL v2.0 which is usually considered less secure than the current SSL v3.0. 128-bit RSA would be very weak ;-). Regards Paul Halliden Director for Strategic Technology ________________________________________________________________________ _ Baltimore, The Square, Basing View, Basingstoke, Hants, RG21 4EG, UK Tel: +44 (0) 1442 342 784 Fax: +44 (0) 1256 812901 http://www.baltimore.com Baltimore is the operating name of Zergo Holdings plc -----Original Message----- From: Steve Mynott [mailto:steve@tightrope.demon.co.uk] Sent: 12 February 1999 09:17 To: ukcrypto@maillist.ox.ac.uk Subject: Re: BT's Trustwire 40 bit secure communications claim strangly enough BT micropayment https://transend.labs.bt.com/ uses a RSA 128-bit cert. How have they managed that? On Thu, Feb 11, 1999 at 07:14:12AM -0800, Duggie Stenhouse wrote: > Just been harangued by a BT salesman trying to sell the services > of the BT spinoff http://www.trustwise.com > > Basically it's a "bona fide" certificate issuer - however, they are also > selling "secure e-commerce solution" based on 40 bit keys which > "guarantee security" -- 1024/D9C69DF9 steve mynott steve@tightrope.demon.co.uk http://www.pineal.com/ just about every computer on the market today runs unix, except the mac (and nobody cares about it). -- bill joy 6/21/85 From hcorn@cix.co.uk Fri, 12 Feb 1999 12:07 +0000 (GMT Standard Time) Date: Fri, 12 Feb 1999 12:07 +0000 (GMT Standard Time) From: Peter Sommer hcorn@cix.co.uk Subject: LSE/CSRC Security Colloquium BS7799 Feb 16 London School of Economics Computer Security Research Centre Public Security Colloquia 16 February 1999 Tuesdays LSE Clement Building Room D602, 1700-1900hrs BS 7799: from Code to Standard to Certificate Pudima Madhvi CIID/DTI The British Standard for Information Security Management is now maturing and a complete revision is due for publication. In 1993 it was Code of Practice and in 1995 it became a full British Standard. A certification scheme, C:cure is in place and the first certicated information systems are expected to be announced in the next tow months. Pudima Madhvi of the DTI will provide an update, discuss the scheme's future and react to criticisms that the certification scheme may engender a false sense of comfort Members of the public may attend free of charge but must pre-register by e-mail to csrc@lse.ac.uk. Some meetings take place under Chatham House Rules. The LSE Clement Building is on the Aldwych, London WC2 between the Law Courts and the south end of Kingsway; there is a large hanging white sign on the outside. Future Programme details: http://csrc.lse.ac.uk/Colloquia/colloquia1.htm Enquiries: 0171 955 6197 (voice-mail service) This year's colloquium series is made possible through the kind assistance of Deutsche Bank |-> Peter Sommer --------------------------------------------->| |-> hcorn@cix.co.uk P.M.Sommer@lse.ac.uk -------------------->| |-> Academic URL: http://csrc.lse.ac.uk/Sommer/sommer.htm ---->| |-> Commercial URL: http://www.virtualcity.co.uk ------------->| From cb@fipr.org Fri, 12 Feb 1999 13:09:42 -0000 Date: Fri, 12 Feb 1999 13:09:42 -0000 From: Caspar Bowden cb@fipr.org Subject: T&I Select Committee evidence (2 Feb) on BBC Parliament Channel (Sunday) For those who can get it, a repeat showing of the oral evidence given on Feb 2nd to the Trade and Industry Select Committee inquiry on E-Commerce, will be shown this Sunday (14/2/99) on the BBC Parliament Channel at 5:30am (duration 2 hours 15 min). May also be repeated next week. Much reference to escrow/licensing etc. Scheduled list of witnesses =========================== British Telecommunications plc Sir Peter Bonfield - Chief Executive Officer Sue Davidson - Director, Strategy and Business Development Federation of the Electronics Industries Mr. Anthony Parish - Director General Mr Christopher Binns - Secretary, FEI's Cryptography & Trust Services Policy Group; EMERITUS Project Manager Mr Keith Chapple - Managing Director Intel (UK); Chairman of FEI's Information and Communications Technology Council Mr Peter Dare - IBM (UK); Chairman FEI's Cryptography and Trust Services Policy Group; EMERITUS Project Director Computing Services and Software Association Mr John Higgins - Director General Mr Robert Carolina - Partner, TarloLyons solicitors Mr Dick Emery - Group E-Commerce Manager, ICL Mr Bob Scott - Director E-Commerce, Cap Gemini Internet Service Provider's Association Mr Tim Pearson - Chairman Mr Nicholas Lansman - Secretary General Mr Jim Dixon - Council Member -- Caspar Bowden http://www.fipr.org Director, Foundation for Information Policy Research Tel: +44(0)171 354 2333 Fax: +44(0)171 827 6534 From davidh@spidacom.co.uk Fri, 12 Feb 1999 13:08:20 -0000 Date: Fri, 12 Feb 1999 13:08:20 -0000 From: davidh@spidacom.co.uk davidh@spidacom.co.uk Subject: BT's Trustwire 40 bit secure communications claim On 11 Feb 99, at 7:14, Duggie Stenhouse wrote: > Basically it's a "bona fide" certificate issuer - however, they are also > selling "secure e-commerce solution" based on 40 bit keys which "guarantee > security" I looked at the BT site yesterday. I have insecure keys turned off in my browser, as a result it told me that it could not negotiate a compatible set of ciphers, or words to that effect. When I temporarily turned on the insecure keys it worked. I was not impressed and pointed my browser at Thawte instead, which prodvides real certificates. David Hansen | davidh@spidacom.co.uk | PGP email preferred Edinburgh | CI$ number 100024,3247 | key number 5432274D From pope@secstan.com Fri, 12 Feb 1999 13:37:53 -0000 Date: Fri, 12 Feb 1999 13:37:53 -0000 From: Nick Pope pope@secstan.com Subject: BT's Trustwire 40 bit secure communications claim I looked through the description of server-gated Cryptogrphy and can't find anything which says exactly what in the certificate switches on this capability. Anyone know? Nick Pope > -----Original Message----- > From: owner-ukcrypto@maillist.ox.ac.uk > [mailto:owner-ukcrypto@maillist.ox.ac.uk]On Behalf Of Ben Laurie > Sent: 12 February 1999 11:38 > To: ukcrypto@maillist.ox.ac.uk > Subject: Re: BT's Trustwire 40 bit secure communications claim > > > Steve Mynott wrote: > > > > strangly enough BT micropayment > > > > https://transend.labs.bt.com/ > > > > uses a RSA 128-bit cert. How have they managed that? > > Server-Gated Cryptography. > > Cheers, > > Ben. > > -- > http://www.apache-ssl.org/ben.html > > "My grandfather once told me that there are two kinds of people: those > who work and those who take the credit. He told me to try to be in the > first group; there was less competition there." > - Indira Gandhi > > From Pete@dmed.demon.co.uk Fri, 12 Feb 1999 15:12:20 +0000 Date: Fri, 12 Feb 1999 15:12:20 +0000 From: Pete Mitchell Pete@dmed.demon.co.uk Subject: T&I Select Committee evidence (2 Feb) on BBC Parliament Channel (Sunday) Caspar Bowden wrote: > > For those who can get it, a repeat showing of the oral evidence given on Feb > 2nd to the Trade and Industry Select Committee inquiry on E-Commerce, will > be shown this Sunday (14/2/99) on the BBC Parliament Channel at 5:30am > (duration 2 hours 15 min). May also be repeated next week. Much reference to > escrow/licensing etc. > Is that BBC1 or BBC2? -- Peter Mitchell From ben@algroup.co.uk Fri, 12 Feb 1999 15:15:10 +0000 Date: Fri, 12 Feb 1999 15:15:10 +0000 From: Ben Laurie ben@algroup.co.uk Subject: BT's Trustwire 40 bit secure communications claim Nick Pope wrote: > > I looked through the description of server-gated Cryptogrphy and can't find > anything which says exactly what in the certificate switches on this > capability. Anyone know? It is the fact that it is issued by a CA which is flagged in the browser's cert DB as being an SGC CA. Cheers, Ben. -- http://www.apache-ssl.org/ben.html "My grandfather once told me that there are two kinds of people: those who work and those who take the credit. He told me to try to be in the first group; there was less competition there." - Indira Gandhi From mark@awe.com Fri, 12 Feb 1999 15:25:40 +0000 (GMT) Date: Fri, 12 Feb 1999 15:25:40 +0000 (GMT) From: Mark J Cox mark@awe.com Subject: BT's Trustwire 40 bit secure communications claim > > https://transend.labs.bt.com/ > > uses a RSA 128-bit cert. How have they managed that? > Server-Gated Cryptography. Actually it isn't using SGC, the site returns a standard certificate which doesn't contain any SGC extensions. They use a version of the Open Market webserver which is SSLv2 only but supports RC4-MD5 (128 bit) as well as EXP-RC4-MD5 (40 bit). Mark Mark J Cox, ......................................... www.awe.com/~mark Latest news on the Apache Web Server ............... www.apacheweek.com From cb@fipr.org Fri, 12 Feb 1999 15:55:12 -0000 Date: Fri, 12 Feb 1999 15:55:12 -0000 From: Caspar Bowden cb@fipr.org Subject: T&I Select Committee evidence (2 Feb) on BBC Parliament Channel (Sunday) >> For those who can get it, a repeat showing of the oral >evidence given on Feb >> 2nd to the Trade and Industry Select Committee inquiry on >E-Commerce, will >> be shown this Sunday (14/2/99) on the BBC Parliament Channel >at 5:30am >> (duration 2 hours 15 min). May also be repeated next week. >Much reference to >> escrow/licensing etc. >> > > >Is that BBC1 or BBC2? Cable/satellite :( -- Caspar Bowden http://www.fipr.org Director, Foundation for Information Policy Research Tel: +44(0)171 354 2333 Fax: +44(0)171 827 6534 From octobersdad@reporters.net Fri, 12 Feb 1999 15:50:53 +0000 Date: Fri, 12 Feb 1999 15:50:53 +0000 From: T Bruce Tober octobersdad@reporters.net Subject: T&I Select Committee evidence (2 Feb) on BBC Parliament Channel (Sunday) In message <99Feb12.150835gmt.27881@gateway.pearson-pro.com>, Pete Mitchell writes >Caspar Bowden wrote: >> >> For those who can get it, a repeat showing of the oral evidence given on Feb >> 2nd to the Trade and Industry Select Committee inquiry on E-Commerce, will >> be shown this Sunday (14/2/99) on the BBC Parliament Channel at 5:30am >> (duration 2 hours 15 min). May also be repeated next week. Much reference to >> escrow/licensing etc. >> > > >Is that BBC1 or BBC2? Neither. BBC Parliament channel is available from cable and ??? > tbt -- | Bruce Tober, , | | Birmingham, UK, EU +44-121-242-3832 (mobile - 07979-521-106). Freelance | |Journalist & Website consultancy and development. PGP details at my website| From alan@kable.co.uk Fri, 12 Feb 1999 16:19:05 -0000 Date: Fri, 12 Feb 1999 16:19:05 -0000 From: Alan Burkitt-Gray alan@kable.co.uk Subject: E-commerce on the box This is a multi-part message in MIME format. ------=_NextPart_000_0031_01BE56A3.69583900 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Caspar wrote: "For those who can get it, a repeat showing of the oral = evidence given on Feb 2nd to the Trade and Industry Select Committee inquiry on E-Commerce, = will be shown this Sunday (14/2/99) on the BBC Parliament Channel at 5:30am (duration 2 hours 15 min)." What a way to start Valentine's Day!=20 Alan B-G - ALAN BURKITT-GRAY, Editor, Government Computing The independent magazine about information age public service, for the people who are going to make it happen NEXT ISSUE: March 1999, mailed out 25 February Published monthly by Kable Ltd The Courtyard, 55 Charterhouse Street, London EC1M 6HA, UK tel 0171 608 0900, fax 0171 608 0901 international tel +44 171 608 0900, fax +44 171 608 0901 website http://www.kable.co.uk=20 e-mail alan@kable.co.uk For advance features information see http://www.governmentcomputing.com=20 Where's Kable? Look at=20 http://www.streetmap.co.uk/streetmap.dll?grid2map?X=3D531650&Y=3D181750&a= rrow=3Dy ------=_NextPart_000_0031_01BE56A3.69583900 Content-Type: text/html; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Caspar wrote: "For those who can get it, a repeat showing of = the oral=20 evidence given on Feb
2nd to the Trade and Industry Select Committee = inquiry=20 on E-Commerce, will
be shown this Sunday (14/2/99) on the BBC = Parliament=20 Channel at 5:30am
(duration 2 hours 15 min)."
 
What a way to start Valentine's Day!
 
Alan B-G


-
ALAN BURKITT-GRAY, Editor, = Government=20 Computing
The independent magazine about information = age=20 public service,
for the people who are going to make it=20 happen

NEXT ISSUE: March 1999, mailed out 25 = February

Published monthly by Kable Ltd
The Courtyard, 55=20 Charterhouse Street, London EC1M 6HA, UK
tel 0171 608 0900, fax 0171 = 608=20 0901
international tel +44 171 608 0900, fax +44 171 608 = 0901
website=20 http://www.kable.co.uk =
e-mail=20 alan@kable.co.uk
For advance features information = see http://www.governmentcomputing.com=20

Where's Kable? Look at
http://www.streetmap.co.uk/streetmap.dll?grid2map?X=3D531650&= ;Y=3D181750&arrow=3Dy

------=_NextPart_000_0031_01BE56A3.69583900-- From Denis.Russell@ncl.ac.uk Fri, 12 Feb 1999 17:31:33 +0000 Date: Fri, 12 Feb 1999 17:31:33 +0000 From: Denis.Russell@ncl.ac.uk Denis.Russell@ncl.ac.uk Subject: Asymmetric Key sizes At 10:01 -0800 10/2/99, Paul Leyland wrote: >... >It has been possible to break 512 bit keys for several years.... >... As for 768-bit keys, they would appear to be resistant to any >reasonable attack with any reasonable amount of hardware. ... I didn't get a clear feeling for what the prudent target should be. Paul says (above) that 768-bit keys should be OK now against "reasonable" attack. Does this mean the worst realistic case that we can think of for the present, and into the "foreseeable" future - a few years? How much more prudent would 1024 bits be? What about putting things the other way round? What's the problem with everyone going for 2048 now and (presumably) putting things so far out of reach that attackers just give up? Denis. From whgiii@openpgp.net Sat, 13 Feb 1999 08:36:21 -0600 Date: Sat, 13 Feb 1999 08:36:21 -0600 From: OpenPGP whgiii@openpgp.net Subject: Labour Party goes pro-GAK - Surprise. ==================BEGIN FORWARDED MESSAGE================== From: nospam@synernet.com (Ed Stone) Newsgroups: alt.privacy,alt.security.pgp,comp.security.pgp.discuss,talk.politics.crypto Subject: Labour Party goes pro-GAK - Surprise. Message-ID: Organization: Synernet X-Newsreader: MicroPlanet Gravity v2.10 Lines: 25 Date: Sat, 13 Feb 1999 08:36:35 -0500 NNTP-Posting-Host: 166.82.194.182 X-Trace: ralph.vnet.net 918913378 166.82.194.182 (Sat, 13 Feb 1999 08:42:58 EDT) NNTP-Posting-Date: Sat, 13 Feb 1999 08:42:58 EDT Path: carrera.intergate.ca!news.vphos.net!newsfeed.direct.ca!news-peer1.sprintlink.net!news-in-east1.sprintlink.net!news.sprintlink.net!ralph.vnet.net!not-for-mail Xref: carrera.intergate.ca alt.privacy:11310 alt.security.pgp:40015 comp.security.pgp.discuss:14989 talk.politics.crypto:8891 "The Labour Party has agreed to allow police access to Internet encryption codes despite a pre-election pledge to protect privacy on the Net." see http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/sci/tech/newsid_52000/52117.stm Earlier discussions asked whether democrats or republicans in the US were more or less pro gak/recovery/escrow/wiretap. The Labour party in the UK had "promised" (to those who still give credibility to political promises) to protect privacy on the net. My observation is that gak/recovery/escrow/wiretap is not a dem/rep, conserv/lib, authoritarian/democracy issue rather it is a government persons/non-government persons issue. Crypto serves as a technical barrier or point of resistance to government intrusion, and as such, almost all who are in government will fear it and attack it. Agreements on curtailing non-government people's access to un-gak'ed crypto will likley bring together such bedfellows as China and the US, as they share an interest in removing barriers to their powers to intrude upon their respective non-government persons. GAK/recovery/escrow/wiretap will be demanded no less fervently by the government of the US, than the government of China. In the US, a few "technical obstacles" (the Constitution and Bill of Rights) must be hurdled. -- --------------------------------------------------------------- William H. Geiger III http://www.openpgp.net Geiger Consulting Cooking With Warp 4.0 Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail. OS/2 PGP 5.0 at: http://www.openpgp.net/pgp.html Talk About PGP on IRC EFNet Channel: #pgp Nick: whgiii --------------------------------------------------------------- From whgiii@openpgp.net Sat, 13 Feb 1999 08:36:21 -0600 Date: Sat, 13 Feb 1999 08:36:21 -0600 From: OpenPGP whgiii@openpgp.net Subject: Labour Party goes pro-GAK - Surprise. ==================BEGIN FORWARDED MESSAGE================== From: nospam@synernet.com (Ed Stone) Newsgroups: alt.privacy,alt.security.pgp,comp.security.pgp.discuss,talk.politics.crypto Subject: Labour Party goes pro-GAK - Surprise. Message-ID: Organization: Synernet X-Newsreader: MicroPlanet Gravity v2.10 Lines: 25 Date: Sat, 13 Feb 1999 08:36:35 -0500 NNTP-Posting-Host: 166.82.194.182 X-Trace: ralph.vnet.net 918913378 166.82.194.182 (Sat, 13 Feb 1999 08:42:58 EDT) NNTP-Posting-Date: Sat, 13 Feb 1999 08:42:58 EDT Path: carrera.intergate.ca!news.vphos.net!newsfeed.direct.ca!news-peer1.sprintlink.net!news-in-east1.sprintlink.net!news.sprintlink.net!ralph.vnet.net!not-for-mail Xref: carrera.intergate.ca alt.privacy:11310 alt.security.pgp:40015 comp.security.pgp.discuss:14989 talk.politics.crypto:8891 "The Labour Party has agreed to allow police access to Internet encryption codes despite a pre-election pledge to protect privacy on the Net." see http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/sci/tech/newsid_52000/52117.stm Earlier discussions asked whether democrats or republicans in the US were more or less pro gak/recovery/escrow/wiretap. The Labour party in the UK had "promised" (to those who still give credibility to political promises) to protect privacy on the net. My observation is that gak/recovery/escrow/wiretap is not a dem/rep, conserv/lib, authoritarian/democracy issue rather it is a government persons/non-government persons issue. Crypto serves as a technical barrier or point of resistance to government intrusion, and as such, almost all who are in government will fear it and attack it. Agreements on curtailing non-government people's access to un-gak'ed crypto will likley bring together such bedfellows as China and the US, as they share an interest in removing barriers to their powers to intrude upon their respective non-government persons. GAK/recovery/escrow/wiretap will be demanded no less fervently by the government of the US, than the government of China. In the US, a few "technical obstacles" (the Constitution and Bill of Rights) must be hurdled. -- --------------------------------------------------------------- William H. Geiger III http://www.openpgp.net Geiger Consulting Cooking With Warp 4.0 Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail. OS/2 PGP 5.0 at: http://www.openpgp.net/pgp.html Talk About PGP on IRC EFNet Channel: #pgp Nick: whgiii --------------------------------------------------------------- From cb@fipr.org Sat, 13 Feb 1999 16:33:33 -0000 Date: Sat, 13 Feb 1999 16:33:33 -0000 From: Caspar Bowden cb@fipr.org Subject: Labour Party goes pro-GAK - Surprise. >[mailto:owner-ukcrypto@maillist.ox.ac.uk]On Behalf Of OpenPGP >Sent: 13 February 1999 14:36 >"The Labour Party has agreed to allow police access to >Internet encryption codes despite a pre-election pledge >to protect privacy on the Net." >see http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/sci/tech/newsid_52000/52117.stm This story is 30th Jan 1998 (Ninety-Eight). -- Caspar Bowden http://www.fipr.org Director, Foundation for Information Policy Research Tel: +44(0)171 354 2333 Fax: +44(0)171 827 6534 From goodyer@well.ox.ac.uk Sat, 13 Feb 1999 17:16:55 +0000 (BST) Date: Sat, 13 Feb 1999 17:16:55 +0000 (BST) From: Ian Goodyer goodyer@well.ox.ac.uk Subject: New welcome message Due to popular command, I have just updated the welcome/info message for the ukcrypto list to include instructions on how to subscribe/unsubscribe from the list and details of the web archive that is generously maintained by Ian Brown. As some of you have been subscribed for ages I thought I would include a copy of the welcome message. Sorry to trouble you all. ian ukcrypto owner ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ UK Cryptography Policy Discussion Group The group, supported by a mailing list, is comprised of people with a professional interest in the formulation and content of UK government policy on the provision, use and control of encryption products and services in the UK. It was been formed in response to the 1996 announcement of UK policy on the provision of encryption services on telecommunications networks. The aim of the forum is to exchange information and co-ordinate actions in order to achieve a UK government policy which: 1. preserves existing freedoms within the UK in respect of the design, development, provision and use of encryption products and services 2. is workable in practice given other constraints and factors which are beyond the control or influence of the UK government 3. meets the common interests of people in the UK in combating crime and terrorism 4. is set out with clarity and precision to meet clearly stated objectives which are demonstrably achievable in both political and technical terms 5. consistent with the above, minimises the extension of domestic and export controls on encryption products and services and removes existing controls which are unachievable, clarifying the scope of those that remain and the processes that will be used to implement them Everyone with an interest in the subject of UK cryptographic policy and deployment is welcome to join the list; it is *not* restricted to the British or those resident in the UK. The mailing list is unmoderated, but only subscribed members can post. The reply address is set to the list, in the interest of maintaining a freely flowing debate, so please be careful that you do not inadvertently post inappropriate responses. Your friends can subscribe to the list by sending a message to majordomo@maillist.ox.ac.uk with 'subscribe ukcrypto' in the body of the message. If you ever wish to unsubscribe send a message from the subscribed address to majordomo@maillist.ox.ac.uk with 'unsubscribe ukcrypto' in the body of the message. An archive of previous posts is kindly maintained by Ian Brown and can be found at http://www.cs.ucl.ac.uk/staff/I.Brown/archives/ukcrypto Please try and restrict postings to UK Encryption law and try not to stray onto general cryptology topics. The following topics for instance are not appropriate: i) Can PGP be cracked ii) What is the best PGP plugin for Eudora iii) What is the best way to encrypt a disk under Windows NT If you have doubts about the relevance of any material you propose to mail to the list, please contact owner-ukcrypto@maillist.ox.ac.uk for guidance. The language of the list is English, though American and other variants of English are acceptable 8-) Paul Leyland. 1997 October 20. Updated by Ian D. Goodyer 1999 February 12 (goodyer@well.ox.ac.uk) From goodyer@well.ox.ac.uk Sat, 13 Feb 1999 17:16:55 +0000 (BST) Date: Sat, 13 Feb 1999 17:16:55 +0000 (BST) From: Ian Goodyer goodyer@well.ox.ac.uk Subject: New welcome message Due to popular command, I have just updated the welcome/info message for the ukcrypto list to include instructions on how to subscribe/unsubscribe from the list and details of the web archive that is generously maintained by Ian Brown. As some of you have been subscribed for ages I thought I would include a copy of the welcome message. Sorry to trouble you all. ian ukcrypto owner ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ UK Cryptography Policy Discussion Group The group, supported by a mailing list, is comprised of people with a professional interest in the formulation and content of UK government policy on the provision, use and control of encryption products and services in the UK. It was been formed in response to the 1996 announcement of UK policy on the provision of encryption services on telecommunications networks. The aim of the forum is to exchange information and co-ordinate actions in order to achieve a UK government policy which: 1. preserves existing freedoms within the UK in respect of the design, development, provision and use of encryption products and services 2. is workable in practice given other constraints and factors which are beyond the control or influence of the UK government 3. meets the common interests of people in the UK in combating crime and terrorism 4. is set out with clarity and precision to meet clearly stated objectives which are demonstrably achievable in both political and technical terms 5. consistent with the above, minimises the extension of domestic and export controls on encryption products and services and removes existing controls which are unachievable, clarifying the scope of those that remain and the processes that will be used to implement them Everyone with an interest in the subject of UK cryptographic policy and deployment is welcome to join the list; it is *not* restricted to the British or those resident in the UK. The mailing list is unmoderated, but only subscribed members can post. The reply address is set to the list, in the interest of maintaining a freely flowing debate, so please be careful that you do not inadvertently post inappropriate responses. Your friends can subscribe to the list by sending a message to majordomo@maillist.ox.ac.uk with 'subscribe ukcrypto' in the body of the message. If you ever wish to unsubscribe send a message from the subscribed address to majordomo@maillist.ox.ac.uk with 'unsubscribe ukcrypto' in the body of the message. An archive of previous posts is kindly maintained by Ian Brown and can be found at http://www.cs.ucl.ac.uk/staff/I.Brown/archives/ukcrypto Please try and restrict postings to UK Encryption law and try not to stray onto general cryptology topics. The following topics for instance are not appropriate: i) Can PGP be cracked ii) What is the best PGP plugin for Eudora iii) What is the best way to encrypt a disk under Windows NT If you have doubts about the relevance of any material you propose to mail to the list, please contact owner-ukcrypto@maillist.ox.ac.uk for guidance. The language of the list is English, though American and other variants of English are acceptable 8-) Paul Leyland. 1997 October 20. Updated by Ian D. Goodyer 1999 February 12 (goodyer@well.ox.ac.uk) From lists@notatla.demon.co.uk Sat, 13 Feb 1999 22:39:34 GMT Date: Sat, 13 Feb 1999 22:39:34 GMT From: lists@notatla.demon.co.uk lists@notatla.demon.co.uk Subject: Asymmetric Key sizes Denis.Russell@ncl.ac.uk: > I didn't get a clear feeling for what the prudent target should be. Paul > says (above) that 768-bit keys should be OK now against "reasonable" > attack. Does this mean the worst realistic case that we can think of for > the present, and into the "foreseeable" future - a few years? How much more > prudent would 1024 bits be? What about putting things the other way round? > What's the problem with everyone going for 2048 now and (presumably) > putting things so far out of reach that attackers just give up? See www.usenix.org/events/sec99 which I think is where I found the following as part of a larger article "Factoring: Facts and Fables". To argue his point, Lenstra extrapolated current factoring capabilities. In 1994, a QS factored an RSA-129 modulus. This required 5,000 MIPS years for stage 1 (sieving) and two days on a 16K MasPar for stage 2 (matrix). Then in 1996, an NFS factored a 130-digit number in less than 700 MIPS years for stage 1 (68 hours and 700MB). However, stage 2 required much more computation time, even on a Cray C-90. Extrapolating these figures, Lenstra believes factoring a 512-bit number with a QS would require 500,000 MIPS years for sieving and four days (and 1GB of space) on a Cray C-90 for the matrix. Substituting NFS, sieving would take 20,000 MIPS years, and matrix computations would take three months (and 4GB of space). Therefore, 512-bit moduli are not long enough for current technology. But factoring 1,024-bit moduli seems hopeless. Just to sieve, the QS would require 1015 MIPS years, and the NFS would take 1011 MIPS years. Lenstra concludes that 512-bit QS factorization is feasible, 512-bit NFS factorization is hardly feasible, and 1,024-bit factorization is hopeless. Which brings me to the following code announcements: pgp553i (Windoze 95/98/NT) is on my website and FBN_funcs.c should join it around midnight GMT. /* * Fixed Big Number library * http://www.notatla.demon.co.uk/CRYPTO/FBN_funcs.c * * This is integer arithmetic code for up to 1024 bits * (with intermediate results up to 2048 bits). * This is what I mean by 'Fixed Big Number' - not arbitrary sizes. * It has been tested against 'bc' for some calculations of each * type, but not right up to the size limits. This code is simple * and not especially fast. * * FBN_powmod() is effectively RSA. This code contains no * primality testing which you would need to generate RSA keys. * * Parts of this code are derived from the book "Applied Cryptography" * 2nd ed by Bruce Schneier. * * Distribution and use is free; no GPL, Berkeley or other licences * apply. The RSA patent in the U.S is due to expire September 2000. * More details at http://cwis.kub.nl/~frw/people/koops/lawsurvy.htm. * * Enail any bug reports to me please. * Antonomasia 13Feb1999 */ From pleyland@microsoft.com Sun, 14 Feb 1999 10:47:02 -0800 Date: Sun, 14 Feb 1999 10:47:02 -0800 From: Paul Leyland pleyland@microsoft.com Subject: Asymmetric Key sizes >>... >>It has been possible to break 512 bit keys for several years.... >>... As for 768-bit keys, they would appear to be resistant to any >reasonable attack with any reasonable amount of hardware. >... > > I didn't get a clear feeling for what the prudent target should be. Paul > says (above) that 768-bit keys should be OK now against "reasonable" > attack. Does this mean the worst realistic case that we can think of for > the present, and into the "foreseeable" future - a few years? How much > more prudent would 1024 bits be? What about putting things the other way > round? What's the problem with everyone going for 2048 now and > (presumably) putting things so far out of reach that attackers > just give up? The image I like to propagate is that breaking a 512-bit key today would take an effort commeasurate with the RSA-129 project. Breaking a 768-bit key would take an investment comparable to the Apollo project. The former is feasible but not trivial; the latter is possible but not feasible. If forced to guess, I'd say that a 512-bit factorization will be demonstrated this year or next, but a 768-bit factorization won't happen in the next decade. I'm pretty sure of the first prediction, but somewhat doubtful about the second. If I am seriously wrong, I'm in very good company --- even I won't stick my neck out as far as predicting 40 quadrillion years! Unless something wonderful happens, a 1024-bit factorization won't be seen for several decades. "And the number of the bits shall be 1024. 512 shallt thou not use, neither shallt thou use 768, excepting that thou shallt go on to 1024. 2048 is right out!" Or something like that. Paul From octobersdad@reporters.net Mon, 15 Feb 1999 08:44:34 +0000 Date: Mon, 15 Feb 1999 08:44:34 +0000 From: T Bruce Tober octobersdad@reporters.net Subject: Labour Party goes pro-GAK - Surprise. In message <199902131336.IAA029.93@whgiii>, OpenPGP writes > > >My observation is that gak/recovery/escrow/wiretap is not a dem/rep, >conserv/lib, authoritarian/democracy issue rather it is a government >persons/non-government persons issue. Crypto serves as a technical >barrier or point of resistance to government intrusion, and as such, >almost all who are in government will fear it and attack it. Agreements >on curtailing non-government people's access to un-gak'ed crypto will >likley bring together such bedfellows as China and the US, as they share >an interest in removing barriers to their powers to intrude upon their >respective non-government persons. I think you're absolutely correct. Similarly the Net is a govt/non-govt issue. Govt is about power and when we the people have the ability to freely publish all our thoughts to the entire world that increases our power and decreases the power of govt. Likewise when we can communicate privately that increases our power and decreases that of govt. tbt -- | Bruce Tober, , | | Birmingham, UK, EU +44-121-242-3832 (mobile - 07979-521-106). Freelance | |Journalist & Website consultancy and development. PGP details at my website| From usura@attic.replay.com Tue, 16 Feb 1999 15:53:39 +0100 (CET) Date: Tue, 16 Feb 1999 15:53:39 +0100 (CET) From: Alex de Joode usura@attic.replay.com Subject: STATION X: Enigma varitions http://www.ft.com/hippocampus/q1279d6.htm A new book about Bletchy Park. Alex -- Exit! Stage Left! From alan@kable.co.uk Tue, 16 Feb 1999 16:23:17 -0000 Date: Tue, 16 Feb 1999 16:23:17 -0000 From: Alan Burkitt-Gray alan@kable.co.uk Subject: STATION X: Enigma varitions This is a multi-part message in MIME format. ------=_NextPart_000_0155_01BE59C8.A91046A0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable -----Original Message----- From: Alex de Joode To: ukcrypto@maillist.ox.ac.uk Date: 16 February 1999 15:49 Subject: STATION X: Enigma varitions =20 =20 http://www.ft.com/hippocampus/q1279d6.htm =20 A new book about Bletchy Park. =20 Alex -- Exit! Stage Left! But it told me "Access is denied". Alan B-G - ALAN BURKITT-GRAY, Editor, Government Computing The independent magazine about information age public service, for the people who are going to make it happen NEXT ISSUE: March 1999, mailed out 25 February Published monthly by Kable Ltd The Courtyard, 55 Charterhouse Street, London EC1M 6HA, UK tel 0171 608 0900, fax 0171 608 0901 international tel +44 171 608 0900, fax +44 171 608 0901 website http://www.kable.co.uk=20 e-mail alan@kable.co.uk For advance features information see http://www.governmentcomputing.com=20 Where's Kable? Look at=20 http://www.streetmap.co.uk/streetmap.dll?grid2map?X=3D531650&Y=3D181750&a= rrow=3Dy ------=_NextPart_000_0155_01BE59C8.A91046A0 Content-Type: text/html; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
-----Original = Message-----
From:=20 Alex de Joode <usura@attic.replay.com>
= To:=20 ukcrypto@maillist.ox.ac.uk= =20 <ukcrypto@maillist.ox.ac.uk= >
Date:=20 16 February 1999 15:49
Subject: STATION X: Enigma=20 varitions

http://www.ft.com/hipp= ocampus/q1279d6.htm

A=20 new book about Bletchy Park.

Alex
--
Exit! Stage=20 Left!

But it told me "Access is denied".

Alan B-G

 


-
ALAN BURKITT-GRAY, Editor, = Government=20 Computing
The independent magazine about information = age=20 public service,
for the people who are going to make it=20 happen

NEXT ISSUE: March 1999, mailed out 25 = February

Published monthly by Kable Ltd
The Courtyard, 55=20 Charterhouse Street, London EC1M 6HA, UK
tel 0171 608 0900, fax 0171 = 608=20 0901
international tel +44 171 608 0900, fax +44 171 608 = 0901
website=20 http://www.kable.co.uk =
e-mail=20 alan@kable.co.uk
For advance features information = see http://www.governmentcomputing.com=20

Where's Kable? Look at
http://www.streetmap.co.uk/streetmap.dll?grid2map?X=3D531650&= ;Y=3D181750&arrow=3Dy

 
------=_NextPart_000_0155_01BE59C8.A91046A0-- From markc@chiark.greenend.org.uk Wed, 17 Feb 1999 12:16:20 +0000 (GMT) Date: Wed, 17 Feb 1999 12:16:20 +0000 (GMT) From: Mark Carroll markc@chiark.greenend.org.uk Subject: Wassenaar question Today I received mail from the DTI saying that the fourth Wassenaar Arrangement Plenary agreement imposes no new restrictions on the export of cryptography technology. This is somewhat at variance with what I remember; could someone set one of us right? Maybe I'm confusing rumour with fact. Ta. (-: I'll go look again and see what's posted at the Wassenaar site... -- Mark From nbohm@ernest.net Wed, 17 Feb 1999 12:44:11 +0000 Date: Wed, 17 Feb 1999 12:44:11 +0000 From: Nicholas Bohm nbohm@ernest.net Subject: Wassenaar question At 12:16 PM 2/17/1999 +0000, Mark Carroll wrote: >Today I received mail from the DTI saying that the fourth Wassenaar >Arrangement Plenary agreement imposes no new restrictions on the export of >cryptography technology. > >This is somewhat at variance with what I remember; could someone set one >of us right? Maybe I'm confusing rumour with fact. > >Ta. (-: I'll go look again and see what's posted at the Wassenaar site... The following, obtained from the Wassenaar site, appears to be the basis on which the EU member states propose to introduce new legislation restricting the export of technology (including cryptographic technology) in intangible form: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> STATEMENTS OF UNDERSTANDING AND VALIDITY NOTES General Technology Note (WG2 GTN TWG/WP1 Revised 2) It is understood that Member Governments are expected to exercise controls on intangible "technology" as far as the scope of their legislation will allow. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> No doubt the DTI would say that this was not really part of the Plenary Agreement! Regards, Nicholas Bohm Salkyns, Great Canfield, Takeley, Bishop's Stortford CM22 6SX, UK Phone 01279 871272 (+44 1279 871272) Fax 01279 870215 (+44 1279 870215) Mobile 0860 636749 (+44 860 636749) PGP RSA 1024 bit public key ID: 0x08340015. Fingerprint: 9E 15 FB 2A 54 96 24 37 98 A2 E0 D1 34 13 48 07 PGP DSS/DH 1024/3072 public key ID: 0x899DD7FF. Fingerprint: 5248 1320 B42E 84FC 1E8B A9E6 0912 AE66 899D D7FF From C.R.Snow@ncl.ac.uk Wed, 17 Feb 1999 15:33:47 +0000 Date: Wed, 17 Feb 1999 15:33:47 +0000 From: Richard Snow C.R.Snow@ncl.ac.uk Subject: There's nothing new under the sun! During a routine web browsing session, I came across the following at http://www.deter.com/unix/papers/treatise_locks.html : "Rudimentary Treatise on the Construction of Locks, 1853 (excerpt) -- Charles Tomlinson A commercial, and in some respects a social, doubt has been started within the last year or two, whether or not it is right to discuss so openly the security or insecurity of locks. Many well-meaning persons suppose that the discussion respecting the means for baffling the supposed safety of locks offers a premium for dishonesty, by showing others how to be dishonest. This is a fallacy. Rogues are very keen in their profession, and already know much more than we can teach them respecting their several kinds of roguery. Rogues knew a good deal about lockpicking long before locksmiths discussed it among themselves, as they have lately done. If a lock -- let it have been made in whatever country, or by whatever maker -- is not so inviolable as it has hitherto been deemed to be, surely it is in the interest of honest persons to know this fact, because the dishonest are tolerably certain to be the first to apply the knowledge practically; and the spread of knowledge is necessary to give fair play to those who might suffer by ignorance. It cannot be too earnestly urged, that an acquintance with real facts will, in the end, be better for all parties. Some time ago, when the reading public was alarmed at being told how London milk is adulterated, timid persons deprecated the exposure, on the plea that it would give instructions in the art of adulterating milk; a vain fear -- milkmen knew all about it before, whether they practiced it or not; and the exposure only taught purchasers the necessity of a little scrutiny and caution, leaving them to obey this necessity or not, as they pleased. ...The unscrupulous have the command of much of this kind of knowledge without our aid; and there is moral and commercial justice in placing on their guard those who might possibly suffer therefrom. We employ these stray expressions concerning adulteration, debasement, roguery, and so forth, simply as a mode of illustrating a principle -- the advantage of publicity. In respect to lock-making, there can scarcely be such a thing as dishonesty of intention: the inventor produces a lock which he honestly thinks will posess such and such qualities; and he declares his belief to the world. If others differ from him in opinion concerning those qualities, it is open to them to say so; and the discussion, truthfully conducted, must lead to public advantage: the discussion stimulates curiosity, and curiosity stimulates invention. Nothing but a partial and limited view of the question could lead to the opinion that harm can result: if there be harm, it will be much more than counterbalanced by good." One can imagine all sorts of interesting ways to bring this piece into the modern context, but I particular enjoyed the thought of GCHQ/NSA being "rogues" and "the unscrupulous". By the way, if anyone can point me at the original source of this (it appeared on the Web exactly as it is reproduced here, with no further references), I would be very grateful. ... Dick. Dr C.R.Snow Department of Computing Science University of Newcastle Newcastle upon Tyne, NE1 7RU United Kingdom. E-mail: C.R.Snow@newcastle.ac.uk Phone: +44 191 222 8064 Fax: +44 191 222 8232 WWW: http://www.cs.ncl.ac.uk/people/c.r.snow/ See home page (or public key server) for PGP public keys. PGP Key (RSA, length 1024). PGP Key ID: 864A1C95 PGP Key Fingerprint: A5E9 5684 A1F9 D08A 097C 7D31 91EC DE13 PGP Key (DSS/Diffie-Hellman, length 1024/2048). PGP Key ID: 5F6DF708 PGP Key Fingerprint: 5B9F B1CF 5C44 8467 AC3A CC81 3EA8 7458 5F6D F708 From ben@algroup.co.uk Wed, 17 Feb 1999 17:44:56 +0000 Date: Wed, 17 Feb 1999 17:44:56 +0000 From: Ben Laurie ben@algroup.co.uk Subject: There's nothing new under the sun! Richard Snow wrote: > > During a routine web browsing session, I came across the following at "I was proceeding in a westerly direction on the Information Superhighway when..." :-) > http://www.deter.com/unix/papers/treatise_locks.html : > > "Rudimentary Treatise on the Construction of Locks, 1853 (excerpt) > > -- Charles Tomlinson [snip] > By the way, if anyone can point me at the original source of this (it > appeared on the Web exactly as it is reproduced here, with no further > references), I would be very grateful. That is also quoted in Cheswick & Bellovin, p. 144. No further references, but you could try asking them... Cheers, Ben. -- http://www.apache-ssl.org/ben.html "My grandfather once told me that there are two kinds of people: those who work and those who take the credit. He told me to try to be in the first group; there was less competition there." - Indira Gandhi From alan@kable.co.uk Wed, 17 Feb 1999 19:23:03 -0000 Date: Wed, 17 Feb 1999 19:23:03 -0000 From: Alan Burkitt-Gray alan@kable.co.uk Subject: There's nothing new under the sun! This is a multi-part message in MIME format. ------=_NextPart_000_00BA_01BE5AAA.F02BE020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable -----Original Message----- >=20 > "Rudimentary Treatise on the Construction of Locks, 1853 (excerpt) >=20 > -- Charles Tomlinson [snip] > By the way, if anyone can point me at the original source of this (it > appeared on the Web exactly as it is reproduced here, with no further > references), I would be very grateful. Try the Library of Congress: www.loc.gov and in a minute or two you will = find: =20 CALL NUMBER: TS521 .H63 1982=20 =20 AUTHOR: Hobbs, A. C.=20 =20 TITLE: The construction of locks / compiled from the papers = of A.C. Hobbs, of New York ; and edited by Charles Tomlinson ; to which = is added a description of J. Beverly Fenby's patent locks, and a note = upon iron safes by Robert Mallet. =20 PUBLISHED: West Orange, N.J. : A. Saifer, [1982?]=20 =20 DESCRIPTION: vi, 212 p. : ill. ; 21 cm. =20 SUBJECT: Locks and keys.=20 =20 OTHER NAME: Tomlinson, Charles, 1808-1897.=20 =20 OTHER NAME: Fenby, J. Beverly.=20 =20 OTHER NAME: Mallet, Robert, 1810-1881.=20 =20 OTHER TITLE: Locks and safes.=20 =20 OTHER TITLE: Construction of locks & safes.=20 =20 OTHER TITLE: Construction of locks and safes.=20 =20 NOTE: At head of title: Locks and safes. Title on spine: = Construiction of locks & safes. Reprint. Originally published: London : = Virtue and Co., 1868. Includes index. =20 LCCN NUMBER: 82-203685 =20 =20 Clever stuff, the Internet! Alan B-G - ALAN BURKITT-GRAY, Editor, Government Computing The independent magazine about information age public service, for the people who are going to make it happen NEXT ISSUE: March 1999, mailed out 25 February Published monthly by Kable Ltd The Courtyard, 55 Charterhouse Street, London EC1M 6HA, UK tel 0171 608 0900, fax 0171 608 0901 international tel +44 171 608 0900, fax +44 171 608 0901 website http://www.kable.co.uk=20 e-mail alan@kable.co.uk For advance features information see http://www.governmentcomputing.com=20 Where's Kable? Look at=20 http://www.streetmap.co.uk/streetmap.dll?grid2map?X=3D531650&Y=3D181750&a= rrow=3Dy ------=_NextPart_000_00BA_01BE5AAA.F02BE020 Content-Type: text/html; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
-----Original = Message-----
>=20
> "Rudimentary Treatise on the Construction of Locks, 1853=20 (excerpt)
>
> -- Charles Tomlinson
[snip]
> By the = way, if=20 anyone can point me at the original source of this (it
> appeared = on the=20 Web exactly as it is reproduced here, with no further
> = references), I=20 would be very grateful.


Try the Library of Congress: www.loc.gov and in a minute or two you = will=20 find:
 
 
 
CALL NUMBER:
TS521 .H63 1982
AUTHOR:=20 Hobbs, A. C.
TITLE:=20 The construction of locks / compiled from the = papers=20 of A.C. Hobbs, of New York ; and edited by Charles Tomlinson = ; to=20 which is added a description of J. Beverly Fenby's patent = locks, and=20 a note upon iron safes by Robert Mallet.
PUBLISHED:=20 West Orange, N.J. : A. Saifer, [1982?]
DESCRIPTION:=20 vi, 212 p. : ill. ; 21 cm.=20
SUBJECT:=20 Locks=20 and keys.
OTHER NAME:=20 Tomlinson, Charles, 1808-1897.
OTHER NAME:=20 Fenby, J. Beverly.
OTHER NAME:=20 Mallet, Robert, 1810-1881.
OTHER TITLE:=20 Locks and safes.
OTHER TITLE:=20 Construction of locks & safes.
OTHER TITLE:=20 Construction of locks and safes.
NOTE:=20 At head of title: Locks and safes. Title on = spine:=20 Construiction of locks & safes. Reprint. Originally = published:=20 London : Virtue and Co., 1868. Includes index.
LCCN NUMBER:=20 82-203685

 

Clever stuff, the Internet!

Alan B-G


-
ALAN BURKITT-GRAY, Editor, = Government=20 Computing
The independent magazine about information = age=20 public service,
for the people who are going to make it=20 happen

NEXT ISSUE: March 1999, mailed out 25 = February

Published monthly by Kable Ltd
The Courtyard, 55=20 Charterhouse Street, London EC1M 6HA, UK
tel 0171 608 0900, fax 0171 = 608=20 0901
international tel +44 171 608 0900, fax +44 171 608 = 0901
website=20 http://www.kable.co.uk =
e-mail=20 alan@kable.co.uk
For advance features information = see http://www.governmentcomputing.com=20

Where's Kable? Look at
http://www.streetmap.co.uk/streetmap.dll?grid2map?X=3D531650&= ;Y=3D181750&arrow=3Dy

  ------=_NextPart_000_00BA_01BE5AAA.F02BE020-- From jon@oaktree.co.uk Fri, 19 Feb 1999 13:58:19 +0000 Date: Fri, 19 Feb 1999 13:58:19 +0000 From: Jon Ribbens jon@oaktree.co.uk Subject: There's nothing new under the sun! Alan Burkitt-Gray wrote: > OTHER NAME: Mallet, Robert, 1810-1881. Aha! We have finally unmasked the mysterious and malicious "Mallet" who is always trying to break into our security protocols! It seems from the above that he is dead now, I suggest therefore that cryptography is no longer required (since the enemy has gone away), and we should send everything in clear henceforth. Cheers Jon -- \/ Jon Ribbens / jon@oaktree.co.uk From proff@iq.org 20 Feb 1999 01:25:55 +1100 Date: 20 Feb 1999 01:25:55 +1100 From: Julian Assange proff@iq.org Subject: Mallet, Robert, 1810-1881. Jon Ribbens writes: > Alan Burkitt-Gray wrote: > > OTHER NAME: Mallet, Robert, 1810-1881. > > Aha! We have finally unmasked the mysterious and malicious "Mallet" who > is always trying to break into our security protocols! > > It seems from the above that he is dead now, I suggest therefore that > cryptography is no longer required (since the enemy has gone away), and > we should send everything in clear henceforth. Heh, heh, heh. I henceforth name this the `Ribbens Mallet Lemma'. -- Julian Assange http://iq.org/~proff An essentially private man who wished his total indifference to public notice to be universally recognized. - Tom Stoppbard on James Joyce From nobody@nowhere.com Fri, 19 Feb 1999 19:36:47 +0200 (EET) Date: Fri, 19 Feb 1999 19:36:47 +0200 (EET) From: nobody@nowhere.com nobody@nowhere.com Subject: Defense Secretary Defends Microsoft And here we have Cohen thanking Microsoft for installing backdoors in the form of convenient bugs into Windows... This is really much bigger than that old Crypto-AG story. Economic espionage dream-tool. http://www.techweb.com/wire/story/msftdoj/TWB19990219S0003 Defense Secretary Defends Microsoft (02/19/99, 10:54 a.m. ET) By Stuart Glascock, Computer Reseller News Microsoft is under heavy fire from the U.S. Department of Justice, but the top gun at the U.S. Department of Defense backs the software giant. During a brief visit Thursday to the Redmond, Wash., headquarters of Microsoft, Secretary of Defense William Cohen praised the company's products and innovations, then trained his sites on other high-tech companies. "There is a sense that in many places beyond this campus -- from Sunnyvale to Silicon Valley to Silicon Alley -- that some in the digital world dismiss the importance of the national security world," Cohen told about 200 Microsoft employees and U.S. Army IT managers who were meeting with Microsoft. "That some soldiers in the high-tech revolution do not fully understand or appreciate the soldiers in camouflage," Cohen continued. "That tanks and guns are somehow rusty relics of the past, nearly obsolete in the new information-based world that will carry us into the future." Cohen, sharing the podium with Microsoft chairman Bill Gates and chief operating officer Bob Herbold, devoted most of his talk to the value of partnerships with companies such as Microsoft. However, Cohen also launched a broad salvo at an unnamed Silicon Valley executive, recently quoted in the New York Times as saying, "Money is extracted from Silicon Valley and then wasted by Washington." Cohen said he could see how people could view the world in that fashion, adding, "The intellectual property and virtual assets of Yahoo are more highly valued by Wall Street than the oil reserves and supertankers of Texaco. It can be easy to forget this global marketplace was neither created by magic nor will it be kept by marketing." Before speaking, Cohen met privately with Gates and discussed how the government can work with private-sector companies to secure the "critical information infrastructure" that manage power grids, telecommunications, and highway, aviation, and other transportation systems. They also discussed Microsoft's Skills 2000 program, which provides a number of training and educational opportunities in technology. Cohen never directly spoke about the long-running U.S. government antitrust trial against Microsoft, but he clearly praised the company's contributions to the "economic dynamism of the American information technology economy." "I am here today because I believe Microsoft does understand the crucial connection between our national security and our national prosperity," he said. The Defense Secretary's trip to Seattle, which included a tour of an assembly line at airplane manufacturing giant Boeing Co., was billed as part of a campaign to spread the message that public and private sector cooperation are essential. He warned about the vulnerabilities of the country's national infrastructure, from terrorist bombs to cyberterrorists to biological warfare, and asked for the computer industries' help in solving the problem. Gates, agreed the potential for disruption of large-scale networks was an "unsolved problem." He called the meeting an opportunity to thank one of "our biggest customers in the world," and suggested government and industry should work closer. "Over the years, we've had a very strong partnership with the Department of Defense," Gates said. "DOD has all the challenges and opportunities of a very large enterprise. Coordinating those activities is an opportunity that pushes our software to the limit." Following the talk, Gates and Cohen took no questions and exited the stage under heavy security. From dave@xemu.demon.co.uk Fri, 19 Feb 1999 01:07:18 +0000 Date: Fri, 19 Feb 1999 01:07:18 +0000 From: Dave Bird dave@xemu.demon.co.uk Subject: encrypted login/data on webpages. Dear people, Can anyone give me brief advice and pointers where to look for detail on the following area. First, is it possible on a web-server to set up a private encrypted web-page. What I mean is that it would require having one (or one of several) signing keys to be allowed to log-in at all. Then it maybe has data locally encrypted in its key, and sends it down the channel in some session key to you, to read. And similarly to write/FTP into the place for those with write-permission. Now, second, if such things exist with crappy weak encryption, can one get Netscape/MSIE plug-ins to upgrade to strong encryption. This has obvious application for almost any group that want to share work-space maybe in a third country, but are subject to interception or disruption if every hostile group can log-in and read it too. Regards, DAVE. -- ^-^-^-@@-^-;-^ http://www.xemu.demon.co.uk/ (..)__u news:alt.smoking.mooses happy as a clam at high tide -. <_" .-._.-. From billp@nmol.com Fri, 19 Feb 1999 12:49:34 -0700 Date: Fri, 19 Feb 1999 12:49:34 -0700 From: bill payne billp@nmol.com Subject: NSA lawsuit and improper garnishment of Morales' wages Sandia labs acting on a document filed in January to garnish his wages for doing discovery according properly which, in fact, was not served until February should have EVERYONE concerned. Sandia labs is responsible for fuzing the US's nuclear weapons. One might hope for competence and respondibility at such a corporation. But this is not the case as evidenced by the documents at http://nmol.com/users/billp/INDEX.HTM Let's all hope for PEACEFUL settlement of this unfortunate matter. http://nmol.com/users/billp/forth.HTM From nobody@nowhere.com Fri, 19 Feb 1999 19:36:47 +0200 (EET) Date: Fri, 19 Feb 1999 19:36:47 +0200 (EET) From: nobody@nowhere.com nobody@nowhere.com Subject: Defense Secretary Defends Microsoft And here we have Cohen thanking Microsoft for installing backdoors in the form of convenient bugs into Windows... This is really much bigger than that old Crypto-AG story. Economic espionage dream-tool. http://www.techweb.com/wire/story/msftdoj/TWB19990219S0003 Defense Secretary Defends Microsoft (02/19/99, 10:54 a.m. ET) By Stuart Glascock, Computer Reseller News Microsoft is under heavy fire from the U.S. Department of Justice, but the top gun at the U.S. Department of Defense backs the software giant. During a brief visit Thursday to the Redmond, Wash., headquarters of Microsoft, Secretary of Defense William Cohen praised the company's products and innovations, then trained his sites on other high-tech companies. "There is a sense that in many places beyond this campus -- from Sunnyvale to Silicon Valley to Silicon Alley -- that some in the digital world dismiss the importance of the national security world," Cohen told about 200 Microsoft employees and U.S. Army IT managers who were meeting with Microsoft. "That some soldiers in the high-tech revolution do not fully understand or appreciate the soldiers in camouflage," Cohen continued. "That tanks and guns are somehow rusty relics of the past, nearly obsolete in the new information-based world that will carry us into the future." Cohen, sharing the podium with Microsoft chairman Bill Gates and chief operating officer Bob Herbold, devoted most of his talk to the value of partnerships with companies such as Microsoft. However, Cohen also launched a broad salvo at an unnamed Silicon Valley executive, recently quoted in the New York Times as saying, "Money is extracted from Silicon Valley and then wasted by Washington." Cohen said he could see how people could view the world in that fashion, adding, "The intellectual property and virtual assets of Yahoo are more highly valued by Wall Street than the oil reserves and supertankers of Texaco. It can be easy to forget this global marketplace was neither created by magic nor will it be kept by marketing." Before speaking, Cohen met privately with Gates and discussed how the government can work with private-sector companies to secure the "critical information infrastructure" that manage power grids, telecommunications, and highway, aviation, and other transportation systems. They also discussed Microsoft's Skills 2000 program, which provides a number of training and educational opportunities in technology. Cohen never directly spoke about the long-running U.S. government antitrust trial against Microsoft, but he clearly praised the company's contributions to the "economic dynamism of the American information technology economy." "I am here today because I believe Microsoft does understand the crucial connection between our national security and our national prosperity," he said. The Defense Secretary's trip to Seattle, which included a tour of an assembly line at airplane manufacturing giant Boeing Co., was billed as part of a campaign to spread the message that public and private sector cooperation are essential. He warned about the vulnerabilities of the country's national infrastructure, from terrorist bombs to cyberterrorists to biological warfare, and asked for the computer industries' help in solving the problem. Gates, agreed the potential for disruption of large-scale networks was an "unsolved problem." He called the meeting an opportunity to thank one of "our biggest customers in the world," and suggested government and industry should work closer. "Over the years, we've had a very strong partnership with the Department of Defense," Gates said. "DOD has all the challenges and opportunities of a very large enterprise. Coordinating those activities is an opportunity that pushes our software to the limit." Following the talk, Gates and Cohen took no questions and exited the stage under heavy security. From paul@hedonism.demon.co.uk 19 Feb 1999 19:32:51 +0000 Date: 19 Feb 1999 19:32:51 +0000 From: Paul Crowley paul@hedonism.demon.co.uk Subject: There's nothing new under the sun! Jon Ribbens writes: > Alan Burkitt-Gray wrote: > > OTHER NAME: Mallet, Robert, 1810-1881. > > Aha! We have finally unmasked the mysterious and malicious "Mallet" who > is always trying to break into our security protocols! > > It seems from the above that he is dead now, I suggest therefore that > cryptography is no longer required (since the enemy has gone away), and > we should send everything in clear henceforth. Let me be the first to point out that as far as we know Eve is still at large... -- __ \/ o\ paul@hedonism.demon.co.uk http://www.hedonism.demon.co.uk/paul/ \ / /\__/ Paul Crowley Upgrade your legacy NT machines to Linux /~\ From erich-moechel@quintessenz.at Sat, 20 Feb 1999 12:30:32 +0100 Date: Sat, 20 Feb 1999 12:30:32 +0100 From: Erich Moechel erich-moechel@quintessenz.at Subject: New evidence 4 EU surveillance plans [ENFOPOL] Dear all, After a while we managed 2 obtain the next piece of evidence concerning EU-wide surveillance plans. The mid January confidential paper by Europolice is titled ENFOPOL 98 Rev 2. It was prepared after the meeting of EU Justice & Interior ministers on December 3rd 98 & it shows that those ministers obviously agreed on the surveillence proposals of joint secret EU police. ENFOPOL 98 Rev 2 either has passed the EU council already or will do so within the next few weeks. If anybody is interested in translating the [German] article, s/he can publish it 4 free. Just notify me, pls cu erich http://www.telepolis.de/tp/deutsch/inhalt/te/1921/1.html -.-. --.- -.-. --.- -.-. --.- q/depesche taeglich ueber internationale hacks--.-zensur im netz crypto--.-IT mergers--.-monopole & die universalitaet digitaler dummheit subscribe http://www.quintessenz.at -.-. --.- -.-. --.- -.-. --.- Certified PGP key https://keyserver.ad.or.at/cgi-bin/key/Search?keyid=AC922C4D -.-. --.- -.-. --.- -.-. --.- erich-moechel.com/munications ++43 2266 687201 fon ++43 2266 687204 fax -.-. --.- -.-. --.- -.-. --.- From nbohm@ernest.net Sat, 20 Feb 1999 18:49:54 +0000 Date: Sat, 20 Feb 1999 18:49:54 +0000 From: Nicholas Bohm nbohm@ernest.net Subject: Encrypted sessions I was left uncertain by recent exchanges about Server Gated Technology, and in the hope of enlightenment (and tolerance) from experts on the list, would like to state the questions as I understand them. I use Netscape, and have "fortified" it. As I understand it, this means that it can establish an SSL session based on a 128-bit symmetric key if the server is capable of doing this (whereas crippled Netscape, and any non-US version of MS IE, can only use a 40-bit key). Right so far? What I want to ask about is the server side, and whether there is a corresponding problem. Is there lots of server software available for people who want sites that can set up 128-bit SSL sessions, or is there lots of crippled software that can only set up 40-bit sessions? Is there a server equivalent of PGP or Fortify, so that everyman can if he wants set up servers that support secure SSL sessions? Is this what Apache servers can do? Is there some simple way to tell what strength session has been established? I gather that there is some deal where banks can get a certificate from someone that lets them enable 128-bit sessions on software that, in the absence of the certificate, sets up only 40-bit sessions: will export-crippled browsers nevertheless be able to establish 128-bit sessions with such servers? Lastly, is it right to assume that in all these cases the key negotiation process itself is secure, and that only the strength of the resulting key is what is affected by the limitations? Regards, Nicholas Bohm Salkyns, Great Canfield, Takeley, Bishop's Stortford CM22 6SX, UK Phone 01279 871272 (+44 1279 871272) Fax 01279 870215 (+44 1279 870215) Mobile 0860 636749 (+44 860 636749) PGP RSA 1024 bit public key ID: 0x08340015. Fingerprint: 9E 15 FB 2A 54 96 24 37 98 A2 E0 D1 34 13 48 07 PGP DSS/DH 1024/3072 public key ID: 0x899DD7FF. Fingerprint: 5248 1320 B42E 84FC 1E8B A9E6 0912 AE66 899D D7FF From ben@algroup.co.uk Sat, 20 Feb 1999 19:06:57 +0000 Date: Sat, 20 Feb 1999 19:06:57 +0000 From: Ben Laurie ben@algroup.co.uk Subject: Encrypted sessions Nicholas Bohm wrote: > > I was left uncertain by recent exchanges about Server Gated Technology, and > in the hope of enlightenment (and tolerance) from experts on the list, > would like to state the questions as I understand them. > > I use Netscape, and have "fortified" it. As I understand it, this means > that it can establish an SSL session based on a 128-bit symmetric key if > the server is capable of doing this (whereas crippled Netscape, and any > non-US version of MS IE, can only use a 40-bit key). Right so far? Yes. > What I want to ask about is the server side, and whether there is a > corresponding problem. Is there lots of server software available for > people who want sites that can set up 128-bit SSL sessions, or is there > lots of crippled software that can only set up 40-bit sessions? Apache-SSL supports 128 bit sessions. US exportware doesn't, natch. > Is there a > server equivalent of PGP or Fortify, so that everyman can if he wants set > up servers that support secure SSL sessions? No. > Is this what Apache servers > can do? Yes. > Is there some simple way to tell what strength session has been established? In Netscape, connect to a secure server, then hit ctl-I and look at what it says under "security". > I gather that there is some deal where banks can get a certificate from > someone that lets them enable 128-bit sessions on software that, in the > absence of the certificate, sets up only 40-bit sessions: will > export-crippled browsers nevertheless be able to establish 128-bit sessions > with such servers? Yes. This is what Server-Gated Cryptography is. The "someone" that issues the certs is Verisign. > Lastly, is it right to assume that in all these cases the key negotiation > process itself is secure, and that only the strength of the resulting key > is what is affected by the limitations? Yes. BTW, what is commonly known as a 40 bit key is actually a 128 bit key of which 88 bits have been revealed to sniffers during session setup. This avoids the dictionary attacks that would be available with a true 40 bit key. However, it is worth noting that the public/private keypair are also limited in export-crippled s/w to 512 bits. Cheers, Ben. -- http://www.apache-ssl.org/ben.html "My grandfather once told me that there are two kinds of people: those who work and those who take the credit. He told me to try to be in the first group; there was less competition there." - Indira Gandhi From jonplews@dial.pipex.com Sat, 20 Feb 1999 21:37:35 -0000 Date: Sat, 20 Feb 1999 21:37:35 -0000 From: Jon Plews jonplews@dial.pipex.com Subject: Encrypted sessions > From: owner-ukcrypto@maillist.ox.ac.uk > [mailto:owner-ukcrypto@maillist.ox.ac.uk]On Behalf Of Nicholas Bohm > > I was left uncertain by recent exchanges about Server Gated Technology, and > in the hope of enlightenment (and tolerance) from experts on the list, > would like to state the questions as I understand them. > > I use Netscape, and have "fortified" it. As I understand it, this means > that it can establish an SSL session based on a 128-bit symmetric key if > the server is capable of doing this (whereas crippled Netscape, and any > non-US version of MS IE, can only use a 40-bit key). Right so far? > [ snip ] You can "fortify" non-US versions of MS IE. I'm running IE4.01sp1 with 128 bit cipher strength. Jon Plews. From I.Brown@cs.ucl.ac.uk Sun, 21 Feb 1999 12:40:01 +0000 Date: Sun, 21 Feb 1999 12:40:01 +0000 From: Ian Brown I.Brown@cs.ucl.ac.uk Subject: Computers, Freedom and Privacy '99: The Global Internet [Circulate until March 15, 1999] Register now for the cyber event of the year: C COMPUTERS, FREEDOM, AND PRIVACY F THE GLOBAL INTERNET P 9 WASHINGTON, DC 9 Omni Shoreham Hotel . April 6-8, 1999 O R G For almost a decade, the conference on Computers, Freedom and Privacy has shaped the public debate on the future of privacy and freedom in the online world. Register now for the number one Internet policy conference. Join a diverse audience from government, industry, academics, the non-profit sector, the hacker community and the media. Enjoy the U.S. Capital in the Spring at one of Washington's premier hotels. * Keynote speakers include Tim Berners-Lee (Director, World Wide Web Consortium), Vint Cerf (President, Internet Society), Congressman Ed Markey (sponsor of "The Electronic Bill of Rights Act"), Congressman Ron Paul (sponsor of the Freedom and Privacy Restoration Act), Henrikas Yushkiavitshus (Associate Director, UNESCO) * Lively and thought-provoking panels on -- "the Creation of a Global Surveillance Network," "Access and Equity on the Global Internet," "Anonymity and Identity in Cyberspace," "Free Speech and Cyber Censorship," "Is Escrow Dead? And what is Wassenaar?", "Self-Regulation Reconsidered" and more * Tutorials -- "The Electronic Communications Privacy Act" (Mark Eckenwiler); "Cryptography: Basic Overview & Nontraditional Uses" (Matt Blaze and Phil Zimmermann), "Free Speech, The Constitution and Privacy in Cyberspace" (Mike Godwin), "Techniques for Circumventing Internet Censorship" (Bennett Haselton and Brian Ristuccia) Early Registration Deadline - March 15, 1999 -------------------------------------------- Register on-line at http://www.regmaster.com/cfp99.html or call +1 407 628 3602. Registration inquiries may also be sent to mann@regmaster.com. - Mark the dates - April 6-8, 1999 - Note the place - Washington, DC - Make your hotel reservations. See you at CFP99. For more information about CFP99, visit http://www.cfp99.org/ or call +1 401 628 3186 Sponsored by the Association for Computing Machinery From jei@zor.hut.fi Sun, 21 Feb 1999 14:44:15 +0200 (EET) Date: Sun, 21 Feb 1999 14:44:15 +0200 (EET) From: jei@zor.hut.fi jei@zor.hut.fi Subject: Mandrake Face Recognition Spy Camera Tested in Australia Way to go UK! ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: The Sunday Telegraph Date: 21st Feb 1999 Spy camera test By Sarah Harris The Sunday Telegraph, 21st Feb 1999. A computerised surveillance system which can pick out unwanted criminals from a crowd may soon be operating in Australian airports, and train and bus depots. The Mandrake system- described as the best tool in crimefighting since the introduction of DNA technology-is under investigation by several law enforcement and security agencies. The system operates in much the same way as normal security cameras, but instead of relying on humans to monitor the footage, surveillance images are sent back to a computer for analysis. The computer compares those filmed with a database of photographs of criminal suspects and known offenders at a rate of 250 per second. When it registers a match, it sends the signal to the operator. While the camera keeps recording the scene, the target's photo is captured at the bottom of the screen next to the Mandrake's nominated match. Mandrake's manufacturer, the UK-based Software and System, boasts it is accurate and untiring. Marketing director Patricia Oldcorn said: "Unlike a human surveillance team, Mandrake can work for hours on end without getting tired and it can also see through disguises that may fool a human being. ================================================================= From jei@zor.hut.fi Sun, 21 Feb 1999 14:44:15 +0200 (EET) Date: Sun, 21 Feb 1999 14:44:15 +0200 (EET) From: jei@zor.hut.fi jei@zor.hut.fi Subject: Mandrake Face Recognition Spy Camera Tested in Australia Way to go UK! ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: The Sunday Telegraph Date: 21st Feb 1999 Spy camera test By Sarah Harris The Sunday Telegraph, 21st Feb 1999. A computerised surveillance system which can pick out unwanted criminals from a crowd may soon be operating in Australian airports, and train and bus depots. The Mandrake system- described as the best tool in crimefighting since the introduction of DNA technology-is under investigation by several law enforcement and security agencies. The system operates in much the same way as normal security cameras, but instead of relying on humans to monitor the footage, surveillance images are sent back to a computer for analysis. The computer compares those filmed with a database of photographs of criminal suspects and known offenders at a rate of 250 per second. When it registers a match, it sends the signal to the operator. While the camera keeps recording the scene, the target's photo is captured at the bottom of the screen next to the Mandrake's nominated match. Mandrake's manufacturer, the UK-based Software and System, boasts it is accurate and untiring. Marketing director Patricia Oldcorn said: "Unlike a human surveillance team, Mandrake can work for hours on end without getting tired and it can also see through disguises that may fool a human being. ================================================================= From gtaylor@efa.org.au Sun, 21 Feb 1999 15:09:27 +1000 Date: Sun, 21 Feb 1999 15:09:27 +1000 From: Greg Taylor gtaylor@efa.org.au Subject: CFP 99 Announcement [Circulate until March 15, 1999] Register now for the cyber event of the year: C COMPUTERS, FREEDOM, AND PRIVACY F THE GLOBAL INTERNET P 9 WASHINGTON, DC 9 Omni Shoreham Hotel . April 6-8, 1999 O R G For almost a decade, the conference on Computers, Freedom and Privacy has shaped the public debate on the future of privacy and freedom in the online world. Register now for the number one Internet policy conference. Join a diverse audience from government, industry, academics, the non-profit sector, the hacker community and the media. Enjoy the U.S. Capital in the Spring at one of Washington's premier hotels. * Keynote speakers include Tim Berners-Lee (Director, World Wide Web Consortium), Vint Cerf (President, Internet Society), Congressman Ed Markey (sponsor of "The Electronic Bill of Rights Act"), Congressman Ron Paul (sponsor of the Freedom and Privacy Restoration Act), Henrikas Yushkiavitshus (Associate Director, UNESCO) * Lively and thought-provoking panels on -- "the Creation of a Global Surveillance Network," "Access and Equity on the Global Internet," "Anonymity and Identity in Cyberspace," "Free Speech and Cyber Censorship," "Is Escrow Dead? And what is Wassenaar?", "Self-Regulation Reconsidered" and more * Tutorials -- "The Electronic Communications Privacy Act" (Mark Eckenwiler); "Cryptography: Basic Overview & Nontraditional Uses" (Matt Blaze and Phil Zimmermann), "Free Speech, The Constitution and Privacy in Cyberspace" (Mike Godwin), "Techniques for Circumventing Internet Censorship" (Bennett Haselton and Brian Ristuccia) Early Registration Deadline - March 15, 1999 -------------------------------------------- Register on-line at http://www.regmaster.com/cfp99.html or call +1 407 628 3602. Registration inquiries may also be sent to mann@regmaster.com. - Mark the dates - April 6-8, 1999 - Note the place - Washington, DC - Make your hotel reservations. See you at CFP99. For more information about CFP99, visit http://www.cfp99.org/ or call +1 401 628 3186 Sponsored by the Association for Computing Machinery From nbohm@ernest.net Mon, 22 Feb 1999 10:45:03 +0000 Date: Mon, 22 Feb 1999 10:45:03 +0000 From: Nicholas Bohm nbohm@ernest.net Subject: Encrypted sessions At 07:06 PM 2/20/1999 +0000, Ben Laurie wrote: >Nicholas Bohm wrote: [snip] >> Lastly, is it right to assume that in all these cases the key negotiation >> process itself is secure, and that only the strength of the resulting key >> is what is affected by the limitations? > >Yes. BTW, what is commonly known as a 40 bit key is actually a 128 bit >key of which 88 bits have been revealed to sniffers during session >setup. This avoids the dictionary attacks that would be available with a >true 40 bit key. > >However, it is worth noting that the public/private keypair are also >limited in export-crippled s/w to 512 bits. Is that limitation overriden by a Verisign certificate enabling use of 128-bit symmetric keys? If not, the protection for the key negotiation seems weaker than the resulting key. And when you say "88 bits have been revealed to sniffers", could you explain further: whose sniffers? Who can get access to the 88 bits? Regards, Nicholas Bohm Salkyns, Great Canfield, Takeley, Bishop's Stortford CM22 6SX, UK Phone 01279 871272 (+44 1279 871272) Fax 01279 870215 (+44 1279 870215) Mobile 0860 636749 (+44 860 636749) PGP RSA 1024 bit public key ID: 0x08340015. Fingerprint: 9E 15 FB 2A 54 96 24 37 98 A2 E0 D1 34 13 48 07 PGP DSS/DH 1024/3072 public key ID: 0x899DD7FF. Fingerprint: 5248 1320 B42E 84FC 1E8B A9E6 0912 AE66 899D D7FF From dparkins@alien.bt.co.uk Mon, 22 Feb 1999 11:32:41 +0000 Date: Mon, 22 Feb 1999 11:32:41 +0000 From: David Parkinson dparkins@alien.bt.co.uk Subject: Encrypted sessions At 18:49 20/02/99 +0000, Nicholas Bohm wrote: >Is there some simple way to tell what strength session has been established? If you are using V3.X of Netscape Navigator look at the key symbol. broken key = none. solid key 1 ward = 40 bits. solid key 2 wards = 128 bits. I'm not too sure what happens with the latest 4.x versions. David From davidh@spidacom.co.uk Mon, 22 Feb 1999 13:10:06 -0000 Date: Mon, 22 Feb 1999 13:10:06 -0000 From: davidh@spidacom.co.uk davidh@spidacom.co.uk Subject: Encrypted sessions On 20 Feb 99, at 18:49, Nicholas Bohm wrote: > Is there some simple way to tell what strength session has been > established? Use Nutscape 3. The key symbol has one tooth for a 40 bit insecure connection and two teeth for a 128 bit session. This was information was removed from Nutscape 4, presumably to hide from the public that not all "secure" sessions are equal. It would be nice if Fortify could modify the lock symbol so that it indicated whethe r a session was secure or not. David Hansen | davidh@spidacom.co.uk | PGP email preferred Edinburgh | CI$ number 100024,3247 | key number 5432274D From ben@algroup.co.uk Mon, 22 Feb 1999 14:55:23 +0000 Date: Mon, 22 Feb 1999 14:55:23 +0000 From: Ben Laurie ben@algroup.co.uk Subject: Encrypted sessions Nicholas Bohm wrote: > > At 07:06 PM 2/20/1999 +0000, Ben Laurie wrote: > >Nicholas Bohm wrote: > [snip] > >> Lastly, is it right to assume that in all these cases the key negotiation > >> process itself is secure, and that only the strength of the resulting key > >> is what is affected by the limitations? > > > >Yes. BTW, what is commonly known as a 40 bit key is actually a 128 bit > >key of which 88 bits have been revealed to sniffers during session > >setup. This avoids the dictionary attacks that would be available with a > >true 40 bit key. > > > >However, it is worth noting that the public/private keypair are also > >limited in export-crippled s/w to 512 bits. > > Is that limitation overriden by a Verisign certificate enabling use of > 128-bit symmetric keys? If not, the protection for the key negotiation > seems weaker than the resulting key. Yes. The 512 bit thing is part of the particular ciphersuites which are used for export crypto. When you use a non-export ciphersuite, the public key size is unlimited. BTW, there are new export ciphersuites on the table that have 56 secret bits and 1024 bit public keys. > And when you say "88 bits have been revealed to sniffers", could you > explain further: whose sniffers? Who can get access to the 88 bits? Anyone who can monitor the conversation. Cheers, Ben. -- http://www.apache-ssl.org/ben.html "My grandfather once told me that there are two kinds of people: those who work and those who take the credit. He told me to try to be in the first group; there was less competition there." - Indira Gandhi From Alec.Muffett@UK.Sun.COM Mon, 22 Feb 1999 15:40:01 +0000 Date: Mon, 22 Feb 1999 15:40:01 +0000 From: Alec Muffett Alec.Muffett@UK.Sun.COM Subject: Mark Thomas + ECHELON? I saw a trailer for what may be this week's episode of the Mark Thomas Comedy Product at the weekend; I can't confirm that it *is* this week, but it sure looked like MT was flying a hot-air balloon over the Menwith Hill golf-balls... I, for one, await this program with baited breath; if he *is* going after ECHELON, then the link to the phone-in advertised at the end of last week's programme is fairly obvious. Wednesday, Channel 4, 11:00pm. http://www.fnord.demon.co.uk/markt.html - alec -- alec muffett, sun professional services, alec.muffett @ uk.sun.com birds and planes go through the rainbow every day From oxley@solarity.demon.co.uk Tue, 23 Feb 1999 09:41:08 +0000 Date: Tue, 23 Feb 1999 09:41:08 +0000 From: Simon Oxley oxley@solarity.demon.co.uk Subject: Encrypted sessions >Nicholas Bohm wrote: >> >> I was left uncertain by recent exchanges about Server Gated Technology, and >> in the hope of enlightenment (and tolerance) from experts on the list, >> would like to state the questions as I understand them. >> There's a reasonable description of server-gated crypto at: http://www.microsoft.com/security/tech/sgc/whitepaper.asp -- Simon Oxley email: oxley@solarity.demon.co.uk Solarity Ltd: Using IT Securely Tel: +44 (1729) 825555 Fax: +44 (1729) 825500 From pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz Wed, 24 Feb 1999 00:58:49 (NZDT) Date: Wed, 24 Feb 1999 00:58:49 (NZDT) From: Peter Gutmann pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz Subject: Encrypted sessions >>I was left uncertain by recent exchanges about Server Gated Technology, and >>in the hope of enlightenment (and tolerance) from experts on the list, >>would like to state the questions as I understand them. > >There's a reasonable description of server-gated crypto at: > >http://www.microsoft.com/security/tech/sgc/whitepaper.asp There's also a description in my godzilla crypto tutorial, http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~pgut001/tutorial/ (along with everything else crypto-related you can think of). Perhaps this SGC thing should go into some FAQ somewhere, it seems to crop up about once a fortnight in various places (sci.crypt/mailing lists/whatever). Peter. From cacib@liberty.org.uk Tue, 23 Feb 1999 12:52:27 -0000 Date: Tue, 23 Feb 1999 12:52:27 -0000 From: Malcolm Hutty cacib@liberty.org.uk Subject: Mark Thomas + ECHELON? Having been somewhat involved with this little event, I can confirm he is going after Menwith Hill in his own inimitable style. I'm not going to spoil it, but if this is your thing, I certainly suggest you watch it on Wednesday night. It's good. > I saw a trailer for what may be this week's episode of the > Mark Thomas Comedy Product at the weekend; I can't confirm that > it *is* this week, but it sure looked like MT was flying a hot-air > balloon over the Menwith Hill golf-balls... > I, for one, await this program with baited breath; if he *is* > going after ECHELON, then the link to the phone-in advertised > at the end of last week's programme is fairly obvious. > > Wednesday, Channel 4, 11:00pm. > > http://www.fnord.demon.co.uk/markt.html ----------------------------------------------------------------------- Campaign Against Censorship Tel: 0171 589 4500 of the Internet in Britain Say NO Fax: 0171 589 4522 60 Albert Court to censorship! Prince Consort Road cacib@liberty.org.uk London SW7 2BE http://www.liberty.org.uk/cacib/ From jim@acm.org Tue, 23 Feb 1999 09:19:40 -0800 Date: Tue, 23 Feb 1999 09:19:40 -0800 From: Jim Gillogly jim@acm.org Subject: SHA-1 bitwise test vectors (Re: RSA Test) "Hani Almansour" wrote: > I have implementation for RSA, SHA, MD5 and I want to test it. is there a > fast way to test the output of any one of these encryption or if there is a > program that test the output. For the basic SHA-1 and MD5 you can use the test vectors published in the specifications to see whether you have the basic idea right. However, there are a lot of places to go wrong if you're implementing the full SHA-1, which is defined for arbitrary bit strings. Francois Grieu and I have agreed on a number of SHA-1 bit strings and their hashes to test problem areas where the internal buffers fill and roll over. This should shake out most of your bugs. In the following we use the notation bitstring#n to mean a bitstring repeated n (in decimal) times, and we use | for concatenation. Therefore 110#3|1 is 1101101101. 110#148|11 : CE7387AE 577337BE 54EA94F8 2C842E8B E76BC3E1 110#149 : DE244F06 3142CB2F 4C903B7F 7660577F 9E0D8791 110#149|1 : A3D29824 27AE39C8 920CA5F4 99D6C2BD 71EBF03C 110#149|11 : 351AAB58 FF93CF12 AF7D5A58 4CFC8F7D 81023D10 110#170 : 99638692 1E480D4E 2955E727 5DF3522C E8F5AB6E 110#170|1 : BB5F4AD4 8913F51B 157EB985 A5C2034B 8243B01B 110#170|11 : 9E92C554 2237B957 BA2244E8 141FDB66 DEC730A5 110#171 : 2103E454 DA4491F4 E32DD425 A3341DC9 C2A90848 011#490 : B4B18049 DE405027 528CD9E7 4B2EC540 D4E6F06B 011#490|0 : 34C63356 B3087427 20AB9669 14EB0FC9 26E4294B 011#490|01 : 75FACE18 02B9F84F 326368AB 06E73E05 02E9EA34 011#491 : 7C2C3D62 F6AEC28D 94CDF93F 02E739E7 490698A1 Here is a set near 2^32 bits to test the roll-over in the length field from one to two 32-bit words: 110#1431655764|11 1eef5a18 969255a3 b1793a2a 955c7ec2 8cd221a5 110#1431655765| 7a1045b9 14672afa ce8d90e6 d19b3a6a da3cb879 110#1431655765|1 d5e09777 a94f1ea9 240874c4 8d9fecb6 b634256b 110#1431655765|11 eb256904 3c3014e5 1b2862ae 6eb5fb4e 0b851d99 011#1431655764|01 4CB0C4EF 69143D5B F34FC35F 1D4B19F6 ECCAE0F2 011#1431655765 47D92F91 1FC7BB74 DE00ADFC 4E981A81 05556D52 011#1431655765|0 A3D7438C 589B0B93 2AA91CC2 446F06DF 9ABC73F0 011#1431655765|01 3EEE3E1E 28DEDE2C A444D68D A5675B2F AAAB3203 There are lots of cases where one might go wrong, so if you're likely to do a partial-byte implementation you might want to hang onto these test vectors, which were performed with quite different implementations. -- Jim Gillogly Sterday, 3 Rethe S.R. 1999, 17:11 12.19.5.17.8, 9 Lamat 1 Kayab, Sixth Lord of Night From proff@iq.org 24 Feb 1999 05:16:12 +1100 Date: 24 Feb 1999 05:16:12 +1100 From: Julian Assange proff@iq.org Subject: Mark Thomas + ECHELON? "Malcolm Hutty" writes: > I'm not going to spoil it, but if this is your thing, I certainly suggest > you watch it on Wednesday night. It's good. Can someone summerise / provide pointers to a transcript for us poor souls who do not receive channel4? -- Julian Assange http://iq.org/~proff Pathological exhibits...human scum...paranoics, degenerates, morons, bludgers...pack of dingoes...industrial outlaws and political lepers...ratbags. If these people went to Russia, Stalin wouldn't even use them for manure. - Arther Calwell, Australian Minister of Immigration and Information, on Australian Communists From Alec.Muffett@UK.Sun.COM Tue, 23 Feb 1999 18:29:36 +0000 Date: Tue, 23 Feb 1999 18:29:36 +0000 From: Alec Muffett Alec.Muffett@UK.Sun.COM Subject: Mark Thomas + ECHELON? >Can someone summerise / provide pointers to a transcript for us poor souls who >do not receive channel4? one will doubtless be posted to www.fnord.demon.co.uk - alec -- alec muffett, sun professional services, alec.muffett @ uk.sun.com ironic way to kill a mime #1: lock them in a fishtank to suffocate From jim@acm.org Tue, 23 Feb 1999 09:19:40 -0800 Date: Tue, 23 Feb 1999 09:19:40 -0800 From: Jim Gillogly jim@acm.org Subject: SHA-1 bitwise test vectors (Re: RSA Test) "Hani Almansour" wrote: > I have implementation for RSA, SHA, MD5 and I want to test it. is there a > fast way to test the output of any one of these encryption or if there is a > program that test the output. For the basic SHA-1 and MD5 you can use the test vectors published in the specifications to see whether you have the basic idea right. However, there are a lot of places to go wrong if you're implementing the full SHA-1, which is defined for arbitrary bit strings. Francois Grieu and I have agreed on a number of SHA-1 bit strings and their hashes to test problem areas where the internal buffers fill and roll over. This should shake out most of your bugs. In the following we use the notation bitstring#n to mean a bitstring repeated n (in decimal) times, and we use | for concatenation. Therefore 110#3|1 is 1101101101. 110#148|11 : CE7387AE 577337BE 54EA94F8 2C842E8B E76BC3E1 110#149 : DE244F06 3142CB2F 4C903B7F 7660577F 9E0D8791 110#149|1 : A3D29824 27AE39C8 920CA5F4 99D6C2BD 71EBF03C 110#149|11 : 351AAB58 FF93CF12 AF7D5A58 4CFC8F7D 81023D10 110#170 : 99638692 1E480D4E 2955E727 5DF3522C E8F5AB6E 110#170|1 : BB5F4AD4 8913F51B 157EB985 A5C2034B 8243B01B 110#170|11 : 9E92C554 2237B957 BA2244E8 141FDB66 DEC730A5 110#171 : 2103E454 DA4491F4 E32DD425 A3341DC9 C2A90848 011#490 : B4B18049 DE405027 528CD9E7 4B2EC540 D4E6F06B 011#490|0 : 34C63356 B3087427 20AB9669 14EB0FC9 26E4294B 011#490|01 : 75FACE18 02B9F84F 326368AB 06E73E05 02E9EA34 011#491 : 7C2C3D62 F6AEC28D 94CDF93F 02E739E7 490698A1 Here is a set near 2^32 bits to test the roll-over in the length field from one to two 32-bit words: 110#1431655764|11 1eef5a18 969255a3 b1793a2a 955c7ec2 8cd221a5 110#1431655765| 7a1045b9 14672afa ce8d90e6 d19b3a6a da3cb879 110#1431655765|1 d5e09777 a94f1ea9 240874c4 8d9fecb6 b634256b 110#1431655765|11 eb256904 3c3014e5 1b2862ae 6eb5fb4e 0b851d99 011#1431655764|01 4CB0C4EF 69143D5B F34FC35F 1D4B19F6 ECCAE0F2 011#1431655765 47D92F91 1FC7BB74 DE00ADFC 4E981A81 05556D52 011#1431655765|0 A3D7438C 589B0B93 2AA91CC2 446F06DF 9ABC73F0 011#1431655765|01 3EEE3E1E 28DEDE2C A444D68D A5675B2F AAAB3203 There are lots of cases where one might go wrong, so if you're likely to do a partial-byte implementation you might want to hang onto these test vectors, which were performed with quite different implementations. -- Jim Gillogly Sterday, 3 Rethe S.R. 1999, 17:11 12.19.5.17.8, 9 Lamat 1 Kayab, Sixth Lord of Night From lawya@lucs-01.novell.leeds.ac.uk Wed, 24 Feb 1999 13:06:03 GMT0BST Date: Wed, 24 Feb 1999 13:06:03 GMT0BST From: Yaman Akdeniz lawya@lucs-01.novell.leeds.ac.uk Subject: CR&CL (UK) issues a report on Intel and privacy concerns Here is the announcement of our report in relation to Intel and privacy concerns. The report is written by Dr Brian Gladman, our Technology Policy Adviser. Yaman Cyber-Rights & Cyber-Liberties (UK) Press Statement "CR&CL (UK) issues a report on Intel and privacy concerns" 13:00 GMT, 24 February, 1999 LEEDS - Today Cyber-Rights & Cyber-Liberties (UK) publishes its report on the Intel PIII Processor Serial Number Feature. The report written by Dr Brian Gladman, Technology Policy Adviser to Cyber-Rights & Cyber-Liberties (UK) criticises Intel for introducing security features on the new Intel PIII chip without adequate or timely public consultation. The report calls for a change in policy for such features, which should in future involve open consultation on time scales which allow concerns about their operation and use to be resolved. The report, furthermore, proposes a new way forward, including important recommendations for Intel, PC Manufacturers, Suppliers, Retailers, Software (and Web/Internet Service) Suppliers, and PC Owners (especially Consumers and Home Users). The report which is available through (a copy of the report is attached at the end of this press release) states that: "CR&CL(UK) does not have any doubts about Intel's desire to improve security for its customers. We are, however, surprised to be faced with a `fait accompli' on such an important issue. We are also surprised to be put in this position by a company that has a global influence on the safety, the security and the privacy of millions of consumers. We simply cannot accept that such steps should be taken without the widest possible public consultation." Dr Brian Gladman, the Technology Policy Adviser to CR&CL(UK) who co-ordinated the CR&CL(UK) strategy in relation to Intel PIII privacy and security issues stated that: "While I feel sure that Intel is genuine in wanting to improve security for its end users, the company needs to be more open about their approach and more willing to involve the wider community at a much earlier stage in their thinking in order to avoid the misunderstandings and concerns that have so clearly been the result of their PIII announcement" Mr Yaman Akdeniz, the Director of CR&CL(UK) stated that: " We are concerned with the impact of this new technology on privacy. Our report is critical and constructive at the same time. We hope, Intel, the computer industry, and the consumers will take into account our recommendations." Mr Nicholas Bohm, E-Commerce Policy Adviser to CR&CL(UK) added: "Serial numbering of chips, under the owner's control, could offer some useful benefits. But it could also be helpful to repressive regimes in taking action against dissidents who use the Internet to promote democracy and human rights causes. And if software vendors tried to tie licences to individual processors as an anti-piracy technique, it could lead to awkward practical problems for users wanting to upgrade processors or run on a backup system. Intel do not seem to have thought through the implications of their plans for the PIII chip." Notes for the Media: This press release will be available at http://www.cyber-rights.org/press The CR&CL (UK) report on Intel and privacy is available through http://www.cyber-rights.org/reports/intel-rep.htm Contact Information Dr Brian Gladman, Crypto Technology Policy Adviser, Cyber Rights & Cyber-Liberties (UK) Telephone: 01905 748990, dial +44 1905 748990 if you are abroad. E-mail: brg@cyber-rights.org Mr Yaman Akdeniz, director of Cyber-Rights & Cyber-Liberties (UK) Telephone: 0498-865116, dial +44 498 865116 if you are abroad. E-mail: lawya@cyber-rights.org Mr Nicholas Bohm, E-Commerce Policy Adviser, Cyber Rights & Cyber-Liberties (UK) Telephone: 01279 871272, dial +44 1279 871272 if you are abroad. E-mail: nbohm@cyber-rights.org ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Yaman Akdeniz Cyber-Rights & Cyber-Liberties (UK) at: http://www.cyber-rights.org Read the new CR&CL (UK) Report, Who Watches the Watchmen, Part:II Accountability & Effective Self-Regulation in the Information Age, August 1998 at http://www.cyber-rights.org/watchmen-ii.htm ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ From cacib@liberty.org.uk Thu, 25 Feb 1999 00:21:19 -0000 Date: Thu, 25 Feb 1999 00:21:19 -0000 From: Malcolm Hutty cacib@liberty.org.uk Subject: Mark Thomas + ECHELON? On 24 Feb 99, at 5:16, Julian Assange wrote: > Can someone summerise / provide pointers to a transcript for us poor souls who > do not receive channel4? Yes, but I had to wait until after broadcast. Mark Thomas went hot-air ballooning over Menwith Hill, as it seems not to be restricted airspace. Also, if you are low on fuel it is an "emergency landing", so you can land there as you have no control over steering in a hot air balloon. Anyway, he's running hot air balloon rides for the public. For details of how to book a ride, and lots of stuff on "RAF" Menwith Hill itself, see http://www.menwithhill.com/ ========================================================================= Campaign Against Censorship Say NO! T: 0171 589 4500 of the Internet in Britain to censorship F: 0171 589 4522 Prince Consort Road E: cacib@liberty.org.uk London SW7 2BE W: http://www.liberty.org.uk/cacib/ From Alec.Muffett@UK.Sun.COM Thu, 25 Feb 1999 00:23:22 +0000 Date: Thu, 25 Feb 1999 00:23:22 +0000 From: Alec Muffett Alec.Muffett@UK.Sun.COM Subject: Mark Thomas + ECHELON? [ for those people who didn't see the programme, bring up http://www.menwithhill.com - it helps put this post in context ] > >Having been somewhat involved with this little event, I can confirm >he is going after Menwith Hill in his own inimitable style. > Well, I must admit I feel rather bemused by the programme; after my posting to ukcrypto of June 1998... http://www.cs.ucl.ac.uk/staff/I.Brown/archives/ukcrypto/old/msg01135.html - I can't help but feeling he (or, more likely, a researcher) has been at the list content dregdging up ideas, and maybe I provided some subconcious inspiration, if I was not actually ripped off. Almost certainly not, but, what the hell, I can dream... 8-) Nonetheless, I think running Ballooning tours over Menwith is a most amusing idea, and I have put my name down, just in case it all comes together before the legal beagles get into action. I wonder what other things we might inspire Mark to address? Hmmm... What gets me riled, and is geeky and novel, and provides ample opportunity for pissing off rich people in embarrassing ways? Ah yes - it's obvious: DVD Region Format encoding! Encryption in the name of filthy lucre! Artificial barriers to trade, and indirect censorship! When may we expect to see a programme about that? Anyone? 8-) - alec (available for scriptwriting, any time, no no, i'm not starstruck at all, honest guv, i'm better nowadays...) From cacib@liberty.org.uk Thu, 25 Feb 1999 12:01:33 -0000 Date: Thu, 25 Feb 1999 12:01:33 -0000 From: Malcolm Hutty cacib@liberty.org.uk Subject: Mark Thomas + ECHELON? > - I can't help but feeling he (or, more likely, a researcher) has been at > the list content dregdging up ideas, and maybe I provided some subconcious > inspiration, if I was not actually ripped off. Well it wasn't me, my involvement was limited to the web site! I don't know if anyone at MTCP reads ukcrypto but friends of friends do, maybe your idea just stuck in someone's head. I wouldn't think of it as being ripped off, think of it as your idea coming to fruition on TV. Glass is half full and all that. ----------------------------------------------------------------------- Campaign Against Censorship Tel: 0171 589 4500 of the Internet in Britain Say NO Fax: 0171 589 4522 60 Albert Court to censorship! Prince Consort Road cacib@liberty.org.uk London SW7 2BE http://www.liberty.org.uk/cacib/ From Alec.Muffett@UK.Sun.COM Thu, 25 Feb 1999 12:58:33 +0000 Date: Thu, 25 Feb 1999 12:58:33 +0000 From: Alec Muffett Alec.Muffett@UK.Sun.COM Subject: Mark Thomas + ECHELON? >I wouldn't think of it as being ripped off, think of it as your idea >coming to fruition on TV. Glass is half full and all that. Quite - I would never have had the money to fund it, anyway, so I don't feel any loss. I am just very amused at the convergnce of the ideas, and the skill with which the MT team carried it off. ("You've done this before, haven't you"?) Actually - would anyone from the list *actually* be interested in a grand tour of UK SIGINT stations, on a "hire a van and share petrol, sleep in tents" basis? Sometime this summer? Just a thought... I am thoroughly looking forward to seeing what comes of all this. -- alec muffett, sun professional services, alec.muffett @ uk.sun.com we had joy, we had fun, we were forking on a sun From alan@kable.co.uk Thu, 25 Feb 1999 14:06:00 -0000 Date: Thu, 25 Feb 1999 14:06:00 -0000 From: Alan Burkitt-Gray alan@kable.co.uk Subject: Ripped off?? This is a multi-part message in MIME format. ------=_NextPart_000_0106_01BE60C7.F9459D40 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable > - I can't help but feeling he (or, more likely, a researcher) has been = at > the list content dregdging up ideas, and maybe I provided some = subconcious > inspiration, if I was not actually ripped off. Hold on, here. Is someone who is against censorship, for the liberty of = the Internet, in general dubious about copyright, complaining that = someone has seen something on the net and followed up the idea? Just wondering, you know. Alan B-G - ALAN BURKITT-GRAY, Editor, Government Computing The independent magazine about information age public service, for the people who are going to make it happen NEXT ISSUE: March 1999, mailed out 25 February Published monthly by Kable Ltd The Courtyard, 55 Charterhouse Street, London EC1M 6HA, UK tel 0171 608 0900, fax 0171 608 0901 international tel +44 171 608 0900, fax +44 171 608 0901 website http://www.kable.co.uk=20 e-mail alan@kable.co.uk For advance features information see http://www.governmentcomputing.com=20 Where's Kable? Look at=20 http://www.streetmap.co.uk/streetmap.dll?grid2map?X=3D531650&Y=3D181750&a= rrow=3Dy ------=_NextPart_000_0106_01BE60C7.F9459D40 Content-Type: text/html; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
> - I can't help but feeling he (or, more likely, a researcher) = has been=20 at
> the list content dregdging up ideas, and maybe I provided = some=20 subconcious
> inspiration, if I was not actually ripped = off.

Hold on, here. Is someone who is against censorship, for the liberty = of the=20 Internet, in general dubious about copyright, complaining that someone = has seen=20 something on the net and followed up the idea?

Just wondering, you know.

Alan B-G

 


-
ALAN BURKITT-GRAY, Editor, = Government=20 Computing
The independent magazine about information = age=20 public service,
for the people who are going to make it=20 happen

NEXT ISSUE: March 1999, mailed out 25 = February

Published monthly by Kable Ltd
The Courtyard, 55=20 Charterhouse Street, London EC1M 6HA, UK
tel 0171 608 0900, fax 0171 = 608=20 0901
international tel +44 171 608 0900, fax +44 171 608 = 0901
website=20 http://www.kable.co.uk =
e-mail=20 alan@kable.co.uk
For advance features information = see http://www.governmentcomputing.com=20

Where's Kable? Look at
http://www.streetmap.co.uk/streetmap.dll?grid2map?X=3D531650&= ;Y=3D181750&arrow=3Dy

------=_NextPart_000_0106_01BE60C7.F9459D40-- From I.G.Batten@ftel.co.uk Thu, 25 Feb 1999 13:59:45 GMT Date: Thu, 25 Feb 1999 13:59:45 GMT From: Ian G Batten I.G.Batten@ftel.co.uk Subject: Mark Thomas + ECHELON? -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- In article <199902251258.MAA13960@coyote.uk.sun.com>, Alec Muffett wrote: > Actually - would anyone from the list *actually* be interested in a grand tour > of UK SIGINT stations, on a "hire a van and share petrol, sleep in tents" basi s? > Sometime this summer? Just a thought... Which brings to mind that old joke, from circa `Come on Eileen': Dexy's Midnight Runners didn't tour, they were just moved on every night. I think, however, if you were going to really wind up The Man, you'd make some careful checks on the provisions of the Official Secrets Act 1911 as amended and the Wireless and Telegraphic Communications Act 1948 - --- after all, any fool can get arrested, the cool thing is to _not_ break the law --- and travel with your vehicle equipped with an array of cameras, aerials, scanners and suchlike. Do a live webcast of any mullarky with GSM and a laptop. ian -- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGPfreeware 5.0i for non-commercial use Charset: noconv iQB1AwUBNtVXK8oy0yij3IvtAQGMYAMAwyM5wCCNrv1G+TEct0PflpN9jxDjgERR JTPhOpX02U3s8Z8wBi4g6EbWnN1ULtw3ibTb2K1H3hWKGjNcTozu0seo1rnK4+Is YKdaGHPfQGXgmhVMuUpo4kF2zBepekz/ =Y4n2 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From ukcrypto-hqn@harlequin.co.uk Thu, 25 Feb 1999 14:38:47 GMT Date: Thu, 25 Feb 1999 14:38:47 GMT From: UKCrypto at Harlequin ukcrypto-hqn@harlequin.co.uk Subject: Mark Thomas + ECHELON? On Mon, 22 Feb 1999 15:40:01 +0000, Alec Muffett wrote: > I, for one, await this program with baited breath; if he *is* > going after ECHELON, then the link to the phone-in advertised > at the end of last week's programme is fairly obvious. > > Wednesday, Channel 4, 11:00pm. > > http://www.fnord.demon.co.uk/markt.html FYI, take a look at . From danny@flirble.org Thu, 25 Feb 1999 15:06:06 +0000 Date: Thu, 25 Feb 1999 15:06:06 +0000 From: Danny O'Brien danny@flirble.org Subject: Mark Thomas + ECHELON? On Thu, Feb 25, 1999 at 12:01:33PM -0000, Malcolm Hutty wrote: > > - I can't help but feeling he (or, more likely, a researcher) has been at > > the list content dregdging up ideas, and maybe I provided some subconcious > > inspiration, if I was not actually ripped off. > > Well it wasn't me, my involvement was limited to the web site! > I don't know if anyone at MTCP reads ukcrypto but friends of > friends do, maybe your idea just stuck in someone's head. > I wouldn't think of it as being ripped off, think of it as your idea > coming to fruition on TV. Glass is half full and all that. > Mark's been banging on about Menwith Hill for as long as anyone else I know. Longtime viewers will remember also his Lincolnshire Poacher references and RSA-in-(n-1)-lines-of-perl in his last series. As an Official Secret, Menwith Hill info is as close to public domain these days as you can get... :) d. > > ----------------------------------------------------------------------- > Campaign Against Censorship Tel: 0171 589 4500 > of the Internet in Britain Say NO Fax: 0171 589 4522 > 60 Albert Court to censorship! > Prince Consort Road cacib@liberty.org.uk > London SW7 2BE http://www.liberty.org.uk/cacib/ From danny@flirble.org Thu, 25 Feb 1999 15:06:06 +0000 Date: Thu, 25 Feb 1999 15:06:06 +0000 From: Danny O'Brien danny@flirble.org Subject: Mark Thomas + ECHELON? On Thu, Feb 25, 1999 at 12:01:33PM -0000, Malcolm Hutty wrote: > > - I can't help but feeling he (or, more likely, a researcher) has been at > > the list content dregdging up ideas, and maybe I provided some subconcious > > inspiration, if I was not actually ripped off. > > Well it wasn't me, my involvement was limited to the web site! > I don't know if anyone at MTCP reads ukcrypto but friends of > friends do, maybe your idea just stuck in someone's head. > I wouldn't think of it as being ripped off, think of it as your idea > coming to fruition on TV. Glass is half full and all that. > Mark's been banging on about Menwith Hill for as long as anyone else I know. Longtime viewers will remember also his Lincolnshire Poacher references and RSA-in-(n-1)-lines-of-perl in his last series. As an Official Secret, Menwith Hill info is as close to public domain these days as you can get... :) d. > > ----------------------------------------------------------------------- > Campaign Against Censorship Tel: 0171 589 4500 > of the Internet in Britain Say NO Fax: 0171 589 4522 > 60 Albert Court to censorship! > Prince Consort Road cacib@liberty.org.uk > London SW7 2BE http://www.liberty.org.uk/cacib/ From I.Brown@cs.ucl.ac.uk Thu, 25 Feb 1999 18:21:57 +0000 Date: Thu, 25 Feb 1999 18:21:57 +0000 From: Ian BROWN I.Brown@cs.ucl.ac.uk Subject: Mark Thomas + ECHELON? > Actually - would anyone from the list *actually* be interested in a grand tour > of UK SIGINT stations, on a "hire a van and share petrol, sleep in tents" basis? > Sometime this summer? Just a thought... Perhaps after the next time we have a crypto do in London, we could pop and see MI5 and MI6. I often see MI6 as it's such a cool building and it's just over the Thames from the Tate. Ian :) PS It has great faux trees right up its side -- wonder if they are a new variation on the golf ball ;) From pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz Fri, 26 Feb 1999 13:36:06 (NZDT) Date: Fri, 26 Feb 1999 13:36:06 (NZDT) From: Peter Gutmann pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz Subject: Mark Thomas + ECHELON? Alec Muffett writes: >DVD Region Format encoding! >Encryption in the name of filthy lucre! >Artificial barriers to trade, and indirect censorship! >When may we expect to see a programme about that? Anyone? 8-) NZ has an interesting situation with region coding. Many manufacturers are quite openly shipping non-region coded players to their NZ vendors (they're even advertised in papers and whatnot as being able to play all regions). Others will take your player out the back when you buy it and bring it back with the region-coding disabled. The justification I've heard for this is a recent law change which legalised parallel importing. Until not too long ago, one company could obtain a monopoly to sell a certain type of imported product, adding massive markups to the price and taking anyone else who imported the same brand from overseas (at a fraction of the cost) to court. The reason for this, it was often claimed, was that the appointed dealer was using the inflated price to cover tech support costs. Microsoft NZ was often used as a counterexample to these claims :-). Because this simply created a government-mandated, charge-what-you-like monopoly for whoever got there first, it was abolished not too long ago so that now anyone can act as an importer and dealer. The pros are that in many cases prices dropped, the cons are that there were claims that anyone could import a product from whatever dodgy source they could locate, but this doesn't seem to have happened (the customer is still covered by the same fairly strong consumer protection laws which cover everything else). Anyway, because parallel importing is legal, it's possible for anyone to import players region-coded for anywhere. It would be pointless trying to sell Asia-Pacific region-coded players here because everyone would buy US or European-coded ones, the manufacturers saw the writing on the wall (either sell non-coded players or none at all) and are shipping non-coded players. Peter. From cb@fipr.org Fri, 26 Feb 1999 13:30:21 -0000 Date: Fri, 26 Feb 1999 13:30:21 -0000 From: Caspar Bowden cb@fipr.org Subject: On the Record - 12pm Sun 28th Feb Sounds like it might be worth watching.... -- Caspar Bowden http://www.fipr.org Director, Foundation for Information Policy Research Tel: +44(0)171 354 2333 Fax: +44(0)171 827 6534 From Streaky_Bacon@email.msn.com Fri, 26 Feb 1999 13:37:00 -0000 Date: Fri, 26 Feb 1999 13:37:00 -0000 From: Michael Bacon Streaky_Bacon@email.msn.com Subject: Mark Thomas + ECHELON? -----Original Message----- From: Ian BROWN To: ukcrypto@maillist.ox.ac.uk Date: 25 February 1999 18:30 Subject: Re: Mark Thomas + ECHELON? [snip - MB] >Perhaps after the next time we have a crypto do in London, we could pop >and see MI5 and MI6. I often see MI6 as it's such a cool building and it's >just over the Thames from the Tate. Why not take in BT's Kingfisher House as well? [snip - MB] >PS It has great faux trees right up its side -- wonder if they are a new >variation on the golf ball ;) > Nah, I watched them build "Christmas Tree House" when I was with Hoskyns (Cap Gemini) just across Vauxhall Cross, and all the aerials went up on the roof. The copper mesh that went inside however ... Michael PS - perhaps they're 'Vaux' trees - M From Streaky_Bacon@email.msn.com Fri, 26 Feb 1999 13:37:00 -0000 Date: Fri, 26 Feb 1999 13:37:00 -0000 From: Michael Bacon Streaky_Bacon@email.msn.com Subject: Mark Thomas + ECHELON? -----Original Message----- From: Ian BROWN To: ukcrypto@maillist.ox.ac.uk Date: 25 February 1999 18:30 Subject: Re: Mark Thomas + ECHELON? [snip - MB] >Perhaps after the next time we have a crypto do in London, we could pop >and see MI5 and MI6. I often see MI6 as it's such a cool building and it's >just over the Thames from the Tate. Why not take in BT's Kingfisher House as well? [snip - MB] >PS It has great faux trees right up its side -- wonder if they are a new >variation on the golf ball ;) > Nah, I watched them build "Christmas Tree House" when I was with Hoskyns (Cap Gemini) just across Vauxhall Cross, and all the aerials went up on the roof. The copper mesh that went inside however ... Michael PS - perhaps they're 'Vaux' trees - M From bdm@fenrir.demon.co.uk Fri, 26 Feb 1999 14:27:20 Date: Fri, 26 Feb 1999 14:27:20 From: Brian Morrison bdm@fenrir.demon.co.uk Subject: On the Record - 12pm Sun 28th Feb On Fri, 26 Feb 1999 13:30:21 -0000, Caspar Bowden wrote: >Sounds like it might be worth watching.... > May one ask, why should that be? -- Brian Morrison bdm@fenrir.demon.co.uk 'The village populace is jumpin' on faces, catchin' the javelin, Headin' the shot.' [FX: wet thud - "Oooo.."] From nbohm@ernest.net Fri, 26 Feb 1999 15:02:22 +0000 Date: Fri, 26 Feb 1999 15:02:22 +0000 From: Nicholas Bohm nbohm@ernest.net Subject: On the Record - 12pm Sun 28th Feb At 01:30 PM 2/26/1999 -0000, Caspar Bowden wrote: >Sounds like it might be worth watching.... I was interviewed for it at very short notice. I think it may be time for another round of "Consultation Paper coming out very soon." Regards, Nicholas Bohm Salkyns, Great Canfield, Takeley, Bishop's Stortford CM22 6SX, UK Phone 01279 871272 (+44 1279 871272) Fax 01279 870215 (+44 1279 870215) Mobile 0860 636749 (+44 860 636749) PGP RSA 1024 bit public key ID: 0x08340015. Fingerprint: 9E 15 FB 2A 54 96 24 37 98 A2 E0 D1 34 13 48 07 PGP DSS/DH 1024/3072 public key ID: 0x899DD7FF. Fingerprint: 5248 1320 B42E 84FC 1E8B A9E6 0912 AE66 899D D7FF From denning@cs.georgetown.edu Fri, 26 Feb 1999 10:34:25 -0500 Date: Fri, 26 Feb 1999 10:34:25 -0500 From: Dorothy Denning denning@cs.georgetown.edu Subject: International Cryptography Institute International Cryptography Institute 1999 Legal and Technological Developments Thursday-Friday, April 29-30, 1999 Washington, DC Presented by The National Intellectual Property Law Institute (NIPLI) and the National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC) 1815 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Suite 300 Washington, D.C. 20006 Phone: 202-842-4800 Fax: 202-296-4098 Conference Chair: Kenneth M. Geide National Infrastructure Protection Center Chairman, Chandler Center for Computer Law The International Cryptography Institute will address the current legal and technological developments in cryptography associated with meeting the information protection needs of users and law enforcement and national security needs of nations. Topics covered will include computer crime and law updates, today's cryptography market, legal and regulatory landscapes, government perspectives, business and government solutions, international business perspectives, encryption as a tool for crime, global trust enterprise, encryption trends, and future developments and predictions. Keynote Speaker: Jeffrey A. Hunker Director, Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office Program Thursday, April 29 8:00 a.m. Registration 9:00 a.m. Welcome and Opening Remarks Professor James P. Chandler, President, National Intellectual Property Law Institute Kenneth M. Geide, Conference Chair, and Section Chief, National Infrastructure Protection Center 9:15 a.m. Computer Crime and Law Update Michael Woods, Chief, National Security Law Unit, FBI 10:00 a.m. Today's Cryptography Market Gary Lynch, Ernst & Young LLP 10:45 a.m. Break 11:00 a.m. Legal and Regulatory Landscape Stewart Baker, Steptoe & Johnson LLP 11:45 a.m. Lunch with Keynote Speaker Mr. Jeffrey A. Hunker, CIAO 1:15 p.m. Government Perspectives Peter Ford, AG Dept., Australia (Chair) Philippe Dejean, SCSSI Detlef Eckert, DG XIII Nigel Hickson, DTI Jim Lewis, BXA 3:00 p.m. Break 3:15 p.m. Business and Government Solutions Patty Edfors, GTE 4:00 p.m. International Business Perspectives Ted Barassi, CertCo Nick Mansfield, Shell Services International B.V. 5:15 p.m. Summary Ed Appel, CertCo 5:30 p.m. Reception Friday, April 30 9:00 a.m. Encryption as a Tool for Crime Dorothy Denning, Georgetown U. 9:30 a.m. Global Trust Enterprise Libby Ghekiere, BankAmerica (Invited) 10:00 a.m. Encryption Trends Edward Giorgio, Booz, Allen & Hamilton 10:30 a.m. Break 10:45 a.m. Future Developments in Cryptography Doug McGowan, Hewlett-Packard (Chair) Jim Foti, NIST Robert Frith, Key Recovery Alliance 12:00 p.m. Future Predictions Bruce McConnell, OMB 12:45 p.m. Wrap-up Kenneth M. Geide, NIPC 1:00 p.m. Adjourn Faculty Faculty Chair Kenneth M. Geide Mr. Edward J. Appel Vice President CertCo Mr. Stewart Baker Partner Steptoe & Johnson LLP Mr. Ted Barassi Vice President CertCo Professor James P. Chandler President, National Intellectual Property Law Institute Mr. Philippe Dejean Chef De La Division Chiffre SCSSI France Ms. Dorothy E. Denning Professor, Computer Science Dept. Georgetown University Mr. Detlef Eckert DG XIII European Commission Ms. Patricia N. Edfors Director, Government Operations GTE Mr. Peter Ford First Assistant Secretary Information and Security Law Division Attorney-General's Department Australia Mr. Jim Foti Security Technology Group NIST Mr. Robert Frith President, Key Recovery Alliance Motorola Mr. Kenneth M. Geide Conference Chair, and Chief Computer Investigations and Operations Section National Infrastructure Protection Center Federal Bureau of Investigation Ms. Libby Ghekiere Senior Vice President BankAmerica Mr. Edward Giorgio Principal Booz, Allen & Hamilton Inc. Mr. Nigel Hickson Head, Information Security Policy Group Department of Trade and Industry U.K. Mr. Jeffrey A. Hunker Director Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office Mr. James A. Lewis Director, Office of Strategic Trade Bureau of Export Administration U.S. Department of Commerce Mr. Gary Lynch Partner Ernst & Young LLP Mr. Nick Mansfield Principal Consultant, Information Security Services Shell Services International B.V. The Netherlands Mr. Bruce McConnell Chief, Information Policy and Technology Branch Office of Management and Budget Mr. Douglas J. McGowan Director, VerSecure Hewlett-Packard Company Mr. Michael Woods Chief, National Security Law Unit Federal Bureau of Investigation Conference Registration Form Name: Organization: Address: Telephone: Fax: E-Mail: Course Fees: General $495.00 U.S. Gov. and Academic $295.00 Please indicate type of payment: CHECK in the amount of $ made payable to NIPLI. MONEY ORDER in the amount of $ CREDIT CARD Visa # Exp. Mastercard # Exp. Discover # Exp. Registration by Fax: 202.296.4098 Registration by phone: 202.842.4800 or 1.888.304.MIND Registration online: www.nipli.org Or mail registration with payment to: NIPLI Attn: Registrar, P.O. Box 27457, Washington, D.C. 20038-7457 From octobersdad@reporters.net Fri, 26 Feb 1999 14:59:30 +0000 Date: Fri, 26 Feb 1999 14:59:30 +0000 From: T Bruce Tober octobersdad@reporters.net Subject: CDT> Bill Lifting Encryption Controls Re-Introduced in Congress Someone asked (I think on this list) about the most recent Goodlatte pro-encryption bill in the US Congress. here's a report. ------- Forwarded message follows ------- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ _____ _____ _______ / ____| __ \__ __| ____ ___ ____ __ | | | | | | | | / __ \____ / (_)______ __ / __ \____ _____/ /_ | | | | | | | | / /_/ / __ \/ / / ___/ / / / / /_/ / __ \/ ___/ __/ | |____| |__| | | | / ____/ /_/ / / / /__/ /_/ / / ____/ /_/ (__ ) /_ \_____|_____/ |_| /_/ \____/_/_/\___/\__, / /_/ \____/____/\__/ The Center for Democracy and Technology /____/ Volume 5, Number 4 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- A briefing on public policy issues affecting civil liberties online ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- CDT POLICY POST Volume 5, Number 4 February 25, 1999 CONTENTS: (1) Bill Lifting Encryption Controls Re-Introduced in Congress (2) Summary of SAFE Act, HR 850 (3) Background on Encryption Fight (4) Subscription Information (5) About the Center for Democracy and Technology ** This document may be redistributed freely with this banner intact ** Excerpts may be re-posted with permission of ________________________________________________________________________________ (1) BILL LIFTING ENCRYPTION CONTROLS RE-INTRODUCED IN CONGRESS Reps. Bob Goodlatte (R-VA) and Zoe Lofgren (D-CA), joined by over 200 other Members of the House of Representatives, today re-introduced the Security and Freedom through Encryption (SAFE) bill, HR 850. Like its predecessors in prior years, HR 850 promotes privacy and security online by lifting export controls on encryption. The bill also affirms the right of all Americans to use whatever form of encryption they choose and prohibits the government from imposing domestic controls on encryption through mandatory "key-escrow" or "backdoor" systems. The unusually large number of original co-sponsors signing onto the bill at the outset demonstrates bipartisan opposition to Clinton Administration policy and widespread support for promoting the availability and use of strong encryption. The co-sponsor list includes the entire House Republican leadership (with the exception of the Speaker who, by tradition, does not co-sponsor bills), as well as Democratic leaders Richard Gephardt (D-MO) and David Bonior (D-MI). ________________________________________________________________________________ (2) SUMMARY OF SAFE ACT, H.R. 850 * Guarantees all Americans the freedom to use any type of encryption anywhere in the world, and allows the sale of any type of encryption domestically. * Prohibits the government from requiring a backdoor into peoples' email and computer files ("mandatory key recovery"). * Modernizes U.S. export controls to permit the export of generally available software and hardware if a product with comparable security is commercially available from foreign suppliers (creates a level playing field). * Creates criminal penalties for the knowing and willful use of encryption to conceal evidence of a crime, BUT specifies that the use of encryption does not constitute probable cause of a crime. * Calls upon the Attorney General to compile examples in which encryption has interfered with law enforcement. * Calls upon the President to convene international conference to draft encryption policy agreement. ________________________________________________________________________________ (3) BACKGROUND ON ENCRYPTION FIGHT By the end of the 105th Congress (1997-98), the SAFE bill had 249 co-sponsors in the House. The bill was reported with widely divergent amendments by 5 committees: Judiciary, International Relations, National Security, Intelligence, and Commerce, and was not brought before the full House for a vote, partly because of the opposition of then-Rules Committee Chairman Gerald Solomon (R-NY). Solomon has retired and SAFE Act co-sponsor David Dreier (R-CA) now chairs the Rules Committee. A hearing on the SAFE Act has tentatively been scheduled for March 4, before the House Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property. Sen. Conrad Burns (R-MT) has announced plans to introduce in the Senate similar legislation lifting encryption export controls. Meanwhile, the Clinton Administration continues to review incremental changes to the export control regulations. http://www.cdt.org/crypto/admin/index.html For more information on the SAFE bill, including the text of the legislation and relevant background information on the encryption policy debate, please visit CDT's encryption policy issues page at http://www.cdt.org/crypto . ________________________________________________________________________________ (4) SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION Be sure you are up to date on the latest public policy issues affecting civil liberties online and how they will affect you! Subscribe to the CDT Policy Post news distribution list. CDT Policy Posts, the regular news publication of the Center for Democracy and Technology, are received by Internet users, industry leaders, policymakers and activists, and have become the leading source for information about critical free speech and privacy issues affecting the Internet and other interactive communications media. To subscribe to CDT's Policy Post list, send mail to majordomo@cdt.org In the BODY of the message (leave the SUBJECT LINE BLANK), type subscribe policy-posts If you ever wish to remove yourself from the list, send mail to the above address with NOTHING IN THE SUBJECT LINE and a BODY TEXT of: unsubscribe policy-posts _____________________________________________________________________________ (5) ABOUT THE CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY AND TECHNOLOGY/CONTACTING US The Center for Democracy and Technology is a non-profit public interest organization based in Washington, DC. The Center's mission is to develop and advocate public policies that advance democratic values and constitutional civil liberties in new computer and communications technologies. Contacting us: General information: info@cdt.org World Wide Web: http://www.cdt.org/ Snail Mail: The Center for Democracy and Technology 1634 Eye Street NW * Suite 1100 * Washington, DC 20006 (v) +1.202.637.9800 * (f) +1.202.637.0968 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- End Policy Post 5.4 2/25/99 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------------ Ari Schwartz Policy Analyst Center for Democracy and Technology 1634 Eye Street NW, Suite 1100 Washington, DC 20006 202 637 9800 fax 202 637 0968 ari@cdt.org http://www.cdt.org ------------------------------------ ~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~-~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~ Posted by Andrew Oram - cr-owner@cpsr.org - Moderator: CYBER-RIGHTS A CPSR Project -- http://www.cpsr.org -- cpsr@cpsr.org http://www.cpsr.org/cpsr/nii/cyber-rights/ ftp://www.cpsr.org/cpsr/nii/cyber-rights/Library/ Materials may be reposted in their _entirety_ for non-commercial use. ~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~-~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~ tbt -- New commentary piece at http://www.crecon.demon.co.uk/nostalgia.htm | Bruce Tober, , | | Birmingham, UK, EU +44-121-242-3832 (mobile - 07979-521-106). Freelance | |Journalist & Website consultancy and development. PGP details at my website| From jei@zor.hut.fi Sat, 27 Feb 1999 01:10:17 +0200 (EET) Date: Sat, 27 Feb 1999 01:10:17 +0200 (EET) From: jei@zor.hut.fi jei@zor.hut.fi Subject: CDT> Bill Lifting Encryption Controls Re-Introduced in Congress On Fri, 26 Feb 1999, T Bruce Tober wrote: > Someone asked (I think on this list) about the most recent > Goodlatte pro-encryption bill in the US Congress. here's a report. > ________________________________________________________________________________ > (2) SUMMARY OF SAFE ACT, H.R. 850 > > * Guarantees all Americans the freedom to use any type of encryption > anywhere in the world, ... Really?? Even if the local laws deny it like in Russia? ++ J From jei@zor.hut.fi Sat, 27 Feb 1999 01:10:17 +0200 (EET) Date: Sat, 27 Feb 1999 01:10:17 +0200 (EET) From: jei@zor.hut.fi jei@zor.hut.fi Subject: CDT> Bill Lifting Encryption Controls Re-Introduced in Congress On Fri, 26 Feb 1999, T Bruce Tober wrote: > Someone asked (I think on this list) about the most recent > Goodlatte pro-encryption bill in the US Congress. here's a report. > ________________________________________________________________________________ > (2) SUMMARY OF SAFE ACT, H.R. 850 > > * Guarantees all Americans the freedom to use any type of encryption > anywhere in the world, ... Really?? Even if the local laws deny it like in Russia? ++ J From octobersdad@reporters.net Sat, 27 Feb 1999 01:52:25 +0000 Date: Sat, 27 Feb 1999 01:52:25 +0000 From: T Bruce Tober octobersdad@reporters.net Subject: CDT> Bill Lifting Encryption Controls Re-Introduced in Congress In message , jei@zor.hut.fi writes >On Fri, 26 Feb 1999, T Bruce Tober wrote: > >> Someone asked (I think on this list) about the most recent >> Goodlatte pro-encryption bill in the US Congress. here's a report. >> ______________________________________________________________________________ >__ >> (2) SUMMARY OF SAFE ACT, H.R. 850 >> >> * Guarantees all Americans the freedom to use any type of encryption >> anywhere in the world, ... > >Really?? > >Even if the local laws deny it like in Russia? Just another case of amerikan hyperbole as is standard in amerikan discussions about everything it does (See, I can use hyperbole too). tbt -- New commentary piece at http://www.crecon.demon.co.uk/nostalgia.htm | Bruce Tober, , | | Birmingham, UK, EU +44-121-242-3832 (mobile - 07979-521-106). Freelance | |Journalist & Website consultancy and development. PGP details at my website| From cb@fipr.org Sat, 27 Feb 1999 10:03:24 -0000 Date: Sat, 27 Feb 1999 10:03:24 -0000 From: Caspar Bowden cb@fipr.org Subject: T&I Select Committee evidence (23 Feb) on BBC Parliament Channel (Sunday 17:10) A repeat showing of the oral evidence given on Feb 23rd to the Trade and Industry Select Committee inquiry on E-Commerce, will be shown this Sunday (28/2/99) on the BBC Parliament Channel at 5:10pm (until 7:15pm) Scheduled list of witnesses =========================== Mr. Chris Reed, Centre for Commercial Law Studies, Queen Mary and Westfield College; APACS; and others -- Caspar Bowden http://www.fipr.org Director, Foundation for Information Policy Research Tel: +44(0)171 354 2333 Fax: +44(0)171 827 6534 From Ross.Anderson@cl.cam.ac.uk Sat, 27 Feb 1999 13:37:38 +0000 Date: Sat, 27 Feb 1999 13:37:38 +0000 From: Ross Anderson Ross.Anderson@cl.cam.ac.uk Subject: Global Internet Trust Register I've just got the 1999 Global Internet Trust Register from MIT Press. This book contains the world's most important 1000 or so public keys; we conceived it in response to the previous government's TTP proposals, which would have banned it. When Nigel and friends sold the old government's line to the new government, we took a copy of the 1998 edition round to Chris Smith and asked him why he wanted to ban our book. I believe this was what got escrow on to the cabinet agenda. So it's already played some small role in history. The MIT press page is: http://mitpress.mit.edu/book-home.tcl?isbn=0262511053 The 1998 edition can be downloaded free from: http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/Research/Security/Trust-Register/index.html Now that the MIT Press has taken over the title, it looks unlikely that a return to the Ian Taylor proposals will ever be possible. The US Constitution takes a dim view of governments banning books Ross From scott@exportcontrols.com Sat, 27 Feb 1999 18:40:30 -0500 Date: Sat, 27 Feb 1999 18:40:30 -0500 From: Scott Gearity scott@exportcontrols.com Subject: CDT> Bill Lifting Encryption Controls Re-Introduced in Congress Obviously, U.S. laws do nothing to invalidate the statutes of other nations. However, the SAFE Act's claim is not necessarily pure hyperbole. Some U.S. export control laws and regulations apply to U.S. citizens, wherever located. Extraterratoriality cuts both ways. Just a thought. Scott Gearity Export Strategies, LLC Direct: 301.986.6849 Fax: 301.986.6847 http://www.exportstrategies.com -----Original Message----- From: T Bruce Tober [SMTP:octobersdad@reporters.net] Sent: Friday, February 26, 1999 8:52 PM To: ukcrypto@maillist.ox.ac.uk Subject: Re: CDT> Bill Lifting Encryption Controls Re-Introduced in Congress In message , jei@zor.hut.fi writes >On Fri, 26 Feb 1999, T Bruce Tober wrote: > >> Someone asked (I think on this list) about the most recent >> Goodlatte pro-encryption bill in the US Congress. here's a report. >> ________________________________________________________________________ ______ >__ >> (2) SUMMARY OF SAFE ACT, H.R. 850 >> >> * Guarantees all Americans the freedom to use any type of encryption >> anywhere in the world, ... > >Really?? > >Even if the local laws deny it like in Russia? Just another case of amerikan hyperbole as is standard in amerikan discussions about everything it does (See, I can use hyperbole too). tbt -- New commentary piece at http://www.crecon.demon.co.uk/nostalgia.htm | Bruce Tober, , | | Birmingham, UK, EU +44-121-242-3832 (mobile - 07979-521-106). Freelance | |Journalist & Website consultancy and development. PGP details at my website| From octobersdad@reporters.net Sun, 28 Feb 1999 00:13:12 +0000 Date: Sun, 28 Feb 1999 00:13:12 +0000 From: T Bruce Tober octobersdad@reporters.net Subject: CDT> Bill Lifting Encryption Controls Re-Introduced in Congress In message <01BE6280.A738B540.scott@exportcontrols.com>, Scott Gearity writes >Obviously, U.S. laws do nothing to invalidate the statutes of other >nations. However, the SAFE Act's claim is not necessarily pure hyperbole. > Some U.S. export control laws and regulations apply to U.S. citizens, >wherever located. Extraterratoriality cuts both ways. Point taken. tbt -- New commentary piece at http://www.crecon.demon.co.uk/nostalgia.htm | Bruce Tober, , | | Birmingham, UK, EU +44-121-242-3832 (mobile - 07979-521-106). Freelance | |Journalist & Website consultancy and development. PGP details at my website| From jei@zor.hut.fi Sun, 28 Feb 1999 23:20:53 +0200 (EET) Date: Sun, 28 Feb 1999 23:20:53 +0200 (EET) From: jei@zor.hut.fi jei@zor.hut.fi Subject: Hackers Seize UK Military Satellite http://dailynews.yahoo.com/headlines/tc/story.html?s=v/nm/19990228/tc/hackers_1.html Sunday February 28 6:41 AM ET Hackers Seize UK Military Satellite - Report LONDON (Reuters) - Hackers have seized control of one of Britain's military communication satellites and issued blackmail threats, The Sunday Business newspaper reported. The paper, quoting security sources, said the intruders altered the course of one of Britain's four satellites which are used by defense planners and military forces around the world. The sources said the satellite's course was changed just over two weeks ago. The hackers then issued a blackmail threat, demanding money to stop interfering with the satellite. ``This is a nightmare scenario,'' said one intelligence source. Military strategists said that if Britain were to come under nuclear attack, an aggressor would first interfere with military communications systems. ``This is not just a case of computer nerds mucking about. This is very, very serious and the blackmail threat has made it even more serious,'' one security source said. Police said they would not comment as the investigation was at too sensitive a stage. The Ministry of Defense made no comment. From jei@zor.hut.fi Sun, 28 Feb 1999 23:20:53 +0200 (EET) Date: Sun, 28 Feb 1999 23:20:53 +0200 (EET) From: jei@zor.hut.fi jei@zor.hut.fi Subject: Hackers Seize UK Military Satellite http://dailynews.yahoo.com/headlines/tc/story.html?s=v/nm/19990228/tc/hackers_1.html Sunday February 28 6:41 AM ET Hackers Seize UK Military Satellite - Report LONDON (Reuters) - Hackers have seized control of one of Britain's military communication satellites and issued blackmail threats, The Sunday Business newspaper reported. The paper, quoting security sources, said the intruders altered the course of one of Britain's four satellites which are used by defense planners and military forces around the world. The sources said the satellite's course was changed just over two weeks ago. The hackers then issued a blackmail threat, demanding money to stop interfering with the satellite. ``This is a nightmare scenario,'' said one intelligence source. Military strategists said that if Britain were to come under nuclear attack, an aggressor would first interfere with military communications systems. ``This is not just a case of computer nerds mucking about. This is very, very serious and the blackmail threat has made it even more serious,'' one security source said. Police said they would not comment as the investigation was at too sensitive a stage. The Ministry of Defense made no comment. From E.J.Koops at kub.nl Mon Feb 1 12:41:37 1999 From: E.J.Koops at kub.nl (Bert-Jaap Koops) Date: Mon, 1 Feb 1999 12:41:37 MET Subject: disclosure of crypto keys In-Reply-To: Message-ID: Ian Miller : > >In summary, my conclusion is that in > >principle, a command to hand over the crypto key or passphrase is > >compatible with the privilege against self-incrimination, provided > >there is sufficient evidence that the suspect is able to decrypt. > Did you consider the case where the individual subject to such a command > refuses to hand-over the long-term key, but agrees to hand-over the session > keys for the revelant messages? I considered the question whether legislation can be enacted to give a decryption command as such. Whether it's a command to hand over a private key or session keys is not really relevant to the issue of compatibility with the privilege against self-incrimination. It is, of course, quite relevant once you decide to enact legislation. The choice for handing over session keys, then, should be obvious. (Alternatively, the suspect could decrypt himself and give plaintext, provided the police can somehow monitor that this is done correctly. You might even use a public notary (or TTP ;-) to do the decrypting.) Adam Back wrote: > > In summary, my conclusion is that in > > principle, a command to hand over the crypto key or passphrase is > > compatible with the privilege against self-incrimination, provided > ^^ > Did you miss out an *in* there? (in-compatible?) > A right to not self-incriminate surely covers not giving out > information stored purely in ones mind, which could be argued might > incriminate the oneself. Not "surely". A passphrase (or memorized key) resembles "material which exists outside of the will of the suspect". Giving blood for a blood sample is compatible with the privilege against self-incrimination, because you cannot alter the blood (or the alcohol percentage in it). You can't alter the passphrase in your mind, because then it wouldn't work on the private key, and you can't alter the private key, because then it wouldn't work on the ciphertext. In that respect, it differs from statements like "I did it", which is an expression of the (changeable) contents of one's mind. The tricky thing remains the retort: "but I don't have the key" or "I've forgotten my passphrase". That is why there must be evidence that someone is able to decrypt (e.g., because the message was encrypted this morning). > Also there is the right to remain silent. (Modulo the change of > late to allow the judge to inform the jury to take into account that > the person has chosen to remain silent). Exactly. See also the Murray case of the European Court. His silence on the question what he did in the house where an IRA hostage was held, could be used as evidence because in this case, there were sufficient and stringent safeguards. > Technical solutions time (write code not laws): Indeed, there are many ways to anticipate a decryption command and make sure you will get away with not decrypting. Another reason why this approach is not fruitful, as I stated. Kind regards, Bert-Jaap --------------------------------------------------------------------- Bert-Jaap Koops tel +31 13 466 8101 Tilburg University facs +31 13 466 8149 P.O. Box 90153 e-mail E.J.Koops@kub.nl 5000 LE Tilburg http://cwis.kub.nl/~frw/people/koops/bertjaap.htm the Netherlands --------------------------------------------------------------------- This world's just mad enough to have been made by the Being his beings into being prayed. (Howard Nemerov) --------------------------------------------------------------------- From lawya at lucs-01.novell.leeds.ac.uk Mon Feb 1 12:43:49 1999 From: lawya at lucs-01.novell.leeds.ac.uk (Yaman Akdeniz) Date: Mon, 1 Feb 1999 12:43:49 GMT0BST Subject: UK ISPA Give Police Secret Briefing and new CR&CL(UK) report lau Message-ID: <65DBFA47E81@lucs-01.novell.leeds.ac.uk> For Immediate Release, 01 February, 1999 UK ISPA Give Police Secret Briefing and new CR&CL(UK) report launched Cyber-Rights & Cyber-Liberties (UK) has discovered that the Internet Service Providers Association ("ISPA") last year gave a secret briefing to the Association of Chief Police Officers ("ACPO") about the ISP industry capabilities for the provision of information to the police about their customers. This new "Who Watches the Watchmen" report therefore brings into the open what your ISP can do for the police with your Internet account. The publication of this new report entitled "Who Watches the Watchmen: Part III - ISP Capabilities for the Provision of Personal Information to the Police," () follows the development of a "privacy letter" from the consumer's perspective by the Leeds based organisation, and an exchange of letters between Cyber-Rights & Cyber-Liberties (UK) and the ACPO/ISPs and the Government Forum in December 1998. Mr Yaman Akdeniz (lawya@cyber-rights.org), director of Cyber-Rights & Cyber-Liberties (UK) stated that: "With all these possibilities and capabilities for the provisions of information through the ISPs to the police, the ISPA runs the risk of becoming the Big Brother Providers Association. The leaked report shows that our concerns were fully justified, and that secrecy, rather than `media disinformation' was at work with the activities of the ACPO/ISPs Forum." Mr Nicholas Bohm (nbohm@cyber-rights.org), E-Commerce Policy Adviser for Cyber-Rights & Cyber-Liberties (UK) added: "The police need help to understand how to deal with Internet crime, and ISPA is of course free to give them that help. But ISPs also have responsibilities to their customers, and for ISPA to produce a report in secret for the benefit of the police is bound to send out completely the wrong message. ISPA should have been open about it, so that there can be proper debate and public understanding of the difficult issues involved. Getting the best out of the Internet depends on public confidence in it and its operators, and secret reports are no way to build confidence." The new Watchmen report concludes that "transparency, openness and accountability are important features of a healthy society. We believe it is now time for the Government through the Parliament to intervene in the activities of the ACPO/ISPs, Government Forum and clarify these matters including the laws in relation to interception of communications and the relevant procedures." Notes for the Media: This press release will be available at http://www.cyber-rights.org/press Cyber-Rights & Cyber-Liberties (UK), "Who Watches the Watchmen: Part III - ISP Capabilities for the Provision of Personal Information to the Police," February 1999, at http://www.cyber-rights.org/privacy/watchmen-iii.htm UK Internet Users Privacy Letter is at Contact Information: Mr Yaman Akdeniz, director Address: Centre For Criminal Justice Studies, University of Leeds, LS2 9JT. Direct Telephone: +44 498 865116 Fax: 0113- 2335056 E-mail: lawya@cyber-rights.org Mr Nicholas Bohm, E-Commerce Policy Adviser, Phone: 01279 871272 (+44 1279 871272) Fax: 01279 870215 (+44 1279 870215) E-mail: nbohm@cyber-rights.org ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Yaman Akdeniz Cyber-Rights & Cyber-Liberties (UK) at: http://www.cyber-rights.org Read the new CR&CL (UK) Report, Who Watches the Watchmen, Part:II Accountability & Effective Self-Regulation in the Information Age, August 1998 at http://www.cyber-rights.org/watchmen-ii.htm ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ From E.J.Koops at kub.nl Mon Feb 1 15:42:42 1999 From: E.J.Koops at kub.nl (Bert-Jaap Koops) Date: Mon, 1 Feb 1999 15:42:42 MET Subject: did I miss the consultation document? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Dear list members, I am (finally) updating the entry on the UK in my Crypto Law Survey. With an enormous backlog of ukcrypto to read, I fear I am not quite up to date. Has the consultation document announced by Barbara Roche on 19 October has been published yet, and if so, where? Did the consultation end on 14 December as planned? (I noticed Nigel stating on 2 November "We are yet to launch consultation document".) And has the Electronic Commerce Bill been published yet? If so, what is its status? Thanks, Bert-Jaap --------------------------------------------------------------------- Bert-Jaap Koops tel +31 13 466 8101 Tilburg University facs +31 13 466 8149 P.O. Box 90153 e-mail E.J.Koops@kub.nl 5000 LE Tilburg http://cwis.kub.nl/~frw/people/koops/bertjaap.htm the Netherlands --------------------------------------------------------------------- This world's just mad enough to have been made by the Being his beings into being prayed. (Howard Nemerov) --------------------------------------------------------------------- From david at swarb.demon.co.uk Mon Feb 1 19:34:08 1999 From: david at swarb.demon.co.uk (David Swarbrick) Date: Mon, 1 Feb 1999 19:34:08 +0000 Subject: disclosure of crypto keys In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: In message , Bert-Jaap Koops writes >Ian Miller : >> >In summary, my conclusion is that in >> >principle, a command to hand over the crypto key or passphrase is >> >compatible with the privilege against self-incrimination, provided >> >there is sufficient evidence that the suspect is able to decrypt. >> Did you consider the case where the individual subject to such a command >> refuses to hand-over the long-term key, but agrees to hand-over the session >> keys for the revelant messages? >I considered the question whether legislation can be enacted to give >a decryption command as such. Whether it's a command to hand over a >private key or session keys is not really relevant to the issue of >compatibility with the privilege against self-incrimination. We already have the answer. The Police and Criminal Evidence Act allows a constable to require the handing over of files in 'legible' form. Is it still self incrimination to hand over existing evidence? I think there is a clear argument to say that the privilege against self incrimination prevents only a requirement to provide a new statement. >It is, >of course, quite relevant once you decide to enact legislation. The >choice for handing over session keys, then, should be obvious. >(Alternatively, the suspect could decrypt himself and give plaintext, >provided the police can somehow monitor that this is done correctly. >You might even use a public notary (or TTP ;-) to do the decrypting.) > >Adam Back wrote: >> > In summary, my conclusion is that in >> > principle, a command to hand over the crypto key or passphrase is >> > compatible with the privilege against self-incrimination, provided >> ^^ >> Did you miss out an *in* there? (in-compatible?) >> A right to not self-incriminate surely covers not giving out >> information stored purely in ones mind, which could be argued might >> incriminate the oneself. >Not "surely". A passphrase (or memorized key) resembles >"material which exists outside of the will of the suspect". Giving >blood for a blood sample is compatible with the privilege against >self-incrimination, because you cannot alter the blood (or the >alcohol percentage in it). You can't alter the passphrase in your >mind, because then it wouldn't work on the private key, and you >can't alter the private key, because then it wouldn't work on the >ciphertext. In that respect, it differs from statements like "I did >it", which is an expression of the (changeable) contents of >one's mind. The tricky thing remains the retort: "but I don't have >the key" or "I've forgotten my passphrase". That is why there must be >evidence that someone is able to decrypt (e.g., because the message >was encrypted this morning). I do not think anyone now argues for more than access to plain text. The context might require holding of private keys, but the concern is not to get your key, but the text. I suspect that the argument about the right against self-incrimination is a false trail. -- David Swarbrick, Solicitor. Brighouse, West Yorkshire. Tel: +44(0)1484 722531 Fax: +44(0)1484 716617 e-mail david@swarb.demon.co.uk http://www.swarb.co.uk/ (Office) http://www.swarb.demon.co.uk/ (Home) Home of the law-index to 8800+ cases - 'damn fine webbery" From nbohm at ernest.net Mon Feb 1 20:01:09 1999 From: nbohm at ernest.net (Nicholas Bohm) Date: Mon, 01 Feb 1999 20:01:09 +0000 Subject: disclosure of crypto keys In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <3.0.5.32.19990201200109.00a6a7c0@mail.netkonect.co.uk> At 07:34 PM 2/1/1999 +0000, David Swarbrick wrote: >In message , Bert-Jaap Koops >writes >>Ian Miller : >>> >In summary, my conclusion is that in >>> >principle, a command to hand over the crypto key or passphrase is >>> >compatible with the privilege against self-incrimination, provided >>> >there is sufficient evidence that the suspect is able to decrypt. >>> Did you consider the case where the individual subject to such a command >>> refuses to hand-over the long-term key, but agrees to hand-over the session >>> keys for the revelant messages? >>I considered the question whether legislation can be enacted to give >>a decryption command as such. Whether it's a command to hand over a >>private key or session keys is not really relevant to the issue of >>compatibility with the privilege against self-incrimination. > >We already have the answer. The Police and Criminal Evidence Act allows >a constable to require the handing over of files in 'legible' form. It allows a constable to require, but provides no penalty for failure to comply. It's really only useful in the case of a warrant executed against a compliant third party who needs to be sure he is within the proper scope of the warrant in order to be relieved of third party liability for complying. It's not much good against the suspect. >Is it still self incrimination to hand over existing evidence? I think >there is a clear argument to say that the privilege against self >incrimination prevents only a requirement to provide a new statement. > > > >>It is, >>of course, quite relevant once you decide to enact legislation. The >>choice for handing over session keys, then, should be obvious. >>(Alternatively, the suspect could decrypt himself and give plaintext, >>provided the police can somehow monitor that this is done correctly. >>You might even use a public notary (or TTP ;-) to do the decrypting.) >> >>Adam Back wrote: >>> > In summary, my conclusion is that in >>> > principle, a command to hand over the crypto key or passphrase is >>> > compatible with the privilege against self-incrimination, provided >>> ^^ >>> Did you miss out an *in* there? (in-compatible?) >>> A right to not self-incriminate surely covers not giving out >>> information stored purely in ones mind, which could be argued might >>> incriminate the oneself. >>Not "surely". A passphrase (or memorized key) resembles >>"material which exists outside of the will of the suspect". Giving >>blood for a blood sample is compatible with the privilege against >>self-incrimination, because you cannot alter the blood (or the >>alcohol percentage in it). You can't alter the passphrase in your >>mind, because then it wouldn't work on the private key, and you >>can't alter the private key, because then it wouldn't work on the >>ciphertext. In that respect, it differs from statements like "I did >>it", which is an expression of the (changeable) contents of >>one's mind. The tricky thing remains the retort: "but I don't have >>the key" or "I've forgotten my passphrase". That is why there must be >>evidence that someone is able to decrypt (e.g., because the message >>was encrypted this morning). > >I do not think anyone now argues for more than access to plain text. The >context might require holding of private keys, but the concern is not to >get your key, but the text. I think it's too soon to say: without a key (even if only a session key) it is difficult for the recipient to know whether the plaintext is derived from the ciphertext. >I suspect that the argument about the right against self-incrimination >is a false trail. Or will be by the time legislation is in place. Regards, Nicholas Bohm Salkyns, Great Canfield, Takeley, Bishop's Stortford CM22 6SX, UK Phone 01279 871272 (+44 1279 871272) Fax 01279 870215 (+44 1279 870215) Mobile 0860 636749 (+44 860 636749) PGP RSA 1024 bit public key ID: 0x08340015. Fingerprint: 9E 15 FB 2A 54 96 24 37 98 A2 E0 D1 34 13 48 07 PGP DSS/DH 1024/3072 public key ID: 0x899DD7FF. Fingerprint: 5248 1320 B42E 84FC 1E8B A9E6 0912 AE66 899D D7FF From chl at clw.cs.man.ac.uk Mon Feb 1 17:28:07 1999 From: chl at clw.cs.man.ac.uk (Charles Lindsey) Date: Mon, 1 Feb 1999 17:28:07 GMT Subject: UK ISPA Give Police Secret Briefing and new CR&CL(UK) report lau Message-ID: <199902011728.RAA00320@clw.cs.man.ac.uk> On Mon, 1 Feb 1999 12:43:49 GMT0BST "Yaman Akdeniz" said... > Cyber-Rights & Cyber-Liberties (UK) has discovered that the Internet > Service Providers Association ("ISPA") last year gave a secret > briefing to the Association of Chief Police Officers ("ACPO") about > the ISP industry capabilities for the provision of information to the > police about their customers. This new "Who Watches the Watchmen" > report therefore brings into the open what your ISP can do for the > police with your Internet account. I don't think there was anything particularly secret about it. The fact that the meeting was to be held was discussed on the newsgroups before it happened. There are circumstances where ISPs should disclose evidence related to a crime in just the same way as any citizen could reasonably be expected to respond when a policeman knocks on the door and asks "Did you see ...?". The meeting was merely to discuss some uniform procedures to be used when such information was requested, and Clive Feather (who attended the meeting) gave clear assurances as to the sort of information Demon might or might not be prepared to divulge. Charles H. Lindsey ---------At Home, doing my own thing------------------------ Email: chl@clw.cs.man.ac.uk Web: http://www.cs.man.ac.uk/~chl Voice/Fax: +44 161 437 4506 Snail: 5 Clerewood Ave, CHEADLE, SK8 3JU, U.K. PGP: 2C15F1A9 Fingerprint: 73 6D C2 51 93 A0 01 E7 65 E8 64 7E 14 A4 AB A5 From Chris.Sundt at tscexch.x400.icl.co.uk Mon Feb 1 23:04:31 1999 From: Chris.Sundt at tscexch.x400.icl.co.uk (Sundt Chris CE) Date: Mon, 1 Feb 1999 23:04:31 -0000 Subject: did I miss the consultation document? Message-ID: Bert-Jaap, I am very much involved in discussions on the Ecommerce Bill. The Consultation document has been delayed by a number of factors - but mainly two things. First is the need for political agreement on the balance between law enforcement requirements and the creation of a commercial/legal environment that encourages ecommerce. Second is the rapid turnover in Ministers at the DTI (we are now on our third in about 6 months!). This requires they be briefed and agree what is contained in the consultation paper. I don't expect to see it until later this month at the earliest. Hope this helps. Regards. Chris Sundt (email c.sundt@iclnet.co.uk tel +44-1344-473692) -----Original Message----- From: Bert-Jaap Koops [mailto:E.J.Koops@kub.nl] Sent: 01 February 1999 15:43 To: ukcrypto@maillist.ox.ac.uk Subject: did I miss the consultation document? From joswald at rpkusa.com Mon Feb 1 23:40:24 1999 From: joswald at rpkusa.com (Jack Oswald) Date: Mon, 1 Feb 1999 15:40:24 -0800 Subject: RPK? Message-ID: <003101be4e3c$3d6b5080$7700a8c0@Server.rpkusa.com> QSBsaXR0bGUgd2hpbGUgYWdvIEkgc2VudCBhIG1lc3NhZ2UgaW4gcmVzcG9uc2UgdG8gYSByZXF1 ZXN0IHRvIGhhdmUgUlBLIGdldCBpbnZvbHZlZCBpbiBhIHNwZWNpZmljIGRpc2N1c3Npb24uICBT aW5jZSBzZW5kaW5nIHRoYXQgbWVzc2FnZSBJIHNhdyBubyBmb2xsb3d1cCBhbmQgc28gSSBqdXN0 IHdhbnQgdG8gbWFrZSBzdXJlIHRoYXQgdGhlIG9yaWdpbmFsIG1lc3NhZ2UgY2FtZSB0aHJvdWdo Lg0KDQpKYWNrDQo= From aba at dcs.ex.ac.uk Tue Feb 2 00:05:14 1999 From: aba at dcs.ex.ac.uk (Adam Back) Date: Tue, 2 Feb 1999 00:05:14 GMT Subject: disclosure of crypto keys In-Reply-To: <3.0.5.32.19990201200109.00a6a7c0@mail.netkonect.co.uk> (message from Nicholas Bohm on Mon, 01 Feb 1999 20:01:09 +0000) Message-ID: <199902020005.AAA21179@server.eternity.org> Nicholas Bohm writes: > At 07:34 PM 2/1/1999 +0000, David Swarbrick wrote: > >We already have the answer. The Police and Criminal Evidence Act allows > >a constable to require the handing over of files in 'legible' form. > > It allows a constable to require, but provides no penalty for failure to > comply. Ah that's good news indeed. So we can hand over a PGP dump. It's not legible to them but that's their problem. If one handed over a note book written in or hand written notes in code, similarly it would be their problem. I think this sounds very reasonable. Absent certain obligations (eg. financial accounting requirments to keep records for x years, etc) I see no special reason why one should be required to keep ones correspondence in a form which is useful to the police -- I keep information for my own use, not for the use of hostile third parties. If I am presumed innocent, why would I be required to keep information in a form useful to law enforcement agents. The `law', and especially some over-zealous law enforcement type's view of it, includes all manner of things which I personally might not think morally right or even sane! I think it unreasonable that one should be deputised to keep a wire tap log on oneself. > >I do not think anyone now argues for more than access to plain text. The > >context might require holding of private keys, but the concern is not to > >get your key, but the text. I think if it's in ciphertext you shouldn't have any obligation to hand over the key. A better metaphor for discussing ciphertext would be to consider it a note to oneself which happens to lack context making it readily understandable to a third party. You are not obliged to explain what it means. Therefore I would argue you are not obliged to provide the key. Adam From joswald at rpkusa.com Tue Feb 2 01:40:25 1999 From: joswald at rpkusa.com (Jack Oswald) Date: Mon, 01 Feb 1999 17:40:25 -0800 Subject: ANNOUNCEMENT: RPK ENCRYPTONITE ENGINE CHOSEN Message-ID: <36B65789.507ACA63@rpkusa.com> All - We have been requested to join the discussion. First of all, there has never been, and never will be any intention to hide any of the methods, techniques or any other element of how RPK is used and implemented. Therefore, I am as concerned as you are that you were not able to find all of the answers to your questions at our web site. If you have not yet found it, on the web site www.rpk.com is a Downloads page where you will find two 25-page(+/-) papers that describe the algorithm in detail. If that has not been sufficient, we may be able to make available directly to individuals who request one of our toolkits with source code purely for the purposes of evaluation and analysis. The source code is the definitive implementation. Also, other analyses have been done which have yet to be made public. We will do so as soon as we can obtain all of the necessary releases. Also, in the future, please fell free to contact us directly. We have nothing to hide. Our business is based on the fact that RPK works as marketed. If anyone can prove otherwise, we sincerely need to know. Jack Oswald President and CEO RPK Security Inc. "Securing the Internet" joswald@rpkusa.com +1 415-563-1800 +1 415-440-0950 fax www.rpkusa.com www.InvisiMail.com 1755 Filbert Street, Suite 1U San Francisco, CA 94123 -----Original Message----- From: owner-ukcrypto@maillist.ox.ac.uk [mailto:owner-ukcrypto@maillist.ox.ac.uk] On Behalf Of William Whyte Sent: Sunday, January 17, 1999 7:10 AM To: 'ukcrypto@maillist.ox.ac.uk' Subject: RE: ANNOUNCEMENT: RPK ENCRYPTONITE ENGINE CHOSEN [I said...] > > It's annoying that people don't realise that RPK is actually only > > about as fast as Diffie-Hellman; it's a public-key operation with a > > bolted-on stream cipher. [Jim said...] > Perhaps annoying, but not surprising: I browsed their website and can't > find a description of what they're really doing. I'm left with the > impression that the stream cipher part is a home-brew invention that's > been looked at by a grand total of two outside cryptographers -- one each > stream cipher specialist and public key specialist. Do I have that right? > Could a serious company rely on security through obscurity in this day and > age? I haven't looked at the site in any detail for a year or so, but as I remember they use the first 256 bytes of output from the LFSR to create a permutation box, and the remainder forms an XOR stream. They then have a kind-of block cipher, where each block is 256 bytes and is permuted according to the permutation box and then XORed with the current output from the LFSR. There's things like "stutter" put into the LFSRs to make them slightly trickier to follow, and the basic set-up is to have two main shift registers and a third one to select whether the next byte of output is from the first or second of the main registers. So that much was clear, at least a year ago. But it's still not _quite_ enough detail to be sure. It's a bit unfair having this discussion behind their backs. Does anyone fancy getting someone from RPK to subscribe to UK Crypto? William From cryptlist at ubik.demon.co.uk Tue Feb 2 03:05:00 1999 From: cryptlist at ubik.demon.co.uk (Anthony Naggs) Date: Tue, 2 Feb 1999 03:05:00 +0000 Subject: RPK? In-Reply-To: <003101be4e3c$3d6b5080$7700a8c0@Server.rpkusa.com> References: <003101be4e3c$3d6b5080$7700a8c0@Server.rpkusa.com> Message-ID: In message <003101be4e3c$3d6b5080$7700a8c0@Server.rpkusa.com>, Jack Oswald wrote >A little while ago I sent a message in response to a request to have RPK get >involved in a specific discussion. Since sending that message I saw no followup >and so I just want to make sure that the original message came through. I certainly saw your message here. Given the absence of response I guess you must have answered all the questions of those who were previously discussing the subject. Cheers, -- Anthony Naggs From joswald at rpkusa.com Tue Feb 2 03:44:07 1999 From: joswald at rpkusa.com (Jack Oswald) Date: Mon, 1 Feb 1999 19:44:07 -0800 Subject: ANNOUNCEMENT: RPK ENCRYPTONITE ENGINE CHOSEN In-Reply-To: <01BE422B.79302D60.wwhyte@baltimore.ie> Message-ID: <005d01be4e5e$497eed60$7700a8c0@Server.rpkusa.com> All - We have been requested to join the discussion. First of all, there has never been, and never will be any intention to hide any of the methods, techniques or any other element of how RPK is used and implemented. Therefore, I am as concerned as you are that you were not able to find all of the answers to your questions at our web site. If you have not yet found it, on the web site www.rpk.com is a Downloads page where you will find two 25-page(+/-) papers that describe the algorithm in detail. If that has not been sufficient, we may be able to make available directly to individuals who request one of our toolkits with source code purely for the purposes of evaluation and analysis. The source code is the definitive implementation. Also, other analyses have been done which have yet to be made public. We will do so as soon as we can obtain all of the necessary releases. Also, in the future, please fell free to contact us directly. We have nothing to hide. Our business is based on the fact that RPK works as marketed. If anyone can prove otherwise, we sincerely need to know. Jack Oswald President and CEO RPK Security Inc. "Securing the Internet" joswald@rpkusa.com +1 415-563-1800 +1 415-440-0950 fax www.rpkusa.com www.InvisiMail.com 1755 Filbert Street, Suite 1U San Francisco, CA 94123 -----Original Message----- From: owner-ukcrypto@maillist.ox.ac.uk [mailto:owner-ukcrypto@maillist.ox.ac.uk] On Behalf Of William Whyte Sent: Sunday, January 17, 1999 7:10 AM To: 'ukcrypto@maillist.ox.ac.uk' Subject: RE: ANNOUNCEMENT: RPK ENCRYPTONITE ENGINE CHOSEN [I said...] > > It's annoying that people don't realise that RPK is actually only > > about as fast as Diffie-Hellman; it's a public-key operation with a > > bolted-on stream cipher. [Jim said...] > Perhaps annoying, but not surprising: I browsed their website and can't > find a description of what they're really doing. I'm left with the > impression that the stream cipher part is a home-brew invention that's > been looked at by a grand total of two outside cryptographers -- one each > stream cipher specialist and public key specialist. Do I have that right? > Could a serious company rely on security through obscurity in this day and > age? I haven't looked at the site in any detail for a year or so, but as I remember they use the first 256 bytes of output from the LFSR to create a permutation box, and the remainder forms an XOR stream. They then have a kind-of block cipher, where each block is 256 bytes and is permuted according to the permutation box and then XORed with the current output from the LFSR. There's things like "stutter" put into the LFSRs to make them slightly trickier to follow, and the basic set-up is to have two main shift registers and a third one to select whether the next byte of output is from the first or second of the main registers. So that much was clear, at least a year ago. But it's still not _quite_ enough detail to be sure. It's a bit unfair having this discussion behind their backs. Does anyone fancy getting someone from RPK to subscribe to UK Crypto? William From Chris.Sundt at tscexch.x400.icl.co.uk Mon Feb 1 23:04:31 1999 From: Chris.Sundt at tscexch.x400.icl.co.uk (Sundt Chris CE) Date: Mon, 1 Feb 1999 23:04:31 -0000 Subject: did I miss the consultation document? Message-ID: Bert-Jaap, I am very much involved in discussions on the Ecommerce Bill. The Consultation document has been delayed by a number of factors - but mainly two things. First is the need for political agreement on the balance between law enforcement requirements and the creation of a commercial/legal environment that encourages ecommerce. Second is the rapid turnover in Ministers at the DTI (we are now on our third in about 6 months!). This requires they be briefed and agree what is contained in the consultation paper. I don't expect to see it until later this month at the earliest. Hope this helps. Regards. Chris Sundt (email c.sundt@iclnet.co.uk tel +44-1344-473692) -----Original Message----- From: Bert-Jaap Koops [mailto:E.J.Koops@kub.nl] Sent: 01 February 1999 15:43 To: ukcrypto@maillist.ox.ac.uk Subject: did I miss the consultation document? From aidan at baltimore.ie Tue Feb 2 09:20:56 1999 From: aidan at baltimore.ie (Aidan Gallagher) Date: Tue, 2 Feb 1999 09:20:56 -0000 Subject: Trusting Internet Banking Message-ID: <01BE4E94.F0384B20@lease54.baltimore.ie> ------ =_NextPart_000_01BE4E94.F050B520 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable I am receiving messages daily from your maillist. I have tried to = unsubscribe from the service unsuccessfully. Can somebody advise me how = I can be taken off this list. Many Thanks Aidan Gallagher _________________________ Aidan Gallagher Head of Sales Baltimore Technologies IFSC House Irish Financial Services Centre Custom House Quay Dublin 1 Ireland Tel +353-1-6054399 Fax +353-1-6054388 E-Mail aidan@baltimore.ie ________________________ -----Original Message----- From: Grupo de seguridad [SMTP:gseguridad@msc.es] Sent: 29 January 1999 12:30 To: 'ukcrypto@maillist.ox.ac.uk' Subject: RE: Trusting Internet Banking > Yes - they are, presumably using SGC (Server-Gated Cryptography). > Basically, this is a cert that switches on full-strength crypto. It is > this mechanism that Fortify exploits (just switches it on for all > certs). It is also possible to mark arbitrary certs in the cert DB as > SGC certs. >=20 Global Server ID from Verisign allows 128 bits for bank institutions, what about other sensitive information institutions as Public Health Systems? It is possible now or in a near future? Best regards, Luis Saiz P.S. 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This new "Who Watches the Watchmen" >> report therefore brings into the open what your ISP can do for the >> police with your Internet account. > >I don't think there was anything particularly secret about it. The >fact that the meeting was to be held was discussed on the newsgroups >before it happened. There are circumstances where ISPs should disclose >evidence related to a crime in just the same way as any citizen could >reasonably be expected to respond when a policeman knocks on the door >and asks "Did you see ...?". The meeting was merely to discuss some >uniform procedures to be used when such information was requested, and >Clive Feather (who attended the meeting) gave clear assurances as to the >sort of information Demon might or might not be prepared to divulge. The briefing is a document, and its existence has not previously been disclosed outside the Forum (as far as I can tell). ISPs are not in the position of a fortuitous witness of what their customers transmit through their services, they are handling their customers' correspondence. Their customers are entitled to have this treated as private under the European Convention on Human Rights, Article 8, which now forms part of UK domestic law. ISPs should be no more free than banks, solicitors, doctors, accountants etc to provide information about their customers as they think fit, except when obliged by law by a judicially-issued warrant or a court order. Regards, Nicholas Bohm Salkyns, Great Canfield, Takeley, Bishop's Stortford CM22 6SX, UK Phone 01279 871272 (+44 1279 871272) Fax 01279 870215 (+44 1279 870215) Mobile 0860 636749 (+44 860 636749) PGP RSA 1024 bit public key ID: 0x08340015. Fingerprint: 9E 15 FB 2A 54 96 24 37 98 A2 E0 D1 34 13 48 07 PGP DSS/DH 1024/3072 public key ID: 0x899DD7FF. Fingerprint: 5248 1320 B42E 84FC 1E8B A9E6 0912 AE66 899D D7FF From gladman at seven77.demon.co.uk Tue Feb 2 10:52:45 1999 From: gladman at seven77.demon.co.uk (Brian Gladman) Date: Tue, 2 Feb 1999 10:52:45 -0000 Subject: Export Controls on Intangible Goods Message-ID: <006301be4e9a$71cad180$966adec2@FortyTwo> Some time ago I published an open letter to the DTI concerning the possible impact of the proposed legislation on the control of intangibles on the publication of crypto source code and R&D results on the Web. I used my site at: http://www.seven77.demon.co.uk/aes.htm as an example. I now have a response from Bridget Butt at the DTI (my thanks to Nigel and to Bridget for providing this) and a copy of this is included below. I have also had a conversation with Bridget about these issues and it seems that the DTI is determined to continue with these proposlas (for which the EC is being 'blamed'). My impression is that the DTI is somewhat blindly following the the principle that if something is controlled in physical form then the same control should be exerted over any intangible equivalent. There does not seem to be any concern about the practical difficulties of implementing such controls or about the impact that they will have on many important and beneficial activities. As far as I can ascertain there has been no attempt to assess such issues proir to any legislation. The strong impression I have is that this is seen as a 'loophole' that has to be closed simply as an 'an act of faith' without regard for practicality or any detrimental consequences that this might have. So we have a situation in which this 'loophole' is to be closed without any knowledge of the real benefits this will provide, without any knowledge of the practicality or the costs involved, and without any understanding of the impact that this will have on desirable activities! All in all, a pretty sound basis for legislation. It hence seems that we now need to lobby our MPs and MEPs to ensure that the they understand what is being proposed. With this and the Electronic Compromise (oops Commerce) Bill, it would seem that government policy in these areas is completely at the mercy of the hawks in the Civil Service. If ever our civil liberties and our hard won personal and academic freedoms needed protection they most certainly need it now. And this from a Labour government that promised us a Freedom of Information Bill and the removal of all controls on cryptography! Brian ----------------------------------------------------------- Dr B. R. Gladman (by email) Dear Dr Gladman In your open letter to the DTI which was sent to Nigel Hickson, and which he has passed on to me for reply, you ask whether the Web Page described in your letter would become illegal under any future government legislation on, or related to, the control of cryptography or intangible exports. The first point to make with regard to proposed legislation on the introduction of export controls on the electronic transfer of technology or software (as set out in the White Paper on Strategic Export Controls and in the European Commission’s proposal for a revised Dual-use Goods Regulation), is that the same general principles determining whether or not a licence is required will apply to electronic transfers, as apply to exports in physical form. As your query relates to cryptography which is of course a dual-use technology, it is the European Commission’s proposal for a revised Dual-use Goods Regulation (COM 1998 257 final) which needs to be considered. The first point I must make is that the Commission’s proposal is, of course, only draft legislation and could well be subject to changes before being adopted. In particular, the issue of how the legislation would apply to technology or software placed on Internet websites is a matter currently under discussion within the Community and so I cannot give you a categorical answer to your question. What I can say, however, is that under the Commission’s proposal, the same conditions would apply to transfers of technology or software made by electronic means as would apply to transfers in tangible form. As I am sure you are aware, technology or software in the public domain is not normally subject to export control (transfers of public domain technology or software may be caught by the end-use control related to weapons of mass destruction). Under the Commission’s proposal, “in the public domain” would continue to be defined as meaning “technology” or “software” which had been made available without restrictions upon its further dissemination (copyright restrictions do not remove “technology” or “software” from being “in the public domain”)”. To the extent that the AES scheme fulfilled these conditions, then it would be regarded as “in the public domain” and not therefore subject to export control. You will also probably be aware of the proposed Wassenaar Cryptography Note. This is likely to have been introduced into EC legislation before the proposal on intangible transfers. This will mean that, to the extent that cryptographic software placed on a website was not regarded as being in the public domain, (e.g. because of restrictions placed on its dissemination) it could still be released from export control if it met the conditions of the Cryptography Note. Yours sincerely Bridget Butt BRIDGET BUTT Scott Inquiry Follow-up Unit From E.J.Koops at kub.nl Tue Feb 2 12:38:14 1999 From: E.J.Koops at kub.nl (Bert-Jaap Koops) Date: Tue, 2 Feb 1999 12:38:14 MET Subject: disclosure of crypto keys In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: David Swarbrick wrote: > Is it still self incrimination to hand over existing evidence? I think > there is a clear argument to say that the privilege against self > incrimination prevents only a requirement to provide a new statement. [snip] > I suspect that the argument about the right against self-incrimination > is a false trail. Not quite. It is true that the privilege against self-incrimination prevents only the mandatory producing of "testimonial statements". US case law provides good guidance on this. Tax returns are not testimonial evidence (Fisher), nor are business documents (Doe) or an authorization (for a bank to disclose information) which the suspect was compelled to write (Doe II). However, the _act of producing_ may be testimonial and incriminating, if in handing something over the holder admits to possession of the document. Only if it is a foregone conclusion that the holder possess a document, is handing it over not testimonial. (Doe) (By and large the same holds for European case law, as I read it.) That is why I conclude that handing over a crypto key is compatible with the privilege only if there is sufficient evidence ("a foregone conclusion") that the suspect has got the key and knows the passphrase. Otherwise, the _act of producing_ the key would testify to his knowledge of it. Bert-Jaap From Clare.Wardle at postoffice.co.uk Tue Feb 2 16:29:55 1999 From: Clare.Wardle at postoffice.co.uk (Clare Wardle) Date: 02 Feb 1999 16:29:55 Z Subject: UK ISPA Give Police Secret Briefing and new CR&CL(UK) report lau Message-ID: <0192D36B72803001*/c=gb/admd=bt/prmd=ukpo/o=royalmail/ou=lnmrm1/s=Wardle/g=Clare/@MHS> Nicholas Bohm wrote >ISPs should be no more free than banks, solicitors, doctors, accountants >etc to provide information about their customers as they think fit, except >when obliged by law by a judicially-issued warrant or a court order. Moreover if in the course of disclosing the messages to a third party such as the police,they disclose personal data, which almost inevitably they will, they need to check that the request to disclose meets the specific criteria of a statutory ability to request information appropriate to the requesting party, and that this statutory power is allowable under the Data Protection Directive, or the ISP will be able to be sued by the people whose personal data it is. It is not open to ISPs or anyone else to decide to give personal data relating to other people willy nilly without authorisation. Fishing expeditions are definitely out. Clare Wardle My views are my own and not necessarily those of my employer or colleagues From david at swarb.demon.co.uk Tue Feb 2 07:28:47 1999 From: david at swarb.demon.co.uk (David Swarbrick) Date: Tue, 2 Feb 1999 07:28:47 +0000 Subject: disclosure of crypto keys In-Reply-To: <199902020005.AAA21179@server.eternity.org> References: <3.0.5.32.19990201200109.00a6a7c0@mail.netkonect.co.uk> <199902020005.AAA21179@server.eternity.org> Message-ID: In message <199902020005.AAA21179@server.eternity.org>, Adam Back writes > >Nicholas Bohm writes: >> At 07:34 PM 2/1/1999 +0000, David Swarbrick wrote: >> >We already have the answer. The Police and Criminal Evidence Act allows >> >a constable to require the handing over of files in 'legible' form. >> >> It allows a constable to require, but provides no penalty for failure to >> comply. > >Ah that's good news indeed. So we can hand over a PGP dump. It's not >legible to them but that's their problem. If one handed over a note >book written in or hand written notes in code, similarly it would be >their problem. > >I think this sounds very reasonable. Absent certain obligations >(eg. financial accounting requirments to keep records for x years, >etc) I see no special reason why one should be required to keep ones >correspondence in a form which is useful to the police -- I keep >information for my own use, not for the use of hostile third parties. > >If I am presumed innocent, why would I be required to keep information >in a form useful to law enforcement agents. The `law', and especially >some over-zealous law enforcement type's view of it, includes all >manner of things which I personally might not think morally right or >even sane! I think it unreasonable that one should be deputised to >keep a wire tap log on oneself. > >> >I do not think anyone now argues for more than access to plain text. The >> >context might require holding of private keys, but the concern is not to >> >get your key, but the text. > >I think if it's in ciphertext you shouldn't have any obligation to >hand over the key. A better metaphor for discussing ciphertext would >be to consider it a note to oneself which happens to lack context >making it readily understandable to a third party. You are not >obliged to explain what it means. Therefore I would argue you are not >obliged to provide the key. > I think you cannot have read the paragraph you quoted. I doubt they will want your key (well ok they might _want_ it). I anticipate that we will get a beefed up version (with penalty) of the old PACE provision. They will say "We have reason to believe that this file represents information we have a right to see. Dec-crypt it or face a penalty. If you want to argue, do it in court' There will be difficulties, contradictions, and conundrums, but none enough to stop it being imposed, and, I think, effective. -- David Swarbrick, Solicitor. Brighouse, West Yorkshire. Tel: +44(0)1484 722531 Fax: +44(0)1484 716617 e-mail david@swarb.demon.co.uk http://www.swarb.co.uk/ (Office) http://www.swarb.demon.co.uk/ (Home) Home of the law-index to 8800+ cases - 'damn fine webbery" From Pete at dmed.demon.co.uk Tue Feb 2 16:57:06 1999 From: Pete at dmed.demon.co.uk (Pete Mitchell) Date: Tue, 2 Feb 1999 16:57:06 +0000 Subject: UK ISPA Give Police Secret Briefing and new CR&CL(UK) report lau In-Reply-To: <0192D36B72803001*/c=gb/admd=bt/prmd=ukpo/o=royalmail/ou=lnmrm1/s=Wardle/g=Clare/@MHS> Message-ID: Clare Wardle wrote: >Nicholas Bohm wrote >>ISPs should be no more free than banks, solicitors, doctors, accountants >>etc to provide information about their customers as they think fit, except >>when obliged by law by a judicially-issued warrant or a court order. > >Moreover if in the course of disclosing the messages to a third party such as >the police,they disclose personal data, which almost inevitably they will, they >need to check that the request to disclose meets the specific criteria of a >statutory ability to request information appropriate to the requesting party, >and that this statutory power is allowable under the Data Protection Directive, >or the ISP will be able to be sued by the people whose personal data it is. It >is not open to ISPs or anyone else to decide to give personal data relating to >other people willy nilly without authorisation. Fishing expeditions are >definitely out. > In principle yes; but in practice? I take the DPA to be next to useless as a means of discouraging official intrusion into private data. Has anyone ever been prosecuted, or sued, under the Act in such circumstances? Has such a complaint ever even been logged by the Registrar? I actually asked this question of the DPR's office a few months ago, but never got a reply. -- Pete Mitchell From lawya at lucs-01.novell.leeds.ac.uk Tue Feb 2 20:17:05 1999 From: lawya at lucs-01.novell.leeds.ac.uk (Yaman Akdeniz) Date: Tue, 2 Feb 1999 20:17:05 GMT0BST Subject: UK ISPA Give Police Secret Briefing and new CR&CL(UK) report In-Reply-To: References: <0192D36B72803001*/c=gb/admd=bt/prmd=ukpo/o=royalmail/ou=lnmrm1/s=Wardle/g=Clare/@MHS> Message-ID: <67D4DD47E52@lucs-01.novell.leeds.ac.uk> Pete- > In principle yes; but in practice? I take the DPA to be next to > useless as a means of discouraging official intrusion into private > data. Has anyone ever been prosecuted, or sued, under the Act in > such circumstances? Has such a complaint ever even been logged by > the Registrar? I actually asked this question of the DPR's office a > few months ago, but never got a reply. There are a few cases resulting from the data protection act and normally the Registrar's annual reports do refer to these cases. One well known case reached the House of Lords. - R. v Brown (Gregory Michael) Court: (HL) House of Lords, Reported: [1996] 1 A.C. 543 The Crown appealed against the quashing of B's conviction for improper use of personal data under the Data Protection Act 1984 s.5. B, a former police officer, was alleged to have misused data contained in the police national computer, whilst collaborating with a debt collection agency. B had retrieved the data and observed its contents, but had taken no other steps in relation to it. The Crown argued that, as information constituted data only when it appeared on the screen, B's actions were the only way that the information could be used. Held, dismissing the appeal, that (1) use of the information did not have to occur while the information was in a computer readable form and (2) "use" had to be given its natural and ordinary meaning as the 1984 Act contained no definition. To display and read data on screen could not, without any further act, constitute "use" contrary to s.5(2)(b). Another police related case is DPP v Bignall Court: (QBD) Queens Bench Division Reported: [1998] 1 Cr. App. R. 1 Police officers with authorised access to computer information were not convicted under the Computer Misuse Act 1990 for unauthorised use of that information as the Act was concerned only with preventing unauthorised access. Unauthorised use should be dealt with under the Data Protection Act 1984. The DPP appealed by way of case stated against the overturning of the respondent police officers' convictions of offences under the Computer Misuse Act 1990 s.1. The respondents had, for private purposes, obtained details relating to two motor cars from the Police National Computer. The DPP maintained that the Commissioner of Police, who controlled access to the computer, gave authority to police officers to access information only for police purposes and the respondents' use of the computer to gain material for non-police purposes was therefore unauthorised. The respondents distinguished between the gaining of access, which was said to be authorised, and the admittedly unauthorised purpose of their excursion. Held, dismissing the appeal, that the Act was concerned with the protection of computer systems and criminalised the "hacking" or unauthorised access to computer material. It was not designed to protect the integrity of information stored on computers, which was the purpose behind the Data Protection Act 1984. Whether or not the Commissioner alone was entitled to control access to the computer, the respondents' access was not unauthorised in terms of s.17(5) or s.17(2) and they were not therefore in breach of s.1. There was not a gap in the law since police officers were open to prosecution for use of the computer for improper purposes under s.5(2)(b) of the 1984 Act. There is one case involving the Data Protection Registrar v Amnesty International (British Section) but I do not have the details for that case and again I believe the information should be obtained from the DPR's annual reports. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Yaman Akdeniz Cyber-Rights & Cyber-Liberties (UK) at: http://www.cyber-rights.org Read the new CR&CL (UK) Report, Who Watches the Watchmen, Part:II Accountability & Effective Self-Regulation in the Information Age, August 1998 at http://www.cyber-rights.org/watchmen-ii.htm ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ From david at swarb.demon.co.uk Tue Feb 2 19:55:53 1999 From: david at swarb.demon.co.uk (David Swarbrick) Date: Tue, 2 Feb 1999 19:55:53 +0000 Subject: disclosure of crypto keys In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: In message , Bert-Jaap Koops writes > David Swarbrick wrote: >> Is it still self incrimination to hand over existing evidence? I think >> there is a clear argument to say that the privilege against self >> incrimination prevents only a requirement to provide a new statement. >[snip] >> I suspect that the argument about the right against self-incrimination >> is a false trail. >Not quite. It is true that the privilege against self-incrimination >prevents only the mandatory producing of "testimonial statements". US >case law provides good guidance on this. Tax returns are not >testimonial evidence (Fisher), nor are business documents (Doe) or an >authorization (for a bank to disclose information) which the >suspect was compelled to write (Doe II). However, the _act of >producing_ may be testimonial and incriminating, if in handing >something over the holder admits to possession of the document. Only >if it is a foregone conclusion that the holder possess a document, >is handing it over not testimonial. (Doe) >(By and large the same holds for European case law, as I read it.) > >That is why I conclude that handing over a crypto key is compatible >with the privilege only if there is sufficient evidence ("a foregone >conclusion") that the suspect has got the key and knows the >passphrase. Otherwise, the _act of producing_ the key would testify >to his knowledge of it. > Bert-Jaap Your erudition about US law is awesome, and I take the logic of what you say. I have to say, though, that it is likely to be of very little persuasive value in the UK, and even less so in Europe. We do not have anything like the same well developed and defined law protecting against self incrimination. My experience and understanding of English law and of English judges suggests that they would not listen too keenly to such refinements, and would probably go out of their way to prevent them getting between the police and a needed conviction. Whether and how much it will change with the incorporation of the Euro Convention on Human Rights remains to be seen. -- David Swarbrick, Solicitor. Brighouse, West Yorkshire. Tel: +44(0)1484 722531 Fax: +44(0)1484 716617 e-mail david@swarb.demon.co.uk http://www.swarb.co.uk/ (Office) http://www.swarb.demon.co.uk/ (Home) Home of the law-index to 8800+ cases - 'damn fine webbery" From david at swarb.demon.co.uk Tue Feb 2 20:42:32 1999 From: david at swarb.demon.co.uk (David Swarbrick) Date: Tue, 2 Feb 1999 20:42:32 +0000 Subject: UK ISPA Give Police Secret Briefing and new CR&CL(UK) report lau In-Reply-To: <0192D36B72803001*/c=gb/admd=bt/prmd=ukpo/o=royalmail/ou=lnmrm1/s=Wardle/g=Clare/@MHS> References: <0192D36B72803001*/c=gb/admd=bt/prmd=ukpo/o=royalmail/ou=lnmrm1/s=Wardle/g=Clare/@MHS> Message-ID: In message <0192D36B72803001*/c=gb/admd=bt/prmd=ukpo/o=royalmail/ou=lnmr m1/s=Wardle/g=Clare/@MHS>, Clare Wardle writes >Nicholas Bohm wrote >>ISPs should be no more free than banks, solicitors, doctors, accountants >>etc to provide information about their customers as they think fit, except >>when obliged by law by a judicially-issued warrant or a court order. > >Moreover if in the course of disclosing the messages to a third party such as >the police,they disclose personal data, which almost inevitably they will, they >need to check that the request to disclose meets the specific criteria of a >statutory ability to request information appropriate to the requesting party, >and that this statutory power is allowable under the Data Protection Directive, >or the ISP will be able to be sued by the people whose personal data it is. I think in this case Data Protection is an undeveloped and ineffective protection. I think the general law of confidence, and the new Human Rights Law properly used is likely to be more effective. > It >is not open to ISPs or anyone else to decide to give personal data relating to >other people willy nilly without authorisation. Fishing expeditions are >definitely out. >From memory, they would say that the form provides a warranty (from a police constable!!) that it is not a fishing expedition, and that they would rely upon the specific exemptions in the Data Protection Act for police investigations. -- David Swarbrick, Solicitor. Brighouse, West Yorkshire. Tel: +44(0)1484 722531 Fax: +44(0)1484 716617 e-mail david@swarb.demon.co.uk http://www.swarb.co.uk/ (Office) http://www.swarb.demon.co.uk/ (Home) Home of the law-index to 8800+ cases - 'damn fine webbery" From joswald at rpkusa.com Wed Feb 3 05:46:57 1999 From: joswald at rpkusa.com (Jack Oswald) Date: Tue, 2 Feb 1999 21:46:57 -0800 Subject: ANNOUNCEMENT: RPK SECURITY ANNOUNCES RPK ENCRYPTONITE GLOBAL REPRESENTATIVE PROGRAM FOR ENCRYPTION TECHNOLOGY Message-ID: <004201be4f38$9cbf53e0$7700a8c0@Server.rpkusa.com> To the moderator: Please forward this (or let pass through your filter) if you believe this announcement would be of interest for your membership. ------------------------------------------------------------------- CONTACT: Paula Miller Lyn Oswald Nadel Phelan, Inc. RPK Security, Inc. (831) 439-5570 x277 (212) 488-9891 paulam@nadelphelan.com lynoswald@rpkusa.com RPK SECURITY ANNOUNCES RPK ENCRYPTONITE GLOBAL REPRESENTATIVE PROGRAM FOR ENCRYPTION TECHNOLOGY SAN FRANCISCO, CA. January 25, 1998 - RPK Security, Inc. (www.rpk.com), a technology leader in strong and fast public key encryption, announced today the launch of its RPK Encryptonite Global Representative Program for its encryption technology, expanding its global reach through a worldwide sales channel. The three charter companies that have joined the program include ITCG, a leading provider of business and information technology consultancy services for electronic commerce, !Effective, an innovative information consulting company focused on delivering IT based business solutions to stock exchange companies, and M & A Group, a leader in management consulting with offices worldwide. The companies will promote and sell RPK Encryptonite Engine licenses and may also offer custom engineering assistance, local implementation and technical support. "We joined the RPK Encryptonite Program based on our customers' increasing demand for high performance security solutions. RPK Security offers a fast, flexible and globally strong encryption solution," said David Maxwell, managing director of ITCG. "Our participation in RPK's program will allow us to offer our customers a superior product." "Our aim is to excite our clientele by delivering innovative technology solutions and RPK allows us to do that," said Ronald Nanninga, marketing executive of !Effective. "We intend to leverage our knowledge and experience of encryption in marketing the RPK technology to our customers." "All M&A Group corporate prospects and customers need RPK security products and we look forward to signing significant deals for RPK in 1999," said Jean-Paul Pinzuti, founder/partner of M&A Group. The RPK Encryptonite Engine, a strong, fast and scalable cryptosystem, uniquely combines all the benefits of public key systems (authentication, digital signatures and digital certificates) with the speed of a secret key system into one algorithm. With the Encryptonite Engine's superior performance, applications requiring streaming data, sound, video or numerous transactions, such as credit card payments, receive instantaneous responses and secure communication links. The RPK Encryptonite Toolkit, a software implementation of the RPK Encryptonite Engine, gives developers everything they need to quickly and easily incorporate strong, fast and scalable public key encryption into all their applications - without an extensive knowledge of cryptography. Its speed and compact size make it suitable for even the most demanding embedded systems. "The first three charter partners of our global representative program will provide world class local sales and engineering support," said Jack Oswald, president and CEO of RPK Security. "Since our encryption technology was developed outside the U.S., it is well suited to be used worldwide and these partners will make a huge difference in RPK's ability to service and support customers on a global basis." ABOUT RPK SECURITY Founded in 1995, RPK Security, Inc. is a technology leader in fast public key encryption. RPK's cryptographic research and product development is based in New Zealand, Switzerland and the U.K, with worldwide sales and marketing in San Francisco, CA. Contact RPK at www.rpk.com or (212) 488-9891. ABOUT ITCG Founded in 1998, Information Technology Consulting Group Limited (ITCG) offers IT Consulting and software development services to global corporations. ITCG consultants are experts in E-Commerce, Business Systems Analysis, Web Technologies, Microsoft Technologies, multi-tiered architectures and Corporate Information Systems Integration. Based in the UK, ITCG can be reached at Enquiries@itcguk.com or call +44 1494 523 996. more ABOUT !EFFECTIVE !Effective, based in the Netherlands, is an innovative information consulting company focused on delivering IT solutions to stock exchange companies. An extensive knowledge of the securities business combined with an expertise in e-commerce solutions make !Effective a valuable partner in providing custom solutions. !Effective can be reached at info@effective-it.com or call +31 (0)10 4253555 ABOUT M&A GROUP M&A Group offers management consulting services in strategic planning, mergers & acquisition, transition management, alliances & partnerships and private placements. With offices worldwide, M&A provides effective support to global corporations. M&A can be reached at 100140.3275@compuserve.com or call +33-(0)1 44 01 51 00. From ben at algroup.co.uk Wed Feb 3 10:42:16 1999 From: ben at algroup.co.uk (Ben Laurie) Date: Wed, 03 Feb 1999 10:42:16 +0000 Subject: ANNOUNCEMENT: RPK SECURITY ANNOUNCES RPK ENCRYPTONITE GLOBAL REPRESENTATIVE PROGRAM FOR ENCRYPTION TECHNOLOGY References: <004201be4f38$9cbf53e0$7700a8c0@Server.rpkusa.com> Message-ID: <36B82808.638D9BC7@algroup.co.uk> Jack Oswald wrote: > The three charter companies that have joined the program include ITCG, a > leading provider of business and information technology consultancy services > for electronic commerce, !Effective, an innovative information consulting Hehe, whoever thought of that name clearly wasn't a C or Perl programmer! :-) Cheers, Ben. -- http://www.apache-ssl.org/ben.html "My grandfather once told me that there are two kinds of people: those who work and those who take the credit. He told me to try to be in the first group; there was less competition there." - Indira Gandhi From Clare.Wardle at postoffice.co.uk Wed Feb 3 12:19:04 1999 From: Clare.Wardle at postoffice.co.uk (Clare Wardle) Date: 03 Feb 1999 12:19:04 Z Subject: UK ISPA Give Police Secret Briefing and new CR&CL(UK) report lau Message-ID: <044B636B83EB807E*/c=gb/admd=bt/prmd=ukpo/o=royalmail/ou=lnmrm1/s=Wardle/g=Clare/@MHS> Pete Mitchell wrote: >I take the DPA to be next to useless >as a means of discouraging official intrusion into private data. Has >anyone ever been prosecuted, or sued, under the Act in such >circumstances? Has such a complaint ever even been logged by the >Registrar? Complaints have certainly been dealt with. And while I agree that with more staff and resources the Data Protection Registrar could be more effective, she and her team do do quite a lot of good work. They have been very effective in getting sensible codes of practice for use of personal data by government agencies e.g. recently under the Social Security Fraud Act. Moreover, when a company is asked for data, eg on its employees by the police or local authority, the DPA makes it clear that such data can only be provided in specific cases, and for specific purposes, which gives an incentive to the company to get it right - certainly don't agree that you can't go behind the bald confirmation by a constable that the data request is not a fishing expedition as suggested by Dave Swarbrick. However, if the general public were more aware of their rights, and enforced them in this kind of case, the legislation would have more teeth. Simple way forward - everyone who thinks that their ISP is providing their information to the police too readily, or their medical records are being accessed by inappropriate people, complain to the Registrar, e-mail data@wycliffe.demon.co.uk. Under the new Act (which is supposed to be in force already, but is in fact probably going to come into force later this year) it will be possible for individuals to sue for damages, which will make it more likely that individuals will sue. Clare Wardle My views are my own and not necessarily those of my employer or colleagues. From ben at algroup.co.uk Thu Feb 4 09:39:40 1999 From: ben at algroup.co.uk (Ben Laurie) Date: Thu, 04 Feb 1999 09:39:40 +0000 Subject: Network Week demonstrate complete lack of clue Message-ID: <36B96ADC.889C7478@algroup.co.uk> In an article entitled "56-bit cipher defeated in just 22 hours", Network Week (3 Feb 1999) say "Eric Young and Tim Hudson used 'brute force' - trying every possible combination - on a $250,000 custom-built super PC". Yeah, right! Cheers, Ben. -- http://www.apache-ssl.org/ben.html "My grandfather once told me that there are two kinds of people: those who work and those who take the credit. He told me to try to be in the first group; there was less competition there." - Indira Gandhi From gladman at seven77.demon.co.uk Thu Feb 4 10:04:59 1999 From: gladman at seven77.demon.co.uk (Brian Gladman) Date: Thu, 4 Feb 1999 10:04:59 -0000 Subject: ANNOUNCEMENT: RPK SECURITY ANNOUNCES RPK ENCRYPTONITE GLOBAL REPRESENTATIVE PROGRAM FOR ENCRYPTION TECHNOLOGY Message-ID: <000c01be5025$d437eec0$966adec2@FortyTwo> -----Original Message----- From: Ben Laurie To: ukcrypto@maillist.ox.ac.uk Date: 03 February 1999 10:48 Subject: Re: ANNOUNCEMENT: RPK SECURITY ANNOUNCES RPK ENCRYPTONITE GLOBAL REPRESENTATIVE PROGRAM FOR ENCRYPTION TECHNOLOGY >Jack Oswald wrote: >> The three charter companies that have joined the program include ITCG, a >> leading provider of business and information technology consultancy services >> for electronic commerce, !Effective, an innovative information consulting > >Hehe, whoever thought of that name clearly wasn't a C or Perl >programmer! :-) > >Cheers, > >Ben. > Yes you are right there - puts me off immediately! Brian From nbohm at ernest.net Thu Feb 4 10:39:03 1999 From: nbohm at ernest.net (Nicholas Bohm) Date: Thu, 04 Feb 1999 10:39:03 +0000 Subject: ANNOUNCEMENT: RPK SECURITY ANNOUNCES RPK ENCRYPTONITE GLOBAL REPRESENTATIVE PROGRAM FOR ENCRYPTION TECHNOLOGY In-Reply-To: <000c01be5025$d437eec0$966adec2@FortyTwo> Message-ID: <3.0.5.32.19990204103903.00a7c4e0@mail.netkonect.co.uk> At 10:04 AM 2/4/1999 -0000, Brian Gladman wrote: > >-----Original Message----- >From: Ben Laurie >To: ukcrypto@maillist.ox.ac.uk >Date: 03 February 1999 10:48 >Subject: Re: ANNOUNCEMENT: RPK SECURITY ANNOUNCES RPK ENCRYPTONITE GLOBAL >REPRESENTATIVE PROGRAM FOR ENCRYPTION TECHNOLOGY > > >>Jack Oswald wrote: >>> The three charter companies that have joined the program include ITCG, a >>> leading provider of business and information technology consultancy >services >>> for electronic commerce, !Effective, an innovative information consulting >> >>Hehe, whoever thought of that name clearly wasn't a C or Perl >>programmer! :-) >> >>Cheers, >> >>Ben. >> > > >Yes you are right there - puts me off immediately! I know this is a boring request, but will someone spill the beans and explain the joke for C and Perl ignorami like me? Plaintive regards, Nicholas Bohm Salkyns, Great Canfield, Takeley, Bishop's Stortford CM22 6SX, UK Phone 01279 871272 (+44 1279 871272) Fax 01279 870215 (+44 1279 870215) Mobile 0860 636749 (+44 860 636749) PGP RSA 1024 bit public key ID: 0x08340015. Fingerprint: 9E 15 FB 2A 54 96 24 37 98 A2 E0 D1 34 13 48 07 PGP DSS/DH 1024/3072 public key ID: 0x899DD7FF. Fingerprint: 5248 1320 B42E 84FC 1E8B A9E6 0912 AE66 899D D7FF From pleyland at microsoft.com Thu Feb 4 11:25:50 1999 From: pleyland at microsoft.com (Paul Leyland) Date: Thu, 4 Feb 1999 03:25:50 -0800 Subject: ANNOUNCEMENT: RPK SECURITY ANNOUNCES RPK ENCRYPTONITE GLOBAL REPRESENTATIVE PROGRAM FOR ENCRYPTION TECHNOLOGY Message-ID: <25983782061AD111B0800000F86310FE0EE690A3@RED-MSG-42> > >>> for electronic commerce, !Effective, an innovative > information consulting > >> > >>Hehe, whoever thought of that name clearly wasn't a C or Perl > >>programmer! :-) ... > I know this is a boring request, but will someone spill the beans and > explain the joke for C and Perl ignorami like me? The '!' character is used for the logical negation operator, so the name reads as "NOT Effective". Someone, somewhere, screwed up. Paul From Brian Morrison" Message-ID: <199902041128.LAA001.28@fenrir.demon.co.uk> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On Thu, 04 Feb 1999 10:39:03 +0000, Nicholas Bohm wrote: >I know this is a boring request, but will someone spill the beans and >explain the joke for C and Perl ignorami like me? > ! is C (and PERL) speak for logical not, so !Effective means not effective, a bad name for a security product eh? - -- Brian Morrison bdm@fenrir.demon.co.uk "Almost noon, and she had yet to go the launderette in Concreton to thaw out chickens in the spin-drier..." PGP Public Key Fingerprint= C7 12 B9 54 00 0F 51 F6 37 9B 18 D1 E1 61 14 0B -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGPfreeware 5.0i OS/2 for non-commercial use Comment: This comment _is_ plain text Charset: cp850 iQA/AwUBNrl2WfQTY1HeMuXFEQIaNgCeLCD9ZvWvkouscOE4WsF7GboiSmIAnR/L 2Te1cy+XfIGZiOFdYIhQz9b5 =y0e9 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From gladman at seven77.demon.co.uk Thu Feb 4 11:30:36 1999 From: gladman at seven77.demon.co.uk (Brian Gladman) Date: Thu, 4 Feb 1999 11:30:36 -0000 Subject: ANNOUNCEMENT: RPK SECURITY ANNOUNCES RPK ENCRYPTONITE GLOBAL REPRESENTATIVE PROGRAM FOR ENCRYPTION TECHNOLOGY Message-ID: <003e01be5031$d4ebdf00$966adec2@FortyTwo> From: Nicholas Bohm To: ukcrypto@maillist.ox.ac.uk Date: 04 February 1999 10:49 Subject: Re: ANNOUNCEMENT: RPK SECURITY ANNOUNCES RPK ENCRYPTONITE GLOBAL REPRESENTATIVE PROGRAM FOR ENCRYPTION TECHNOLOGY In a number of popular computer languages including C, C++ and Perl, placing an exclamation mark (!) in front of an object negates its value. Hence the use of the expression '!Effective' is immediately read by any computer programmer as 'Not Effective' - not quite the intended message. Brian - From markc at chiark.greenend.org.uk Thu Feb 4 12:00:02 1999 From: markc at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Mark Carroll) Date: Thu, 4 Feb 1999 12:00:02 +0000 (GMT) Subject: ANNOUNCEMENT: RPK SECURITY ANNOUNCES RPK ENCRYPTONITE GLOBAL REPRESENTATIVE PROGRAM FOR ENCRYPTION TECHNOLOGY In-Reply-To: <3.0.5.32.19990204103903.00a7c4e0@mail.netkonect.co.uk> Message-ID: On Thu, 4 Feb 1999, Nicholas Bohm wrote: (snip) > >>Jack Oswald wrote: (snip) > >>> for electronic commerce, !Effective, an innovative information consulting (snip) > I know this is a boring request, but will someone spill the beans and > explain the joke for C and Perl ignorami like me? ! is normally read as 'not' (the logical operator). -- Mark From phillip.temple at onlinemagic.com Thu Feb 4 12:04:30 1999 From: phillip.temple at onlinemagic.com (Phillip Temple) Date: Thu, 04 Feb 1999 12:04:30 +0000 Subject: ANNOUNCEMENT: RPK SECURITY ANNOUNCES RPK ENCRYPTONITE GLOBAL REPRESENTATIVE PROGRAM FOR ENCRYPTION TECHNOLOGY In-Reply-To: <3.0.5.32.19990204103903.00a7c4e0@mail.netkonect.co.uk> References: <000c01be5025$d437eec0$966adec2@FortyTwo> Message-ID: <3.0.5.32.19990204120430.00d177b0@mailhost.onlinemagic.com> At 10:39 AM 2/4/99 +0000, Nicholas wrote: > >I know this is a boring request, but will someone spill the beans and >explain the joke for C and Perl ignorami like me? ! is the NOT operator. Thus !Effective translates to "NOT effective". Phillip. From lclarke at mpc-data.co.uk Thu Feb 4 11:41:03 1999 From: lclarke at mpc-data.co.uk (Leon Clarke) Date: 04 Feb 1999 11:41:03 +0000 Subject: ANNOUNCEMENT: RPK SECURITY ANNOUNCES RPK ENCRYPTONITE GLOBAL REPRESENTATIVE PROGRAM FOR ENCRYPTION TECHNOLOGY In-Reply-To: Nicholas Bohm's message of "Thu, 04 Feb 1999 10:39:03 +0000" References: <3.0.5.32.19990204103903.00a7c4e0@mail.netkonect.co.uk> Message-ID: Nicholas Bohm writes: > >>Jack Oswald wrote: > >>> for electronic commerce, !Effective, an innovative information consulting > I know this is a boring request, but will someone spill the beans and > explain the joke for C and Perl ignorami like me? '!' means 'not' From jei at zor.hut.fi Thu Feb 4 13:55:47 1999 From: jei at zor.hut.fi (jei@zor.hut.fi) Date: Thu, 4 Feb 1999 15:55:47 +0200 (EET) Subject: ANNOUNCEMENT: RPK SECURITY ANNOUNCES RPK ENCRYPTONITE GLOBAL REPRESENTATIVE PROGRAM FOR ENCRYPTION TECHNOLOGY In-Reply-To: <199902041128.LAA001.28@fenrir.demon.co.uk> Message-ID: On Thu, 4 Feb 1999, Brian Morrison wrote: > > > On Thu, 04 Feb 1999 10:39:03 +0000, Nicholas Bohm wrote: > > >I know this is a boring request, but will someone spill the beans and > >explain the joke for C and Perl ignorami like me? > > > > ! is C (and PERL) speak for logical not, so !Effective means not > effective, a bad name for a security product eh? Maybe it's one of those NSA trojan companies, like Crypto AG. ;-) ++ J From jei at zor.hut.fi Thu Feb 4 13:55:47 1999 From: jei at zor.hut.fi (jei@zor.hut.fi) Date: Thu, 4 Feb 1999 15:55:47 +0200 (EET) Subject: ANNOUNCEMENT: RPK SECURITY ANNOUNCES RPK ENCRYPTONITE GLOBAL REPRESENTATIVE PROGRAM FOR ENCRYPTION TECHNOLOGY In-Reply-To: <199902041128.LAA001.28@fenrir.demon.co.uk> Message-ID: On Thu, 4 Feb 1999, Brian Morrison wrote: > > > On Thu, 04 Feb 1999 10:39:03 +0000, Nicholas Bohm wrote: > > >I know this is a boring request, but will someone spill the beans and > >explain the joke for C and Perl ignorami like me? > > > > ! is C (and PERL) speak for logical not, so !Effective means not > effective, a bad name for a security product eh? Maybe it's one of those NSA trojan companies, like Crypto AG. ;-) ++ J From joswald at rpkusa.com Thu Feb 4 16:58:23 1999 From: joswald at rpkusa.com (Jack Oswald) Date: Thu, 4 Feb 1999 08:58:23 -0800 Subject: ANNOUNCEMENT: RPK SECURITY ANNOUNCES RPK ENCRYPTONITE GLOBAL REPRESENTATIVE PROGRAM FOR ENCRYPTION TECHNOLOGY In-Reply-To: <199902041128.LAA001.28@fenrir.demon.co.uk> Message-ID: <001e01be505f$93cdb600$7700a8c0@Server.rpkusa.com> Just to be clear (and I am just helping !Effective clarify) is that the firm is a consulting firm with the goal of helping companies go from !(not) Effective to Effective. It is not the name of a security product. I agree that it is a bit too esoteric but except for geeks like us who "speak" in programming languages, most of their target audience only sees it as a variant of Spanish punctuation ;) Jack -----Original Message----- From: owner-ukcrypto@maillist.ox.ac.uk [mailto:owner-ukcrypto@maillist.ox.ac.uk] On Behalf Of Brian Morrison Sent: Thursday, February 04, 1999 3:29 AM To: ukcrypto@maillist.ox.ac.uk Subject: Re: ANNOUNCEMENT: RPK SECURITY ANNOUNCES RPK ENCRYPTONITE GLOBAL REPRESENTATIVE PROGRAM FOR ENCRYPTION TECHNOLOGY -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On Thu, 04 Feb 1999 10:39:03 +0000, Nicholas Bohm wrote: >I know this is a boring request, but will someone spill the beans and >explain the joke for C and Perl ignorami like me? > ! is C (and PERL) speak for logical not, so !Effective means not effective, a bad name for a security product eh? - -- Brian Morrison bdm@fenrir.demon.co.uk "Almost noon, and she had yet to go the launderette in Concreton to thaw out chickens in the spin-drier..." PGP Public Key Fingerprint= C7 12 B9 54 00 0F 51 F6 37 9B 18 D1 E1 61 14 0B -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGPfreeware 5.0i OS/2 for non-commercial use Comment: This comment _is_ plain text Charset: cp850 iQA/AwUBNrl2WfQTY1HeMuXFEQIaNgCeLCD9ZvWvkouscOE4WsF7GboiSmIAnR/L 2Te1cy+XfIGZiOFdYIhQz9b5 =y0e9 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From E.J.Koops at kub.nl Fri Feb 5 13:19:18 1999 From: E.J.Koops at kub.nl (Bert-Jaap Koops) Date: Fri, 5 Feb 1999 13:19:18 MET Subject: disclosure of crypto keys In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: David Swarbrick : > I have to say, though, that it is likely to be of very little > persuasive value in the UK, and even less so in Europe. > We do not have anything like the same well developed and defined law > protecting against self incrimination. Not the same well developed case-law, but we do have two judgements of the European Court of Human Rights: Funke and Saunders. My reading of those judgements is that the protection in Europe is quite similar to that in the US. You should read Funke to gain some confidence that the privilege against self-incrimination is really substantial in Europe. (Funke was threatened with a conviction for not giving foreign bank account papers which he'd said earlier he had. The European Court concluded a breach of article 6 of the European Convention because there was improper compulsion to hand over potentially incriminating material.) > Whether and how much it will change with the incorporation of the Euro > Convention on Human Rights remains to be seen. Pardon my ignorance, but is not the UK already bound to the European Convention of Human Rights? Bert-Jaap --------------------------------------------------------------------- Bert-Jaap Koops tel +31 13 466 8101 Tilburg University facs +31 13 466 8149 P.O. Box 90153 e-mail E.J.Koops@kub.nl 5000 LE Tilburg http://cwis.kub.nl/~frw/people/koops/bertjaap.htm the Netherlands --------------------------------------------------------------------- This world's just mad enough to have been made by the Being his beings into being prayed. (Howard Nemerov) --------------------------------------------------------------------- From E.J.Koops at kub.nl Fri Feb 5 13:41:31 1999 From: E.J.Koops at kub.nl (Bert-Jaap Koops) Date: Fri, 5 Feb 1999 13:41:31 MET Subject: Self Incrimination and Crypto FAQ In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: "Arnold G. Reinhold" wrote (some time ago) > Subject: Re: Self Incrimination and Cryptographic Keys in US > This discussion deserves an FAQ of its own I haven't participated in the discussion on cryptography@c2.net, but there is a similar thread on ukcrypto in which I mentioned briefly the results of my research into this issue [*]. Moreover, the discussion pops up every year or so on these or other lists, and the same arguments are repeated many times. So, it seems sensible to make a FAQ. I would volunteer for this, but that I probably won't have time until July. What do people think? Should I give it a try? If so, can it wait until July? Kind regards, Bert-Jaap [*] See Chapter 8 of my Ph.D. thesis The Crypto Controversy, not online, but summary available at http://cwis.kub.nl/~frw/people/koops/thesis/thesis.htm --------------------------------------------------------------------- Bert-Jaap Koops tel +31 13 466 8101 Tilburg University facs +31 13 466 8149 P.O. Box 90153 e-mail E.J.Koops@kub.nl 5000 LE Tilburg http://cwis.kub.nl/~frw/people/koops/bertjaap.htm the Netherlands --------------------------------------------------------------------- This world's just mad enough to have been made by the Being his beings into being prayed. (Howard Nemerov) --------------------------------------------------------------------- From Clare.Wardle at postoffice.co.uk Fri Feb 5 14:02:04 1999 From: Clare.Wardle at postoffice.co.uk (Clare Wardle) Date: 05 Feb 1999 14:02:04 Z Subject: disclosure of crypto keys Message-ID: <06E5136BAF9DC11B*/c=gb/admd=bt/prmd=ukpo/o=royalmail/ou=lnmrm1/s=Wardle/g=Clare/@MHS> Yes, the UK is a signatory to the European Convention on Human Rights, but it is about to incorporate it into UK law in a statute (which will mean that it will hopefully be easier for those who think that their rights have been breached to get a remedy since they will be able to cite the statute in the courts in the UK, rather than having to go through those courts under national law and then go to Europe to check whether that answer was in accordance with their rights under the Convention. From Clare.Wardle at postoffice.co.uk Fri Feb 5 14:02:03 1999 From: Clare.Wardle at postoffice.co.uk (Clare Wardle) Date: 05 Feb 1999 14:02:03 Z Subject: disclosure of crypto keys Message-ID: <06E5136BAF9DB11A*/c=gb/admd=bt/prmd=ukpo/o=royalmail/ou=lnmrm1/s=Wardle/g=Clare/@MHS> Yes, the UK is a signatory to the European Convention on Human Rights, but it is about to incorporate it into UK law in a statute (which will mean that it will hopefully be easier for those who think that their rights have been breached to get a remedy since they will be able to cite the statute in the UK courts, rather than having to go through the UK courts under national law and then go to Europe to check whether that answer was in accordance with their rights under the Convention. From proff at iq.org Fri Feb 5 14:27:07 1999 From: proff at iq.org (Julian Assange) Date: Sat, 6 Feb 1999 01:27:07 +1100 (EST) Subject: Danger: spooks at work Message-ID: <199902051427.BAA29159@yoshi.iq.org> Danger: spooks at work by STEWART FIST The Australian 2feb99 ONE standby of investigative journalism is the Freedom of Information Act (the FOI) which sometimes allows reporters to access documents that politicians or bureaucrats would prefer remain hidden. Australia wasn't the first to introduce such an act. We copied the idea fairly recently and quite reluctantly from the US, where, for 30 years the right of journalists to access government information has been a mainstay of democracy. The FOI movement came from the government's denial in 1954 that nuclear bomb tests in the Pacific had resulted in lethal radiation. Everyone knew they had, but the news media ran into a wall of government silence. As US President James Madison once said: "A popular government, without popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a prologue to a farce or a tragedy - or perhaps both. Knowledge will forever govern ignorance, and a people who mean to be their own Governors must arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives." The American Civil Liberties Union took up the matter, and in 1966 the US Congress passed the Freedom of Information Act which "requires Federal agencies to make records available to the public through public inspection and upon the request of any person for any public or private use". Two years ago, the US amended its act to allow for electronic access (E-FOIA) which "includes improving public access to government information and records . . . [and] reducing the delays in agencies' responses to request for records". It also redefined records as including electronically stored information. Some US states also have their own FOI Acts, and some have quasi-judicial commissions that impose substantial penalties on departments and individuals failing to produce documents. Other states have what they cutely call Project Sunshines, which work in association with local bar associations to ensure government agencies respond to legitimate requests. Connecticut's FOI Commission recently imposed fines of $1800 for non-compliance on an agency, and warned the Oxford Board of Education that failure to act would "result in the referral of this matter to the appropriate state's attorney for criminal prosecution". This is technically a class-B misdemeanour. In Australia, we are light years behind, although we've come a long way since I was actively involved in television current affairs in the late 1960s. But politicians such as Jeff Kennett aren't particularly enamoured of the idea of having journalists probe into their dealings. Apart from banning his ministers and staff from talking to any pinko ABC types, Kennett has now found an excuse to attack the whole concept of FOI, and is threatening to legislate to block all access. This is casino capitalism with a totalitarian slant. Attacks of this kind on investigative journalism surface every year or two, yet many Australians don't appear to interpret them as personal attacks on their right to know. In the US, the FOI Act is used more by grassroots activists and organisations than by journalists; but here it is too complex, expensive and time-consuming for most non-journalists to bother. It is instructive to lift the curtain of bureaucratic secrecy in Australia to see what government agencies release and what they censor. This month we've been given an opportunity to do that, through the online release of an uncensored copy of the Walsh Report by Internet privacy campaign group Electronic Frontiers Australia (EFA). Gerard Walsh, a former deputy director of ASIO, and one of Australia's spy-masters, names his report: Review of Policy Relating to Encryption Technologies. It was commissioned by the Federal Attorney-General's Department in late 1996 as a background paper for an open public debate on cryptography. However, distribution was blocked at the last minute by unknown bureaucrats in some unknown government agency - but only after the report was in the hands of the government printer. The EFA, which takes a serious interest in cryptographic matters, applied for a copy under FOI, but the request was refused for "law enforcement, public safety and national security" reasons. EFA tried again in 1997, and finally scored a heavily censored copy. Cuts in FOI documents are accompanied by explanations of why the material is said to be sensitive. Unfortunately for the censors, a few original copies of the report were sent to libraries, and a university student recently stumbled across an unexpurgated version gathering dust in the State Library in Hobart. So it is now possible to make a comparison between the censored and virgin copies, and evaluate the FOI process itself. Walsh was proposing to open discussion on some legitimate questions about the way criminals were able to use encryption to avoid detection. As befitting a spy master, he was willing to accept that Trojan Horses and secret back doors into computer systems should be used to keep the police informed of possible criminal activities. Trojan Horses are virus-like utilities that can be planted in software to transmit passwords and other information back to the police or security services. I have no desire to see criminals gain ascendancy over the police by using new electronic technologies, but I do have reservations about the casual way the police claim the right to use such invasive technologies, and the way they ignore basic rights of privacy. But whether you agree with Walsh or not is beside the point. You didn't ever get to see the background document, so these discussion items were never seriously considered by the community. They disappeared from public view courtesy of some bureaucratic censor's scissors. So it's fascinating now to compare the cut made with the claims as to why they were made. For example, a suggestion of design flaws in American and British key-recovery proposals was cut out, despite the fact that the flaws were well-known worldwide. Also cut was a comment that export controls were of dubious value, along with one that American agencies sought to dominate discussion on encryption policy. Since the US Government has banned the export of serious cryptography under its Munitions Act and lined up police and security services around the world to support it, this seems hard to deny. These cuts were ostensibly made for reasons of "national security, defence or international relations", when obviously they were casually censored so as not to hurt the delicate feelings of some American or Pommy mates in brother security establishments. Two other cuts purported to refer to internal working documents. The first recommended that law enforcement agencies should be allowed to hack into private computers without being charged under anti-hacking laws (they do this all the time), and the second suggested the authorities be given the legal right to demand encryption keys (the secret key that permits decoding) from suspects. The first recommendation tries to legalise a common-but-illegal police/security practice, and the second infringes the right of citizens not to incriminate themselves. With the above, you can credit the authorities with self-serving rationality and a minuscule of efficiency, but the following are almost beyond belief. These cuts were made supposedly because they were capable of "affecting enforcement of law and protection of public safety": A statement that encryption is a looming problem. A statement that strong encryption is widely available and can't be broken. Acknowledgment that more overt forms of surveillance carry political risk. A statement that communications interception is valuable. A statement that criminals are using prepaid cards in mobile phones. These are so trivial they almost deserve cutting because they patronise the intelligence of the reader. But the idea that they could affect law enforcement or public safety is beyond comprehension. The bureaucrats also cut a bit of scuttlebutt that Australia might need another crypto-analytical agency (probably protecting their own department's pre-eminence in this area), and some motherhood statements about the need for secret agencies to have special privileges: protection from disclosure; the rights of covert entry to premises; and exemption from the normal legal discovery process. As Mandy Rice-Davies once said about some other figures of authority caught in similarly compromising circumstances: "They would say that, wouldn't they!" This censoring of the Walsh Report makes a mockery of the Freedom of Information Act. The agency concerned has misused both the Act and the regulations concerning national security classifications. This is clearly a bureaucracy more anxious to avoid embarrassment than to encourage genuine policy debate. The EFA report is at: www.efa.org.au/Issues/Crypto/Walsh/index.htm -- Julian Assange Patriots always talk of dying for their country, and never of killing for their country. - Bertrand Russel From I.Brown at cs.ucl.ac.uk Fri Feb 5 15:18:29 1999 From: I.Brown at cs.ucl.ac.uk (Ian BROWN) Date: Fri, 05 Feb 1999 16:18:29 +0100 Subject: Danger: spooks at work In-Reply-To: Your message of "Sat, 06 Feb 1999 01:27:07 +1100." <199902051427.BAA29159@yoshi.iq.org> Message-ID: <789.918231509@cs.ucl.ac.uk> > ONE standby of investigative journalism is the Freedom of > Information Act (the FOI) which sometimes allows reporters to > access documents that politicians or bureaucrats would prefer > remain hidden... And on a UK FOIA, ta-da, here comes Jack Straw to the rescue of the spooks and police (as usual). Unbelievable for someone who was spied upon by MI5 because he was president of the National Union of Students in a previous life. Access to secrets will be diluted By Andrew Grice, Political Editor The Independent, 5 February 1999 THE GOVERNMENT has watered down its long-awaited plans for a Freedom of Information Act, which will be published next month. Although ministers will hail their proposals as an historic and radical change, they are facing a backlash from Labour MPs furious that the legislation will be weaker than outlined in a 1997 White Paper... Labour MPs who want "an act with teeth" believe it has been watered down by Jack Straw, the Home Secretary, who took over responsibility for freedom of information after David Clark, the Cabinet Office minister, was sacked by Tony Blair last July. Mr Clark drew up the White Paper and wanted a radical bill. Andrew Mackinlay, the Labour MP for Thurrock, said yesterday: "The White Paper was a ground-breaking document and should be enacted in full. It would give us one of the most radical Freedom of Information Acts in the world..." http://www.independent.co.uk/stories/A0502918.html From gladman at seven77.demon.co.uk Mon Feb 8 17:07:32 1999 From: gladman at seven77.demon.co.uk (Brian Gladman) Date: Mon, 8 Feb 1999 17:07:32 -0000 Subject: PGP 6.0 Source Code Message-ID: <000301be538e$1e8d7100$966adec2@FortyTwo> The source code for PGP 6.0 is now available in Europe at: www.pgpi.com I have downloaded it but I have not compiled all of it yet as it uses a few tools that I don't have. Brian From ben at algroup.co.uk Mon Feb 8 19:14:37 1999 From: ben at algroup.co.uk (Ben Laurie) Date: Mon, 08 Feb 1999 19:14:37 +0000 Subject: Possible Security Problem: Fake PGP Key Message-ID: <36BF379D.8B305E2@algroup.co.uk> It has come to my attention that there is a faked key out there, purporting to be mine: Key ID: 0x6B722A59 Fingerprint: 428C 1E68 35E1 E96C 177A F49C A906 3F1F 6B72 2A59 Name: Ben Laurie Created: 09/10/98 Type: 2048/1024 DH/DSS It isn't clear to me what the point of this key is, but since I use PGP to sign both Apache and Apache-SSL, and given recent Trojans, it isn't hard to guess. I didn't create this key. I don't know who did. I have no report of it being used (yet), but if anyone has seen it used, I'd like to know about it. BTW, I observe that it is hard to know that my key is really mine, since it isn't signed by well-known people. If there's anyone out there who wants to sign it on the basis that they've seen it sign Apache or Apache-SSL distributions for several years, that would seem to be at least as worthwhile as having met me at a key-signing party.... Cheers, Ben. -- http://www.apache-ssl.org/ben.html "My grandfather once told me that there are two kinds of people: those who work and those who take the credit. He told me to try to be in the first group; there was less competition there." - Indira Gandhi From 101544.3054 at compuserve.com Tue Feb 9 19:32:45 1999 From: 101544.3054 at compuserve.com (Rainer Fahs) Date: Tue, 9 Feb 1999 14:32:45 -0500 Subject: PGP 6.0 Source Code Message-ID: <199902091432_MC2-69DA-522A@compuserve.com> Good news, Brian, should we now ask SECAN to start evaluation? :-) Rainer From gladman at seven77.demon.co.uk Wed Feb 10 09:01:50 1999 From: gladman at seven77.demon.co.uk (Brian Gladman) Date: Wed, 10 Feb 1999 09:01:50 -0000 Subject: PGP 6.0 Source Code Message-ID: <001201be54d4$0122a440$966adec2@FortyTwo> -----Original Message----- From: Rainer Fahs <101544.3054@compuserve.com> To: INTERNET:ukcrypto@maillist.ox.ac.uk Date: 09 February 1999 19:38 Subject: PGP 6.0 Source Code Good news, Brian, should we now ask SECAN to start evaluation? :-) Rainer Hi Rainer, Certainly be interesting to hear their response - are you volunteering? Brian PS. For the uninitiated SECAN is NATO's crypto and infosec evaluation agency (and this is effectively NSA under another name). From Tony Seymour" Casper, I am unable to read the New Statesman article, would there be any possibility of you sending me the article, thanks tony seymour -----Original Message----- From: Caspar Bowden To: ukcrypto@maillist.ox.ac.uk Date: 15 January 1999 17:59 Subject: New Stateman on crypto >http://rots.ivision.co.uk/~stefan/php/library.php3?Action=Record&searchStar t >=1&searchRange=10&searchWriter=&searchContent=encryption&searchSection=&sea r >chDayFrom=&searchMonthFrom=&searchYearFrom=&searchDayTo=&searchMonthTo=&sea r >chYearTo=&URN=199901080043 > >-- >Caspar Bowden http://www.fipr.org >Director, Foundation for Information Policy Research >Tel: +44(0)171 354 2333 Fax: +44(0)171 827 6534 > > > From jya at pipeline.com Wed Feb 10 13:36:04 1999 From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young) Date: Wed, 10 Feb 1999 08:36:04 -0500 Subject: RSA v. C2 In-Reply-To: <002f01be54d6$1e333700$2e7510ac@hd14621.corp.bacs.co.uk> Message-ID: <199902101336.IAA27581@smtp2.mindspring.com> Dan Tebbutt wrote an excellent piece yesterday in The Australian on RSA's fight with C2 for the IP of Eric Young and Tim Hudson, the covert process of getting AU approval for export of crypto and what it may mean for sweetheart arrangements to bypass global controls (no, there's no hint of GAK, yet): http://technology.news.com.au/indextech.asp?URL=/techno/features/f90210a.htm Mirrored at: http://jya.com/rsa-c2.dt.htm What's also of interest is how it demonstrates what appears to be happening with out-of-sight deal making among crypto manufacturers and government, as indicated by Freeh's remarks posted here by Declan. Sue Parker at Americans for Computer Privacy says that it too is busily working behind the scene to devise crypto legislation "acceptable to all parties." She wouldn't say when drafts of deals would be publically available. She did say that the recent Reno and Freeh encryption remarks "are nothing new." These offstage deals may account for why the crypto topic has been relatively quiet, and not merely because of the impeachment circus, maybe, indeed, the circus has served as a useful diversion. The rising hurrahs for counterterrorism funding, both in the US and overseas, portends a push for maintaining crypto controls worldwide -- as BXA's Reinsch stated in a speech yesterday: with a 64-bit worldwide limit "a loophole in Wassenaar has been closed." And BXA opened its regulation-rich, backroom deal-richer, Wassenaar site on Monday: http://www.bxa.doc.gov/Wassenaar/ Compare that smoke-filled Davos-forum with Dan's article on ever far-reaching, ever-richer RSA. Dream turbo-capitalism. From Tom.A.Parker at icl.com Wed Feb 10 15:02:15 1999 From: Tom.A.Parker at icl.com (Parker Tom TA) Date: Wed, 10 Feb 1999 15:02:15 -0000 Subject: Asymmetric Key sizes Message-ID: Although a lot is being said about the shrinking level of security offered by various symmetric key sizes, with 56 bits coming in for a lot of stick, haven't seen anything lately on asymmetric attacks. Has anyone any information on the latest successful attack position on asymmetric keys, RSA in particular? How secure is 512 bits considered now, and why? What's the current recommended key size? Has anything been published that is later than the now rather old (January 1996) "Report by the Ad Hoc Group of Cryptographers and Computer Scientists"? Thanks in advance, Tom Parker tom.a.parker@icl.com From Tom.A.Parker at icl.com Wed Feb 10 15:02:15 1999 From: Tom.A.Parker at icl.com (Parker Tom TA) Date: Wed, 10 Feb 1999 15:02:15 -0000 Subject: Asymmetric Key sizes Message-ID: Although a lot is being said about the shrinking level of security offered by various symmetric key sizes, with 56 bits coming in for a lot of stick, haven't seen anything lately on asymmetric attacks. Has anyone any information on the latest successful attack position on asymmetric keys, RSA in particular? How secure is 512 bits considered now, and why? What's the current recommended key size? Has anything been published that is later than the now rather old (January 1996) "Report by the Ad Hoc Group of Cryptographers and Computer Scientists"? Thanks in advance, Tom Parker tom.a.parker@icl.com From Brian Morrison" On Wed, 10 Feb 1999 15:02:15 -0000, Parker Tom TA wrote: >Although a lot is being said about the shrinking level of security offered >by various symmetric key sizes, with 56 bits coming in for a lot of stick, >haven't seen anything lately on asymmetric attacks. Has anyone any >information on the latest successful attack position on asymmetric keys, RSA >in particular? How secure is 512 bits considered now, and why? What's the >current recommended key size? Has anything been published that is later than >the now rather old (January 1996) "Report by the Ad Hoc Group of >Cryptographers and Computer Scientists"? > There was a posting to sci.crypt (might have been sci.crypt.research) a few days ago stating that the RSA-140 factoring challenge had been completed, this involves factoring a 140 digit number, a similar process to that required to break an RSA key. I think that this development means that it is now possible to break 512 bit RSA keys, and reduces the security of 768 bit RSA keys. I certainly can't claim to be able to rigorously state this, but that was the tone of the post. A search of Dejanews would probably locate the post in question. HTH -- Brian Morrison bdm@fenrir.demon.co.uk 'The village populace is jumpin' on faces, catchin' the javelin, Headin' the shot.' [FX: wet thud - "Oooo.."] From jya at pipeline.com Wed Feb 10 17:16:49 1999 From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young) Date: Wed, 10 Feb 1999 12:16:49 -0500 Subject: Asymmetric Key sizes In-Reply-To: <199902101656.IAA19235@mailgate.cadence.com> Message-ID: <199902101717.MAB23114@smtp2.mindspring.com> The factoring of RSA140 is described at: http://jya.com/rsa140.htm From s.simpson at mia.co.uk Wed Feb 10 17:20:00 1999 From: s.simpson at mia.co.uk (Simpson, Sam) Date: Wed, 10 Feb 1999 17:20:00 +0000 Subject: Asymmetric Key sizes Message-ID: -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 We know that 512-bit keys have been insecure for some time now [Sch96a], [Odl95], [Rob95]; a well-funded adversary could certainly break these size keys (even if it does take a month or two). In reality, an adversary wouldn't even need to be well funded - they would just need access to a large network of computers. The adversary could thus be a computer manufacturer, a large corporation (using idle time on computers) or a co-ordinated effort. If doubt exists about the ability to factor a 512-bit key one only has to see that a 465-bit key was broken with just 2000 MIPS-years of effort [Paa99]. [Odl95] A.M.Odlyzko, "The Future of Integer Factorization", RSA CryptoBytes, Volume 1, Number 2, Summer 1995. [Paa99] C.Paar, message beginning "The next RSA challenge, RSA140...", as distributed on cryptography@c2.net mailing list, 4th Feb 1999. [Rob95] M.J.B.Robshaw, "Security Estimates for 512-bit RSA", RSA Labs, June 29. [Sch96a] B.Schneier, "Applied Cryptography, Second Edition", Wiley, 1996. Using any less than an absolute minimum of 768-bits for data which needs even medium term protection seems imprudent. Hope this helps, Sam Simpson Comms Analyst - -- http://www.hertreg.ac.uk/ss/ for ScramDisk hard-drive encryption & Delphi Crypto Components. PGP Keys available at the same site. > -----Original Message----- > From: Parker Tom TA [mailto:Tom.A.Parker@icl.com] > Sent: Wednesday, February 10, 1999 3:02 PM > To: 'ukcrypto@maillist.ox.ac.uk' > Subject: Asymmetric Key sizes > > > Although a lot is being said about the shrinking level of > security offered > by various symmetric key sizes, with 56 bits coming in for a > lot of stick, > haven't seen anything lately on asymmetric attacks. Has anyone any > information on the latest successful attack position on > asymmetric keys, RSA > in particular? How secure is 512 bits considered now, and > why? What's the > current recommended key size? Has anything been published > that is later than > the now rather old (January 1996) "Report by the Ad Hoc Group of > Cryptographers and Computer Scientists"? > > Thanks in advance, > > Tom Parker > tom.a.parker@icl.com > > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP 6.0.2 iQA/AwUBNsG/z+0ty8FDP9tPEQJQgQCg6sgjXUI9FRsp8Z+2CldsRv1gJRIAoNg+ mf3aq0BXhGthwuQ9FXlFEMTH =zQIA -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From R.ASKWITH at livjm.ac.uk Wed Feb 10 17:38:16 1999 From: R.ASKWITH at livjm.ac.uk (Bob Askwith) Date: Wed, 10 Feb 1999 17:38:16 +0000 Subject: Asymmetric Key sizes In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <3.0.5.32.19990210173816.00833120@staff-mail.livjm.ac.uk> happened to see this just today... RSA 140 factored (465 bits) http://jya.com/rsa140.htm At 15:02 10/02/99 -0000, you wrote: >Although a lot is being said about the shrinking level of security offered >by various symmetric key sizes, with 56 bits coming in for a lot of stick, >haven't seen anything lately on asymmetric attacks. Has anyone any >information on the latest successful attack position on asymmetric keys, RSA >in particular? How secure is 512 bits considered now, and why? What's the >current recommended key size? Has anything been published that is later than >the now rather old (January 1996) "Report by the Ad Hoc Group of >Cryptographers and Computer Scientists"? --------------- Cheers, Bob. From pleyland at microsoft.com Wed Feb 10 17:40:43 1999 From: pleyland at microsoft.com (Paul Leyland) Date: Wed, 10 Feb 1999 09:40:43 -0800 Subject: Asymmetric Key sizes Message-ID: <25983782061AD111B0800000F86310FE0EE690CD@RED-MSG-42> > Although a lot is being said about the shrinking level of > security offered > by various symmetric key sizes, with 56 bits coming in for a > lot of stick, > haven't seen anything lately on asymmetric attacks. Has anyone any > information on the latest successful attack position on > asymmetric keys, RSA > in particular? How secure is 512 bits considered now, and > why? What's the > current recommended key size? Has anything been published > that is later than > the now rather old (January 1996) "Report by the Ad Hoc Group of > Cryptographers and Computer Scientists"? The world record factorization is now 463 bits. See, for example, http://listserv.nodak.edu/scripts/wa.exe?A2=ind9902&L=nmbrthry&F=&S=&P=302 512 bits is looking decidedly shaky IMAO. Paul From LKhan at zergo.com Wed Feb 10 17:52:42 1999 From: LKhan at zergo.com (Liaquat Khan) Date: Wed, 10 Feb 1999 17:52:42 -0000 Subject: Asymmetric Key sizes Message-ID: <199902101806.SAA17120@ns0.zergo.com> The RSA challenge RSA-140, a 140-digit modulus (about 465-bits long) was factored into two 70-digit prime numbers, using the Number Field Sieve(NFS), recently, see http://jya.com/rsa140.htm. 512-bit keys were considered on the small size for a quite while now, but they are definitely too close for comfort after this (although key length is really dependent on the application, I feel, the (absolute) minimum key length (for RSA) one should really use is 640-bits). regards, Liaquat Khan -----Original Message----- From: Parker Tom TA [mailto:Tom.A.Parker@icl.com] Sent: 10 February 1999 15:02 To: 'ukcrypto@maillist.ox.ac.uk' Subject: Asymmetric Key sizes Although a lot is being said about the shrinking level of security offered by various symmetric key sizes, with 56 bits coming in for a lot of stick, haven't seen anything lately on asymmetric attacks. Has anyone any information on the latest successful attack position on asymmetric keys, RSA in particular? How secure is 512 bits considered now, and why? What's the current recommended key size? Has anything been published that is later than the now rather old (January 1996) "Report by the Ad Hoc Group of Cryptographers and Computer Scientists"? Thanks in advance, Tom Parker tom.a.parker@icl.com From pleyland at microsoft.com Wed Feb 10 18:01:00 1999 From: pleyland at microsoft.com (Paul Leyland) Date: Wed, 10 Feb 1999 10:01:00 -0800 Subject: Asymmetric Key sizes Message-ID: <25983782061AD111B0800000F86310FE0EE690CF@RED-MSG-42> > From: Brian Morrison [mailto:bdm@fenrir.demon.co.uk] > There was a posting to sci.crypt (might have been > sci.crypt.research) a > few days ago stating that the RSA-140 factoring challenge had been > completed, this involves factoring a 140 digit number, a similar > process to that required to break an RSA key. > > I think that this development means that it is now possible to break > 512 bit RSA keys, and reduces the security of 768 bit RSA keys. I > certainly can't claim to be able to rigorously state this, > but that was the tone of the post. It has been possible to break 512 bit keys for several years. Back in 1994 we estimated that the same approach we used for RSA-129 (429 bits) would work for a 512-bit key, albeit with about 90 times as much sieving and several weeks on big iron for the linear algebra. We also recognized back then that GNFS would do the job with less effort. Advances in algorithms and technology have made a 512-bit key now about as hard as 429-bit key then --- at least as far as the sieving goes. The linear algebra is still much harder. As for 768-bit keys, they would appear to be resistant to any reasonable attack with any reasonable amount of hardware. > A search of Dejanews would probably locate the post in question. I refer the honorable member to my previous reply. 8-) Paul From duggie_stenhouse at hotmail.com Thu Feb 11 15:14:12 1999 From: duggie_stenhouse at hotmail.com (Duggie Stenhouse) Date: Thu, 11 Feb 1999 07:14:12 PST Subject: BT's Trustwire 40 bit secure communications claim Message-ID: <19990211151413.2137.qmail@hotmail.com> Just been harangued by a BT salesman trying to sell the services of the BT spinoff http://www.trustwise.com Basically it's a "bona fide" certificate issuer - however, they are also selling "secure e-commerce solution" based on 40 bit keys which "guarantee security" ho hum ______________________________________________________ Get Your Private, Free Email at http://www.hotmail.com From duggie_stenhouse at hotmail.com Thu Feb 11 15:14:12 1999 From: duggie_stenhouse at hotmail.com (Duggie Stenhouse) Date: Thu, 11 Feb 1999 07:14:12 PST Subject: BT's Trustwire 40 bit secure communications claim Message-ID: <19990211151413.2137.qmail@hotmail.com> Just been harangued by a BT salesman trying to sell the services of the BT spinoff http://www.trustwise.com Basically it's a "bona fide" certificate issuer - however, they are also selling "secure e-commerce solution" based on 40 bit keys which "guarantee security" ho hum ______________________________________________________ Get Your Private, Free Email at http://www.hotmail.com From owenc at panix.com Thu Feb 11 23:57:14 1999 From: owenc at panix.com (Owen O'Connor) Date: Thu, 11 Feb 1999 18:57:14 -0500 (EST) Subject: BT's Trustwire 40 bit secure communications claim In-Reply-To: <19990211151413.2137.qmail@hotmail.com> Message-ID: THIS IS NOT FOR FORWARDING OR PUBLIC ATTRIBUTION. The product is re-badged Verisign. Officially and effectively, it's verisign with a locacl reseller. Notice the huge similarity between it and digitalid.verisign.com. It's also oddly more expensive than VS - and they also admit that. On Thu, 11 Feb 1999, Duggie Stenhouse wrote: > Just been harangued by a BT salesman trying to sell the services > of the BT spinoff http://www.trustwise.com > > Basically it's a "bona fide" certificate issuer - however, they are also > selling "secure e-commerce solution" based on 40 bit keys which > "guarantee security" > > ho hum > > ______________________________________________________ > Get Your Private, Free Email at http://www.hotmail.com > From steve at tightrope.demon.co.uk Fri Feb 12 09:16:31 1999 From: steve at tightrope.demon.co.uk (Steve Mynott) Date: Fri, 12 Feb 1999 09:16:31 +0000 Subject: BT's Trustwire 40 bit secure communications claim In-Reply-To: <19990211151413.2137.qmail@hotmail.com>; from Duggie Stenhouse on Thu, Feb 11, 1999 at 07:14:12AM -0800 References: <19990211151413.2137.qmail@hotmail.com> Message-ID: <19990212091630.A8782@tightrope.demon.co.uk> strangly enough BT micropayment https://transend.labs.bt.com/ uses a RSA 128-bit cert. How have they managed that? On Thu, Feb 11, 1999 at 07:14:12AM -0800, Duggie Stenhouse wrote: > Just been harangued by a BT salesman trying to sell the services > of the BT spinoff http://www.trustwise.com > > Basically it's a "bona fide" certificate issuer - however, they are also > selling "secure e-commerce solution" based on 40 bit keys which > "guarantee security" -- 1024/D9C69DF9 steve mynott steve@tightrope.demon.co.uk http://www.pineal.com/ just about every computer on the market today runs unix, except the mac (and nobody cares about it). -- bill joy 6/21/85 From dparkins at alien.bt.co.uk Fri Feb 12 10:57:37 1999 From: dparkins at alien.bt.co.uk (David Parkinson) Date: Fri, 12 Feb 1999 10:57:37 +0000 Subject: BT's Trustwire 40 bit secure communications claim In-Reply-To: <19990212091630.A8782@tightrope.demon.co.uk> References: <19990211151413.2137.qmail@hotmail.com> <19990211151413.2137.qmail@hotmail.com> Message-ID: <4.1.19990212105554.00a7ac30@mail.alien.bt.co.uk> At 09:16 12/02/99 +0000, Steve Mynott wrote: >strangly enough BT micropayment > >https://transend.labs.bt.com/ > >uses a RSA 128-bit cert. How have they managed that? > According to my browser: The RC4 encryption is 128-bit (40 secret) The RSA element is 512-bit. David From ben at algroup.co.uk Fri Feb 12 11:38:19 1999 From: ben at algroup.co.uk (Ben Laurie) Date: Fri, 12 Feb 1999 11:38:19 +0000 Subject: BT's Trustwire 40 bit secure communications claim References: <19990211151413.2137.qmail@hotmail.com> <19990212091630.A8782@tightrope.demon.co.uk> Message-ID: <36C412AB.31B42911@algroup.co.uk> Steve Mynott wrote: > > strangly enough BT micropayment > > https://transend.labs.bt.com/ > > uses a RSA 128-bit cert. How have they managed that? Server-Gated Cryptography. Cheers, Ben. -- http://www.apache-ssl.org/ben.html "My grandfather once told me that there are two kinds of people: those who work and those who take the credit. He told me to try to be in the first group; there was less competition there." - Indira Gandhi From PHalliden at zergo.com Fri Feb 12 12:03:13 1999 From: PHalliden at zergo.com (Paul Halliden) Date: Fri, 12 Feb 1999 12:03:13 -0000 Subject: BT's Trustwire 40 bit secure communications claim Message-ID: <199902121216.MAA24385@ns0.zergo.com> According to my browser (IE4.01) the site uses a 128-bit *hash* (MD5) with 512-bit RSA keys used to establish a 40-bit RC4 encryption key. It also uses the older SSL v2.0 which is usually considered less secure than the current SSL v3.0. 128-bit RSA would be very weak ;-). Regards Paul Halliden Director for Strategic Technology ________________________________________________________________________ _ Baltimore, The Square, Basing View, Basingstoke, Hants, RG21 4EG, UK Tel: +44 (0) 1442 342 784 Fax: +44 (0) 1256 812901 http://www.baltimore.com Baltimore is the operating name of Zergo Holdings plc -----Original Message----- From: Steve Mynott [mailto:steve@tightrope.demon.co.uk] Sent: 12 February 1999 09:17 To: ukcrypto@maillist.ox.ac.uk Subject: Re: BT's Trustwire 40 bit secure communications claim strangly enough BT micropayment https://transend.labs.bt.com/ uses a RSA 128-bit cert. How have they managed that? On Thu, Feb 11, 1999 at 07:14:12AM -0800, Duggie Stenhouse wrote: > Just been harangued by a BT salesman trying to sell the services > of the BT spinoff http://www.trustwise.com > > Basically it's a "bona fide" certificate issuer - however, they are also > selling "secure e-commerce solution" based on 40 bit keys which > "guarantee security" -- 1024/D9C69DF9 steve mynott steve@tightrope.demon.co.uk http://www.pineal.com/ just about every computer on the market today runs unix, except the mac (and nobody cares about it). -- bill joy 6/21/85 From hcorn at cix.co.uk Fri Feb 12 12:07:00 1999 From: hcorn at cix.co.uk (Peter Sommer) Date: Fri, 12 Feb 1999 12:07 +0000 (GMT Standard Time) Subject: LSE/CSRC Security Colloquium BS7799 Feb 16 Message-ID: London School of Economics Computer Security Research Centre Public Security Colloquia 16 February 1999 Tuesdays LSE Clement Building Room D602, 1700-1900hrs BS 7799: from Code to Standard to Certificate Pudima Madhvi CIID/DTI The British Standard for Information Security Management is now maturing and a complete revision is due for publication. In 1993 it was Code of Practice and in 1995 it became a full British Standard. A certification scheme, C:cure is in place and the first certicated information systems are expected to be announced in the next tow months. Pudima Madhvi of the DTI will provide an update, discuss the scheme's future and react to criticisms that the certification scheme may engender a false sense of comfort Members of the public may attend free of charge but must pre-register by e-mail to csrc@lse.ac.uk. Some meetings take place under Chatham House Rules. The LSE Clement Building is on the Aldwych, London WC2 between the Law Courts and the south end of Kingsway; there is a large hanging white sign on the outside. Future Programme details: http://csrc.lse.ac.uk/Colloquia/colloquia1.htm Enquiries: 0171 955 6197 (voice-mail service) This year's colloquium series is made possible through the kind assistance of Deutsche Bank |-> Peter Sommer --------------------------------------------->| |-> hcorn@cix.co.uk P.M.Sommer@lse.ac.uk -------------------->| |-> Academic URL: http://csrc.lse.ac.uk/Sommer/sommer.htm ---->| |-> Commercial URL: http://www.virtualcity.co.uk ------------->| From cb at fipr.org Fri Feb 12 13:09:42 1999 From: cb at fipr.org (Caspar Bowden) Date: Fri, 12 Feb 1999 13:09:42 -0000 Subject: T&I Select Committee evidence (2 Feb) on BBC Parliament Channel (Sunday) Message-ID: <000b01be5688$f4abe6c0$d200a8c0@cpsb> For those who can get it, a repeat showing of the oral evidence given on Feb 2nd to the Trade and Industry Select Committee inquiry on E-Commerce, will be shown this Sunday (14/2/99) on the BBC Parliament Channel at 5:30am (duration 2 hours 15 min). May also be repeated next week. Much reference to escrow/licensing etc. Scheduled list of witnesses =========================== British Telecommunications plc Sir Peter Bonfield - Chief Executive Officer Sue Davidson - Director, Strategy and Business Development Federation of the Electronics Industries Mr. Anthony Parish - Director General Mr Christopher Binns - Secretary, FEI's Cryptography & Trust Services Policy Group; EMERITUS Project Manager Mr Keith Chapple - Managing Director Intel (UK); Chairman of FEI's Information and Communications Technology Council Mr Peter Dare - IBM (UK); Chairman FEI's Cryptography and Trust Services Policy Group; EMERITUS Project Director Computing Services and Software Association Mr John Higgins - Director General Mr Robert Carolina - Partner, TarloLyons solicitors Mr Dick Emery - Group E-Commerce Manager, ICL Mr Bob Scott - Director E-Commerce, Cap Gemini Internet Service Provider's Association Mr Tim Pearson - Chairman Mr Nicholas Lansman - Secretary General Mr Jim Dixon - Council Member -- Caspar Bowden http://www.fipr.org Director, Foundation for Information Policy Research Tel: +44(0)171 354 2333 Fax: +44(0)171 827 6534 From davidh at spidacom.co.uk Fri Feb 12 13:08:20 1999 From: davidh at spidacom.co.uk (davidh@spidacom.co.uk) Date: Fri, 12 Feb 1999 13:08:20 -0000 Subject: BT's Trustwire 40 bit secure communications claim In-Reply-To: <19990211151413.2137.qmail@hotmail.com> Message-ID: <199902121307.NAA18444@handel.ednet.co.uk> On 11 Feb 99, at 7:14, Duggie Stenhouse wrote: > Basically it's a "bona fide" certificate issuer - however, they are also > selling "secure e-commerce solution" based on 40 bit keys which "guarantee > security" I looked at the BT site yesterday. I have insecure keys turned off in my browser, as a result it told me that it could not negotiate a compatible set of ciphers, or words to that effect. When I temporarily turned on the insecure keys it worked. I was not impressed and pointed my browser at Thawte instead, which prodvides real certificates. David Hansen | davidh@spidacom.co.uk | PGP email preferred Edinburgh | CI$ number 100024,3247 | key number 5432274D From pope at secstan.com Fri Feb 12 13:37:53 1999 From: pope at secstan.com (Nick Pope) Date: Fri, 12 Feb 1999 13:37:53 -0000 Subject: BT's Trustwire 40 bit secure communications claim In-Reply-To: <36C412AB.31B42911@algroup.co.uk> Message-ID: <001a01be568c$e4c6da40$0300000a@npwork> I looked through the description of server-gated Cryptogrphy and can't find anything which says exactly what in the certificate switches on this capability. Anyone know? Nick Pope > -----Original Message----- > From: owner-ukcrypto@maillist.ox.ac.uk > [mailto:owner-ukcrypto@maillist.ox.ac.uk]On Behalf Of Ben Laurie > Sent: 12 February 1999 11:38 > To: ukcrypto@maillist.ox.ac.uk > Subject: Re: BT's Trustwire 40 bit secure communications claim > > > Steve Mynott wrote: > > > > strangly enough BT micropayment > > > > https://transend.labs.bt.com/ > > > > uses a RSA 128-bit cert. How have they managed that? > > Server-Gated Cryptography. > > Cheers, > > Ben. > > -- > http://www.apache-ssl.org/ben.html > > "My grandfather once told me that there are two kinds of people: those > who work and those who take the credit. He told me to try to be in the > first group; there was less competition there." > - Indira Gandhi > > From mdbn at dmed.demon.co.uk Fri Feb 12 15:12:20 1999 From: mdbn at dmed.demon.co.uk (Pete Mitchell) Date: Fri, 12 Feb 1999 15:12:20 +0000 Subject: T&I Select Committee evidence (2 Feb) on BBC Parliament Channel (Sunday) References: <000b01be5688$f4abe6c0$d200a8c0@cpsb> Message-ID: <99Feb12.150835gmt.27881@gateway.pearson-pro.com> Caspar Bowden wrote: > > For those who can get it, a repeat showing of the oral evidence given on Feb > 2nd to the Trade and Industry Select Committee inquiry on E-Commerce, will > be shown this Sunday (14/2/99) on the BBC Parliament Channel at 5:30am > (duration 2 hours 15 min). May also be repeated next week. Much reference to > escrow/licensing etc. > Is that BBC1 or BBC2? -- Peter Mitchell From ben at algroup.co.uk Fri Feb 12 15:15:10 1999 From: ben at algroup.co.uk (Ben Laurie) Date: Fri, 12 Feb 1999 15:15:10 +0000 Subject: BT's Trustwire 40 bit secure communications claim References: <001a01be568c$e4c6da40$0300000a@npwork> Message-ID: <36C4457E.BEDEF466@algroup.co.uk> Nick Pope wrote: > > I looked through the description of server-gated Cryptogrphy and can't find > anything which says exactly what in the certificate switches on this > capability. Anyone know? It is the fact that it is issued by a CA which is flagged in the browser's cert DB as being an SGC CA. Cheers, Ben. -- http://www.apache-ssl.org/ben.html "My grandfather once told me that there are two kinds of people: those who work and those who take the credit. He told me to try to be in the first group; there was less competition there." - Indira Gandhi From mark at awe.com Fri Feb 12 15:25:40 1999 From: mark at awe.com (Mark J Cox) Date: Fri, 12 Feb 1999 15:25:40 +0000 (GMT) Subject: BT's Trustwire 40 bit secure communications claim In-Reply-To: <36C412AB.31B42911@algroup.co.uk> Message-ID: > > https://transend.labs.bt.com/ > > uses a RSA 128-bit cert. How have they managed that? > Server-Gated Cryptography. Actually it isn't using SGC, the site returns a standard certificate which doesn't contain any SGC extensions. They use a version of the Open Market webserver which is SSLv2 only but supports RC4-MD5 (128 bit) as well as EXP-RC4-MD5 (40 bit). Mark Mark J Cox, ......................................... www.awe.com/~mark Latest news on the Apache Web Server ............... www.apacheweek.com From cb at fipr.org Fri Feb 12 15:55:12 1999 From: cb at fipr.org (Caspar Bowden) Date: Fri, 12 Feb 1999 15:55:12 -0000 Subject: T&I Select Committee evidence (2 Feb) on BBC Parliament Channel (Sunday) In-Reply-To: <99Feb12.150835gmt.27881@gateway.pearson-pro.com> Message-ID: <001201be56a0$135d72c0$d200a8c0@cpsb> >> For those who can get it, a repeat showing of the oral >evidence given on Feb >> 2nd to the Trade and Industry Select Committee inquiry on >E-Commerce, will >> be shown this Sunday (14/2/99) on the BBC Parliament Channel >at 5:30am >> (duration 2 hours 15 min). May also be repeated next week. >Much reference to >> escrow/licensing etc. >> > > >Is that BBC1 or BBC2? Cable/satellite :( -- Caspar Bowden http://www.fipr.org Director, Foundation for Information Policy Research Tel: +44(0)171 354 2333 Fax: +44(0)171 827 6534 From octobersdad at reporters.net Fri Feb 12 15:50:53 1999 From: octobersdad at reporters.net (T Bruce Tober) Date: Fri, 12 Feb 1999 15:50:53 +0000 Subject: T&I Select Committee evidence (2 Feb) on BBC Parliament Channel (Sunday) In-Reply-To: <99Feb12.150835gmt.27881@gateway.pearson-pro.com> References: <000b01be5688$f4abe6c0$d200a8c0@cpsb> <99Feb12.150835gmt.27881@gateway.pearson-pro.com> Message-ID: In message <99Feb12.150835gmt.27881@gateway.pearson-pro.com>, Pete Mitchell writes >Caspar Bowden wrote: >> >> For those who can get it, a repeat showing of the oral evidence given on Feb >> 2nd to the Trade and Industry Select Committee inquiry on E-Commerce, will >> be shown this Sunday (14/2/99) on the BBC Parliament Channel at 5:30am >> (duration 2 hours 15 min). May also be repeated next week. Much reference to >> escrow/licensing etc. >> > > >Is that BBC1 or BBC2? Neither. BBC Parliament channel is available from cable and ??? > tbt -- | Bruce Tober, , | | Birmingham, UK, EU +44-121-242-3832 (mobile - 07979-521-106). Freelance | |Journalist & Website consultancy and development. PGP details at my website| From Alan Burkitt-Gray" This is a multi-part message in MIME format. ------=_NextPart_000_0031_01BE56A3.69583900 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Caspar wrote: "For those who can get it, a repeat showing of the oral = evidence given on Feb 2nd to the Trade and Industry Select Committee inquiry on E-Commerce, = will be shown this Sunday (14/2/99) on the BBC Parliament Channel at 5:30am (duration 2 hours 15 min)." What a way to start Valentine's Day!=20 Alan B-G - ALAN BURKITT-GRAY, Editor, Government Computing The independent magazine about information age public service, for the people who are going to make it happen NEXT ISSUE: March 1999, mailed out 25 February Published monthly by Kable Ltd The Courtyard, 55 Charterhouse Street, London EC1M 6HA, UK tel 0171 608 0900, fax 0171 608 0901 international tel +44 171 608 0900, fax +44 171 608 0901 website http://www.kable.co.uk=20 e-mail alan@kable.co.uk For advance features information see http://www.governmentcomputing.com=20 Where's Kable? Look at=20 http://www.streetmap.co.uk/streetmap.dll?grid2map?X=3D531650&Y=3D181750&a= rrow=3Dy ------=_NextPart_000_0031_01BE56A3.69583900 Content-Type: text/html; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Caspar wrote: "For those who can get it, a repeat showing of = the oral=20 evidence given on Feb
2nd to the Trade and Industry Select Committee = inquiry=20 on E-Commerce, will
be shown this Sunday (14/2/99) on the BBC = Parliament=20 Channel at 5:30am
(duration 2 hours 15 min)."
 
What a way to start Valentine's Day!
 
Alan B-G


-
ALAN BURKITT-GRAY, Editor, = Government=20 Computing
The independent magazine about information = age=20 public service,
for the people who are going to make it=20 happen

NEXT ISSUE: March 1999, mailed out 25 = February

Published monthly by Kable Ltd
The Courtyard, 55=20 Charterhouse Street, London EC1M 6HA, UK
tel 0171 608 0900, fax 0171 = 608=20 0901
international tel +44 171 608 0900, fax +44 171 608 = 0901
website=20 http://www.kable.co.uk =
e-mail=20 alan@kable.co.uk
For advance features information = see http://www.governmentcomputing.com=20

Where's Kable? Look at
http://www.streetmap.co.uk/streetmap.dll?grid2map?X=3D531650&= ;Y=3D181750&arrow=3Dy

------=_NextPart_000_0031_01BE56A3.69583900-- From Denis.Russell at ncl.ac.uk Fri Feb 12 17:31:33 1999 From: Denis.Russell at ncl.ac.uk (Denis.Russell@ncl.ac.uk) Date: Fri, 12 Feb 1999 17:31:33 +0000 Subject: Asymmetric Key sizes In-Reply-To: <25983782061AD111B0800000F86310FE0EE690CF@RED-MSG-42> Message-ID: At 10:01 -0800 10/2/99, Paul Leyland wrote: >... >It has been possible to break 512 bit keys for several years.... >... As for 768-bit keys, they would appear to be resistant to any >reasonable attack with any reasonable amount of hardware. ... I didn't get a clear feeling for what the prudent target should be. Paul says (above) that 768-bit keys should be OK now against "reasonable" attack. Does this mean the worst realistic case that we can think of for the present, and into the "foreseeable" future - a few years? How much more prudent would 1024 bits be? What about putting things the other way round? What's the problem with everyone going for 2048 now and (presumably) putting things so far out of reach that attackers just give up? Denis. From whgiii at openpgp.net Sat Feb 13 14:36:21 1999 From: whgiii at openpgp.net (OpenPGP) Date: Sat, 13 Feb 1999 08:36:21 -0600 Subject: Labour Party goes pro-GAK - Surprise. Message-ID: <199902131336.IAA029.93@whgiii> ==================BEGIN FORWARDED MESSAGE================== From: nospam@synernet.com (Ed Stone) Newsgroups: alt.privacy,alt.security.pgp,comp.security.pgp.discuss,talk.politics.crypto Subject: Labour Party goes pro-GAK - Surprise. Message-ID: Organization: Synernet X-Newsreader: MicroPlanet Gravity v2.10 Lines: 25 Date: Sat, 13 Feb 1999 08:36:35 -0500 NNTP-Posting-Host: 166.82.194.182 X-Trace: ralph.vnet.net 918913378 166.82.194.182 (Sat, 13 Feb 1999 08:42:58 EDT) NNTP-Posting-Date: Sat, 13 Feb 1999 08:42:58 EDT Path: carrera.intergate.ca!news.vphos.net!newsfeed.direct.ca!news-peer1.sprintlink.net!news-in-east1.sprintlink.net!news.sprintlink.net!ralph.vnet.net!not-for-mail Xref: carrera.intergate.ca alt.privacy:11310 alt.security.pgp:40015 comp.security.pgp.discuss:14989 talk.politics.crypto:8891 "The Labour Party has agreed to allow police access to Internet encryption codes despite a pre-election pledge to protect privacy on the Net." see http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/sci/tech/newsid_52000/52117.stm Earlier discussions asked whether democrats or republicans in the US were more or less pro gak/recovery/escrow/wiretap. The Labour party in the UK had "promised" (to those who still give credibility to political promises) to protect privacy on the net. My observation is that gak/recovery/escrow/wiretap is not a dem/rep, conserv/lib, authoritarian/democracy issue rather it is a government persons/non-government persons issue. Crypto serves as a technical barrier or point of resistance to government intrusion, and as such, almost all who are in government will fear it and attack it. Agreements on curtailing non-government people's access to un-gak'ed crypto will likley bring together such bedfellows as China and the US, as they share an interest in removing barriers to their powers to intrude upon their respective non-government persons. GAK/recovery/escrow/wiretap will be demanded no less fervently by the government of the US, than the government of China. In the US, a few "technical obstacles" (the Constitution and Bill of Rights) must be hurdled. -- --------------------------------------------------------------- William H. Geiger III http://www.openpgp.net Geiger Consulting Cooking With Warp 4.0 Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail. OS/2 PGP 5.0 at: http://www.openpgp.net/pgp.html Talk About PGP on IRC EFNet Channel: #pgp Nick: whgiii --------------------------------------------------------------- From whgiii at openpgp.net Sat Feb 13 14:36:21 1999 From: whgiii at openpgp.net (OpenPGP) Date: Sat, 13 Feb 1999 08:36:21 -0600 Subject: Labour Party goes pro-GAK - Surprise. Message-ID: <199902131336.IAA029.93@whgiii> ==================BEGIN FORWARDED MESSAGE================== From: nospam@synernet.com (Ed Stone) Newsgroups: alt.privacy,alt.security.pgp,comp.security.pgp.discuss,talk.politics.crypto Subject: Labour Party goes pro-GAK - Surprise. Message-ID: Organization: Synernet X-Newsreader: MicroPlanet Gravity v2.10 Lines: 25 Date: Sat, 13 Feb 1999 08:36:35 -0500 NNTP-Posting-Host: 166.82.194.182 X-Trace: ralph.vnet.net 918913378 166.82.194.182 (Sat, 13 Feb 1999 08:42:58 EDT) NNTP-Posting-Date: Sat, 13 Feb 1999 08:42:58 EDT Path: carrera.intergate.ca!news.vphos.net!newsfeed.direct.ca!news-peer1.sprintlink.net!news-in-east1.sprintlink.net!news.sprintlink.net!ralph.vnet.net!not-for-mail Xref: carrera.intergate.ca alt.privacy:11310 alt.security.pgp:40015 comp.security.pgp.discuss:14989 talk.politics.crypto:8891 "The Labour Party has agreed to allow police access to Internet encryption codes despite a pre-election pledge to protect privacy on the Net." see http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/sci/tech/newsid_52000/52117.stm Earlier discussions asked whether democrats or republicans in the US were more or less pro gak/recovery/escrow/wiretap. The Labour party in the UK had "promised" (to those who still give credibility to political promises) to protect privacy on the net. My observation is that gak/recovery/escrow/wiretap is not a dem/rep, conserv/lib, authoritarian/democracy issue rather it is a government persons/non-government persons issue. Crypto serves as a technical barrier or point of resistance to government intrusion, and as such, almost all who are in government will fear it and attack it. Agreements on curtailing non-government people's access to un-gak'ed crypto will likley bring together such bedfellows as China and the US, as they share an interest in removing barriers to their powers to intrude upon their respective non-government persons. GAK/recovery/escrow/wiretap will be demanded no less fervently by the government of the US, than the government of China. In the US, a few "technical obstacles" (the Constitution and Bill of Rights) must be hurdled. -- --------------------------------------------------------------- William H. Geiger III http://www.openpgp.net Geiger Consulting Cooking With Warp 4.0 Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail. OS/2 PGP 5.0 at: http://www.openpgp.net/pgp.html Talk About PGP on IRC EFNet Channel: #pgp Nick: whgiii --------------------------------------------------------------- From cb at fipr.org Sat Feb 13 16:33:33 1999 From: cb at fipr.org (Caspar Bowden) Date: Sat, 13 Feb 1999 16:33:33 -0000 Subject: Labour Party goes pro-GAK - Surprise. In-Reply-To: <199902131336.IAA029.93@whgiii> Message-ID: <000101be576e$999bdba0$d200a8c0@cpsb> >[mailto:owner-ukcrypto@maillist.ox.ac.uk]On Behalf Of OpenPGP >Sent: 13 February 1999 14:36 >"The Labour Party has agreed to allow police access to >Internet encryption codes despite a pre-election pledge >to protect privacy on the Net." >see http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/sci/tech/newsid_52000/52117.stm This story is 30th Jan 1998 (Ninety-Eight). -- Caspar Bowden http://www.fipr.org Director, Foundation for Information Policy Research Tel: +44(0)171 354 2333 Fax: +44(0)171 827 6534 From goodyer at well.ox.ac.uk Sat Feb 13 17:16:55 1999 From: goodyer at well.ox.ac.uk (Ian Goodyer) Date: Sat, 13 Feb 1999 17:16:55 +0000 (BST) Subject: New welcome message Message-ID: Due to popular command, I have just updated the welcome/info message for the ukcrypto list to include instructions on how to subscribe/unsubscribe from the list and details of the web archive that is generously maintained by Ian Brown. As some of you have been subscribed for ages I thought I would include a copy of the welcome message. Sorry to trouble you all. ian ukcrypto owner ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ UK Cryptography Policy Discussion Group The group, supported by a mailing list, is comprised of people with a professional interest in the formulation and content of UK government policy on the provision, use and control of encryption products and services in the UK. It was been formed in response to the 1996 announcement of UK policy on the provision of encryption services on telecommunications networks. The aim of the forum is to exchange information and co-ordinate actions in order to achieve a UK government policy which: 1. preserves existing freedoms within the UK in respect of the design, development, provision and use of encryption products and services 2. is workable in practice given other constraints and factors which are beyond the control or influence of the UK government 3. meets the common interests of people in the UK in combating crime and terrorism 4. is set out with clarity and precision to meet clearly stated objectives which are demonstrably achievable in both political and technical terms 5. consistent with the above, minimises the extension of domestic and export controls on encryption products and services and removes existing controls which are unachievable, clarifying the scope of those that remain and the processes that will be used to implement them Everyone with an interest in the subject of UK cryptographic policy and deployment is welcome to join the list; it is *not* restricted to the British or those resident in the UK. The mailing list is unmoderated, but only subscribed members can post. The reply address is set to the list, in the interest of maintaining a freely flowing debate, so please be careful that you do not inadvertently post inappropriate responses. Your friends can subscribe to the list by sending a message to majordomo@maillist.ox.ac.uk with 'subscribe ukcrypto' in the body of the message. If you ever wish to unsubscribe send a message from the subscribed address to majordomo@maillist.ox.ac.uk with 'unsubscribe ukcrypto' in the body of the message. An archive of previous posts is kindly maintained by Ian Brown and can be found at http://www.cs.ucl.ac.uk/staff/I.Brown/archives/ukcrypto Please try and restrict postings to UK Encryption law and try not to stray onto general cryptology topics. The following topics for instance are not appropriate: i) Can PGP be cracked ii) What is the best PGP plugin for Eudora iii) What is the best way to encrypt a disk under Windows NT If you have doubts about the relevance of any material you propose to mail to the list, please contact owner-ukcrypto@maillist.ox.ac.uk for guidance. The language of the list is English, though American and other variants of English are acceptable 8-) Paul Leyland. 1997 October 20. Updated by Ian D. Goodyer 1999 February 12 (goodyer@well.ox.ac.uk) From goodyer at well.ox.ac.uk Sat Feb 13 17:16:55 1999 From: goodyer at well.ox.ac.uk (Ian Goodyer) Date: Sat, 13 Feb 1999 17:16:55 +0000 (BST) Subject: New welcome message Message-ID: Due to popular command, I have just updated the welcome/info message for the ukcrypto list to include instructions on how to subscribe/unsubscribe from the list and details of the web archive that is generously maintained by Ian Brown. As some of you have been subscribed for ages I thought I would include a copy of the welcome message. Sorry to trouble you all. ian ukcrypto owner ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ UK Cryptography Policy Discussion Group The group, supported by a mailing list, is comprised of people with a professional interest in the formulation and content of UK government policy on the provision, use and control of encryption products and services in the UK. It was been formed in response to the 1996 announcement of UK policy on the provision of encryption services on telecommunications networks. The aim of the forum is to exchange information and co-ordinate actions in order to achieve a UK government policy which: 1. preserves existing freedoms within the UK in respect of the design, development, provision and use of encryption products and services 2. is workable in practice given other constraints and factors which are beyond the control or influence of the UK government 3. meets the common interests of people in the UK in combating crime and terrorism 4. is set out with clarity and precision to meet clearly stated objectives which are demonstrably achievable in both political and technical terms 5. consistent with the above, minimises the extension of domestic and export controls on encryption products and services and removes existing controls which are unachievable, clarifying the scope of those that remain and the processes that will be used to implement them Everyone with an interest in the subject of UK cryptographic policy and deployment is welcome to join the list; it is *not* restricted to the British or those resident in the UK. The mailing list is unmoderated, but only subscribed members can post. The reply address is set to the list, in the interest of maintaining a freely flowing debate, so please be careful that you do not inadvertently post inappropriate responses. Your friends can subscribe to the list by sending a message to majordomo@maillist.ox.ac.uk with 'subscribe ukcrypto' in the body of the message. If you ever wish to unsubscribe send a message from the subscribed address to majordomo@maillist.ox.ac.uk with 'unsubscribe ukcrypto' in the body of the message. An archive of previous posts is kindly maintained by Ian Brown and can be found at http://www.cs.ucl.ac.uk/staff/I.Brown/archives/ukcrypto Please try and restrict postings to UK Encryption law and try not to stray onto general cryptology topics. The following topics for instance are not appropriate: i) Can PGP be cracked ii) What is the best PGP plugin for Eudora iii) What is the best way to encrypt a disk under Windows NT If you have doubts about the relevance of any material you propose to mail to the list, please contact owner-ukcrypto@maillist.ox.ac.uk for guidance. The language of the list is English, though American and other variants of English are acceptable 8-) Paul Leyland. 1997 October 20. Updated by Ian D. Goodyer 1999 February 12 (goodyer@well.ox.ac.uk) From lists at notatla.demon.co.uk Sat Feb 13 22:39:34 1999 From: lists at notatla.demon.co.uk (lists@notatla.demon.co.uk) Date: Sat, 13 Feb 1999 22:39:34 GMT Subject: Asymmetric Key sizes Message-ID: <199902132239.WAA01070@notatla.demon.co.uk> Denis.Russell@ncl.ac.uk: > I didn't get a clear feeling for what the prudent target should be. Paul > says (above) that 768-bit keys should be OK now against "reasonable" > attack. Does this mean the worst realistic case that we can think of for > the present, and into the "foreseeable" future - a few years? How much more > prudent would 1024 bits be? What about putting things the other way round? > What's the problem with everyone going for 2048 now and (presumably) > putting things so far out of reach that attackers just give up? See www.usenix.org/events/sec99 which I think is where I found the following as part of a larger article "Factoring: Facts and Fables". To argue his point, Lenstra extrapolated current factoring capabilities. In 1994, a QS factored an RSA-129 modulus. This required 5,000 MIPS years for stage 1 (sieving) and two days on a 16K MasPar for stage 2 (matrix). Then in 1996, an NFS factored a 130-digit number in less than 700 MIPS years for stage 1 (68 hours and 700MB). However, stage 2 required much more computation time, even on a Cray C-90. Extrapolating these figures, Lenstra believes factoring a 512-bit number with a QS would require 500,000 MIPS years for sieving and four days (and 1GB of space) on a Cray C-90 for the matrix. Substituting NFS, sieving would take 20,000 MIPS years, and matrix computations would take three months (and 4GB of space). Therefore, 512-bit moduli are not long enough for current technology. But factoring 1,024-bit moduli seems hopeless. Just to sieve, the QS would require 1015 MIPS years, and the NFS would take 1011 MIPS years. Lenstra concludes that 512-bit QS factorization is feasible, 512-bit NFS factorization is hardly feasible, and 1,024-bit factorization is hopeless. Which brings me to the following code announcements: pgp553i (Windoze 95/98/NT) is on my website and FBN_funcs.c should join it around midnight GMT. /* * Fixed Big Number library * http://www.notatla.demon.co.uk/CRYPTO/FBN_funcs.c * * This is integer arithmetic code for up to 1024 bits * (with intermediate results up to 2048 bits). * This is what I mean by 'Fixed Big Number' - not arbitrary sizes. * It has been tested against 'bc' for some calculations of each * type, but not right up to the size limits. This code is simple * and not especially fast. * * FBN_powmod() is effectively RSA. This code contains no * primality testing which you would need to generate RSA keys. * * Parts of this code are derived from the book "Applied Cryptography" * 2nd ed by Bruce Schneier. * * Distribution and use is free; no GPL, Berkeley or other licences * apply. The RSA patent in the U.S is due to expire September 2000. * More details at http://cwis.kub.nl/~frw/people/koops/lawsurvy.htm. * * Enail any bug reports to me please. * Antonomasia 13Feb1999 */ From pleyland at microsoft.com Sun Feb 14 18:47:02 1999 From: pleyland at microsoft.com (Paul Leyland) Date: Sun, 14 Feb 1999 10:47:02 -0800 Subject: Asymmetric Key sizes Message-ID: <25983782061AD111B0800000F86310FE0EE690EC@RED-MSG-42> >>... >>It has been possible to break 512 bit keys for several years.... >>... As for 768-bit keys, they would appear to be resistant to any >reasonable attack with any reasonable amount of hardware. >... > > I didn't get a clear feeling for what the prudent target should be. Paul > says (above) that 768-bit keys should be OK now against "reasonable" > attack. Does this mean the worst realistic case that we can think of for > the present, and into the "foreseeable" future - a few years? How much > more prudent would 1024 bits be? What about putting things the other way > round? What's the problem with everyone going for 2048 now and > (presumably) putting things so far out of reach that attackers > just give up? The image I like to propagate is that breaking a 512-bit key today would take an effort commeasurate with the RSA-129 project. Breaking a 768-bit key would take an investment comparable to the Apollo project. The former is feasible but not trivial; the latter is possible but not feasible. If forced to guess, I'd say that a 512-bit factorization will be demonstrated this year or next, but a 768-bit factorization won't happen in the next decade. I'm pretty sure of the first prediction, but somewhat doubtful about the second. If I am seriously wrong, I'm in very good company --- even I won't stick my neck out as far as predicting 40 quadrillion years! Unless something wonderful happens, a 1024-bit factorization won't be seen for several decades. "And the number of the bits shall be 1024. 512 shallt thou not use, neither shallt thou use 768, excepting that thou shallt go on to 1024. 2048 is right out!" Or something like that. Paul From octobersdad at reporters.net Mon Feb 15 08:44:34 1999 From: octobersdad at reporters.net (T Bruce Tober) Date: Mon, 15 Feb 1999 08:44:34 +0000 Subject: Labour Party goes pro-GAK - Surprise. In-Reply-To: <199902131336.IAA029.93@whgiii> References: <199902131336.IAA029.93@whgiii> Message-ID: In message <199902131336.IAA029.93@whgiii>, OpenPGP writes > > >My observation is that gak/recovery/escrow/wiretap is not a dem/rep, >conserv/lib, authoritarian/democracy issue rather it is a government >persons/non-government persons issue. Crypto serves as a technical >barrier or point of resistance to government intrusion, and as such, >almost all who are in government will fear it and attack it. Agreements >on curtailing non-government people's access to un-gak'ed crypto will >likley bring together such bedfellows as China and the US, as they share >an interest in removing barriers to their powers to intrude upon their >respective non-government persons. I think you're absolutely correct. Similarly the Net is a govt/non-govt issue. Govt is about power and when we the people have the ability to freely publish all our thoughts to the entire world that increases our power and decreases the power of govt. Likewise when we can communicate privately that increases our power and decreases that of govt. tbt -- | Bruce Tober, , | | Birmingham, UK, EU +44-121-242-3832 (mobile - 07979-521-106). Freelance | |Journalist & Website consultancy and development. PGP details at my website| From usura at attic.replay.com Tue Feb 16 14:53:39 1999 From: usura at attic.replay.com (Alex de Joode) Date: Tue, 16 Feb 1999 15:53:39 +0100 (CET) Subject: STATION X: Enigma varitions Message-ID: <199902161453.PAA18238@attic.replay.com> http://www.ft.com/hippocampus/q1279d6.htm A new book about Bletchy Park. Alex -- Exit! Stage Left! From Alan Burkitt-Gray" This is a multi-part message in MIME format. ------=_NextPart_000_0155_01BE59C8.A91046A0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable -----Original Message----- From: Alex de Joode To: ukcrypto@maillist.ox.ac.uk Date: 16 February 1999 15:49 Subject: STATION X: Enigma varitions =20 =20 http://www.ft.com/hippocampus/q1279d6.htm =20 A new book about Bletchy Park. =20 Alex -- Exit! Stage Left! But it told me "Access is denied". Alan B-G - ALAN BURKITT-GRAY, Editor, Government Computing The independent magazine about information age public service, for the people who are going to make it happen NEXT ISSUE: March 1999, mailed out 25 February Published monthly by Kable Ltd The Courtyard, 55 Charterhouse Street, London EC1M 6HA, UK tel 0171 608 0900, fax 0171 608 0901 international tel +44 171 608 0900, fax +44 171 608 0901 website http://www.kable.co.uk=20 e-mail alan@kable.co.uk For advance features information see http://www.governmentcomputing.com=20 Where's Kable? Look at=20 http://www.streetmap.co.uk/streetmap.dll?grid2map?X=3D531650&Y=3D181750&a= rrow=3Dy ------=_NextPart_000_0155_01BE59C8.A91046A0 Content-Type: text/html; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
-----Original = Message-----
From:=20 Alex de Joode <usura@attic.replay.com>
= To:=20 ukcrypto@maillist.ox.ac.uk= =20 <ukcrypto@maillist.ox.ac.uk= >
Date:=20 16 February 1999 15:49
Subject: STATION X: Enigma=20 varitions

http://www.ft.com/hipp= ocampus/q1279d6.htm

A=20 new book about Bletchy Park.

Alex
--
Exit! Stage=20 Left!

But it told me "Access is denied".

Alan B-G

 


-
ALAN BURKITT-GRAY, Editor, = Government=20 Computing
The independent magazine about information = age=20 public service,
for the people who are going to make it=20 happen

NEXT ISSUE: March 1999, mailed out 25 = February

Published monthly by Kable Ltd
The Courtyard, 55=20 Charterhouse Street, London EC1M 6HA, UK
tel 0171 608 0900, fax 0171 = 608=20 0901
international tel +44 171 608 0900, fax +44 171 608 = 0901
website=20 http://www.kable.co.uk =
e-mail=20 alan@kable.co.uk
For advance features information = see http://www.governmentcomputing.com=20

Where's Kable? Look at
http://www.streetmap.co.uk/streetmap.dll?grid2map?X=3D531650&= ;Y=3D181750&arrow=3Dy

 
------=_NextPart_000_0155_01BE59C8.A91046A0-- From markc at chiark.greenend.org.uk Wed Feb 17 12:16:20 1999 From: markc at chiark.greenend.org.uk (Mark Carroll) Date: Wed, 17 Feb 1999 12:16:20 +0000 (GMT) Subject: Wassenaar question Message-ID: Today I received mail from the DTI saying that the fourth Wassenaar Arrangement Plenary agreement imposes no new restrictions on the export of cryptography technology. This is somewhat at variance with what I remember; could someone set one of us right? Maybe I'm confusing rumour with fact. Ta. (-: I'll go look again and see what's posted at the Wassenaar site... -- Mark From nbohm at ernest.net Wed Feb 17 12:44:11 1999 From: nbohm at ernest.net (Nicholas Bohm) Date: Wed, 17 Feb 1999 12:44:11 +0000 Subject: Wassenaar question In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <3.0.5.32.19990217124411.00a7a760@mail.netkonect.co.uk> At 12:16 PM 2/17/1999 +0000, Mark Carroll wrote: >Today I received mail from the DTI saying that the fourth Wassenaar >Arrangement Plenary agreement imposes no new restrictions on the export of >cryptography technology. > >This is somewhat at variance with what I remember; could someone set one >of us right? Maybe I'm confusing rumour with fact. > >Ta. (-: I'll go look again and see what's posted at the Wassenaar site... The following, obtained from the Wassenaar site, appears to be the basis on which the EU member states propose to introduce new legislation restricting the export of technology (including cryptographic technology) in intangible form: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> STATEMENTS OF UNDERSTANDING AND VALIDITY NOTES General Technology Note (WG2 GTN TWG/WP1 Revised 2) It is understood that Member Governments are expected to exercise controls on intangible "technology" as far as the scope of their legislation will allow. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> No doubt the DTI would say that this was not really part of the Plenary Agreement! Regards, Nicholas Bohm Salkyns, Great Canfield, Takeley, Bishop's Stortford CM22 6SX, UK Phone 01279 871272 (+44 1279 871272) Fax 01279 870215 (+44 1279 870215) Mobile 0860 636749 (+44 860 636749) PGP RSA 1024 bit public key ID: 0x08340015. Fingerprint: 9E 15 FB 2A 54 96 24 37 98 A2 E0 D1 34 13 48 07 PGP DSS/DH 1024/3072 public key ID: 0x899DD7FF. Fingerprint: 5248 1320 B42E 84FC 1E8B A9E6 0912 AE66 899D D7FF From C.R.Snow at ncl.ac.uk Wed Feb 17 15:33:47 1999 From: C.R.Snow at ncl.ac.uk (Richard Snow) Date: Wed, 17 Feb 1999 15:33:47 +0000 Subject: There's nothing new under the sun! Message-ID: During a routine web browsing session, I came across the following at http://www.deter.com/unix/papers/treatise_locks.html : "Rudimentary Treatise on the Construction of Locks, 1853 (excerpt) -- Charles Tomlinson A commercial, and in some respects a social, doubt has been started within the last year or two, whether or not it is right to discuss so openly the security or insecurity of locks. Many well-meaning persons suppose that the discussion respecting the means for baffling the supposed safety of locks offers a premium for dishonesty, by showing others how to be dishonest. This is a fallacy. Rogues are very keen in their profession, and already know much more than we can teach them respecting their several kinds of roguery. Rogues knew a good deal about lockpicking long before locksmiths discussed it among themselves, as they have lately done. If a lock -- let it have been made in whatever country, or by whatever maker -- is not so inviolable as it has hitherto been deemed to be, surely it is in the interest of honest persons to know this fact, because the dishonest are tolerably certain to be the first to apply the knowledge practically; and the spread of knowledge is necessary to give fair play to those who might suffer by ignorance. It cannot be too earnestly urged, that an acquintance with real facts will, in the end, be better for all parties. Some time ago, when the reading public was alarmed at being told how London milk is adulterated, timid persons deprecated the exposure, on the plea that it would give instructions in the art of adulterating milk; a vain fear -- milkmen knew all about it before, whether they practiced it or not; and the exposure only taught purchasers the necessity of a little scrutiny and caution, leaving them to obey this necessity or not, as they pleased. ...The unscrupulous have the command of much of this kind of knowledge without our aid; and there is moral and commercial justice in placing on their guard those who might possibly suffer therefrom. We employ these stray expressions concerning adulteration, debasement, roguery, and so forth, simply as a mode of illustrating a principle -- the advantage of publicity. In respect to lock-making, there can scarcely be such a thing as dishonesty of intention: the inventor produces a lock which he honestly thinks will posess such and such qualities; and he declares his belief to the world. If others differ from him in opinion concerning those qualities, it is open to them to say so; and the discussion, truthfully conducted, must lead to public advantage: the discussion stimulates curiosity, and curiosity stimulates invention. Nothing but a partial and limited view of the question could lead to the opinion that harm can result: if there be harm, it will be much more than counterbalanced by good." One can imagine all sorts of interesting ways to bring this piece into the modern context, but I particular enjoyed the thought of GCHQ/NSA being "rogues" and "the unscrupulous". By the way, if anyone can point me at the original source of this (it appeared on the Web exactly as it is reproduced here, with no further references), I would be very grateful. ... Dick. Dr C.R.Snow Department of Computing Science University of Newcastle Newcastle upon Tyne, NE1 7RU United Kingdom. E-mail: C.R.Snow@newcastle.ac.uk Phone: +44 191 222 8064 Fax: +44 191 222 8232 WWW: http://www.cs.ncl.ac.uk/people/c.r.snow/ See home page (or public key server) for PGP public keys. PGP Key (RSA, length 1024). PGP Key ID: 864A1C95 PGP Key Fingerprint: A5E9 5684 A1F9 D08A 097C 7D31 91EC DE13 PGP Key (DSS/Diffie-Hellman, length 1024/2048). PGP Key ID: 5F6DF708 PGP Key Fingerprint: 5B9F B1CF 5C44 8467 AC3A CC81 3EA8 7458 5F6D F708 From ben at algroup.co.uk Wed Feb 17 17:44:56 1999 From: ben at algroup.co.uk (Ben Laurie) Date: Wed, 17 Feb 1999 17:44:56 +0000 Subject: There's nothing new under the sun! References: Message-ID: <36CB0018.4A7EDFA2@algroup.co.uk> Richard Snow wrote: > > During a routine web browsing session, I came across the following at "I was proceeding in a westerly direction on the Information Superhighway when..." :-) > http://www.deter.com/unix/papers/treatise_locks.html : > > "Rudimentary Treatise on the Construction of Locks, 1853 (excerpt) > > -- Charles Tomlinson [snip] > By the way, if anyone can point me at the original source of this (it > appeared on the Web exactly as it is reproduced here, with no further > references), I would be very grateful. That is also quoted in Cheswick & Bellovin, p. 144. No further references, but you could try asking them... Cheers, Ben. -- http://www.apache-ssl.org/ben.html "My grandfather once told me that there are two kinds of people: those who work and those who take the credit. He told me to try to be in the first group; there was less competition there." - Indira Gandhi From Alan Burkitt-Gray" This is a multi-part message in MIME format. ------=_NextPart_000_00BA_01BE5AAA.F02BE020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable -----Original Message----- >=20 > "Rudimentary Treatise on the Construction of Locks, 1853 (excerpt) >=20 > -- Charles Tomlinson [snip] > By the way, if anyone can point me at the original source of this (it > appeared on the Web exactly as it is reproduced here, with no further > references), I would be very grateful. Try the Library of Congress: www.loc.gov and in a minute or two you will = find: =20 CALL NUMBER: TS521 .H63 1982=20 =20 AUTHOR: Hobbs, A. C.=20 =20 TITLE: The construction of locks / compiled from the papers = of A.C. Hobbs, of New York ; and edited by Charles Tomlinson ; to which = is added a description of J. Beverly Fenby's patent locks, and a note = upon iron safes by Robert Mallet. =20 PUBLISHED: West Orange, N.J. : A. Saifer, [1982?]=20 =20 DESCRIPTION: vi, 212 p. : ill. ; 21 cm. =20 SUBJECT: Locks and keys.=20 =20 OTHER NAME: Tomlinson, Charles, 1808-1897.=20 =20 OTHER NAME: Fenby, J. Beverly.=20 =20 OTHER NAME: Mallet, Robert, 1810-1881.=20 =20 OTHER TITLE: Locks and safes.=20 =20 OTHER TITLE: Construction of locks & safes.=20 =20 OTHER TITLE: Construction of locks and safes.=20 =20 NOTE: At head of title: Locks and safes. Title on spine: = Construiction of locks & safes. Reprint. Originally published: London : = Virtue and Co., 1868. Includes index. =20 LCCN NUMBER: 82-203685 =20 =20 Clever stuff, the Internet! Alan B-G - ALAN BURKITT-GRAY, Editor, Government Computing The independent magazine about information age public service, for the people who are going to make it happen NEXT ISSUE: March 1999, mailed out 25 February Published monthly by Kable Ltd The Courtyard, 55 Charterhouse Street, London EC1M 6HA, UK tel 0171 608 0900, fax 0171 608 0901 international tel +44 171 608 0900, fax +44 171 608 0901 website http://www.kable.co.uk=20 e-mail alan@kable.co.uk For advance features information see http://www.governmentcomputing.com=20 Where's Kable? Look at=20 http://www.streetmap.co.uk/streetmap.dll?grid2map?X=3D531650&Y=3D181750&a= rrow=3Dy ------=_NextPart_000_00BA_01BE5AAA.F02BE020 Content-Type: text/html; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
-----Original = Message-----
>=20
> "Rudimentary Treatise on the Construction of Locks, 1853=20 (excerpt)
>
> -- Charles Tomlinson
[snip]
> By the = way, if=20 anyone can point me at the original source of this (it
> appeared = on the=20 Web exactly as it is reproduced here, with no further
> = references), I=20 would be very grateful.


Try the Library of Congress: www.loc.gov and in a minute or two you = will=20 find:
 
 
 
CALL NUMBER:
TS521 .H63 1982
AUTHOR:=20 Hobbs, A. C.
TITLE:=20 The construction of locks / compiled from the = papers=20 of A.C. Hobbs, of New York ; and edited by Charles Tomlinson = ; to=20 which is added a description of J. Beverly Fenby's patent = locks, and=20 a note upon iron safes by Robert Mallet.
PUBLISHED:=20 West Orange, N.J. : A. Saifer, [1982?]
DESCRIPTION:=20 vi, 212 p. : ill. ; 21 cm.=20
SUBJECT:=20 Locks=20 and keys.
OTHER NAME:=20 Tomlinson, Charles, 1808-1897.
OTHER NAME:=20 Fenby, J. Beverly.
OTHER NAME:=20 Mallet, Robert, 1810-1881.
OTHER TITLE:=20 Locks and safes.
OTHER TITLE:=20 Construction of locks & safes.
OTHER TITLE:=20 Construction of locks and safes.
NOTE:=20 At head of title: Locks and safes. Title on = spine:=20 Construiction of locks & safes. Reprint. Originally = published:=20 London : Virtue and Co., 1868. Includes index.
LCCN NUMBER:=20 82-203685

 

Clever stuff, the Internet!

Alan B-G


-
ALAN BURKITT-GRAY, Editor, = Government=20 Computing
The independent magazine about information = age=20 public service,
for the people who are going to make it=20 happen

NEXT ISSUE: March 1999, mailed out 25 = February

Published monthly by Kable Ltd
The Courtyard, 55=20 Charterhouse Street, London EC1M 6HA, UK
tel 0171 608 0900, fax 0171 = 608=20 0901
international tel +44 171 608 0900, fax +44 171 608 = 0901
website=20 http://www.kable.co.uk =
e-mail=20 alan@kable.co.uk
For advance features information = see http://www.governmentcomputing.com=20

Where's Kable? Look at
http://www.streetmap.co.uk/streetmap.dll?grid2map?X=3D531650&= ;Y=3D181750&arrow=3Dy

  ------=_NextPart_000_00BA_01BE5AAA.F02BE020-- From jon at oaktree.co.uk Fri Feb 19 13:58:19 1999 From: jon at oaktree.co.uk (Jon Ribbens) Date: Fri, 19 Feb 1999 13:58:19 +0000 Subject: There's nothing new under the sun! In-Reply-To: <00c101be5aab$10becdc0$1700000a@alan>; from Alan Burkitt-Gray on Wed, Feb 17, 1999 at 07:23:03PM -0000 References: <00c101be5aab$10becdc0$1700000a@alan> Message-ID: <19990219135819.A27487@oaktree.co.uk> Alan Burkitt-Gray wrote: > OTHER NAME: Mallet, Robert, 1810-1881. Aha! We have finally unmasked the mysterious and malicious "Mallet" who is always trying to break into our security protocols! It seems from the above that he is dead now, I suggest therefore that cryptography is no longer required (since the enemy has gone away), and we should send everything in clear henceforth. Cheers Jon -- \/ Jon Ribbens / jon@oaktree.co.uk From proff at iq.org Fri Feb 19 14:25:55 1999 From: proff at iq.org (Julian Assange) Date: 20 Feb 1999 01:25:55 +1100 Subject: Mallet, Robert, 1810-1881. In-Reply-To: Jon Ribbens's message of "Fri, 19 Feb 1999 13:58:19 +0000" References: <00c101be5aab$10becdc0$1700000a@alan> <19990219135819.A27487@oaktree.co.uk> Message-ID: Jon Ribbens writes: > Alan Burkitt-Gray wrote: > > OTHER NAME: Mallet, Robert, 1810-1881. > > Aha! We have finally unmasked the mysterious and malicious "Mallet" who > is always trying to break into our security protocols! > > It seems from the above that he is dead now, I suggest therefore that > cryptography is no longer required (since the enemy has gone away), and > we should send everything in clear henceforth. Heh, heh, heh. I henceforth name this the `Ribbens Mallet Lemma'. -- Julian Assange http://iq.org/~proff An essentially private man who wished his total indifference to public notice to be universally recognized. - Tom Stoppbard on James Joyce From nobody at nowhere.com Fri Feb 19 17:36:47 1999 From: nobody at nowhere.com (nobody@nowhere.com) Date: Fri, 19 Feb 1999 19:36:47 +0200 (EET) Subject: Defense Secretary Defends Microsoft Message-ID: And here we have Cohen thanking Microsoft for installing backdoors in the form of convenient bugs into Windows... This is really much bigger than that old Crypto-AG story. Economic espionage dream-tool. http://www.techweb.com/wire/story/msftdoj/TWB19990219S0003 Defense Secretary Defends Microsoft (02/19/99, 10:54 a.m. ET) By Stuart Glascock, Computer Reseller News Microsoft is under heavy fire from the U.S. Department of Justice, but the top gun at the U.S. Department of Defense backs the software giant. During a brief visit Thursday to the Redmond, Wash., headquarters of Microsoft, Secretary of Defense William Cohen praised the company's products and innovations, then trained his sites on other high-tech companies. "There is a sense that in many places beyond this campus -- from Sunnyvale to Silicon Valley to Silicon Alley -- that some in the digital world dismiss the importance of the national security world," Cohen told about 200 Microsoft employees and U.S. Army IT managers who were meeting with Microsoft. "That some soldiers in the high-tech revolution do not fully understand or appreciate the soldiers in camouflage," Cohen continued. "That tanks and guns are somehow rusty relics of the past, nearly obsolete in the new information-based world that will carry us into the future." Cohen, sharing the podium with Microsoft chairman Bill Gates and chief operating officer Bob Herbold, devoted most of his talk to the value of partnerships with companies such as Microsoft. However, Cohen also launched a broad salvo at an unnamed Silicon Valley executive, recently quoted in the New York Times as saying, "Money is extracted from Silicon Valley and then wasted by Washington." Cohen said he could see how people could view the world in that fashion, adding, "The intellectual property and virtual assets of Yahoo are more highly valued by Wall Street than the oil reserves and supertankers of Texaco. It can be easy to forget this global marketplace was neither created by magic nor will it be kept by marketing." Before speaking, Cohen met privately with Gates and discussed how the government can work with private-sector companies to secure the "critical information infrastructure" that manage power grids, telecommunications, and highway, aviation, and other transportation systems. They also discussed Microsoft's Skills 2000 program, which provides a number of training and educational opportunities in technology. Cohen never directly spoke about the long-running U.S. government antitrust trial against Microsoft, but he clearly praised the company's contributions to the "economic dynamism of the American information technology economy." "I am here today because I believe Microsoft does understand the crucial connection between our national security and our national prosperity," he said. The Defense Secretary's trip to Seattle, which included a tour of an assembly line at airplane manufacturing giant Boeing Co., was billed as part of a campaign to spread the message that public and private sector cooperation are essential. He warned about the vulnerabilities of the country's national infrastructure, from terrorist bombs to cyberterrorists to biological warfare, and asked for the computer industries' help in solving the problem. Gates, agreed the potential for disruption of large-scale networks was an "unsolved problem." He called the meeting an opportunity to thank one of "our biggest customers in the world," and suggested government and industry should work closer. "Over the years, we've had a very strong partnership with the Department of Defense," Gates said. "DOD has all the challenges and opportunities of a very large enterprise. Coordinating those activities is an opportunity that pushes our software to the limit." Following the talk, Gates and Cohen took no questions and exited the stage under heavy security. From dave at xemu.demon.co.uk Fri Feb 19 01:07:18 1999 From: dave at xemu.demon.co.uk (Dave Bird) Date: Fri, 19 Feb 1999 01:07:18 +0000 Subject: encrypted login/data on webpages. Message-ID: Dear people, Can anyone give me brief advice and pointers where to look for detail on the following area. First, is it possible on a web-server to set up a private encrypted web-page. What I mean is that it would require having one (or one of several) signing keys to be allowed to log-in at all. Then it maybe has data locally encrypted in its key, and sends it down the channel in some session key to you, to read. And similarly to write/FTP into the place for those with write-permission. Now, second, if such things exist with crappy weak encryption, can one get Netscape/MSIE plug-ins to upgrade to strong encryption. This has obvious application for almost any group that want to share work-space maybe in a third country, but are subject to interception or disruption if every hostile group can log-in and read it too. Regards, DAVE. -- ^-^-^-@@-^-;-^ http://www.xemu.demon.co.uk/ (..)__u news:alt.smoking.mooses happy as a clam at high tide -. <_" .-._.-. From billp at nmol.com Fri Feb 19 19:49:34 1999 From: billp at nmol.com (bill payne) Date: Fri, 19 Feb 1999 12:49:34 -0700 Subject: NSA lawsuit and improper garnishment of Morales' wages Message-ID: <36CDC04E.3667@nmol.com> Sandia labs acting on a document filed in January to garnish his wages for doing discovery according properly which, in fact, was not served until February should have EVERYONE concerned. Sandia labs is responsible for fuzing the US's nuclear weapons. One might hope for competence and respondibility at such a corporation. But this is not the case as evidenced by the documents at http://nmol.com/users/billp/INDEX.HTM Let's all hope for PEACEFUL settlement of this unfortunate matter. http://nmol.com/users/billp/forth.HTM From nobody at nowhere.com Fri Feb 19 17:36:47 1999 From: nobody at nowhere.com (nobody@nowhere.com) Date: Fri, 19 Feb 1999 19:36:47 +0200 (EET) Subject: Defense Secretary Defends Microsoft Message-ID: And here we have Cohen thanking Microsoft for installing backdoors in the form of convenient bugs into Windows... This is really much bigger than that old Crypto-AG story. Economic espionage dream-tool. http://www.techweb.com/wire/story/msftdoj/TWB19990219S0003 Defense Secretary Defends Microsoft (02/19/99, 10:54 a.m. ET) By Stuart Glascock, Computer Reseller News Microsoft is under heavy fire from the U.S. Department of Justice, but the top gun at the U.S. Department of Defense backs the software giant. During a brief visit Thursday to the Redmond, Wash., headquarters of Microsoft, Secretary of Defense William Cohen praised the company's products and innovations, then trained his sites on other high-tech companies. "There is a sense that in many places beyond this campus -- from Sunnyvale to Silicon Valley to Silicon Alley -- that some in the digital world dismiss the importance of the national security world," Cohen told about 200 Microsoft employees and U.S. Army IT managers who were meeting with Microsoft. "That some soldiers in the high-tech revolution do not fully understand or appreciate the soldiers in camouflage," Cohen continued. "That tanks and guns are somehow rusty relics of the past, nearly obsolete in the new information-based world that will carry us into the future." Cohen, sharing the podium with Microsoft chairman Bill Gates and chief operating officer Bob Herbold, devoted most of his talk to the value of partnerships with companies such as Microsoft. However, Cohen also launched a broad salvo at an unnamed Silicon Valley executive, recently quoted in the New York Times as saying, "Money is extracted from Silicon Valley and then wasted by Washington." Cohen said he could see how people could view the world in that fashion, adding, "The intellectual property and virtual assets of Yahoo are more highly valued by Wall Street than the oil reserves and supertankers of Texaco. It can be easy to forget this global marketplace was neither created by magic nor will it be kept by marketing." Before speaking, Cohen met privately with Gates and discussed how the government can work with private-sector companies to secure the "critical information infrastructure" that manage power grids, telecommunications, and highway, aviation, and other transportation systems. They also discussed Microsoft's Skills 2000 program, which provides a number of training and educational opportunities in technology. Cohen never directly spoke about the long-running U.S. government antitrust trial against Microsoft, but he clearly praised the company's contributions to the "economic dynamism of the American information technology economy." "I am here today because I believe Microsoft does understand the crucial connection between our national security and our national prosperity," he said. The Defense Secretary's trip to Seattle, which included a tour of an assembly line at airplane manufacturing giant Boeing Co., was billed as part of a campaign to spread the message that public and private sector cooperation are essential. He warned about the vulnerabilities of the country's national infrastructure, from terrorist bombs to cyberterrorists to biological warfare, and asked for the computer industries' help in solving the problem. Gates, agreed the potential for disruption of large-scale networks was an "unsolved problem." He called the meeting an opportunity to thank one of "our biggest customers in the world," and suggested government and industry should work closer. "Over the years, we've had a very strong partnership with the Department of Defense," Gates said. "DOD has all the challenges and opportunities of a very large enterprise. Coordinating those activities is an opportunity that pushes our software to the limit." Following the talk, Gates and Cohen took no questions and exited the stage under heavy security. From paul at hedonism.demon.co.uk Fri Feb 19 19:32:51 1999 From: paul at hedonism.demon.co.uk (Paul Crowley) Date: 19 Feb 1999 19:32:51 +0000 Subject: There's nothing new under the sun! In-Reply-To: Jon Ribbens's message of "Fri, 19 Feb 1999 13:58:19 +0000" References: <00c101be5aab$10becdc0$1700000a@alan> <19990219135819.A27487@oaktree.co.uk> Message-ID: <87btiqdw9o.fsf@hedonism.demon.co.uk> Jon Ribbens writes: > Alan Burkitt-Gray wrote: > > OTHER NAME: Mallet, Robert, 1810-1881. > > Aha! We have finally unmasked the mysterious and malicious "Mallet" who > is always trying to break into our security protocols! > > It seems from the above that he is dead now, I suggest therefore that > cryptography is no longer required (since the enemy has gone away), and > we should send everything in clear henceforth. Let me be the first to point out that as far as we know Eve is still at large... -- __ \/ o\ paul@hedonism.demon.co.uk http://www.hedonism.demon.co.uk/paul/ \ / /\__/ Paul Crowley Upgrade your legacy NT machines to Linux /~\ From erich-moechel at quintessenz.at Sat Feb 20 11:30:32 1999 From: erich-moechel at quintessenz.at (Erich Moechel) Date: Sat, 20 Feb 1999 12:30:32 +0100 Subject: New evidence 4 EU surveillance plans [ENFOPOL] In-Reply-To: <87btiqdw9o.fsf@hedonism.demon.co.uk> References: Jon Ribbens's message of "Fri, 19 Feb 1999 13:58:19 +0000" Message-ID: <199902201130.MAA27292@apain2.apa.at> Dear all, After a while we managed 2 obtain the next piece of evidence concerning EU-wide surveillance plans. The mid January confidential paper by Europolice is titled ENFOPOL 98 Rev 2. It was prepared after the meeting of EU Justice & Interior ministers on December 3rd 98 & it shows that those ministers obviously agreed on the surveillence proposals of joint secret EU police. ENFOPOL 98 Rev 2 either has passed the EU council already or will do so within the next few weeks. If anybody is interested in translating the [German] article, s/he can publish it 4 free. Just notify me, pls cu erich http://www.telepolis.de/tp/deutsch/inhalt/te/1921/1.html -.-. --.- -.-. --.- -.-. --.- q/depesche taeglich ueber internationale hacks--.-zensur im netz crypto--.-IT mergers--.-monopole & die universalitaet digitaler dummheit subscribe http://www.quintessenz.at -.-. --.- -.-. --.- -.-. --.- Certified PGP key https://keyserver.ad.or.at/cgi-bin/key/Search?keyid=AC922C4D -.-. --.- -.-. --.- -.-. --.- erich-moechel.com/munications ++43 2266 687201 fon ++43 2266 687204 fax -.-. --.- -.-. --.- -.-. --.- From nbohm at ernest.net Sat Feb 20 18:49:54 1999 From: nbohm at ernest.net (Nicholas Bohm) Date: Sat, 20 Feb 1999 18:49:54 +0000 Subject: Encrypted sessions Message-ID: <3.0.5.32.19990220184954.00a4e3f0@mail.netkonect.co.uk> I was left uncertain by recent exchanges about Server Gated Technology, and in the hope of enlightenment (and tolerance) from experts on the list, would like to state the questions as I understand them. I use Netscape, and have "fortified" it. As I understand it, this means that it can establish an SSL session based on a 128-bit symmetric key if the server is capable of doing this (whereas crippled Netscape, and any non-US version of MS IE, can only use a 40-bit key). Right so far? What I want to ask about is the server side, and whether there is a corresponding problem. Is there lots of server software available for people who want sites that can set up 128-bit SSL sessions, or is there lots of crippled software that can only set up 40-bit sessions? Is there a server equivalent of PGP or Fortify, so that everyman can if he wants set up servers that support secure SSL sessions? Is this what Apache servers can do? Is there some simple way to tell what strength session has been established? I gather that there is some deal where banks can get a certificate from someone that lets them enable 128-bit sessions on software that, in the absence of the certificate, sets up only 40-bit sessions: will export-crippled browsers nevertheless be able to establish 128-bit sessions with such servers? Lastly, is it right to assume that in all these cases the key negotiation process itself is secure, and that only the strength of the resulting key is what is affected by the limitations? Regards, Nicholas Bohm Salkyns, Great Canfield, Takeley, Bishop's Stortford CM22 6SX, UK Phone 01279 871272 (+44 1279 871272) Fax 01279 870215 (+44 1279 870215) Mobile 0860 636749 (+44 860 636749) PGP RSA 1024 bit public key ID: 0x08340015. Fingerprint: 9E 15 FB 2A 54 96 24 37 98 A2 E0 D1 34 13 48 07 PGP DSS/DH 1024/3072 public key ID: 0x899DD7FF. Fingerprint: 5248 1320 B42E 84FC 1E8B A9E6 0912 AE66 899D D7FF From ben at algroup.co.uk Sat Feb 20 19:06:57 1999 From: ben at algroup.co.uk (Ben Laurie) Date: Sat, 20 Feb 1999 19:06:57 +0000 Subject: Encrypted sessions References: <3.0.5.32.19990220184954.00a4e3f0@mail.netkonect.co.uk> Message-ID: <36CF07D1.E600FB36@algroup.co.uk> Nicholas Bohm wrote: > > I was left uncertain by recent exchanges about Server Gated Technology, and > in the hope of enlightenment (and tolerance) from experts on the list, > would like to state the questions as I understand them. > > I use Netscape, and have "fortified" it. As I understand it, this means > that it can establish an SSL session based on a 128-bit symmetric key if > the server is capable of doing this (whereas crippled Netscape, and any > non-US version of MS IE, can only use a 40-bit key). Right so far? Yes. > What I want to ask about is the server side, and whether there is a > corresponding problem. Is there lots of server software available for > people who want sites that can set up 128-bit SSL sessions, or is there > lots of crippled software that can only set up 40-bit sessions? Apache-SSL supports 128 bit sessions. US exportware doesn't, natch. > Is there a > server equivalent of PGP or Fortify, so that everyman can if he wants set > up servers that support secure SSL sessions? No. > Is this what Apache servers > can do? Yes. > Is there some simple way to tell what strength session has been established? In Netscape, connect to a secure server, then hit ctl-I and look at what it says under "security". > I gather that there is some deal where banks can get a certificate from > someone that lets them enable 128-bit sessions on software that, in the > absence of the certificate, sets up only 40-bit sessions: will > export-crippled browsers nevertheless be able to establish 128-bit sessions > with such servers? Yes. This is what Server-Gated Cryptography is. The "someone" that issues the certs is Verisign. > Lastly, is it right to assume that in all these cases the key negotiation > process itself is secure, and that only the strength of the resulting key > is what is affected by the limitations? Yes. BTW, what is commonly known as a 40 bit key is actually a 128 bit key of which 88 bits have been revealed to sniffers during session setup. This avoids the dictionary attacks that would be available with a true 40 bit key. However, it is worth noting that the public/private keypair are also limited in export-crippled s/w to 512 bits. Cheers, Ben. -- http://www.apache-ssl.org/ben.html "My grandfather once told me that there are two kinds of people: those who work and those who take the credit. He told me to try to be in the first group; there was less competition there." - Indira Gandhi From jonplews at dial.pipex.com Sat Feb 20 21:37:35 1999 From: jonplews at dial.pipex.com (Jon Plews) Date: Sat, 20 Feb 1999 21:37:35 -0000 Subject: Encrypted sessions In-Reply-To: <3.0.5.32.19990220184954.00a4e3f0@mail.netkonect.co.uk> Message-ID: <199902202137.VAA09525@testpig.fastnet> > From: owner-ukcrypto@maillist.ox.ac.uk > [mailto:owner-ukcrypto@maillist.ox.ac.uk]On Behalf Of Nicholas Bohm > > I was left uncertain by recent exchanges about Server Gated Technology, and > in the hope of enlightenment (and tolerance) from experts on the list, > would like to state the questions as I understand them. > > I use Netscape, and have "fortified" it. As I understand it, this means > that it can establish an SSL session based on a 128-bit symmetric key if > the server is capable of doing this (whereas crippled Netscape, and any > non-US version of MS IE, can only use a 40-bit key). Right so far? > [ snip ] You can "fortify" non-US versions of MS IE. I'm running IE4.01sp1 with 128 bit cipher strength. Jon Plews. From I.Brown at cs.ucl.ac.uk Sun Feb 21 12:40:01 1999 From: I.Brown at cs.ucl.ac.uk (Ian Brown) Date: Sun, 21 Feb 1999 12:40:01 +0000 Subject: Computers, Freedom and Privacy '99: The Global Internet Message-ID: <36CFFEA1.DC9DFD09@cs.ucl.ac.uk> [Circulate until March 15, 1999] Register now for the cyber event of the year: C COMPUTERS, FREEDOM, AND PRIVACY F THE GLOBAL INTERNET P 9 WASHINGTON, DC 9 Omni Shoreham Hotel . April 6-8, 1999 O R G For almost a decade, the conference on Computers, Freedom and Privacy has shaped the public debate on the future of privacy and freedom in the online world. Register now for the number one Internet policy conference. Join a diverse audience from government, industry, academics, the non-profit sector, the hacker community and the media. Enjoy the U.S. Capital in the Spring at one of Washington's premier hotels. * Keynote speakers include Tim Berners-Lee (Director, World Wide Web Consortium), Vint Cerf (President, Internet Society), Congressman Ed Markey (sponsor of "The Electronic Bill of Rights Act"), Congressman Ron Paul (sponsor of the Freedom and Privacy Restoration Act), Henrikas Yushkiavitshus (Associate Director, UNESCO) * Lively and thought-provoking panels on -- "the Creation of a Global Surveillance Network," "Access and Equity on the Global Internet," "Anonymity and Identity in Cyberspace," "Free Speech and Cyber Censorship," "Is Escrow Dead? And what is Wassenaar?", "Self-Regulation Reconsidered" and more * Tutorials -- "The Electronic Communications Privacy Act" (Mark Eckenwiler); "Cryptography: Basic Overview & Nontraditional Uses" (Matt Blaze and Phil Zimmermann), "Free Speech, The Constitution and Privacy in Cyberspace" (Mike Godwin), "Techniques for Circumventing Internet Censorship" (Bennett Haselton and Brian Ristuccia) Early Registration Deadline - March 15, 1999 -------------------------------------------- Register on-line at http://www.regmaster.com/cfp99.html or call +1 407 628 3602. Registration inquiries may also be sent to mann@regmaster.com. - Mark the dates - April 6-8, 1999 - Note the place - Washington, DC - Make your hotel reservations. See you at CFP99. For more information about CFP99, visit http://www.cfp99.org/ or call +1 401 628 3186 Sponsored by the Association for Computing Machinery From jei at zor.hut.fi Sun Feb 21 12:44:15 1999 From: jei at zor.hut.fi (jei@zor.hut.fi) Date: Sun, 21 Feb 1999 14:44:15 +0200 (EET) Subject: Mandrake Face Recognition Spy Camera Tested in Australia Message-ID: Way to go UK! ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: The Sunday Telegraph Date: 21st Feb 1999 Spy camera test By Sarah Harris The Sunday Telegraph, 21st Feb 1999. A computerised surveillance system which can pick out unwanted criminals from a crowd may soon be operating in Australian airports, and train and bus depots. The Mandrake system- described as the best tool in crimefighting since the introduction of DNA technology-is under investigation by several law enforcement and security agencies. The system operates in much the same way as normal security cameras, but instead of relying on humans to monitor the footage, surveillance images are sent back to a computer for analysis. The computer compares those filmed with a database of photographs of criminal suspects and known offenders at a rate of 250 per second. When it registers a match, it sends the signal to the operator. While the camera keeps recording the scene, the target's photo is captured at the bottom of the screen next to the Mandrake's nominated match. Mandrake's manufacturer, the UK-based Software and System, boasts it is accurate and untiring. Marketing director Patricia Oldcorn said: "Unlike a human surveillance team, Mandrake can work for hours on end without getting tired and it can also see through disguises that may fool a human being. ================================================================= From jei at zor.hut.fi Sun Feb 21 12:44:15 1999 From: jei at zor.hut.fi (jei@zor.hut.fi) Date: Sun, 21 Feb 1999 14:44:15 +0200 (EET) Subject: Mandrake Face Recognition Spy Camera Tested in Australia Message-ID: Way to go UK! ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: The Sunday Telegraph Date: 21st Feb 1999 Spy camera test By Sarah Harris The Sunday Telegraph, 21st Feb 1999. A computerised surveillance system which can pick out unwanted criminals from a crowd may soon be operating in Australian airports, and train and bus depots. The Mandrake system- described as the best tool in crimefighting since the introduction of DNA technology-is under investigation by several law enforcement and security agencies. The system operates in much the same way as normal security cameras, but instead of relying on humans to monitor the footage, surveillance images are sent back to a computer for analysis. The computer compares those filmed with a database of photographs of criminal suspects and known offenders at a rate of 250 per second. When it registers a match, it sends the signal to the operator. While the camera keeps recording the scene, the target's photo is captured at the bottom of the screen next to the Mandrake's nominated match. Mandrake's manufacturer, the UK-based Software and System, boasts it is accurate and untiring. Marketing director Patricia Oldcorn said: "Unlike a human surveillance team, Mandrake can work for hours on end without getting tired and it can also see through disguises that may fool a human being. ================================================================= From gtaylor at efa.org.au Sun Feb 21 05:09:27 1999 From: gtaylor at efa.org.au (Greg Taylor) Date: Sun, 21 Feb 1999 15:09:27 +1000 Subject: CFP 99 Announcement Message-ID: <3.0.3.32.19990221150927.02e5b6e4@mail.gil.com.au> [Circulate until March 15, 1999] Register now for the cyber event of the year: C COMPUTERS, FREEDOM, AND PRIVACY F THE GLOBAL INTERNET P 9 WASHINGTON, DC 9 Omni Shoreham Hotel . April 6-8, 1999 O R G For almost a decade, the conference on Computers, Freedom and Privacy has shaped the public debate on the future of privacy and freedom in the online world. Register now for the number one Internet policy conference. Join a diverse audience from government, industry, academics, the non-profit sector, the hacker community and the media. Enjoy the U.S. Capital in the Spring at one of Washington's premier hotels. * Keynote speakers include Tim Berners-Lee (Director, World Wide Web Consortium), Vint Cerf (President, Internet Society), Congressman Ed Markey (sponsor of "The Electronic Bill of Rights Act"), Congressman Ron Paul (sponsor of the Freedom and Privacy Restoration Act), Henrikas Yushkiavitshus (Associate Director, UNESCO) * Lively and thought-provoking panels on -- "the Creation of a Global Surveillance Network," "Access and Equity on the Global Internet," "Anonymity and Identity in Cyberspace," "Free Speech and Cyber Censorship," "Is Escrow Dead? And what is Wassenaar?", "Self-Regulation Reconsidered" and more * Tutorials -- "The Electronic Communications Privacy Act" (Mark Eckenwiler); "Cryptography: Basic Overview & Nontraditional Uses" (Matt Blaze and Phil Zimmermann), "Free Speech, The Constitution and Privacy in Cyberspace" (Mike Godwin), "Techniques for Circumventing Internet Censorship" (Bennett Haselton and Brian Ristuccia) Early Registration Deadline - March 15, 1999 -------------------------------------------- Register on-line at http://www.regmaster.com/cfp99.html or call +1 407 628 3602. Registration inquiries may also be sent to mann@regmaster.com. - Mark the dates - April 6-8, 1999 - Note the place - Washington, DC - Make your hotel reservations. See you at CFP99. For more information about CFP99, visit http://www.cfp99.org/ or call +1 401 628 3186 Sponsored by the Association for Computing Machinery From nbohm at ernest.net Mon Feb 22 10:45:03 1999 From: nbohm at ernest.net (Nicholas Bohm) Date: Mon, 22 Feb 1999 10:45:03 +0000 Subject: Encrypted sessions In-Reply-To: <36CF07D1.E600FB36@algroup.co.uk> References: <3.0.5.32.19990220184954.00a4e3f0@mail.netkonect.co.uk> Message-ID: <3.0.5.32.19990222104503.00a18d10@mail.netkonect.co.uk> At 07:06 PM 2/20/1999 +0000, Ben Laurie wrote: >Nicholas Bohm wrote: [snip] >> Lastly, is it right to assume that in all these cases the key negotiation >> process itself is secure, and that only the strength of the resulting key >> is what is affected by the limitations? > >Yes. BTW, what is commonly known as a 40 bit key is actually a 128 bit >key of which 88 bits have been revealed to sniffers during session >setup. This avoids the dictionary attacks that would be available with a >true 40 bit key. > >However, it is worth noting that the public/private keypair are also >limited in export-crippled s/w to 512 bits. Is that limitation overriden by a Verisign certificate enabling use of 128-bit symmetric keys? If not, the protection for the key negotiation seems weaker than the resulting key. And when you say "88 bits have been revealed to sniffers", could you explain further: whose sniffers? Who can get access to the 88 bits? Regards, Nicholas Bohm Salkyns, Great Canfield, Takeley, Bishop's Stortford CM22 6SX, UK Phone 01279 871272 (+44 1279 871272) Fax 01279 870215 (+44 1279 870215) Mobile 0860 636749 (+44 860 636749) PGP RSA 1024 bit public key ID: 0x08340015. Fingerprint: 9E 15 FB 2A 54 96 24 37 98 A2 E0 D1 34 13 48 07 PGP DSS/DH 1024/3072 public key ID: 0x899DD7FF. Fingerprint: 5248 1320 B42E 84FC 1E8B A9E6 0912 AE66 899D D7FF From dparkins at alien.bt.co.uk Mon Feb 22 11:32:41 1999 From: dparkins at alien.bt.co.uk (David Parkinson) Date: Mon, 22 Feb 1999 11:32:41 +0000 Subject: Encrypted sessions In-Reply-To: <3.0.5.32.19990220184954.00a4e3f0@mail.netkonect.co.uk> Message-ID: <4.1.19990222113010.00a79690@mail.alien.bt.co.uk> At 18:49 20/02/99 +0000, Nicholas Bohm wrote: >Is there some simple way to tell what strength session has been established? If you are using V3.X of Netscape Navigator look at the key symbol. broken key = none. solid key 1 ward = 40 bits. solid key 2 wards = 128 bits. I'm not too sure what happens with the latest 4.x versions. David From davidh at spidacom.co.uk Mon Feb 22 13:10:06 1999 From: davidh at spidacom.co.uk (davidh@spidacom.co.uk) Date: Mon, 22 Feb 1999 13:10:06 -0000 Subject: Encrypted sessions In-Reply-To: <3.0.5.32.19990220184954.00a4e3f0@mail.netkonect.co.uk> Message-ID: <199902221309.NAA14839@handel.ednet.co.uk> On 20 Feb 99, at 18:49, Nicholas Bohm wrote: > Is there some simple way to tell what strength session has been > established? Use Nutscape 3. The key symbol has one tooth for a 40 bit insecure connection and two teeth for a 128 bit session. This was information was removed from Nutscape 4, presumably to hide from the public that not all "secure" sessions are equal. It would be nice if Fortify could modify the lock symbol so that it indicated whethe r a session was secure or not. David Hansen | davidh@spidacom.co.uk | PGP email preferred Edinburgh | CI$ number 100024,3247 | key number 5432274D From ben at algroup.co.uk Mon Feb 22 14:55:23 1999 From: ben at algroup.co.uk (Ben Laurie) Date: Mon, 22 Feb 1999 14:55:23 +0000 Subject: Encrypted sessions References: <3.0.5.32.19990220184954.00a4e3f0@mail.netkonect.co.uk> <3.0.5.32.19990222104503.00a18d10@mail.netkonect.co.uk> Message-ID: <36D16FDB.F2D67F89@algroup.co.uk> Nicholas Bohm wrote: > > At 07:06 PM 2/20/1999 +0000, Ben Laurie wrote: > >Nicholas Bohm wrote: > [snip] > >> Lastly, is it right to assume that in all these cases the key negotiation > >> process itself is secure, and that only the strength of the resulting key > >> is what is affected by the limitations? > > > >Yes. BTW, what is commonly known as a 40 bit key is actually a 128 bit > >key of which 88 bits have been revealed to sniffers during session > >setup. This avoids the dictionary attacks that would be available with a > >true 40 bit key. > > > >However, it is worth noting that the public/private keypair are also > >limited in export-crippled s/w to 512 bits. > > Is that limitation overriden by a Verisign certificate enabling use of > 128-bit symmetric keys? If not, the protection for the key negotiation > seems weaker than the resulting key. Yes. The 512 bit thing is part of the particular ciphersuites which are used for export crypto. When you use a non-export ciphersuite, the public key size is unlimited. BTW, there are new export ciphersuites on the table that have 56 secret bits and 1024 bit public keys. > And when you say "88 bits have been revealed to sniffers", could you > explain further: whose sniffers? Who can get access to the 88 bits? Anyone who can monitor the conversation. Cheers, Ben. -- http://www.apache-ssl.org/ben.html "My grandfather once told me that there are two kinds of people: those who work and those who take the credit. He told me to try to be in the first group; there was less competition there." - Indira Gandhi From Alec.Muffett at UK.Sun.COM Mon Feb 22 15:40:01 1999 From: Alec.Muffett at UK.Sun.COM (Alec Muffett) Date: Mon, 22 Feb 1999 15:40:01 +0000 Subject: Mark Thomas + ECHELON? Message-ID: <199902221540.PAA08068@coyote.uk.sun.com> I saw a trailer for what may be this week's episode of the Mark Thomas Comedy Product at the weekend; I can't confirm that it *is* this week, but it sure looked like MT was flying a hot-air balloon over the Menwith Hill golf-balls... I, for one, await this program with baited breath; if he *is* going after ECHELON, then the link to the phone-in advertised at the end of last week's programme is fairly obvious. Wednesday, Channel 4, 11:00pm. http://www.fnord.demon.co.uk/markt.html - alec -- alec muffett, sun professional services, alec.muffett @ uk.sun.com birds and planes go through the rainbow every day From oxley at solarity.demon.co.uk Tue Feb 23 09:41:08 1999 From: oxley at solarity.demon.co.uk (Simon Oxley) Date: Tue, 23 Feb 1999 09:41:08 +0000 Subject: Encrypted sessions In-Reply-To: <36CF07D1.E600FB36@algroup.co.uk> Message-ID: <1cf6ODA0en02Ew3L@solarity.demon.co.uk> >Nicholas Bohm wrote: >> >> I was left uncertain by recent exchanges about Server Gated Technology, and >> in the hope of enlightenment (and tolerance) from experts on the list, >> would like to state the questions as I understand them. >> There's a reasonable description of server-gated crypto at: http://www.microsoft.com/security/tech/sgc/whitepaper.asp -- Simon Oxley email: oxley@solarity.demon.co.uk Solarity Ltd: Using IT Securely Tel: +44 (1729) 825555 Fax: +44 (1729) 825500 From pgut001 at cs.auckland.ac.nz Wed Feb 24 00:58:49 1999 From: pgut001 at cs.auckland.ac.nz (Peter Gutmann) Date: Wed, 24 Feb 1999 00:58:49 (NZDT) Subject: Encrypted sessions Message-ID: <91977112913470@cs26.cs.auckland.ac.nz> >>I was left uncertain by recent exchanges about Server Gated Technology, and >>in the hope of enlightenment (and tolerance) from experts on the list, >>would like to state the questions as I understand them. > >There's a reasonable description of server-gated crypto at: > >http://www.microsoft.com/security/tech/sgc/whitepaper.asp There's also a description in my godzilla crypto tutorial, http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~pgut001/tutorial/ (along with everything else crypto-related you can think of). Perhaps this SGC thing should go into some FAQ somewhere, it seems to crop up about once a fortnight in various places (sci.crypt/mailing lists/whatever). Peter. From cacib at liberty.org.uk Tue Feb 23 12:52:27 1999 From: cacib at liberty.org.uk (Malcolm Hutty) Date: Tue, 23 Feb 1999 12:52:27 -0000 Subject: Mark Thomas + ECHELON? In-Reply-To: <199902221540.PAA08068@coyote.uk.sun.com> Message-ID: Having been somewhat involved with this little event, I can confirm he is going after Menwith Hill in his own inimitable style. I'm not going to spoil it, but if this is your thing, I certainly suggest you watch it on Wednesday night. It's good. > I saw a trailer for what may be this week's episode of the > Mark Thomas Comedy Product at the weekend; I can't confirm that > it *is* this week, but it sure looked like MT was flying a hot-air > balloon over the Menwith Hill golf-balls... > I, for one, await this program with baited breath; if he *is* > going after ECHELON, then the link to the phone-in advertised > at the end of last week's programme is fairly obvious. > > Wednesday, Channel 4, 11:00pm. > > http://www.fnord.demon.co.uk/markt.html ----------------------------------------------------------------------- Campaign Against Censorship Tel: 0171 589 4500 of the Internet in Britain Say NO Fax: 0171 589 4522 60 Albert Court to censorship! Prince Consort Road cacib@liberty.org.uk London SW7 2BE http://www.liberty.org.uk/cacib/ From jim at acm.org Tue Feb 23 17:19:40 1999 From: jim at acm.org (Jim Gillogly) Date: Tue, 23 Feb 1999 09:19:40 -0800 Subject: SHA-1 bitwise test vectors (Re: RSA Test) Message-ID: <36D2E32C.BC215CE0@acm.org> "Hani Almansour" wrote: > I have implementation for RSA, SHA, MD5 and I want to test it. is there a > fast way to test the output of any one of these encryption or if there is a > program that test the output. For the basic SHA-1 and MD5 you can use the test vectors published in the specifications to see whether you have the basic idea right. However, there are a lot of places to go wrong if you're implementing the full SHA-1, which is defined for arbitrary bit strings. Francois Grieu and I have agreed on a number of SHA-1 bit strings and their hashes to test problem areas where the internal buffers fill and roll over. This should shake out most of your bugs. In the following we use the notation bitstring#n to mean a bitstring repeated n (in decimal) times, and we use | for concatenation. Therefore 110#3|1 is 1101101101. 110#148|11 : CE7387AE 577337BE 54EA94F8 2C842E8B E76BC3E1 110#149 : DE244F06 3142CB2F 4C903B7F 7660577F 9E0D8791 110#149|1 : A3D29824 27AE39C8 920CA5F4 99D6C2BD 71EBF03C 110#149|11 : 351AAB58 FF93CF12 AF7D5A58 4CFC8F7D 81023D10 110#170 : 99638692 1E480D4E 2955E727 5DF3522C E8F5AB6E 110#170|1 : BB5F4AD4 8913F51B 157EB985 A5C2034B 8243B01B 110#170|11 : 9E92C554 2237B957 BA2244E8 141FDB66 DEC730A5 110#171 : 2103E454 DA4491F4 E32DD425 A3341DC9 C2A90848 011#490 : B4B18049 DE405027 528CD9E7 4B2EC540 D4E6F06B 011#490|0 : 34C63356 B3087427 20AB9669 14EB0FC9 26E4294B 011#490|01 : 75FACE18 02B9F84F 326368AB 06E73E05 02E9EA34 011#491 : 7C2C3D62 F6AEC28D 94CDF93F 02E739E7 490698A1 Here is a set near 2^32 bits to test the roll-over in the length field from one to two 32-bit words: 110#1431655764|11 1eef5a18 969255a3 b1793a2a 955c7ec2 8cd221a5 110#1431655765| 7a1045b9 14672afa ce8d90e6 d19b3a6a da3cb879 110#1431655765|1 d5e09777 a94f1ea9 240874c4 8d9fecb6 b634256b 110#1431655765|11 eb256904 3c3014e5 1b2862ae 6eb5fb4e 0b851d99 011#1431655764|01 4CB0C4EF 69143D5B F34FC35F 1D4B19F6 ECCAE0F2 011#1431655765 47D92F91 1FC7BB74 DE00ADFC 4E981A81 05556D52 011#1431655765|0 A3D7438C 589B0B93 2AA91CC2 446F06DF 9ABC73F0 011#1431655765|01 3EEE3E1E 28DEDE2C A444D68D A5675B2F AAAB3203 There are lots of cases where one might go wrong, so if you're likely to do a partial-byte implementation you might want to hang onto these test vectors, which were performed with quite different implementations. -- Jim Gillogly Sterday, 3 Rethe S.R. 1999, 17:11 12.19.5.17.8, 9 Lamat 1 Kayab, Sixth Lord of Night From proff at iq.org Tue Feb 23 18:16:12 1999 From: proff at iq.org (Julian Assange) Date: 24 Feb 1999 05:16:12 +1100 Subject: Mark Thomas + ECHELON? In-Reply-To: "Malcolm Hutty"'s message of "Tue, 23 Feb 1999 12:52:27 -0000" References: Message-ID: "Malcolm Hutty" writes: > I'm not going to spoil it, but if this is your thing, I certainly suggest > you watch it on Wednesday night. It's good. Can someone summerise / provide pointers to a transcript for us poor souls who do not receive channel4? -- Julian Assange http://iq.org/~proff Pathological exhibits...human scum...paranoics, degenerates, morons, bludgers...pack of dingoes...industrial outlaws and political lepers...ratbags. If these people went to Russia, Stalin wouldn't even use them for manure. - Arther Calwell, Australian Minister of Immigration and Information, on Australian Communists From Alec.Muffett at UK.Sun.COM Tue Feb 23 18:29:36 1999 From: Alec.Muffett at UK.Sun.COM (Alec Muffett) Date: Tue, 23 Feb 1999 18:29:36 +0000 Subject: Mark Thomas + ECHELON? In-Reply-To: Your message of "24 Feb 1999 05:16:12 +1100." Message-ID: <199902231829.SAA01054@coyote.uk.sun.com> >Can someone summerise / provide pointers to a transcript for us poor souls who >do not receive channel4? one will doubtless be posted to www.fnord.demon.co.uk - alec -- alec muffett, sun professional services, alec.muffett @ uk.sun.com ironic way to kill a mime #1: lock them in a fishtank to suffocate From jim at acm.org Tue Feb 23 17:19:40 1999 From: jim at acm.org (Jim Gillogly) Date: Tue, 23 Feb 1999 09:19:40 -0800 Subject: SHA-1 bitwise test vectors (Re: RSA Test) Message-ID: <36D2E32C.BC215CE0@acm.org> "Hani Almansour" wrote: > I have implementation for RSA, SHA, MD5 and I want to test it. is there a > fast way to test the output of any one of these encryption or if there is a > program that test the output. For the basic SHA-1 and MD5 you can use the test vectors published in the specifications to see whether you have the basic idea right. However, there are a lot of places to go wrong if you're implementing the full SHA-1, which is defined for arbitrary bit strings. Francois Grieu and I have agreed on a number of SHA-1 bit strings and their hashes to test problem areas where the internal buffers fill and roll over. This should shake out most of your bugs. In the following we use the notation bitstring#n to mean a bitstring repeated n (in decimal) times, and we use | for concatenation. Therefore 110#3|1 is 1101101101. 110#148|11 : CE7387AE 577337BE 54EA94F8 2C842E8B E76BC3E1 110#149 : DE244F06 3142CB2F 4C903B7F 7660577F 9E0D8791 110#149|1 : A3D29824 27AE39C8 920CA5F4 99D6C2BD 71EBF03C 110#149|11 : 351AAB58 FF93CF12 AF7D5A58 4CFC8F7D 81023D10 110#170 : 99638692 1E480D4E 2955E727 5DF3522C E8F5AB6E 110#170|1 : BB5F4AD4 8913F51B 157EB985 A5C2034B 8243B01B 110#170|11 : 9E92C554 2237B957 BA2244E8 141FDB66 DEC730A5 110#171 : 2103E454 DA4491F4 E32DD425 A3341DC9 C2A90848 011#490 : B4B18049 DE405027 528CD9E7 4B2EC540 D4E6F06B 011#490|0 : 34C63356 B3087427 20AB9669 14EB0FC9 26E4294B 011#490|01 : 75FACE18 02B9F84F 326368AB 06E73E05 02E9EA34 011#491 : 7C2C3D62 F6AEC28D 94CDF93F 02E739E7 490698A1 Here is a set near 2^32 bits to test the roll-over in the length field from one to two 32-bit words: 110#1431655764|11 1eef5a18 969255a3 b1793a2a 955c7ec2 8cd221a5 110#1431655765| 7a1045b9 14672afa ce8d90e6 d19b3a6a da3cb879 110#1431655765|1 d5e09777 a94f1ea9 240874c4 8d9fecb6 b634256b 110#1431655765|11 eb256904 3c3014e5 1b2862ae 6eb5fb4e 0b851d99 011#1431655764|01 4CB0C4EF 69143D5B F34FC35F 1D4B19F6 ECCAE0F2 011#1431655765 47D92F91 1FC7BB74 DE00ADFC 4E981A81 05556D52 011#1431655765|0 A3D7438C 589B0B93 2AA91CC2 446F06DF 9ABC73F0 011#1431655765|01 3EEE3E1E 28DEDE2C A444D68D A5675B2F AAAB3203 There are lots of cases where one might go wrong, so if you're likely to do a partial-byte implementation you might want to hang onto these test vectors, which were performed with quite different implementations. -- Jim Gillogly Sterday, 3 Rethe S.R. 1999, 17:11 12.19.5.17.8, 9 Lamat 1 Kayab, Sixth Lord of Night From lawya at lucs-01.novell.leeds.ac.uk Wed Feb 24 13:06:03 1999 From: lawya at lucs-01.novell.leeds.ac.uk (Yaman Akdeniz) Date: Wed, 24 Feb 1999 13:06:03 GMT0BST Subject: CR&CL (UK) issues a report on Intel and privacy concerns Message-ID: <88629E9508E@lucs-01.novell.leeds.ac.uk> Here is the announcement of our report in relation to Intel and privacy concerns. The report is written by Dr Brian Gladman, our Technology Policy Adviser. Yaman Cyber-Rights & Cyber-Liberties (UK) Press Statement "CR&CL (UK) issues a report on Intel and privacy concerns" 13:00 GMT, 24 February, 1999 LEEDS - Today Cyber-Rights & Cyber-Liberties (UK) publishes its report on the Intel PIII Processor Serial Number Feature. The report written by Dr Brian Gladman, Technology Policy Adviser to Cyber-Rights & Cyber-Liberties (UK) criticises Intel for introducing security features on the new Intel PIII chip without adequate or timely public consultation. The report calls for a change in policy for such features, which should in future involve open consultation on time scales which allow concerns about their operation and use to be resolved. The report, furthermore, proposes a new way forward, including important recommendations for Intel, PC Manufacturers, Suppliers, Retailers, Software (and Web/Internet Service) Suppliers, and PC Owners (especially Consumers and Home Users). The report which is available through (a copy of the report is attached at the end of this press release) states that: "CR&CL(UK) does not have any doubts about Intel's desire to improve security for its customers. We are, however, surprised to be faced with a `fait accompli' on such an important issue. We are also surprised to be put in this position by a company that has a global influence on the safety, the security and the privacy of millions of consumers. We simply cannot accept that such steps should be taken without the widest possible public consultation." Dr Brian Gladman, the Technology Policy Adviser to CR&CL(UK) who co-ordinated the CR&CL(UK) strategy in relation to Intel PIII privacy and security issues stated that: "While I feel sure that Intel is genuine in wanting to improve security for its end users, the company needs to be more open about their approach and more willing to involve the wider community at a much earlier stage in their thinking in order to avoid the misunderstandings and concerns that have so clearly been the result of their PIII announcement" Mr Yaman Akdeniz, the Director of CR&CL(UK) stated that: " We are concerned with the impact of this new technology on privacy. Our report is critical and constructive at the same time. We hope, Intel, the computer industry, and the consumers will take into account our recommendations." Mr Nicholas Bohm, E-Commerce Policy Adviser to CR&CL(UK) added: "Serial numbering of chips, under the owner's control, could offer some useful benefits. But it could also be helpful to repressive regimes in taking action against dissidents who use the Internet to promote democracy and human rights causes. And if software vendors tried to tie licences to individual processors as an anti-piracy technique, it could lead to awkward practical problems for users wanting to upgrade processors or run on a backup system. Intel do not seem to have thought through the implications of their plans for the PIII chip." Notes for the Media: This press release will be available at http://www.cyber-rights.org/press The CR&CL (UK) report on Intel and privacy is available through http://www.cyber-rights.org/reports/intel-rep.htm Contact Information Dr Brian Gladman, Crypto Technology Policy Adviser, Cyber Rights & Cyber-Liberties (UK) Telephone: 01905 748990, dial +44 1905 748990 if you are abroad. E-mail: brg@cyber-rights.org Mr Yaman Akdeniz, director of Cyber-Rights & Cyber-Liberties (UK) Telephone: 0498-865116, dial +44 498 865116 if you are abroad. E-mail: lawya@cyber-rights.org Mr Nicholas Bohm, E-Commerce Policy Adviser, Cyber Rights & Cyber-Liberties (UK) Telephone: 01279 871272, dial +44 1279 871272 if you are abroad. E-mail: nbohm@cyber-rights.org ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Yaman Akdeniz Cyber-Rights & Cyber-Liberties (UK) at: http://www.cyber-rights.org Read the new CR&CL (UK) Report, Who Watches the Watchmen, Part:II Accountability & Effective Self-Regulation in the Information Age, August 1998 at http://www.cyber-rights.org/watchmen-ii.htm ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ From cacib at liberty.org.uk Thu Feb 25 00:21:19 1999 From: cacib at liberty.org.uk (Malcolm Hutty) Date: Thu, 25 Feb 1999 00:21:19 -0000 Subject: Mark Thomas + ECHELON? In-Reply-To: References: "Malcolm Hutty"'s message of "Tue, 23 Feb 1999 12:52:27 -0000" Message-ID: <199902250019.AAA18869@mailhost.dircon.co.uk> On 24 Feb 99, at 5:16, Julian Assange wrote: > Can someone summerise / provide pointers to a transcript for us poor souls who > do not receive channel4? Yes, but I had to wait until after broadcast. Mark Thomas went hot-air ballooning over Menwith Hill, as it seems not to be restricted airspace. Also, if you are low on fuel it is an "emergency landing", so you can land there as you have no control over steering in a hot air balloon. Anyway, he's running hot air balloon rides for the public. For details of how to book a ride, and lots of stuff on "RAF" Menwith Hill itself, see http://www.menwithhill.com/ ========================================================================= Campaign Against Censorship Say NO! T: 0171 589 4500 of the Internet in Britain to censorship F: 0171 589 4522 Prince Consort Road E: cacib@liberty.org.uk London SW7 2BE W: http://www.liberty.org.uk/cacib/ From Alec.Muffett at UK.Sun.COM Thu Feb 25 00:23:22 1999 From: Alec.Muffett at UK.Sun.COM (Alec Muffett) Date: Thu, 25 Feb 1999 00:23:22 +0000 Subject: Mark Thomas + ECHELON? In-Reply-To: Your message of "Tue, 23 Feb 1999 12:52:27 GMT." Message-ID: <199902250023.AAA12677@coyote.uk.sun.com> [ for those people who didn't see the programme, bring up http://www.menwithhill.com - it helps put this post in context ] > >Having been somewhat involved with this little event, I can confirm >he is going after Menwith Hill in his own inimitable style. > Well, I must admit I feel rather bemused by the programme; after my posting to ukcrypto of June 1998... http://www.cs.ucl.ac.uk/staff/I.Brown/archives/ukcrypto/old/msg01135.html - I can't help but feeling he (or, more likely, a researcher) has been at the list content dregdging up ideas, and maybe I provided some subconcious inspiration, if I was not actually ripped off. Almost certainly not, but, what the hell, I can dream... 8-) Nonetheless, I think running Ballooning tours over Menwith is a most amusing idea, and I have put my name down, just in case it all comes together before the legal beagles get into action. I wonder what other things we might inspire Mark to address? Hmmm... What gets me riled, and is geeky and novel, and provides ample opportunity for pissing off rich people in embarrassing ways? Ah yes - it's obvious: DVD Region Format encoding! Encryption in the name of filthy lucre! Artificial barriers to trade, and indirect censorship! When may we expect to see a programme about that? Anyone? 8-) - alec (available for scriptwriting, any time, no no, i'm not starstruck at all, honest guv, i'm better nowadays...) From cacib at liberty.org.uk Thu Feb 25 12:01:33 1999 From: cacib at liberty.org.uk (Malcolm Hutty) Date: Thu, 25 Feb 1999 12:01:33 -0000 Subject: Mark Thomas + ECHELON? In-Reply-To: <199902250023.AAA12677@coyote.uk.sun.com> References: Your message of "Tue, 23 Feb 1999 12:52:27 GMT." Message-ID: > - I can't help but feeling he (or, more likely, a researcher) has been at > the list content dregdging up ideas, and maybe I provided some subconcious > inspiration, if I was not actually ripped off. Well it wasn't me, my involvement was limited to the web site! I don't know if anyone at MTCP reads ukcrypto but friends of friends do, maybe your idea just stuck in someone's head. I wouldn't think of it as being ripped off, think of it as your idea coming to fruition on TV. Glass is half full and all that. ----------------------------------------------------------------------- Campaign Against Censorship Tel: 0171 589 4500 of the Internet in Britain Say NO Fax: 0171 589 4522 60 Albert Court to censorship! Prince Consort Road cacib@liberty.org.uk London SW7 2BE http://www.liberty.org.uk/cacib/ From Alec.Muffett at UK.Sun.COM Thu Feb 25 12:58:33 1999 From: Alec.Muffett at UK.Sun.COM (Alec Muffett) Date: Thu, 25 Feb 1999 12:58:33 +0000 Subject: Mark Thomas + ECHELON? In-Reply-To: Your message of "Thu, 25 Feb 1999 12:01:33 GMT." Message-ID: <199902251258.MAA13960@coyote.uk.sun.com> >I wouldn't think of it as being ripped off, think of it as your idea >coming to fruition on TV. Glass is half full and all that. Quite - I would never have had the money to fund it, anyway, so I don't feel any loss. I am just very amused at the convergnce of the ideas, and the skill with which the MT team carried it off. ("You've done this before, haven't you"?) Actually - would anyone from the list *actually* be interested in a grand tour of UK SIGINT stations, on a "hire a van and share petrol, sleep in tents" basis? Sometime this summer? Just a thought... I am thoroughly looking forward to seeing what comes of all this. -- alec muffett, sun professional services, alec.muffett @ uk.sun.com we had joy, we had fun, we were forking on a sun From Alan Burkitt-Gray" This is a multi-part message in MIME format. ------=_NextPart_000_0106_01BE60C7.F9459D40 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable > - I can't help but feeling he (or, more likely, a researcher) has been = at > the list content dregdging up ideas, and maybe I provided some = subconcious > inspiration, if I was not actually ripped off. Hold on, here. Is someone who is against censorship, for the liberty of = the Internet, in general dubious about copyright, complaining that = someone has seen something on the net and followed up the idea? Just wondering, you know. Alan B-G - ALAN BURKITT-GRAY, Editor, Government Computing The independent magazine about information age public service, for the people who are going to make it happen NEXT ISSUE: March 1999, mailed out 25 February Published monthly by Kable Ltd The Courtyard, 55 Charterhouse Street, London EC1M 6HA, UK tel 0171 608 0900, fax 0171 608 0901 international tel +44 171 608 0900, fax +44 171 608 0901 website http://www.kable.co.uk=20 e-mail alan@kable.co.uk For advance features information see http://www.governmentcomputing.com=20 Where's Kable? Look at=20 http://www.streetmap.co.uk/streetmap.dll?grid2map?X=3D531650&Y=3D181750&a= rrow=3Dy ------=_NextPart_000_0106_01BE60C7.F9459D40 Content-Type: text/html; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
> - I can't help but feeling he (or, more likely, a researcher) = has been=20 at
> the list content dregdging up ideas, and maybe I provided = some=20 subconcious
> inspiration, if I was not actually ripped = off.

Hold on, here. Is someone who is against censorship, for the liberty = of the=20 Internet, in general dubious about copyright, complaining that someone = has seen=20 something on the net and followed up the idea?

Just wondering, you know.

Alan B-G

 


-
ALAN BURKITT-GRAY, Editor, = Government=20 Computing
The independent magazine about information = age=20 public service,
for the people who are going to make it=20 happen

NEXT ISSUE: March 1999, mailed out 25 = February

Published monthly by Kable Ltd
The Courtyard, 55=20 Charterhouse Street, London EC1M 6HA, UK
tel 0171 608 0900, fax 0171 = 608=20 0901
international tel +44 171 608 0900, fax +44 171 608 = 0901
website=20 http://www.kable.co.uk =
e-mail=20 alan@kable.co.uk
For advance features information = see http://www.governmentcomputing.com=20

Where's Kable? Look at
http://www.streetmap.co.uk/streetmap.dll?grid2map?X=3D531650&= ;Y=3D181750&arrow=3Dy

------=_NextPart_000_0106_01BE60C7.F9459D40-- From I.G.Batten at ftel.co.uk Thu Feb 25 13:59:45 1999 From: I.G.Batten at ftel.co.uk (Ian G Batten) Date: Thu, 25 Feb 1999 13:59:45 GMT Subject: Mark Thomas + ECHELON? In-Reply-To: <199902251258.MAA13960@coyote.uk.sun.com> Message-ID: <199902251359.NAA22795@archive-1.ftel.co.uk> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- In article <199902251258.MAA13960@coyote.uk.sun.com>, Alec Muffett wrote: > Actually - would anyone from the list *actually* be interested in a grand tour > of UK SIGINT stations, on a "hire a van and share petrol, sleep in tents" basi s? > Sometime this summer? Just a thought... Which brings to mind that old joke, from circa `Come on Eileen': Dexy's Midnight Runners didn't tour, they were just moved on every night. I think, however, if you were going to really wind up The Man, you'd make some careful checks on the provisions of the Official Secrets Act 1911 as amended and the Wireless and Telegraphic Communications Act 1948 - --- after all, any fool can get arrested, the cool thing is to _not_ break the law --- and travel with your vehicle equipped with an array of cameras, aerials, scanners and suchlike. Do a live webcast of any mullarky with GSM and a laptop. ian -- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGPfreeware 5.0i for non-commercial use Charset: noconv iQB1AwUBNtVXK8oy0yij3IvtAQGMYAMAwyM5wCCNrv1G+TEct0PflpN9jxDjgERR JTPhOpX02U3s8Z8wBi4g6EbWnN1ULtw3ibTb2K1H3hWKGjNcTozu0seo1rnK4+Is YKdaGHPfQGXgmhVMuUpo4kF2zBepekz/ =Y4n2 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From ukcrypto-hqn at harlequin.co.uk (UKCrypto at Harlequin) Thu Feb 25 14:38:47 1999 From: ukcrypto-hqn at harlequin.co.uk (UKCrypto at Harlequin) (UKCrypto at Harlequin) Date: Thu, 25 Feb 1999 14:38:47 GMT Subject: Mark Thomas + ECHELON? In-Reply-To: <199902221540.PAA08068@coyote.uk.sun.com> References: <199902221540.PAA08068@coyote.uk.sun.com> Message-ID: <37745f50.779369413@mailhost.cam.harlequin.co.uk> On Mon, 22 Feb 1999 15:40:01 +0000, Alec Muffett wrote: > I, for one, await this program with baited breath; if he *is* > going after ECHELON, then the link to the phone-in advertised > at the end of last week's programme is fairly obvious. > > Wednesday, Channel 4, 11:00pm. > > http://www.fnord.demon.co.uk/markt.html FYI, take a look at . From danny at flirble.org Thu Feb 25 15:06:06 1999 From: danny at flirble.org (Danny O'Brien) Date: Thu, 25 Feb 1999 15:06:06 +0000 Subject: Mark Thomas + ECHELON? In-Reply-To: ; from Malcolm Hutty on Thu, Feb 25, 1999 at 12:01:33PM -0000 References: <199902250023.AAA12677@coyote.uk.sun.com> Message-ID: <19990225150606.O14736@spesh.com> On Thu, Feb 25, 1999 at 12:01:33PM -0000, Malcolm Hutty wrote: > > - I can't help but feeling he (or, more likely, a researcher) has been at > > the list content dregdging up ideas, and maybe I provided some subconcious > > inspiration, if I was not actually ripped off. > > Well it wasn't me, my involvement was limited to the web site! > I don't know if anyone at MTCP reads ukcrypto but friends of > friends do, maybe your idea just stuck in someone's head. > I wouldn't think of it as being ripped off, think of it as your idea > coming to fruition on TV. Glass is half full and all that. > Mark's been banging on about Menwith Hill for as long as anyone else I know. Longtime viewers will remember also his Lincolnshire Poacher references and RSA-in-(n-1)-lines-of-perl in his last series. As an Official Secret, Menwith Hill info is as close to public domain these days as you can get... :) d. > > ----------------------------------------------------------------------- > Campaign Against Censorship Tel: 0171 589 4500 > of the Internet in Britain Say NO Fax: 0171 589 4522 > 60 Albert Court to censorship! > Prince Consort Road cacib@liberty.org.uk > London SW7 2BE http://www.liberty.org.uk/cacib/ From danny at flirble.org Thu Feb 25 15:06:06 1999 From: danny at flirble.org (Danny O'Brien) Date: Thu, 25 Feb 1999 15:06:06 +0000 Subject: Mark Thomas + ECHELON? In-Reply-To: ; from Malcolm Hutty on Thu, Feb 25, 1999 at 12:01:33PM -0000 References: <199902250023.AAA12677@coyote.uk.sun.com> Message-ID: <19990225150606.O14736@spesh.com> On Thu, Feb 25, 1999 at 12:01:33PM -0000, Malcolm Hutty wrote: > > - I can't help but feeling he (or, more likely, a researcher) has been at > > the list content dregdging up ideas, and maybe I provided some subconcious > > inspiration, if I was not actually ripped off. > > Well it wasn't me, my involvement was limited to the web site! > I don't know if anyone at MTCP reads ukcrypto but friends of > friends do, maybe your idea just stuck in someone's head. > I wouldn't think of it as being ripped off, think of it as your idea > coming to fruition on TV. Glass is half full and all that. > Mark's been banging on about Menwith Hill for as long as anyone else I know. Longtime viewers will remember also his Lincolnshire Poacher references and RSA-in-(n-1)-lines-of-perl in his last series. As an Official Secret, Menwith Hill info is as close to public domain these days as you can get... :) d. > > ----------------------------------------------------------------------- > Campaign Against Censorship Tel: 0171 589 4500 > of the Internet in Britain Say NO Fax: 0171 589 4522 > 60 Albert Court to censorship! > Prince Consort Road cacib@liberty.org.uk > London SW7 2BE http://www.liberty.org.uk/cacib/ From I.Brown at cs.ucl.ac.uk Thu Feb 25 18:21:57 1999 From: I.Brown at cs.ucl.ac.uk (Ian BROWN) Date: Thu, 25 Feb 1999 18:21:57 +0000 Subject: Mark Thomas + ECHELON? In-Reply-To: Your message of "Thu, 25 Feb 1999 12:58:33 GMT." <199902251258.MAA13960@coyote.uk.sun.com> Message-ID: <29903.919966917@cs.ucl.ac.uk> > Actually - would anyone from the list *actually* be interested in a grand tour > of UK SIGINT stations, on a "hire a van and share petrol, sleep in tents" basis? > Sometime this summer? Just a thought... Perhaps after the next time we have a crypto do in London, we could pop and see MI5 and MI6. I often see MI6 as it's such a cool building and it's just over the Thames from the Tate. Ian :) PS It has great faux trees right up its side -- wonder if they are a new variation on the golf ball ;) From pgut001 at cs.auckland.ac.nz Fri Feb 26 13:36:06 1999 From: pgut001 at cs.auckland.ac.nz (Peter Gutmann) Date: Fri, 26 Feb 1999 13:36:06 (NZDT) Subject: Mark Thomas + ECHELON? Message-ID: <91998936627709@cs26.cs.auckland.ac.nz> Alec Muffett writes: >DVD Region Format encoding! >Encryption in the name of filthy lucre! >Artificial barriers to trade, and indirect censorship! >When may we expect to see a programme about that? Anyone? 8-) NZ has an interesting situation with region coding. Many manufacturers are quite openly shipping non-region coded players to their NZ vendors (they're even advertised in papers and whatnot as being able to play all regions). Others will take your player out the back when you buy it and bring it back with the region-coding disabled. The justification I've heard for this is a recent law change which legalised parallel importing. Until not too long ago, one company could obtain a monopoly to sell a certain type of imported product, adding massive markups to the price and taking anyone else who imported the same brand from overseas (at a fraction of the cost) to court. The reason for this, it was often claimed, was that the appointed dealer was using the inflated price to cover tech support costs. Microsoft NZ was often used as a counterexample to these claims :-). Because this simply created a government-mandated, charge-what-you-like monopoly for whoever got there first, it was abolished not too long ago so that now anyone can act as an importer and dealer. The pros are that in many cases prices dropped, the cons are that there were claims that anyone could import a product from whatever dodgy source they could locate, but this doesn't seem to have happened (the customer is still covered by the same fairly strong consumer protection laws which cover everything else). Anyway, because parallel importing is legal, it's possible for anyone to import players region-coded for anywhere. It would be pointless trying to sell Asia-Pacific region-coded players here because everyone would buy US or European-coded ones, the manufacturers saw the writing on the wall (either sell non-coded players or none at all) and are shipping non-coded players. Peter. From cb at fipr.org Fri Feb 26 13:30:21 1999 From: cb at fipr.org (Caspar Bowden) Date: Fri, 26 Feb 1999 13:30:21 -0000 Subject: On the Record - 12pm Sun 28th Feb In-Reply-To: <199902201130.MAA27292@apain2.apa.at> Message-ID: <001201be618c$29266390$0100a8c0@director> Sounds like it might be worth watching.... -- Caspar Bowden http://www.fipr.org Director, Foundation for Information Policy Research Tel: +44(0)171 354 2333 Fax: +44(0)171 827 6534 From Streaky_Bacon at email.msn.com Fri Feb 26 13:37:00 1999 From: Streaky_Bacon at email.msn.com (Michael Bacon) Date: Fri, 26 Feb 1999 13:37:00 -0000 Subject: Mark Thomas + ECHELON? Message-ID: <05a2b3545131a29CPIMSSMTPU07@email.msn.com> -----Original Message----- From: Ian BROWN To: ukcrypto@maillist.ox.ac.uk Date: 25 February 1999 18:30 Subject: Re: Mark Thomas + ECHELON? [snip - MB] >Perhaps after the next time we have a crypto do in London, we could pop >and see MI5 and MI6. I often see MI6 as it's such a cool building and it's >just over the Thames from the Tate. Why not take in BT's Kingfisher House as well? [snip - MB] >PS It has great faux trees right up its side -- wonder if they are a new >variation on the golf ball ;) > Nah, I watched them build "Christmas Tree House" when I was with Hoskyns (Cap Gemini) just across Vauxhall Cross, and all the aerials went up on the roof. The copper mesh that went inside however ... Michael PS - perhaps they're 'Vaux' trees - M From Streaky_Bacon at email.msn.com Fri Feb 26 13:37:00 1999 From: Streaky_Bacon at email.msn.com (Michael Bacon) Date: Fri, 26 Feb 1999 13:37:00 -0000 Subject: Mark Thomas + ECHELON? Message-ID: <05a2b3545131a29CPIMSSMTPU07@email.msn.com> -----Original Message----- From: Ian BROWN To: ukcrypto@maillist.ox.ac.uk Date: 25 February 1999 18:30 Subject: Re: Mark Thomas + ECHELON? [snip - MB] >Perhaps after the next time we have a crypto do in London, we could pop >and see MI5 and MI6. I often see MI6 as it's such a cool building and it's >just over the Thames from the Tate. Why not take in BT's Kingfisher House as well? [snip - MB] >PS It has great faux trees right up its side -- wonder if they are a new >variation on the golf ball ;) > Nah, I watched them build "Christmas Tree House" when I was with Hoskyns (Cap Gemini) just across Vauxhall Cross, and all the aerials went up on the roof. The copper mesh that went inside however ... Michael PS - perhaps they're 'Vaux' trees - M From Brian Morrison" On Fri, 26 Feb 1999 13:30:21 -0000, Caspar Bowden wrote: >Sounds like it might be worth watching.... > May one ask, why should that be? -- Brian Morrison bdm@fenrir.demon.co.uk 'The village populace is jumpin' on faces, catchin' the javelin, Headin' the shot.' [FX: wet thud - "Oooo.."] From nbohm at ernest.net Fri Feb 26 15:02:22 1999 From: nbohm at ernest.net (Nicholas Bohm) Date: Fri, 26 Feb 1999 15:02:22 +0000 Subject: On the Record - 12pm Sun 28th Feb In-Reply-To: <001201be618c$29266390$0100a8c0@director> References: <199902201130.MAA27292@apain2.apa.at> Message-ID: <3.0.5.32.19990226150222.0094c100@mail.netkonect.co.uk> At 01:30 PM 2/26/1999 -0000, Caspar Bowden wrote: >Sounds like it might be worth watching.... I was interviewed for it at very short notice. I think it may be time for another round of "Consultation Paper coming out very soon." Regards, Nicholas Bohm Salkyns, Great Canfield, Takeley, Bishop's Stortford CM22 6SX, UK Phone 01279 871272 (+44 1279 871272) Fax 01279 870215 (+44 1279 870215) Mobile 0860 636749 (+44 860 636749) PGP RSA 1024 bit public key ID: 0x08340015. Fingerprint: 9E 15 FB 2A 54 96 24 37 98 A2 E0 D1 34 13 48 07 PGP DSS/DH 1024/3072 public key ID: 0x899DD7FF. Fingerprint: 5248 1320 B42E 84FC 1E8B A9E6 0912 AE66 899D D7FF From denning at cs.georgetown.edu Fri Feb 26 15:34:25 1999 From: denning at cs.georgetown.edu (Dorothy Denning) Date: Fri, 26 Feb 1999 10:34:25 -0500 Subject: International Cryptography Institute Message-ID: <199902261534.KAA16662@heron.cs.georgetown.edu> International Cryptography Institute 1999 Legal and Technological Developments Thursday-Friday, April 29-30, 1999 Washington, DC Presented by The National Intellectual Property Law Institute (NIPLI) and the National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC) 1815 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Suite 300 Washington, D.C. 20006 Phone: 202-842-4800 Fax: 202-296-4098 Conference Chair: Kenneth M. Geide National Infrastructure Protection Center Chairman, Chandler Center for Computer Law The International Cryptography Institute will address the current legal and technological developments in cryptography associated with meeting the information protection needs of users and law enforcement and national security needs of nations. Topics covered will include computer crime and law updates, today's cryptography market, legal and regulatory landscapes, government perspectives, business and government solutions, international business perspectives, encryption as a tool for crime, global trust enterprise, encryption trends, and future developments and predictions. Keynote Speaker: Jeffrey A. Hunker Director, Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office Program Thursday, April 29 8:00 a.m. Registration 9:00 a.m. Welcome and Opening Remarks Professor James P. Chandler, President, National Intellectual Property Law Institute Kenneth M. Geide, Conference Chair, and Section Chief, National Infrastructure Protection Center 9:15 a.m. Computer Crime and Law Update Michael Woods, Chief, National Security Law Unit, FBI 10:00 a.m. Today's Cryptography Market Gary Lynch, Ernst & Young LLP 10:45 a.m. Break 11:00 a.m. Legal and Regulatory Landscape Stewart Baker, Steptoe & Johnson LLP 11:45 a.m. Lunch with Keynote Speaker Mr. Jeffrey A. Hunker, CIAO 1:15 p.m. Government Perspectives Peter Ford, AG Dept., Australia (Chair) Philippe Dejean, SCSSI Detlef Eckert, DG XIII Nigel Hickson, DTI Jim Lewis, BXA 3:00 p.m. Break 3:15 p.m. Business and Government Solutions Patty Edfors, GTE 4:00 p.m. International Business Perspectives Ted Barassi, CertCo Nick Mansfield, Shell Services International B.V. 5:15 p.m. Summary Ed Appel, CertCo 5:30 p.m. Reception Friday, April 30 9:00 a.m. Encryption as a Tool for Crime Dorothy Denning, Georgetown U. 9:30 a.m. Global Trust Enterprise Libby Ghekiere, BankAmerica (Invited) 10:00 a.m. Encryption Trends Edward Giorgio, Booz, Allen & Hamilton 10:30 a.m. Break 10:45 a.m. Future Developments in Cryptography Doug McGowan, Hewlett-Packard (Chair) Jim Foti, NIST Robert Frith, Key Recovery Alliance 12:00 p.m. Future Predictions Bruce McConnell, OMB 12:45 p.m. Wrap-up Kenneth M. Geide, NIPC 1:00 p.m. Adjourn Faculty Faculty Chair Kenneth M. Geide Mr. Edward J. Appel Vice President CertCo Mr. Stewart Baker Partner Steptoe & Johnson LLP Mr. Ted Barassi Vice President CertCo Professor James P. Chandler President, National Intellectual Property Law Institute Mr. Philippe Dejean Chef De La Division Chiffre SCSSI France Ms. Dorothy E. Denning Professor, Computer Science Dept. Georgetown University Mr. Detlef Eckert DG XIII European Commission Ms. Patricia N. Edfors Director, Government Operations GTE Mr. Peter Ford First Assistant Secretary Information and Security Law Division Attorney-General's Department Australia Mr. Jim Foti Security Technology Group NIST Mr. Robert Frith President, Key Recovery Alliance Motorola Mr. Kenneth M. Geide Conference Chair, and Chief Computer Investigations and Operations Section National Infrastructure Protection Center Federal Bureau of Investigation Ms. Libby Ghekiere Senior Vice President BankAmerica Mr. Edward Giorgio Principal Booz, Allen & Hamilton Inc. Mr. Nigel Hickson Head, Information Security Policy Group Department of Trade and Industry U.K. Mr. Jeffrey A. Hunker Director Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office Mr. James A. Lewis Director, Office of Strategic Trade Bureau of Export Administration U.S. Department of Commerce Mr. Gary Lynch Partner Ernst & Young LLP Mr. Nick Mansfield Principal Consultant, Information Security Services Shell Services International B.V. The Netherlands Mr. Bruce McConnell Chief, Information Policy and Technology Branch Office of Management and Budget Mr. Douglas J. McGowan Director, VerSecure Hewlett-Packard Company Mr. Michael Woods Chief, National Security Law Unit Federal Bureau of Investigation Conference Registration Form Name: Organization: